







CORRESPONDENCE,  
DESPATCHES, AND OTHER PAPERS,  
OF  
VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH,

SECOND MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY.

EDITED BY  
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SECOND SERIES.

MILITARY AND MISCELLANEOUS.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. VI.

LONDON:  
WILLIAM SHOBERL, PUBLISHER,  
20, GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET.

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1851.



C O N T E N T S  
OF  
T H E   S I X T H   V O L U M E.

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EXPEDITION TO THE NORTH OF GERMANY, AND  
NEGOCIATIONS WITH PRUSSIA.

1805—1806.

	PAGE
1805.	
Preliminary Observations . . . . .	1
Sept. Memorandum for the consideration of the Cabinet, by Lord Castlereagh, proposing an Expedition to the North of Germany . . . . .	6
Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of York, relative to the military force required for the proposed Expedition . . . . .	8
Oct. 10. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of York, respecting the embarkation of the German Legion, and the appointment of a General . . . . .	10
13. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of York, proposing to send General Don to Berlin, to ascertain the spirit of that Court . . . . .	11
13. Lord Castlereagh to the Baron Nicolai, requesting him to write to apprise General Tolstoi, at Stralsund, of the intended expedition . . . . .	13
16. Instructions to Lieutenant-General Don . . . . .	ib.
16. Memorandum relative to the Provision and Equipment of Transports . . . . .	17
16. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith, respecting the embarkation of the troops . . . . .	18
16. Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham, requesting his presence in town . . . . .	19
17. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of York, relative to embarkation of troops . . . . .	ib.
18. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith—Embarkation of troops . . . . .	21
19. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith, relative to sailing and convoy of the divisions . . . . .	ib.

	PAGE
1805.	
Oct. 19. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don—Suggestions for the landing of the troops when in the Elbe . . . . .	22
19. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don—Further instructions . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
19. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don—Directions for his proceedings . . . . .	25
21. Memorandum relative to the projected Expedition for the consideration of the Cabinet. By Lord Castlereagh . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
21. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Barham, on the transport of troops from Ireland . . . . .	29
24. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don, directing him not to proceed to sea till further orders . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
24. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith, directing arrangements for receiving troops on board King's ships . . . . .	30
25. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don—Directs him not to proceed to Berlin, Lord Harrowby being sent on a special mission . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
26. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don, on the re- cruiting of the German Legion . . . . .	31
28. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don—Directions for his conduct . . . . .	32
29. Mr. Cooke to Lord Keith, relative to Johnson and Par- sons . . . . .	33
29. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of York, signifying the King's commands that he should order the whole of the troops embarked to proceed to the Elbe . . . . .	34
30. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don, approving of arrangements proposed by him . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
30. Mr. Cooke to Lieutenant-General Don, respecting em- barkation of artillery and ammunition . . . . .	35
Nov. 3. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of York, signifying the King's commands for the formation of the whole disposable force into one connected army . . . . .	36
Chronological Memorandum . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
10. Lord Keith to Lord Castlereagh, with report of Rob and Muchett . . . . .	38
12. Lord Keith to Lord Castlereagh—Seizure of Rob and Muchett's lugger . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
12. Lord Castlereagh to Baron Jacobi—Offer of Prussian ves- sels to engage in the service of Government . . . . .	39
14. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith, on the affair of Rob and Muchett . . . . .	40
14. Lord Castlereagh to Count Münster, signifying the King's determination, on the conclusion of peace, to transfer the German Legion to Hanover . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>

## CONTENTS.

v

	PAGE
<b>1805.</b>	
Nov. 14. Lord Castlereagh to Count Münster—Transfer of German Legion . . . . .	41
19. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith, directing the disembarkation of troops at Bremerlehe . . . . .	42
19. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby—Delay caused by contrary winds—Appropriation of transports—Views respecting Holland—Disposition to attempt the reduction of Walcheren—Disposable force . . . . .	43
19. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don — Report from Baron Decken—Importance of acting against Holland—Arrangements for embarkation of cavalry . . . . .	47
22. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith—Troops now embarked to proceed to Bremerlehe . . . . .	48
26. Mr. Cooke to his Majesty's Consul at Embden, inquiring if the Court of Prussia has given permission for troops to disembark in the Ems . . . . .	49
27. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of York, communicating the King's directions to send an additional force to the Continent, and Lord Cathcart to command the whole . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
27. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby, acquainting him with the appointment of Lord Cathcart to the command of the whole British army on the Continent . . . . .	50
27. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart—General view of our relations with foreign powers . . . . .	51.
27. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don, acquainting him with the orders for reinforcing the army on the Continent, and the appointment of Lord Cathcart to the command . . . . .	56
27. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham—Artillery and stores for reinforcements going to the Continent . . . . .	58
28. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith—Outline of operations intended and in progress . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
28. Lord Castlereagh to Count Münster, introducing Mr. Engelbach as superintendent of bakeries for the army on the Continent . . . . .	60
28. Lord Castlereagh to the Consul at Embden, introducing Mr. Bullock as Deputy Commissary . . . . .	61
29. Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Admiralty, on providing convoys for troops embarking . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
29. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith, requesting him to assist inquiries about the safety of entering the Ems with a fleet of transports . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Dec. 4. Mr. Cooke to Lord Keith—Embarkation of troops, ordnance stores, &c. . . . .	62
5. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart—Instructions in case of	

1805.

	PAGE
the British troops being employed conjointly with those of other powers—Importance attached to the early recovery of Holland . . . . .	63
Dec. 5. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby, transmitting a copy of his further instructions to Lord Cathcart . . . . .	68
6. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith, respecting orders for sailing—Facility of entering the river Ems . . . . .	ib.
6. Right Hon. W. Pitt to Lord Castlereagh—Expedition to the Continent . . . . .	69
7. Mr. Cooke to Lieutenant-General Don, communicating Lord Castlereagh's wish for the continuance of his correspondence . . . . .	70
7. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby, assigning reasons for changing the destination of the troops to the Weser . . . . .	ib.
Memorandum sent to Lord Cathcart and Lord Harrowby—Favourable assurances of the Court of Berlin—Supplies provided for the army . . . . .	72
7. Mr. Cooke to Mr. Bullock, expressing approbation of his proceedings, and announcing the coming of Lord Cathcart . . . . .	74
7. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don, informing him of the departure of Lord Cathcart to take the chief command . . . . .	ib.
7. Mr. Cooke to Brigadier-General Decken, to same purport as the preceding . . . . .	75
7. Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Admiralty, directing that troops and stores then assembling should proceed to the Weser, and light vessels be stationed there for facilitating communication with England . . . . .	ib.
7. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith, notifying the change of destination of the troops to the Weser . . . . .	76
12. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith — Arrangements for embarkation . . . . .	77
13. Lord Castlereagh to Right Hon. W. Pitt, on the appointment of the Duke of Cambridge to the chief command on the Continent . . . . .	78
19. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of York, relative to sailing of troops to the Weser . . . . .	80
21. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby—Sailing of the armament, and disastrous storm—The intended attempt against Walcheren abandoned — Successive embarkations of troops—Statement of force and tonnage employed . . . . .	81
23. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart—Intended military movements of Prussia—Importance of affording effectual protection to Hanover—Expected support from Prussian forces . . . . .	87

## CONTENTS.

vii

	PAGE
<b>1805.</b>	
Lord Castlereagh to Right Hon. W. Pitt, on the policy of Prussia . . . . .	90
Dec. 23. Lord Castlereagh to Right Hon. W. Pitt—Escape of a French squadron from Brest—Affairs of the Continent . . . . .	91
28. Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh—Arrival at Bremer-lehe—Stormy voyage—Transports lost—armistice between Emperor of Germany and Bonaparte . . . . .	93
29. Lord Castlereagh to Senior Naval Officer in the Downs, enjoining him to take measures for executing directions given in an enclosed letter to Lord Keith, of the same date . . . . .	94
29. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart—Confirmation of intelligence of the disasters of the Allies—He has in consequence ordered additional transports and light armed ships to the Weser and the Elbe . . . . .	95
<b>1806.</b>	
Jan. 1. Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh—State of the troops . . . . .	97
Memorandum of the late equipments . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
3. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of York—Observations on the Austrian armistice . . . . .	100
5 Lord Castlereagh to Right Hon. W. Pitt—Propriety of withdrawing the troops from the Continent—Precaution, in case of the evacuation of Hanover, suggested . . . . .	103
10 Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart, signifying the King's approbation of his proceedings—Instructions for his future conduct . . . . .	105
10. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby, enclosing a copy of his instructions to Lord Cathcart — Solicitude for the safety of the army on the Continent — Speculations on the policy of Prussia . . . . .	112
10. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart—Uncertainty respecting the line of policy likely to be pursued by Prussia — Assemblage of hostile forces in Holland, and consequent anxiety respecting the safety of his army . . . . .	115
10. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart, enclosing copy of his private letter to Lord Harrowby, and urging the necessity of a speedy decision respecting the detention or return of the army . . . . .	116
11. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby, expressing distrust of Prussia . . . . .	117
11. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart—Evidence being obtained of the intentions of Prussia to make the best terms with France, he directs preparations to be made for embarking the troops . . . . .	118

1806.

	PAGE
Jan. 11. The Duke of Montrose to Lord Castlereagh, urging the immediate return of the last detachment sent to the Continent . . . . .	ib.
12. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart, explaining that his instructions of the 11th were confined to the embarkation of the troops last sent and the new German levies . . . . .	120
12. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby, communicating the King's sentiments with respect to Hanover, in case of its evacuation . . . . .	120
14. The Duke of York to Lord Castlereagh, on the policy of leaving the British troops on the Continent, in the then critical state of affairs . . . . .	121
14. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby, relative to correspondence with the King respecting Hanover . . . . .	124
15. List of Transports employed in the Continental expedition wrecked . . . . .	125
19. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart, conveying orders for the return of the troops . . . . .	ib.
20. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart, repeating the orders for the immediate re-embarkation of the troops for England . . . . .	126
Feb. 4. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart, notifying the arrival of Lord Harrowby, and satisfaction with the arrangements made for the return of the army . . . . .	127

## EXPEDITION AGAINST THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

1805.

1805. Preliminary Observations . . . . .	128
July 20. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote, respecting the destination of troops embarked at Cork . . . . .	ib.
22. Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. W. Pitt, on a representation from Sir D. Baird of the inadequacy of the force destined for the reduction of the Cape, proposes that regiments going to West Indies should assist in it . . . . .	129
25. Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham, enclosing an application for ammunition from Sir D. Baird . . . . .	130
25. Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Admiralty, signifying the King's command for undertaking an expedition against the Cape, and giving orders respecting the naval part of the armament . . . . .	131
25. Instructions to Major-General Sir D. Baird, enclosing regulations for bounty paid to recruits raised for the East India Company . . . . .	133
25. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Barham, suggesting the expediency of sending out two light cutters with the expedition, and also two officers who had served with the Hottentots . . . . .	137

## CONTENTS.

ix

1805.

	PAGE
July 26. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Barham, transmitting a Memorandum from Sir D. Baird, respecting the two officers mentioned in the preceding letter . . . . .	138
26. Lord Castlereagh to Sir D. Baird—Additional Instructions	139
26. Lord Castlereagh to Sir D. Baird, respecting his salary as Governor of the Cape . . . . .	140
26. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of York—Arrangements proposed in case of the failure of the Expedition against the Cape . . . . .	140
31. Mr. Cooke to Sir D. Baird, signifying the King's command not to proceed to sea till further orders . . . . .	ib.
Aug. 4. Lord Hawkesbury to Sir D. Baird, with directions to put to sea without delay . . . . .	141
6. Lord Hawkesbury to Sir D. Baird—In consequence of the escape of a French squadron from Rochefort, he is not to put to sea till further orders . . . . .	ib.
20. Lord Castlereagh to Sir D. Baird, with orders to proceed to sea forthwith . . . . .	ib.
20. Lord Castlereagh to Sir D. Baird, respecting the French squadron from Rochefort . . . . .	142
Sept. 10. Lord Castlereagh to Marquess Cornwallis, or Officer commanding his Majesty's forces in India, acquainting him with the Expedition against the Cape, and with the orders given to Sir David Baird to send succours to India, if required, and even to evacuate the settlement, and to transfer the garrison thither, in case of emergency . . . . .	ib.
10. Lord Castlereagh to Sir D. Baird, instructing him, on the requisition of the Government of India, to furnish all possible reinforcements . . . . .	146
Oct. 18. Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Admiralty, desiring them to instruct Sir Home Popham to co-operate with Sir D. Baird in sending home all transports not wanted at the Cape . . . . .	148

## EXPEDITION AGAINST CONSTANTINOPLE.

1807.

1807. Preliminary Observations . . . . .	149
Jan. 13. Lord Collingwood to Vice-Admiral Sir J. T. Duckworth—instructions for collecting a squadron, and proceeding with it to Constantinople, where, in concert with Mr. Arbuthnot, the British Ambassador, he is ordered, in case of the refusal of the Porte to comply with certain demands, to bombard the city, and to apply to the Commander-in-Chief in Sicily for a force to take possession of Alexandria	151

1807.

	PAGE
Feb. The Hon. Captain Blackwood to Lord Castlereagh—Objects 2-18. and scanty force of the expedition—Its proceedings—It joins Sir Thomas Louis's squadron at Tenedos, where it finds Mr. Arbuthnot with the English factory—Destruc- tion of the writer's ship, the <i>Ajax</i> , by fire—He advertises to his private concerns . . . . .	155
Mar. 6. Hon. Captain Blackwood to Lord Castlereagh—Passage of the Dardanelles—Negociations with the Turks—Influ- ence over the Porte acquired by Sebastiani, the French Ambassador—Character of Sir John Duckworth, and of Mr. Arbuthnot . . . . .	161
Memorandum relative to the Expedition. By Sir J. Duck- worth . . . . .	167

## EXPEDITION AGAINST COPENHAGEN.

1807.

Preliminary Observations . . . . .	168
April 22. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Mulgrave, on the expediency of sending a light squadron to the Baltic, in aid of the ope- rations of the Allies . . . . .	169
Aug. 8. Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, concerning the Danish Military establishment . . . . .	ib.
Memorandum by Lord Castlereagh, relative to the Ordnance appointments of the Baltic Expedition . . . . .	171
Sept. 13. Lord Castlereagh to Sir A. Wellesley, requesting opinions and information . . . . .	175
13. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart, proposing various queries having reference to the objects of the expedition Lord Castlereagh to Lord Catheart, respecting the capitula- tion of Copenhagen, and the practicability of retaining Zealand . . . . .	176
22. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Catheart—Disposition of Russia in regard to the Copenhagen expedition—Considerations on retaining and defending Zealand . . . . .	179
27. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart, promising to send in- structions for future proceedings . . . . .	182
28. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Hawkesbury, forwarding de- spatches just received, and advertizing to the unfavourable effect which would be produced by keeping Zealand . . . . .	186
29. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Hawkesbury, communicating the result of his discussion of the Baltic question with Sir A. Wellesley, and recommending that he should be sent to treat with Denmark . . . . .	ib.
Oct. 1. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Hawkesbury, agreeing to the appointment of Mr. Merry to the mission to Denmark,	187

## CONTENTS.

xi

1807.

	PAGE
and adverting to the employment of Sir Arthur Wellesley in a projected attempt against Walcheren . . . . .	188
Oct. 1. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Hawkesbury, adverting to the Denmark negociation, and the progress of the equipment of the Danish fleet . . . . .	189
2. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart, referring to the ques- tion of withdrawing the army from Zealand . . . . .	190
2. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart, respecting alleged mis- conduct of the troops towards the people of Zealand . .	191
3. Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Canning, concerning Danish ques- tions . . . . .	192
9. Lord Castlereagh to the King, relative to the retaining Zealand . . . . .	193
9. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart—Evacuation of Zealand decided upon . . . . .	ib.
9. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart, soliciting admission for a brother into the family of the latter . . . . .	194
18. Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. Charles Long, respect- ing a supply of dollars for the army in the Baltic . . .	ib.
1808.	
April 22. Colonel (Sir Mark) Wood to Lord Castlereagh, enclosing a Memoir on the re-capture of Copenhagen . . . . .	195
Nov. 25. Major Macdonald to Lord Cathcart, concerning Prize-money for the Fleet and Stores taken at Copenhagen . . . . .	202

PROJECTED OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH OF GERMANY AND  
SWEDEN.

1807--1808.

1807. Preliminary Observations . . . . .	206
May 30. Report of a Mission to the North of Germany, by Captain Kuckuck, of the Hanoverian Legion, to Lord Castlereagh Enclosures:	209
Report of the state of the North of Germany, and plan of insurrection there. By M. von Lossberg . . . . .	214
Proposal of Messrs. Weddig and Witte, for supply of horses	220
June 6. Explanation of a proposed Expedition against the Texel— Naval and military means required—Plan of operations .	222
1808.	
April 29. Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, on a project for the conquest of the island of Zealand . . . . .	230
Memorandum on the Defence of Sweden . . . . .	231
Memorandum—Sweden . . . . .	236
Memorandum relative to Operations in Sweden . . . . .	237
Remarks on the Military Operations of Sweden against Norway and Denmark. By General Dumouriez . . . .	ib.

**EXPEDITION FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE ISLAND OF  
WALCHEREN.**

**1808—1810.**

	PAGE
<b>1808.</b>	
Preliminary Observations . . . . .	243
July 7. The Right Hon. Robert Dundas to Lord Castlereagh . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Enclosing:	
Mr. Bruce, of the State Paper Office, to Right Hon. R. Dundas . . . . .	244
Extract of a Letter accompanying a Report on Conjunct Expeditions, with particular reference to the island of Walcheren . . . . .	245
Memorandum for the consideration of the Cabinet, respecting an Expedition against Walcheren. By Lord Castlereagh . . . . .	247
Memorandum relative to an Attack on Walcheren. By Lord Castlereagh . . . . .	250
<b>1809.</b>	
April 1. Memorandum respecting the expense of transports . . . . .	254
May 18. Lord Chatham to Lord Castlereagh, on the offer of the command of the proposed Expedition . . . . .	256
31. Memorandum upon the supposed practicability of destroying the French ships in the Scheldt and in the arsenals of Antwerp. By Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon . . . . .	257
June 1. Memorandum relative to the projected Expedition against Walcheren. By Major-General the Hon. A. Hope . . . . .	261
2. Lieutenant-General Brownrigg to Sir David Dundas, Commander-in-Chief, on the circumstances likely to occur to an army landing on the Flemish coast, and proceeding by land to Antwerp . . . . .	266
3. Memorandum relative to the projected Expedition to the Scheldt. By Major-General Calvert . . . . .	269
3. Memorandum respecting the intended Expedition. By Sir David Dundas . . . . .	270
13. Sir Home Popham to Lord Castlereagh, relative to the Expedition, and urging the importance of saving time . . . . .	273
13. Lord Chatham to Lord Castlereagh, respecting the Expedition . . . . .	275
14. Lord Castlereagh to the King, recommending that an Expedition should be sent to the Scheldt, and the Earl of Chatham be appointed to conduct it . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
16. Answer of his Majesty, approving the proposal . . . . .	276
May 16. Admiralty Memorandums relative to the Scheldt Expedition:	
1. Naval Operations in the Scheldt—2. The co-operation	

1809.

PAGE

of the fleet with the army in the attack on Antwerp—	
3. Arrangement for conveying troops in men-of-war—	
4. The Expedition against Antwerp—5. Landing troops between Sandfleet and Lillo—6. The attack on Antwerp . . . . .	
June 21. Lord Castlereagh to the King, submitting a Report of the Board of Admiralty on the practicability of landing in force within the Scheldt, and recommending movements preparatory to embarkation . . . . .	281
22. Answer of his Majesty, approving the proposed operation in the Scheldt . . . . .	282
23. Lord Chatham to Lord Castlereagh, remarking upon his instructions and inadequacy of the force assigned . . . . .	282
July 15. Lord Castlereagh to the King, respecting embarkation of troops . . . . .	283
16. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, authorizing him to make pecuniary advances for secret services . . . . .	ib.
16. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham—Official notification of his appointment to the military command of the Expedition . . . . .	284
16. The King's instructions to the Earl of Chatham . . . . .	285
17. Lord Castlereagh to the King, respecting the embarkation of the troops, and submitting the instructions framed for the Commanders of the Expedition, in regard to the supply of the army . . . . .	286
18. His Majesty's answer, signifying approval of the instructions . . . . .	ib.
17. Mr. Huskisson to Commissary-General Robinson, giving instructions respecting requisitions . . . . .	287
18. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, enclosing copy of instruction of the Lords of the Admiralty to Sir Richard Strachan, appointed to command the naval part of the Expedition . . . . .	290
18. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham—General Instructions . . . . .	ib.
25. Lord Elgin to Right Hon. Spencer Perceval, with observations on the Expedition . . . . .	293
28. Captain Taylor to Lord Castlereagh, returning the King's thanks for information transmitted by him respecting the motions of the armament . . . . .	297
29. Lord Castlereagh to the King, announcing the sailing of the division of the fleet destined for the attack of Walcheren . . . . .	ib
Memorandum relative to Mr. Johnson, authorizing Lord Chatham to employ him . . . . .	298

1809.	PAGE
<b>July 29. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, transmitting plans, intelligence, and Admiralty communications, and advert-</b>	
<b>ing to the expected results of the Expedition . . . . .</b>	<b>299</b>
<b>Aug. 8. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, signifying the King's approbation of the promptitude and vigour of his operations, and desiring him to express to the officers and troops his Majesty's sense of their services . . . . .</b>	<b>301</b>
<b>11. Lord Chatham to Lord Castlereagh, informing him that he has sent persons into Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom for intelligence—Remarks relative to Flushing . . . . .</b>	<b>302</b>
<b>12. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, expressing his Majesty's continued approbation of his proceedings . . . . .</b>	<i>ib.</i>
<b>12. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, signifying the desire of the Duke of Brunswick to place himself and his corps under the orders of Lord Chatham . . . . .</b>	<b>303</b>
<b>Aug. 17. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, congratulating him on the fall of Flushing, and advertizing to the scarcity of coin . . . . .</b>	<b>304</b>
<b>17. Mr. Huskisson to Commissary-General Robinson, relative to supplies for the army, and to prices to be paid to the people of the country . . . . .</b>	<i>ib.</i>
<b>21. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, expressing his Majesty's satisfaction at the surrender of Flushing, and approbation of the services of himself and army . . . . .</b>	<b>307</b>
<b>21. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, conveying intelligence received respecting rupture of armistice by Austria . . . . .</b>	<b>308</b>
<b>26. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham—Directions for administrative arrangements in Walcheren . . . . .</b>	<b>309</b>
<b>29. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, respecting requisitions . . . . .</b>	<b>310</b>
<b>29. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, on the rate of pay for supplies furnished by the inhabitants, and the scarcity of silver coin . . . . .</b>	<b>312</b>
<b>29. Lord Chatham to Lord Castlereagh—Sickness of the troops in Walcheren . . . . .</b>	<b>314</b>
<b>29. Commissary-General Robinson to Lord Chatham, giving his opinion on the subject of requisitions . . . . .</b>	<i>ib.</i>
<b>29. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, requesting information to enable Ministers to decide on the expediency of retaining Walcheren . . . . .</b>	<b>319</b>
<b>Sept. 2. Lord Castlereagh to the King, recommending that the army in Walcheren should be ordered home . . . . .</b>	<i>ib.</i>
<b>2. Answer of the King, complying with the recommendation . . . . .</b>	<b>320</b>
<b>2. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, conveying the King's command to return to England . . . . .</b>	<i>ib.</i>
<b>2. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, applying for a Report of the state and defences of Walcheren . . . . .</b>	<b>321</b>

	PAGE
<b>1809.</b>	
3. Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham, acquainting him with the preparation of an Order in Council prohibiting foreign vessels from trading with Walcheren without the King's licence . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
3. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham, signifying the King's permission to return to England with the troops ordered home . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
8. Lord Chatham to Lord Castlereagh, signifying the abandonment of any further operations against Holland . . . . .	322
15. Mr. G. Harrison to Commissary-General Robinson, relative to the providing barrack accommodation for the troops left in Walcheren . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
18. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote, in answer to an application from the mayor and council of Flushing . . . . .	323
Sept. 19. Lord Castlereagh to the King, recommending an early decision upon the expediency of keeping Walcheren, and alluding to the peculiar situation in which he then stood in his Majesty's Councils . . . . .	324
Cabinet Memorandum relative to sickness at Walcheren . . . . .	325
23. Lord Castlereagh to Right Hon. Spencer Perceval, transmitting the letters which had passed between him and Mr. Canning . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
23. Lord Castlereagh to Right Hon. Spencer Perceval, declining to attend a Cabinet Council to be held on the subject of Walcheren, unless his attendance should appear desirable . . . . .	326
23. Right Hon. Spencer Perceval to Lord Castlereagh, requesting his attendance at the Council . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
24. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote, respecting sickness in Walcheren . . . . .	327
<b>1810.</b>	
Feb. 1. Mr. Henry Vernon to Lord Castlereagh, communicating information relative to Flushing and Antwerp derived from the French General Monnet, and offering his services to obtain further facts . . . . .	328
12. Memorandum from the Surgeon-General's Office, relative to the supply of bark, bedding, &c., for Walcheren . . . . .	329
March 2. Remarks on the practicability of taking Antwerp by a <i>coup de main</i> . By Colonel Sontag . . . . .	333
3 Exposition of the causes, symptoms, and treatment of the late fever among the troops in Zealand. By R. Renny, Assistant-Surgeon to the forces . . . . .	337
7. General Vyse to General Brownrigg, furnishing information respecting the defences of Antwerp . . . . .	347

## OPERATIONS IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.

1807—1809.

	PAGE
<b>1797. Preliminary Observations</b>	<b>350</b>
<b>Aug. 1. The Hon. C. Stuart to M. de Pinto, respecting the trans-</b>	
<b>port of artillery, and recommending the establishment</b>	
<b>of guides</b>	<b>356</b>
<b>1807.</b>	
On the transfer of the Portuguese Government to the	
Brazils	357
<b>Nov 11. Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Cooke, relative to the embarka-</b>	
<b>tion of a force for Madeira—Question respecting Portu-</b>	
<b>guese fleet—Importance of keeping a strong squadron</b>	
<b>off the mouth of the Tagus</b>	<b>358</b>
<b>Dec. 28. Right Hon. G. Canning to Lord Castlereagh, enclosing a</b>	
<b>Letter from Sir A. Paget, representing the importance</b>	
<b>of Ceuta</b>	<b>361</b>
<b>1808.</b>	
<b>Mar. 26. Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Beresford, expressing</b>	
<b>an intention to procure his relief from the military com-</b>	
<b>mand at Madeira</b>	<b>362</b>
<b>May 25. Declaration of the Juntas of the Asturias, with full powers</b>	
<b>to deputies to treat with Great Britain</b>	<b>363</b>
<b>June 4. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Manchester, transmitting</b>	
<b>intelligence of the general insurrection against the</b>	
<b>French in Spain, and instructing him to inform the Go-</b>	
<b>vernors of the Spanish Colonies in America of the state</b>	
<b>of affairs there</b>	<b>364</b>
<b>4. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Manchester—Directions</b>	
<b>respecting secret service money</b>	<b>368</b>
<b>4. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Manchester, introducing</b>	
<b>Mr. Pavier</b>	<i>ib.</i>
<b>4. Lord Castlereagh to C. Williamson, Esq., charging him to</b>	
<b>proceed to Jamaica, with confidential despatches to the</b>	
<b>Duke of Manchester</b>	<b>369</b>
<b>4. Lord Castlereagh to the Commander of the Forces in the</b>	
<b>Leeward Islands, enclosing accounts of events in Spain,</b>	
<b>and instructing him to have them translated into Spanish,</b>	
<b>and circulated in the Colonies</b>	<i>ib.</i>
<b>16. Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Canning, suggesting the release</b>	
<b>of Spanish prisoners of war</b>	<b>370</b>
<b>16. Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Admiralty, directing</b>	
<b>that all American ships coming from Dutch ports should</b>	
<b>be strictly searched for Spanish officers, bound with hos-</b>	
<b>tile views for America</b>	<b>371</b>

## CONTENTS.

xvii

1808.

	PAGE
<b>June 19.</b> Lord Castlereagh to Colonel Sir T. Dyer and others, with directions to proceed to the Asturias, and specifying the objects of their mission . . . . .	371
20. Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Admiralty, signifying the King's command for the release of certain Spanish prisoners of war at Plymouth . . . . .	373
20. Lord Castlereagh to the Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands, acquainting him with the late events in Spain, and desiring him to make them known in the Colonies, and also the King's determination to assist the efforts of the Spaniards for their liberation . . . . .	374
20. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Manchester, on the restoration of the Spanish Monarchy . . . . .	375
20. Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Manchester, enclosing a letter from one of the Asturian deputies to the Governor of Mexico . . . . .	ib.
28. Translation of a plan of defensive operations for the French army in Portugal. By Colonel Vincent, of the Engineers . . . . .	376
<b>July 2.</b> Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle, acquainting him that he has been appointed to superintend the embarkation and return of Spanish prisoners of war . . . . .	381
7. Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, announcing his arrival at Cork, and intended movements—Statement respecting transports . . . . .	383
11. Lord Castlereagh to Commodore Owen, requesting intelligence respecting the enemy's movements and means of defence on the line of coast from Boulogne to Walcheren . . . . .	384
15. Lord Castlereagh to Sir A. Wellesley, alluding to his future service in the Peninsula . . . . .	385
23. Right Hon. G. Canning to Lord Castlereagh, suggesting the expediency of having a force at St. Andero . . . . .	ib.
25. Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, describing the state of the Portuguese provinces—He intends to confer with Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, respecting the landing of the troops . . . . .	386
28. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir D.-Baird, urging his departure with the gross of his armament . . . . .	388
<b>Aug. 1.</b> Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, recommending that Great Britain should raise, organize, and pay an army of Portuguese troops, to operate on the frontiers of Portugal, and referring to the affair between Castanhos and Dupont . . . . .	389
4. Lord Castlereagh to Brigadier-General Decken and Brigadier Sontag, announcing the Mission of the former to the	

1808.

PAGE

Province of Asturias, and of the latter to Galicia, with Enclosure . . . . .	390
Memorandum of the direct objects respecting which information is required in regard to the Provinces of Asturias and Galicia . . . . .	392
<b>Aug. 8. Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh—Complains of his Commissariat, and mentions the departure of Joseph Buonaparte from Madrid . . . . .</b>	<b>396</b>
8. General Dumouriez to Lord Castlereagh, on the state of affairs in Spain ; his opinion how the war there ought to be conducted . . . . .	ib.
10. Memorandum for consideration on measures projected in the present state of affairs in Spain and Portugal. By Lord Castlereagh . . . . .	399
16. Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, referring to his separation from the Portuguese Army . . . . .	401
18. Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, mentioning attacks made by the French on his troops, and their capital defence—Loss of the enemy—Complains of the artillery horses . . . . .	402
20. Lord Castlereagh to Sir H. Dalrymple, desiring to be informed of his sentiments with respect to ulterior operations —Points to which he wishes to direct his attention . . . . .	403
20. Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh—Position of the enemy—His reason for not sending Captain Campbell with his letters . . . . .	408
21. Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, animadverting on Sir H. Burrard's determination not to attack the French till the arrival of Sir John Moore's corps . . . . .	ib.
22. Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh—Battle of Vimero . .	409
23. Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh—Suspension of hostilities, and proposed Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French . . . . .	410
26. Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Leith, relative to the defence of the Asturias . . . . .	413
27. Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Leith, respecting the insurrection in Biscay . . . . .	416
29. Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Castlereagh, remarking on a Letter of Colonel Doyle's . . . . .	ib.
30. Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, communicating the signature of the Convention, and his earnest desire to quit the army . . . . .	418
31. Mr. Cooke to Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle, reproving him for spreading false intelligence, and stepping out of his sphere . . . . .	419

## CONTENTS.

xix

1808.

	PAGE
Sept. 4. Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley, expressing the extraordinary gratification afforded by his two victories .	420
4. Lord Castlereagh to Brigadier-General C. Stewart, animadverting on the terms of the Convention .	421
4. The Duke of Portland to Lord Castlereagh, expressing his astonishment at the paper purporting to be the Convention Lord Castlereagh to Lord Burghersh, on his appointment to a mission for collecting information respecting the military situation of Portugal and Spain .	423
Lord Castlereagh to Sir Hew Dalrymple, acquainting him with the appointment of Lord Burghersh .	424
ib.	
4. Lord Castlereagh to Sir Hew Dalrymple, referring to M. de Souza's communications respecting the Convention .	425
5. Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, intimating that it is impossible for him to continue with the army if Sir Hew Dalrymple should remain at the head of it; and the ratification of the Convention by Junot .	ib.
5. Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, giving his opinion on various points of Lord Castlereagh's letter, of August 20, to Sir Hew Dalrymple, communicated by his (Lord C.'s) brother Charles .	426
9. Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, recommending the appointment of Lord R. Fitzgerald as Ambassador at Lisbon, and conveying his own ideas respecting the constitution of a Regency .	433
14. Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Leith, announcing the despatch of supplies for General Blake's army, and Mission of Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton to purchase horses and mules .	434
17. Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Leith, acquainting him with the despatch of pikes consigned to him, and destined for Biscay .	436
17. Lord Castlereagh to Sir Hew Dalrymple, remarking on Article 5 of the Convention, stipulating that no Portuguese property should be carried away by the French, and conveying the King's commands for its rigid enforcement .	ib.
17. Lord Castlereagh to Sir Hew Dalrymple, giving directions relative to the disembarkation of the French troops .	437
17. Right Hon. G. Canning to Lord Castlereagh, condemning certain Articles of the Convention .	438
17. Right Hon. G. Canning to Lord Castlereagh, transmitting "Thoughts on this most calamitous transaction"	441
18. Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, mentioning that the second division of the French troops are embarked, and	

1808.	PAGE
that he has obtained leave to go to England, and reasons for desiring to return . . . . .	441
<b>Sept. 19. Sir H. Dalrymple to Lord Castlereagh, suggesting the appointment of some confidential person for the supply of pecuniary aids for the Spanish armies, and to take care for their due application ; and remarking on the hostile proceedings of Spanish troops in Portugal, with enclosures :</b>	442
Brigadier-General Doyle to Major Cox, desiring him to call upon the Junta of Seville to forward money remaining of that received from England, for the benefit of the army of Andalusia, then in the neighbourhood of Madrid, September 1 . . . . .	443
Quartermaster-General Whittingham to Major Cox, communicating the decision of a meeting of generals for the advance of the army of Andalusia, and reflecting on the Junta of Seville for withholding the means to enable it to move, September 5 . . . . .	444
Major Cox to the Supreme Junta of Seville, remonstrating against its conduct towards the army of Andalusia, September 9 . . . . .	446
<b>21. Lord Castlereagh to Sir H. Dalrymple, conveying the desire of Government for his return to England . . . . .</b>	447
<b>25. Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Brodrick, informing him of the intention to assemble a large corps of British troops at Corunna ; directing him to proceed thither, and to arrange with the Spanish authorities for placing them in comfortable cantonments during the progress of the necessary equipments for service ; and giving further instructions . . . . .</b>	448
<b>25. Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Leith, acquainting him with the assembling of an army in the North of Spain, to be commanded by Sir John Moore ; and that the Marquis de Romana has troops at Santander ; and bespeaking General Leith's aid for their accommodation . . . . .</b>	449
<b>26. Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Leith, informing him that Romana's corps is to be subsisted at the expense of Great Britain, till an arrangement can be made with the general Government . . . . .</b>	451
<b>26. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir H. Burrard, on his departure to take the command in Portugal . . . . .</b>	452
<b>26. Lord Castlereagh to Sir A. Wellesley, advertizing to the painful impression produced by the Convention ; to the recall of Sir H. Dalrymple ; and to his anxiety that the country should not be deprived of his services . . . . .</b>	453

## CONTENTS.

xxi

1808.

	PAGE
Sept. 26. Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Castlereagh, sending a draft of a letter to the King on the late Convention . . . . .	455
30. Major-General Beresford to Mr. Cooke, advertizing to the recall of Sir H. Dalrymple, and deprecating the inactivity of the British army . . . . .	459
30. Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck, on his selec- tion for the mission to Madrid . . . . .	460
Oct. 1. Lord Castlereagh to the Marquis de la Romana, taking leave of him, and enclosing a letter to General Leith, whom he has desired to render himself useful to him in every possible manner . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
4. Mr. Canning to Lord Castlereagh, intimating that in for- warding into circulation a paper of Lord Castlereagh's on the Convention, he thinks it right to join with it a copy of his own letter to the King on that subject, enclosing: . . . . . Observations on the Convention of Cintra. By Lord Castlereagh . . . . .	461 462
2. Note accompanying Lord Castlereagh's Observations on the Convention, enclosing: . . . . .	469
Extracts of a Convention for the Evacuation of Cairo, be- tween General Belliard and Lord Hutchinson, June 27, 1801 . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
8. Lieutenant-General Sir J. Moore to Brigadier-General Charles Stewart, communicating his appointment to the chief command in Spain . . . . .	471
8. Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh—State of affairs and of the national sentiments in Spain . . . . .	472
13. Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir John Stuart, on military operations in the Peninsula and Medi- terranean . . . . .	475
19. Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, offering speculations on military operations in Spain . . . . .	476
29. Lord Castlereagh to Sir H. Burrard, enclosing copy of the warrant for assembling a Court of Inquiry into the late Convention, and desiring his immediate return to England, on that account . . . . .	481



LETTERS AND DESPATCHES

OF

L O R D C A S T L E R E A G H.

EXPEDITION TO THE NORTH OF GERMANY,

AND

NEGOCIATIONS WITH PRUSSIA.

1805—1806.

It has been shown, in the Biographical Memoir prefixed to the first volume of this Collection, that, after presiding for three years at the Board of Control, Lord Castlereagh was appointed, during Mr. Pitt's second administration, Secretary of State for the War and Colonial Department. In that official situation, the Expedition to which this section relates was planned and directed by him. Nearly all the Drafts that it contains are in his handwriting; and I will venture to affirm, at the risk of being pronounced a partial judge, that, had no other records of him but these remained, they would afford abundant evidence that there never existed a more able, zealous, indefatigable Minister, or one better qualified in every

respect for the high and responsible offices confided to him during his long career.

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So early as November, 1804, Austria had entered into negotiations with England, and indicated, by the equipment and movements of troops, a disposition for war. On the 14th of January, 1805, the King of Sweden concluded with Russia a secret treaty, which was never made public; and this was followed, on the 11th of April, by a treaty between Russia and Great Britain. Its object was the formation of a European military league, that should furnish 500,000 men, and compel France to evacuate the north of Germany, to release Holland and Switzerland from her control, and to restore Piedmont to the King of Sardinia. For every 100,000 men, England was to pay £1,150,000 to the allied powers. Lombardy was to revert to Austria, Belgium to Holland, and Genoa, Savoy, and Nice to be assigned to Sardinia. At the end of the war, a congress was to regulate the affairs of Europe. The accession of Austria was anticipated with certainty; Austrian troops assembled on the Inn; and the signature of the treaty, on the part of that power, on the 9th of August, completed what was called the Third Coalition.

Prussia, which, for ten years, had adhered to a system of neutrality, refused to listen to the overtures of these confederated powers. The new Emperor of France, nevertheless, not feeling sufficiently assured of her neutrality, at the moment when he was about to march against Austria, resolved to hold

out to her, as a bait, a prospect of the possession of Hanover. At this price, the Prussian cabinet was ready to form an alliance with France, and Duroc was sent to Berlin for the purpose of concluding it. Napoleon now retracted, and proposed merely a neutrality on condition of the transfer of Hanover as a deposit, without right of possession. Thus the relations between the two powers were left in a precarious state.

Meanwhile, the camp at Boulogne was broken up on the 28th of August; and the mighty army assembled there for the boasted invasion of England was marched off in five divisions for the Rhine, to meet the Austrians, who had crossed the Inn and entered the territories of the ally of France, the Elector of Bavaria. Two Russian armies were advancing to support the Austrians on the opening of the campaign, when the Emperor Alexander despatched General Buxhöwden to Berlin, to solicit a free passage for his troops through the Prussian territories; the King, offended at the demand, replied by a categorical negative, and Prussian troops broke up for the Vistula, to repel force by force.

While the other French corps were pursuing their march from the Rhine to the Danube, Bernadotte received orders to proceed with that which he commanded from the Mayn; and, having united with it the Bavarian force, 20,000 strong, to join the grand army at Nördlingen. In order that he might reach that point by the time required, Napoleon expressly directed him, by way of shortening the distance, to

march through the country of Anspach, belonging to Prussia, without regarding the neutrality of that power. The tidings of this insult, when they reached Berlin, roused great indignation; the King himself had thoughts of war; orders were issued for placing the army on the war footing; but yet a paltry compensation of 66,000 florins was not disdained; and a note of the 14th of October merely intimated that Prussia should no longer consider herself bound to refuse a passage through her territory to the enemies of France, but should open Silesia to the Russians.

In this disposition of the Prussian court and cabinet, the Emperor Alexander arrived in Berlin; and so successful were his eloquent persuasions, that, on the 3rd of November, a secret treaty was concluded between the two monarchs for the restoration of the balance of power between the European States. The Treaty of Luneville was to serve for its basis; Holland and Switzerland were to be independent; the Italian crown was to be separated from the French, and Sardinia indemnified. Prussia was to address a remonstrance on these points to Napoleon, and, if he disregarded it, to take part in the war against him.

I pass over the nocturnal dramatic scene, enacted immediately after this bold step, in which, over the tomb of the great Frederick, the two monarchs vowed everlasting friendship to each other. The disastrous battle of Austerlitz soon followed, to dispel the war-like reveries of the King of Prussia; and Count Haugwitz, who was sent as his plenipotentiary to

Napoleon at Vienna, agreed on the 15th of December to a Convention by which Prussia ceded Anspach, Cleve with Wesel, and Neufchatel, for Hanover; and a district of Bavaria, containing 20,000 souls, to round Baireuth: but the occupation of Hanover was to be only provisional, till a general peace, when further negotiations were to take place in Paris. Franconia was evacuated by the Prussian army; Hanover by the Russians, Hanoverians, and English, in January; while the Swedes remained encamped in Lauenburg.

To the policy of the Prussian cabinet; to its earnest desire to obtain that bait which Bonaparte proposed to its ambition—namely, the possession of Hanover; and to the hollow diplomacy resorted to in order to secure it, must be principally ascribed the return of the British armament, without attaining any of the objects which it might fairly have been expected to accomplish. To this grand cause of disappointment were certainly added uncontrollable accidents of wind and weather, which retarded the arrival of a large portion of that force on the Continent, till the season for active operations was past; and the speedy termination of hostilities with Austria permitted the French Emperor to detach an overwhelming mass of his victorious army to the north of Germany.

Before Prussia was permitted to gain her favourite point—possession of Hanover—she had to submit to the conclusion of a new treaty with France on the 15th of February. By this treaty, which was

not made public, and the provisions of which became known only by the actual consequences, she was obliged to accept Hanover without any clause of provisional possession; moreover, to engage to bar the mouths of the rivers of North Germany against the English; and the promised district of Bavaria was withheld from her. Her manifesto, relative to the closing of the rivers, was issued on the 25th of March; and on the 1st of April followed the final occupation of Hanover. A declaration of war ensued on the part of Great Britain: but our Government, distinguishing between involuntary and compulsory acts, generously abstained from any vigorous exercise of hostility.

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*Memorandum for the Consideration of the Cabinet.*

Downing Street, September, 1805.

By the latest intelligence, it appears that the French have withdrawn, with the exception of about 2,000 men, their troops from Hanover, which small force is probably employed to garrison the fortress of Hameln, and to occupy the seat of Government; the entire of the northern parts of the Electorate, connected with the Elbe and Weser, having been evacuated.

It may be presumed that 20,000 Russians are by this time assembled at Stralsund; and, from Mr. Pierrepont's last letters, it is probable that the Swedish subsidiary corps may have been extended from 4,000 to 12,000 men by a subsequent engagement.

The Danes are assembling a corps of 26,000 men in Holstein, and we have reason to believe that they have an understanding with Russia favourable to the common cause.

*Prussia shows no disposition to active measures of hostility ; and it is to be hoped that the approaching interview between the King and the Emperor will have ascertained, at least, her neutrality.* If so, and if she has not entered into engagements with France for the occupation of Hanover, of which there is as yet no appearance, there seems little probability of any serious obstacle being opposed to the immediate entrance of a light corps by the Elbe, directed, in the first instance, to the expulsion of the few remaining French, and the re-occupation of the Electorate ; secondly, to the re-assembly and extension of the Hanoverian army ; and, thirdly, to the formation of a concert between the force at Stralsund and the Danes, to be supported from hence, as circumstances may point out.

The corps to be landed in the first instance should be sufficiently strong not only to effect the object and provide for its own safety against any inconsiderable attack, but such as will also effectually encourage the loyal Hanoverians confidently to declare themselves. For this purpose it seems desirable that not less than 10,000 men should be sent, and that it should consist, in addition to the German Legion, of about 5,000 British infantry.

It is proposed that a confidential officer (Lieutenant-General Don) should be immediately sent to Berlin, to obtain, with the assistance of his Majesty's Minister at that Court, such information as may facilitate or bear upon the prudence of carrying this service into effect ; that, in the mean time, the troops should be embarked, and sail for the Elbe ; but with orders not to disembark till the arrival of Lieutenant-General Don, on his return from Berlin, on whose judgment and discretion (after the inquiries above directed) the landing is altogether to depend.

It is proposed to hold a further force of 5,000 British infantry in readiness to follow as a reinforcement, provided, on receiving Lieutenant-General Don's report, it shall appear

desirable, with a view to the above objects, to augment the army in Hanover before the winter sets in, reserving for future consideration how any larger British force can be hereafter best applied to give effect to a co-operation from the North.

In case of any attack from the French army, the corps in Hanover may retire upon their transports in the Elbe, so long as the navigation is open; or they may fall back on Holstein, or on Stralsund, through the Mecklenburg territory. Nothing but a gross act of perfidy on the part of Prussia (which is not to be presumed) can expose them to any sudden attack, and even then they will have full time to fall back upon their transports.

A corps of 10,000 men now sent into Hanover may, it is presumed, be doubled in number by the 1st of March, which, joined to 20,000 Russians, 10,000 Swedes (supposing 2,000 to remain in garrison at Stralsund), and 26,000 Danes, would produce an active army of from 70,000 to 80,000 men at the opening of the campaign; to which might certainly be added not less than 20,000 from hence; making, in the whole, an active force of not less than 100,000 men, for the deliverance of Holland in the first instance, and to be subsequently directed against the enemy, as circumstances may point out.

Should, however, the leading objects above stated from unforeseen events be disappointed, and the corps be obliged to retire, there is every reason to hope that the numbers of the German Legion may, even during a limited stay in the Hanoverian territory, be so rapidly and largely augmented as to render the expedition highly expedient, even with a view to this limited result.

---

*Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Duke of York.*

**Draft.**

Sir—It being of importance, in the event of hostilities on the Continent, that this country should be prepared, according

to circumstances, either to menace or attack the enemy on their maritime frontier, and, by compelling them to continue in force on the coast and in Holland, weaken their efforts proportionably in other quarters, I am desirous of calling your Royal Highness's early attention to this subject, with a view to considering what proportion of our army now at home may be made applicable to such a purpose, and whether preliminary arrangements are requisite to render the whole or a proportion of this force ready to act on this principle at the shortest notice.

As a general outline, it has occurred to me to suggest whether, taking the gross force now at home at 180,000 rank and file, of which about 70,000 is militia, a corps of from 30 to 35,000 infantry, and from 8 to 10,000 cavalry, might not be immediately selected and appropriated to this service.

When the particular regiments have been designated which your Royal Highness may consider most suited to this purpose, it may be desirable to make a distribution of the whole, so as to station them as near the ports of embarkation, and as much in connection with each other, as may be consistent with a due attention to the present system of defence against invasion. The most convenient cantonments, with a view to the object in question, I apprehend would be in the neighbourhood of Cork for such proportion of the force as must be taken from the army now in Ireland, and Portsmouth for a limited corps; and the positions in Kent for the main body of the British part of the force with a view to embarkation in the Downs; as the passing of troops from the eastern district can never be productive of any very serious delay, in the event of their services being called for. The superior advantage and convenience of having the entire of the disposable force in the southern district is not so pressing in point of time as to render it necessary for your Royal Highness to disturb too extensively your present distribution for the security of that particular part of the coast.

When I am honoured with an outline of the arrangements which your Royal Highness would propose, with a view to this object, I shall be prepared to concert such measures, with respect to keeping a due provision of transports in constant readiness at the several ports of embarkation above alluded to, as the particular circumstances of the moment may appear to his Majesty's Government to demand.

It will certainly make a part of any such arrangement to have a fleet of transports perfectly equipped and victualled for foreign service, capable of receiving about 10,000 men, constantly stationed between Cork and Portsmouth ; and I am, therefore, to suggest to your Royal Highness the expediency of stationing as much in the vicinity of those ports as the general distribution will permit, the particular regiments which your Royal Highness considers as most proper to be early detached on distant service, in order that any demand of this description which may arise may be supplied with secrecy and despatch.

I should hope an arrangement of the above description may be made at a moderate expense, without prejudice, in the first instance, to the efficiency of our internal defence ; that, whilst it is calculated to furnish us with additional means of distracting and, in favourable conjunctures, of attacking the enemy, its application will always remain a question of prudence, to be judged of according to the circumstances of the moment.

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*Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Duke of York.*

Downing Street, October 10, 1805.

Sir—In consequence of the communications I have had the honour of holding with your Royal Highness by the King's command, I am now to signify to you his royal pleasure, that you do issue the necessary orders for the Hanoverian Legion,

consisting of the forces in the margin mentioned,<sup>1</sup> to be marched into the neighbourhood of Dover, in order to be embarked for foreign service. And your Royal Highness will receive his Majesty's pleasure for appointing a Lieutenant-General, and a suitable staff for the said corps. And your Royal Highness will be pleased to have the necessary arrangements made, so that the corps may be provided with camp equipage, ordnance, and ammunition, &c., to enable it to take the field, if necessary, on its arrival on the Continent.

The commissioners for the transport service have received directions to prepare a sufficiency of tonnage for this service, and will receive your Royal Highness's directions respecting the places of embarkation.

I am, &c.,  
CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Duke of York.*

Walmer Castle, October 13, 1805.

Sir—As there is no immediate reason to apprehend that Russia and Prussia will be committed in hostile relations, and

	Rank and File.
1st Heavy Dragoons . . . . .	550
2nd ditto . . . . .	76
1st Light Dragoons . . . . .	567
2nd ditto . . . . .	91
1st Battalion of, and Line . . . . .	623
2nd ditto . . . . .	624
3rd ditto . . . . .	621
4th ditto . . . . .	628
5th ditto . . . . .	248
1st Light Infantry Battalion . . . . .	622
2nd ditto . . . . .	617
Artillery . . . . .	724
Depôt Cavalry . . . . .	89
<hr/>	
	6,080

there appears strong ground to suppose that a corps of 10,000 men sent in by the Elbe might safely take possession of Hanover, and thus open the way for future exertions on the Continent, it is my intention, with Mr. Pitt's concurrence, to propose this measure, on my return to town, for the consideration of his Majesty's Ministers.

As time is material, your Royal Highness will concur, no doubt, in the propriety of proceeding with the necessary arrangements in the mean time. The embarkation had better take place from Ramsgate; and I will take care to arrange with the agent for transports here, that the requisite tonnage shall be ready for the reception of the troops, calculating the British force to accompany or immediately follow the German Legion at 5,000 men.

I should propose to send forward a confidential officer (if your Royal Highness should see no objection to General Don) to Berlin, with a view of making all the necessary inquiries, upon which the prudence of the debarkation will depend; in the mean time, the troops to remain on board the transports in the Elbe.

It may, perhaps, be more convenient that the German Legion, being nearly ready, should embark and proceed without loss of time; the British force to follow, with the least possible delay. As some cavalry will be required, and the Hanoverian is the most applicable, I should propose to your Royal Highness to embark one regiment immediately at Southampton, leaving it for consideration whether the rest should not immediately follow.

Mr. Pitt and I propose leaving this place for town early to-morrow morning, where any communication with which your Royal Highness may honour me will be sure to find me.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Baron Nicolai.*

October 13, 1805.

Lord Castlereagh presents his compliments to Baron Nicolai. Lord Mulgrave proposes to write by a messenger, by this night's mail, to General Tolstoi, at Stralsund, and is desirous that Baron Nicolai should write at the same time in concurrence with his lordship, with a view of apprizing the General of the force proceeding from hence, and inviting the General to advance with the Russians and Swedes into Hanover, there to co-operate with his Majesty's forces. Lord Castlereagh suggests the expediency of Baron Nicolai seeing Lord Mulgrave without delay on this subject.

The forces ordered for this service are as follows: — 12,000 men to proceed forthwith to the Elbe; 2,000 cavalry, at least, to follow as soon as the requisite tonnage can be prepared; 5,000 men to be embarked at Cork to proceed to the Downs, there to receive further orders, and to reinforce the force on the Elbe, if necessary.

*Instructions to Lieutenant-General Don.*

Draft.

October 16, 1805.

Sir—I am to acquaint you that his Majesty has determined, in consequence of the French army (with the exception of 3,500 men) having been withdrawn from Hanover, to send a force consisting of the number stated in the margin,<sup>1</sup> for the purpose of expelling the enemy from the Electorate, and of

<sup>1</sup> German Legion . . . . .	4,808
Brigade of Guards . . . . .	2,000
4th, 14th, 23rd regiments . . . . .	2,800
Four Companies Rifle Corps . . . . .	400
German Regiment Light Dragoons . . . . .	575
Two Brigades of Artillery . . . . .	300
<hr/>	
Rank and File . . . . .	10,883
Ordered from Ireland to the Downs . . . . .	5,000

restoring to the inhabitants the protection of their lawful Government.

The troops are directed immediately to assemble and embark at Ramsgate in the transports now ready in the Downs, and they will proceed, with the least practicable delay, either in one or two divisions, as may be found most convenient, to the Elbe.

The King having been graciously pleased to select you for the command of the troops to be employed on this service, in order that you may obtain the most precise intelligence of all circumstances which may in any degree bear upon the safety or successful conduct of the expedition, his Majesty has been pleased to direct that you do proceed, without loss of time, to Berlin (a frigate being prepared in the Downs to convey you to the Elbe), there to communicate with his Majesty's Minister, Mr. Jackson, who will be directed to assist you in procuring every information which you may require.

You will particularly direct your inquiries to the following points :

1. The number and position of the enemy's troops.
2. How the Cabinet of Berlin will feel with respect to the proposed measure. His Majesty cannot suppose that Prussia, upon any principles of justice or neutrality, can either desire or pretend to oppose any obstacle to his Majesty re-occupying his own dominions. It is, however, desirable that you should inform yourself, through Mr. Jackson (but without any formal steps being taken which might seem to imply a doubt of any obstruction being given to the exercise of so obvious a right), of the precise principles upon which Prussia professes to regulate her neutrality, whether she acts separately or in conjunction with other powers, and with what powers; whether there is any reason to suppose that an understanding exists between France and Prussia with a view to the occupation of Hanover by the troops of the latter power, and whether there will be any disposition in the Prussian Government to take a

distinction, however little founded in any sound principle, between the introduction of troops strictly British, and those which may be considered as his Majesty's electoral subjects.

3. What the dispositions of the Court of Copenhagen are likely to be, and how far they might be expected, in the event of any attack made by the enemy during the winter upon the corps under your command, to give you direct support in Hanover, or to favour your retiring into Holstein, if it should become requisite.

4. What the views are of the Duke of Mecklenburgh, what facilities he would afford either to the troops from Stralsund, advancing through his territory to your support, or to your retiring upon that place; and, as connected with this point, how far Prussia would resent an infraction of the Mecklenburgh territory, in either of the above cases.

5. You will inform yourself of the number and state of the Russian and Swedish troops at Stralsund, and in like manner ascertain what support you may expect in the like case from that quarter; or what may be the relative facilities and advantages of retiring, in case of necessity, through the territory of Mecklenburgh upon Stralsund, rather than into Holstein, or upon your transports; it being his Majesty's intentions that the vessels on which the troops are to be conveyed shall remain in the Elbe, taking the station best calculated to preserve a free communication between the army and the sea; and transports will be progressively sent from hence in proportion to any augmentation of your corps, which you may report to have taken place.

His Majesty has given directions that the troops, on their arrival in the Elbe, should remain on board till your return to the Elbe from Berlin, and is pleased to authorize and direct you to disembark and advance them into Hanover so soon as you have reason to consider that the safety of the corps is not likely to be thereby compromised.

The objects to which your operations will be directed are:

1. The expulsion of the enemy, and the re-occupation of Hanover in his Majesty's name as Elector ; taking care, however, not to advance your corps into the interior, till you are fully satisfied of the safety of the measure in a military point of view. 2. The immediate assembly and augmentation, according to instructions which you will receive to that effect, of his Majesty's Hanoverian army, which may be commenced immediately on your landing. 3. The keeping your troops in such positions as may best enable you to provide for their immediate security, to preserve their discipline, to prepare the new levies for the field, and generally to hold the corps in such a state of constant readiness and complete equipment, as will enable you to prosecute such further operations as his Majesty may, in conjunction with his allies, undertake upon the Continent.

You will address to me any representation you may wish to have submitted to his Majesty's consideration, should reinforcements from hence appear to you essential to the accomplishment of the above objects. His Majesty has thought fit, as a measure of precaution, to direct the above inquiries to be instituted previous to the actual landing of his troops between the Elbe and Weser.

His Majesty, however, commands me to repeat, that he cannot, in justice to his Prussian Majesty, for a moment suppose, after the French have, without molestation, been permitted unjustly to seize on his dominions, that the King of Prussia will feel any other sentiment than that of satisfaction, at the Electorate again returning under the government of its lawful sovereign ; or that, whilst Prussia has suffered France to violate with impunity the territories of weaker and neutral States in the North of Germany, she will oppose any obstacle to his Majesty's troops, without the violation of any territory whatever, re-entering and re-occupying his rightful possessions ; in which sentiment his Majesty is confirmed by the language lately held by Baron Hardenberg on this subject.

You will report to me regularly, for his Majesty's information, such measures as you may adopt in the execution of the above instructions which I have received—the King's commands to convey to you for the direction of your conduct.

*Memorandum relative to the Provision and Equipment of Transports.*

October 16, 1805.

Cavalry transports to receive one regiment of the German Legion, to be fitted with the utmost despatch, and to rendezvous at Southampton, where they will embark.

It is proposed, in addition, to provide tonnage for the following strength, the whole to be completed by the 1st of January next :

	Men.	Tons.
Cavalry . . . . .	2,000	16,000
Artillery . . . . .	1,500	10,000
Infantry . . . . .	<u>20,000</u>	<u>30,000</u>
	<u>23,500</u>	<u>56,000</u>
Extra . . . . .	<u>4,000</u>	
		<u>60,000</u>

As the whole must be completed in less than three months, in executing this measure progressively, not less than 20,000 tons must be taken up in each month. They will be assembled as follows :

	Tons.
Cork . . . . .	20,000
Portsmouth . . . . .	20,000
The River . . . . .	<u>20,000</u>
	<u>60,000</u>

50,000 tons are to be engaged for home service, 10,000 for foreign ; the latter to be sent to Cork—the former to be victualled for two, the latter for six months.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, October 16, 1805.

My dear Lord—I return you many thanks for your lordship's zeal and activity in putting forward the several points connected with the public service, on which I addressed you privately, previous to the official order being forwarded from hence, and am much gratified to find them all in such good train.

It is desirable that the German Legion should be successively embarked with the least practicable delay, so as to make room for the embarkation of 5,000 additional infantry, consisting of the brigade of Guards now at Dover, and Major-General Paget's brigade, viz., the 4th, 14th, and 23rd regiments, together with five companies of the Rifle Corps.

After providing for the Hanoverians, without interfering with the ships under orders for Leith to bring troops to the southward, there will remain disposable in the Downs 6,809 tons, which, with 951 ordered round from Portsmouth, will amply accommodate the above force. There will also remain cavalry transports for ninety horses, which will receive the officers' horses of the British corps.

Your lordship will best judge where the transports, after taking on board the troops, can most safely be assembled, previous to their proceeding to their destination. I shall accelerate the march of the troops, and your lordship will have the goodness to make all the necessary arrangements with Captain Culverhouse for the embarkation being carried on without delay, or unnecessary interruption.

The orders to the Admiralty will be sent to-day, and I hope the attack on Boulogne may be carried into effect so soon as Mr. Congreve reports his arrangements complete. The squadron your lordship has assigned to Sir Sidney Smith seems fully

equal to the service, and I am persuaded you will leave nothing undone which can contribute to its success.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Downing Street, October 16, 1805.

My dear Lord—Colonel Hadden communicated to me this morning your kind offer to come up to town in the course of next week, if there was anything of importance. Things are grown so interesting, that I trust you will forgive me for availing myself of your proposal; and if you could appropriate Sunday to the journey, you would, without wasting a sporting day, catch your brother before his return to Walmer on Monday. I send you by the messenger the outline of our immediate measures, which has been approved by the king, and will be executed without delay. But this subject connects itself so much with the state of the Continent, and the general scheme of our future military views, that I feel extremely desirous of having a full conversation with you upon the whole of this interesting subject.

Believe me, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Duke of York.*

Downing Street, October 17, 1805.

Sir—Having by his Majesty's commands concerted with your Royal Highness the necessary measures for sending the Hanoverian Legion, with the addition of 5,000 British troops, to the Elbe, which, under certain circumstances, were to be followed by another corps of a similar number, I have now to signify to your Royal Highness his Majesty's pleasure that you do issue the necessary orders for the embarkation of the German Legion, according to the number in the margin men-

tioned,<sup>1</sup> at those places which, as stated in your Royal Highness's letter of the 11th instant, have been arranged with the Commissioners of the Transport Service.

In your Royal Highness's private letter to me of the 25th instant, you propose that the second embarkation should consist of the regiments named in the margin.<sup>2</sup> Transports are in preparation to receive them, and the Commissioners for the Transport Service are directed to arrange the places for embarkation under your Royal Highness's orders, so that the troops may be embarked with the utmost expedition.

It having been also arranged, in concert with your Royal Highness, that the third corps of 5,000 men should be taken from the establishment of Ireland, I am to signify his Majesty's pleasure that you do order the regiments which you shall destine for the service to be immediately embarked at Cork, where tonnage is already provided. It is his Majesty's pleasure that these corps should be embarked with a proper quantity of camp equipage, ammunition, &c., &c., to enable them to take the field.

I am likewise to desire your Royal Highness will receive his Majesty's pleasure for appointing a suitable staff to the whole; and measures will be arranged with the Board of Ordnance, in concert with your Royal Highness, for supplying the necessary artillery and ordnance.

<sup>1</sup> 1st Battalion, Line . . . . .	633	<sup>2</sup> Brigade of Guards . . . . .	2,161
2nd      "      "      .      .	624	4th Foot . . . . .	950
3rd      "      "      .      .	621	14th    "      .      .      .	1,000
4th      "      "      .      .	628	23rd    "      .      .      .	751
5th      "      "      .      .	248	4 Rifle Companies . . . . .	400
1st Light Infantry . . . . .	622		—
2nd      "      "      .      .	617		5,262
Artillery . . . . .	724		
Depôt Company . . . . .	89		
	4,806		

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, October 18, 1805.

My dear Lord—I have urged that the march of the British troops may be accelerated. Time will be saved by your embarking the Guards first, which are nearest; the 14th the next, which is less distant than General Paget's brigade; and I should recommend your lordship to communicate with General Finch, at Dover, and fix with him the earliest moment for their embarking.

We have not yet altogether decided whether the whole should proceed in one fleet, or the British follow in a second division. I should like to know your lordship's opinion as to the comparative convenience, with respect to convoy, arriving in the Elbe, &c. As it is desirable not to waste tonnage unnecessarily for so short a trip, when circumstances may require all we can collect for the reception of a further embarkation, I have to beg your lordship will keep this in view, and be as economical with our means as is consistent with the health and comfort of the troops.

I have conversed this morning with Lord Barham, and your lordship will hear from him on the subject. It is our wish to be informed (without as yet interfering with the active employment of your ships) what number of infantry you have the means of transporting to the coast of Holland, or to the Elbe, in the King's ships now under your flag, if circumstances should render it necessary to have recourse, upon an emergency, to this extraordinary resource.

I am, &amp;c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, October 19, 1805.

My dear Lord—The favourable intelligence from the Continent, as it improves the probability of our troops being enabled to disembark in safety in the Elbe, immediately on their

arrival, has determined his Majesty's Ministers to send the force now under orders in two divisions. Your lordship will, therefore, have the goodness to apprise me of the period when it may be desirable that the final orders for sailing should be sent for the first division, and also make arrangements for affording to the British 2nd division a suitable convoy, so soon as it is ready to proceed, all which I will officially direct through the Admiralty in due time.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don.*

Downing Street, October 19, 1805.

Sir—I trust it is rather an excess of precaution, but, as it may be attended to with little difficulty, I should suggest your ascertaining, when you arrive at Cuxhaven, before you land, whether you may proceed without interruption to Hamburgh and Berlin, by the Hanoverian bank of the river; if not, it may be necessary to land either on the Danish shore, or proceed to Husum. Should any such unexpected interruption be found to exist, you will take care to station the frigate off the Elbe, to give notice to the convoy from England with the troops, in order that they may adopt all necessary measures of precaution. And you will take the most expeditious means of transmitting information to me of the state of things in that quarter.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don.*

Downing Street, October 19, 1805.

Sir—Intelligence having been received from Berlin since my former instructions of the 15th instant, bearing upon the objects of your mission, I feel it material, understanding you have not been able to proceed to sea, to communicate the substance for the direction of your conduct. In consequence of the infraction committed by the French army on the Prussian territory, in the Margraviate of Anspach, his Prussian Majesty

has signified to the Emperor of Russia that the Russian troops may now pass through Silesia, and that no interruption will be given to his troops advancing also from Stralsund.

We learn that a Russian corps of nearly 20,000 men, under General Tolstoi, landed at Stralsund on the 5th instant; that the King of Sweden has engaged to apply 10,000 of his troops to co-operate with the Russian corps; and we further understand the Russian General had orders to advance into Hanover, if Prussia opposed no obstacle to his doing so. A strong invitation from the King has been forwarded from hence to General Tolstoi, in his electoral capacity, inviting that officer to move forward without delay, and to concert his operations with the force now under orders from hence.

In this state of things, it is possible that all doubt of the prudence of landing the troops may be removed by the time you reach the Elbe. The better to inform your judgment in this respect, I am to desire that you will, immediately on your arrival, communicate with the British Minister at Hamburg, Mr. Thornton, who will be prepared, on your explaining to him the general nature of your mission, to furnish you with every information and assistance. After you have conversed with Mr. Thornton, and previous to your proceeding to Berlin, you will entrust Mr. Thornton with instructions addressed to the officer in command of his Majesty's troops, to be delivered to him on his arrival in the Elbe, and you will vary these instructions, in case any intelligence which you may receive on your route, or on your arrival at Berlin, should render it expedient so to do.

As circumstances may render it of importance to pass over a considerable force to the Continent before the winter sets in, it certainly would be desirable, if attended with no material risk, that the troops should be disembarked immediately on their arrival, and the transports returned to England without delay. This more particularly applies to the transports fitted for the reception of cavalry, pressing representations having

been received from General Tolstoi with respect to the inadequacy of the Russian and Swedish cavalry under his command, in the event of active operations.

With a view of facilitating the disembarkation, if it should immediately be directed to take place, the German Legion will be ordered to precede the British troops, whose arrival, however, I trust, cannot be delayed for many days, and no time will be lost in forwarding cavalry from hence as speedily as transports can be fitted for their reception.

Full instructions shall be forwarded for the direction of your conduct with respect to the course of your proceedings within the Electorate, before your return from Berlin; and I rely upon your transmitting to me every information which can enable his Majesty's Government to judge of the supplies and horses which the country may be expected to produce, and what must be forwarded from hence.

I enclose to you the copy of a private letter received this morning, and you will take every means to inform yourself as to the truth of the statement it contains.

PS. The intelligence above alluded to is referred to in a despatch from Mr. Thornton, of the 11th instant, as having been in circulation at Hamburgh, but he states it to be devoid of any foundation.

Octobre 19, 1805.

Monsieur—J'apprends dans ce moment, par un ami arrivé hier et parti lundi dernier de Schleswig, le fait suivant que je crois devoir vous communiquer, au risque de vous apprendre ce que probablement vous savez déjà.

Le Comte de Lynar a reçu samedy dernier à Schleswig une lettre de son beaufrère, le Baron de Wense de Hanovre, qui lui marque que 9,000 François sont rentrés en Hanovre; que 5,000 sont dans la capitale, le surplus réuni à la garnison de Hameln, qui étoit déjà de 2,500 hommes, et qui se fortifient jusqu'aux dents.

Le rapport de cette nouvelle, avec la proclamation sur la levée du blocus de l' Elbe, et avec le débarquement de la légion Hanovrienne, est assez clair pour faire excuser la communication que j'ai l'honneur de vous faire. Le Prince de Hesse-Cassel qui commande en Holstein a reçu le même avis.

Je suis, avec respect, Monsieur,  
Votre très humble et obéissant serviteur,

C. TINSEAU.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Don.*

Downing Street, October 19, 1805.

Sir—Since I closed my despatch of this day's date, I have received from his Majesty's Hanoverian Minister, Count Münster, an instrument signed by his Majesty, directing his Hanoverian servants and subjects to afford their best aid and assistance to the British forces in their operations for the recovery of his Electoral dominions.

I also forward a memorandum of the course of policy which it is his Majesty's command you do pursue, in case you should direct his troops to be disembarked; also the form of a Proclamation, which, in conformity to the principles stated in the memorandum, you are authorized and directed at a proper moment to issue.

In any use you may find it expedient to make of the instrument under his Majesty's sign-manual, you will take care to act with all proper attention to the safety of individuals, till they are relieved from all danger or apprehension of the resentment of the enemy.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Memorandum relative to the Projected Expedition, for the consideration of the Cabinet.*

Downing Street, October 21, 1805.

Since the decision of the Cabinet to send a force to the Elbe was taken, the German Legion has been embarked, and will sail the moment the wind permits.

Two battalions of Guards, the 4th, 14th, and 23rd Regiments of Infantry, five companies of the Rifle Corps, and a due proportion of Artillery, amounting to near 6,000 men, are in progress of embarkation, and will be ready to sail on Saturday next.

The six following regiments, viz., the 8th, 9th, 28th, 30th, 36th, and 89th, consisting of 5,638 rank and file, are ordered to embark immediately at Cork, and proceed to the Downs, there to receive further orders, where they may be expected to arrive, if the weather is favourable, in about ten days.

Two thousand cavalry are held in readiness to proceed to the Continent, so soon as cavalry transports can be assembled for their reception, or those now proceeding to the Elbe are returned to England.

The only impediment at present to operations on a large scale is the want of tonnage fit for the reception of cavalry. Our arrangements have hitherto been framed with a view to demonstrations and to expeditions, where the attack was to be made in the nature of a *coup de main*, rather than that of a regular military operation, supported by the due proportion of cavalry and Horse Artillery: the most active efforts are, however, now making to supply this defect in the shortest possible time. For the transport of infantry, we have a full supply of tonnage for the reception of 20,000 men.

The Admiralty have been called on to state what number of men the lighter armed vessels in the Navy can, upon an emergency, transport to the Elbe or to the coasts of Holland. No regular notice has yet been received; but Lord Keith, in a private letter, states that he considers the armed ships now under his flag to be capable of receiving on board about 14,000 men. It may, therefore, be assumed that we have the means of conveying as large a force of infantry to the Continent, even during the present season, as the most favourable events can call for, and that our means of sending cavalry will be progressive so long as the weather is open.

With a view to facilitate the execution of any military measures which his Majesty's servants may hereafter recommend, Lord Castlereagh wishes to suggest the expediency of forming the present disposable force into one connected army for active operations, from which detachments may be made correspondent to any service to be undertaken; and that the Staff should be immediately appointed for the whole, under the chief command of the Duke of York.

As the officers to be named will be selected from among those now on the Staff at home, no additional expense will be thereby incurred: they will be enabled at once to take charge of the particular corps to which they are to be attached on foreign service, without being altogether withdrawn, so long as they remain at home, from local duty. And, when the array is once formed as a whole in the manner proposed, operations not requiring the application of the entire force may be undertaken without hazard of the object of attack being brought into suspicion by the selection of a particular staff for the immediate service.

If the Cabinet should think fit to recommend the above arrangements for his Majesty's approbation, including the German Legion and the British troops embarking, the arrangement may at once be formed with reference to a force of 40,000 infantry, rank and file, and 10,000 cavalry, with the due proportion of artillery, subject to be increased in whatever extent the German Legion may be augmented on its arrival at Hanover. With a view to this increase, means of equipment will be forwarded for 10,000 men.

Upon the whole, this force may be estimated, for active service early in the next year, at an army of 60,000 rank and file at the least. Whether the whole, or what proportion of the army so to be rendered disposable, shall be actually detached on foreign service, and at what time, must necessarily depend upon events. It may, however, be satisfactory to the Cabinet that the general distribution of our military force should be so far

stated as to bring before them what the amount of the army left for the home service will be, supposing circumstances should induce them to advise that the entire of the above force should be employed in offensive operations abroad.

The total force, in rank and file, at present, including militia and artillery, is 256,609.

The force on foreign stations, including the troops under the orders of Sir James Craig and Sir David Baird, amounts to, rank and file . . . . .	75,162
At home . . . . .	181,447
Total, as above . . . . .	256,609

If from the home force 50,000 rank and file, with the requisite artillery, be detached, there will remain about 130,000 rank and file, for internal defence, composed as follows:—

Regulars . . . . .	55,251
Militia . . . . .	74,749
	130,000

The general distribution would then stand thus; stated in round numbers, considering the force under Sir James Craig and Sir David Baird, viz. 12,000 men, as acting offensively:—

Foreign possessions . . . . .	63,000
Acting offensively . . . . .	63,000
Home defence . . . . .	130,000
	256,000

The active force, above stated at 63,000, then, it is presumed, may, before the spring, receive an addition of 10,000 Hanoverians; in which case, after appropriating above 60,000 men to Colonial service, the army for offensive operations will exceed 70,000, rank and file.

Lord Castlereagh has not thought it necessary to delay submitting the above to the consideration of his Majesty's servants, till the line which the Court of Berlin means to pursue shall be finally disclosed. The system of Prussia may influence materially the course of our future military opera-

tions; but, war on the Continent having now actually commenced, and thereby a prospect being opened to this country of employing its arms offensively, whether we act separately or conjointly, whether our efforts be directed to operations on a large or on a limited scale, whether to objects strictly Continental, or to those more pointedly British—the measure of rendering our active force disposable at the shortest notice, and of placing it in a condition to move as a whole, should its services be called for, seems in every view expedient.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Barham.*

Downing Street, October 21, 1805.

My dear Lord—There is a doubt that the transport tonnage assembled at Cork may not be able to bring over to the Downs the whole of the troops ordered to be embarked. In this case, and if it should not be possible to take up without delay tonnage at Cork, to make up the deficiency, I beg leave to suggest to your Lordship that possibly Lord Gardner might supply accommodation in the ships of war on the station.

Upon their arrival in the Downs, such of the troops as may have been there put on board his Majesty's ships can be re-embarked on board transports.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Don.*

Downing Street, October 24, 1805.

Sir—I am to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure that you do not proceed to sea until further orders; and you are to consider that this instruction is intended to extend to the German Legion; and you will make the proper communications accordingly, to prevent their sailing.

I am, &c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, October 24, 1805.

My dear Lord—I have to request your lordship, on receipt of this, will make an arrangement in the Downs to receive on board King's ships about 5,000 men, as far as you can, without interfering with the service at Boulogne. It is material, however, that they should be collected without delay. The place of debarkation will probably be the Scheldt, with a view to Flushing. Under present circumstances, I think it most probable the armament now in readiness to sail will not, in the first instance, proceed to the Elbe. I mention this in the strictest confidence, that your lordship may select the ships accordingly, which are to be employed in the service above-mentioned.

I hope your lordship will be enabled to make your arrangements so early to-morrow as to reach town to-morrow evening; and if you could make it convenient to take your bed at East Sheen, we might settle our minds on future arrangements, and return to town in the morning, prepared for business with Lord Barham.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

I have settled with Lord Barham that the lighter ships under your flag, from the Nore and the ports north of Thames, should be ordered to the Downs immediately, to facilitate your lordship's arrangements.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Don.<sup>1</sup>*

Downing Street, October 25, 1805.

Sir—As the advices received from Berlin, subsequent to my last instructions, have removed all apprehension of the march of the Russian and Swedish troops from Stralsund being resisted by the Prussians, or of any obstacle being opposed by

<sup>1</sup> This letter was, by mistake, not delivered, but brought back by the cutter which carried it.—*Note to the Original.*

that power to the entry of his Majesty's troops into Hanover, and as it appears that the former are now considerably advanced on their march towards the Electorate, his Majesty commands me to acquaint you that it is no longer necessary for you to proceed on to Berlin; your presence, on the arrival of the troops in the Elbe, being deemed, under present circumstances, more advantageous to the public service.

The King having been pleased to direct Lord Harrowby to proceed to Berlin on a special mission, you will communicate with his lordship on his arrival in the Elbe, and be prepared to furnish him with all the information which you have been enabled to collect with respect to the North of Germany. And it is his Majesty's command that you do conform to any instructions his Lordship may have occasion to transmit to you from time to time.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. I send this by a cutter, in the hope that it may reach you before you set out for Berlin. Lord Harrowby proposes leaving town on Monday.

Orders were this day sent by telegraph directing the King's German Legion to sail for the Elbe, the wind having become fair; and it is hoped they may proceed to sea this evening.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Don.*

October 26, 1805.

Sir—I am to acquaint you that his Majesty has been pleased to appoint Baron Decken to be Superintendent-General of the Recruiting of the King's German Legion, and he has received full instructions for his proceeding in the service.

The levy-money allowed is six guineas, three of which the recruit is to receive, and the remainder to be disposed of in necessaries and other expenses previous to the recruit joining, and an additional guinea is to be given to the bringer. This sum is considered as sufficient to produce a rapid levy, when

it is considered that the German Legion will be within the Hanoverian territories, and receiving British pay, so long as it remains on our establishment. If, however, contrary to expectation, this levy money shall fail to produce the desired success, you are hereby authorized to increase it, so that, on the whole, the levy money for each recruit shall not exceed ten guineas.

I need not express my hope that you will take every means in your power to forward the service on which Baron Decken is particularly sent, and at the same time to arrange whatever may be necessary to prevent imposition.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Don.*

Downing Street, October 28, 1805.

Sir—As there is every reason to hope that, on your arrival with the forces now under your orders in the Elbe, you will find a Russian and probably a Swedish corps established in Hanover, and it being necessary that you should be informed of his Majesty's pleasure with respect to the chief command, in case the troops of the several Allied Powers should be employed in any conjoint operations, I am to convey to you the King's commands that, until you receive more precise instructions from me, or from Lord Harrowby, on this point, in the event of any such concert being established, you do propose that the chief command of such united forces should, as a provisional arrangement, be assumed and exercised by the senior officer then serving in the respective armies.

So soon as your troops are established in Hanover, you will lose no time in making such arrangements as may be necessary to render the army moveable at the shortest notice.

It will be an early object of Lord Harrowby's attention to endeavour to establish a concert with the court of Berlin, for the recovery of Holland, in which the Allied Army assembled

in Hanover shall take a part, by making a forward movement towards the Yssel: It is of great importance that this should be undertaken with the utmost force that can be appropriated to the service consistent with the preservation of order within the Electorate.

I should hope his Majesty's Electoral troops and subjects (supposing the enemy to have been previously expelled) may be induced to come forward without delay, and in numbers adequate at once to charge themselves with the police of the country, placed, as it will then be, in the rear of, and consequently covered by, the army; and that you will thus be enabled to avail yourself, for offensive operations, of the services of the greater part, if not the whole, of the King's German Legion, as it now stands constituted.

I am to desire that you do keep Lord Harrowby regularly informed of your proceedings in all material particulars; and that you do refer to his lordship, as well as to me, any points on which you may require further instructions, as it is most probable that his lordship's general instructions and full powers may enable him, with the least possible delay, to afford you the information you may require.

As it is not wished that, under these circumstances, you should proceed to Berlin, I sent a despatch to you on the 25th inst., to prevent your taking that step, a copy of which I now enclose.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Mr. Cooke to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, October 29, 1805.

My Lord—Lord Castlereagh has directed me to mention to your lordship that, as Johnson and Parsons are not in the way, so as to be sent down to you immediately, it seems preferable to have them detained here on their appearance, and they will be ready for examination by your lordship and General Moore on your return to town.

Orders have been given for the two corps assembled in the Downs to proceed to sea together, and his lordship has no doubt you will regulate the force of the convoy accordingly.

I am, &c.,

E. COOKE.

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*Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Duke of York.*

Downing Street, October 29, 1805.

Sir—Advices having been this morning received, that not only the German Legion, but also the brigade of Guards, with the 4th, 14th, and 23rd Regiments, and 500 of the Rifle Corps, had been embarked in the Downs, I am to signify to your Royal Highness his Majesty's pleasure that you do issue the necessary orders for the whole to proceed to the Elbe as soon as the wind will permit.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don.*

Downing Street, October 30, 1805.

Sir—I have received your letter of the 29th instant, proposing that Brigadier-General Decken should be sent forward in a fast-sailing vessel to the Elbe, to gain information, and make arrangements, viz.—1st, to engage pilots; 2nd, to make preparations for the disembarkation of the troops, and for immediate forward movements: 3rd, to procure information as to the situation of the allied corps, and the movements of the enemy; 4th, to communicate with Mr. Thornton, his Majesty's Minister at Hamburg; 5th, to send an officer to meet you at Heligoland, with information on the above points.

In answer thereto, I am to express my approbation of the measures you have proposed, and am to acquaint you that the Admiralty have been desired to instruct Lord Keith, or Rear-Admiral Holloway, to furnish a fast-sailing cutter accordingly, on the application to either of them by Baron Decken.

I also am to convey to you my approbation with regard to

those objects of inquiry and arrangement to which you intend pointing your orders to Baron Decken. And it may be expedient for you to open to him the various points of the instructions which you have received from me, and by which the Baron may further regulate his proceedings.

I think it right to suggest to you the expediency of sending forward also the Commissary-General with Baron Decken.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Mr. Cooke to Lieutenant-General Don.*

Downing Street, October 30, 1805.

Sir—Lord Castlereagh directs me to acknowledge your letter of the 29th instant, stating that Major-Generals Finch and Paget have reported that the following articles have not been embarked with their respective brigades, viz.—field artillery; reserve musket ammunition; reserve musket flints; hospital stores; purveyors' stores; hospital staff for the two brigades.

In answer thereto, I am directed by his lordship to acquaint you that twelve battalion six-pounder guns have been embarked, and the vessels sailed yesterday for the Downs; that 3,000,000 rounds of ammunition for the German Legion are embarked, one half in the River, and one half at Portsmouth, and ordered to the Downs; that the same quantity, for the British force, is embarking in the River, and will be forwarded.

There are five transports, laden with ordnance stores, at Portsmouth, and six with medical stores and camp equipage, which will sail for the Downs as soon as the wind changes.

If the corps under your command shall have sailed, they will be forwarded without delay under convoy.

You will be furnished, as soon as possible, with a complete detail of the articles ordered to accompany your expedition.

I am, &c.,

E. COOKE.

*Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Duke of York.*

Downing Street, November 3, 1805.

Sir—His Majesty's confidential servants, with a view to facilitate the execution of offensive operations against the enemy, have humbly submitted to his Majesty the expediency of forming the present disposable force into one connected army for active service, from which detachments may be made correspondent to any service to be undertaken; and that a staff should be immediately appointed for the whole, under the chief command of your Royal Highness.

I have the honour to acquaint your Royal Highness that his Majesty has been graciously pleased to express his entire approbation of this arrangement, and I am directed to convey to your Royal Highness the King's commands that your Royal Highness should take his Majesty's pleasure without delay upon the detailed military arrangements for carrying the same into execution.

I am to request, so soon as the above arrangements are completed, that your Royal Highness will communicate to me, for the information of the King's servants, the numbers and formation of the army so rendered disposable for foreign service, as also the amount and nature of the force which will remain for the defence of the Colonies and of the United Kingdom, in the event of the whole of the disposable infantry, a due proportion of artillery, and a corps of about 10,000 cavalry, being detached on foreign service.

I am, &c.,  
CASTLEREAGH.

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*Chronological Memorandum.*

1805.

August 3. First order for providing transports.

September 29. Orders to the Commander-in-Chief to canton the troops near the coast, so as to be in readiness for embarkation.

From August 29 to September 10. The troops at Boulogne

broke up, and marched for the Rhine in divisions under Davoust, &c.

From September 5 to 10. The troops in Holland broke up from Zeyst, &c., and marched in divisions for the Danube, under Marmont, &c.

September 16. The French army under Bernadotte evacuated Hanover, and marched towards the Danube.

September 18. Decree of Buonaparte for enrolling the conscripts.

September 25 and 26. The first divisions of French troops passed the Rhine, and advanced into Suabia.

October 3 and 4. The Bavarian troops entered the Prussian territories in Franconia, and Bernadotte passed through Anspach.

October 18. This intelligence received in London.

October 5. Russians landed at Stralsund.

About October 12 or 13. The King of Prussia gave leave to the Russians to pass through his territories.

October 11. Augereau's army from Brest passed the Rhine at Huningen.

October 10. Order for embarking the German Legion.

October 16. They embarked.

October 17. Order for embarking the first division of British, and 5,000 troops ordered from Ireland.

November 5. They sailed.

November 3. Order for preparing the whole disposable force for foreign service.

November 28. German cavalry of the Legion sailed.

December 10. Second division of British sailed.

December 14 and 15. Put back.

December 22. Sailed again.

October 21. Lord Nelson defeated the combined fleets of France and Spain.

November 6. Account of the victory received at the Admiralty.

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*Lord Keith to Lord Castlereagh.*

Sunday, November 10, 1805.

My Lord—Messrs. Rob and Muchett are this morning arrived off this coast, and came on shore in an open boat, leaving the larger one becalmed at sea. I send their report, and the answers to some questions I put to them, also some late papers.

The winds and thick weather prevent the arrival of transports, which I lament on account of those men who are on board with the horses. There are some transports in the Downs, with horse-artillery on board; the officers have inquired of me whether they are to proceed with the Germans or not, and, of course, with the first convoy; to which I could not answer. Will your lordship send them or me instructions on this subject?

I send a sea-chart of the Dutch coast, and have the honour to be, &c.,

KEITH.

I cannot help entertaining some apprehension that our friends tell us more than they can actually have seen in so short a time. At first Rob said he had not seen General Murat, and, some time after, repeated a conversation he had held with the General; but, observing my surprise, he said—  
“ It was the General’s secretary I saw, not himself.”

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*Lord Keith to Lord Castlereagh.*

November 12, 1805.

My Lord—Soon after the two men Muchett and Rob quitted their lugger at sea, to come on shore with the information I had the honour to transmit, it was seized by the Watchful gun-brig and Griffin cutter, and brought into the Downs. I wrote to S. H. Low, commander of the Watchful, that I had knowledge of mission. Mr. Low is here, and willing to give up the vessel, provided the Board of Customs and the Griffin

will consent, and the Treasury will hold him guiltless. He has not reported to the Custom House yet; but the officers at Deal know of the transaction, and will seize the vessel if he quits her. This is an unfortunate business, and I am at a loss what to recommend. Perhaps the quietest way would be to reward the captors, and let the vessel go. I dare say the smugglers have taken all advantage by loading a rich cargo. The officer seems extremely well disposed to let the vessel go, if I will desire him to do so; but such a step is beyond my authority, and might offend the Treasury, where the matter entirely rests; for Admirals have no share or interest in any contraband captures. I hope your lordship will get the business settled as soon as is convenient.

Your lordship's, &c.,

KEITH.

The officer of the Watchful proposes to take her out to sea, and there let her go; but perhaps we might be no better by doing so, as I have ordered a sharp look-out ever since the late Act passed.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Baron Jacobi.*

November 12, 1805.

Sir—Several masters of Prussian vessels having signified to the Transport Board their readiness to engage in the service of Government, provided the Prussian Consul, acting under your directions, should not feel himself called upon to object to the same, I take the liberty of laying these circumstances before you, with the expression of my hope and request that, as the British Government will be prepared, upon the requisition of the Court of Berlin, at any time, to release Prussian vessels from any engagement which, under the provisional acquiescence of the mission here, they may enter into, you will not feel yourself called upon to discountenance an arrangement which, I venture to hope, may eventually contribute to the interest of both Courts.

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CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, November 14, 1805.

My dear Lord—I am rather apprehensive that Messrs. Rob and Muchett were more attentive to their smuggling concerns than any other objects during their very limited absence. I have consulted with the Treasury as to the mode of affording them any protection under the circumstances represented by your lordship. They are clearly of opinion that no interposition can take place between the seizure and condemnation; and that any relief to be afforded must be a subsequent and separate consideration, to be determined with reference to their actual losses, the services they may be deemed to have rendered, and the degree to which your lordship could be presumed, by sending them over, to countenance any commercial transaction, which, I conceive, could not be considered as going beyond what might be sufficient to cover the transaction.

I very much lament the perverse state of the wind. I trust, however, our troops have reached the Elbe in safety.

I am, &amp;c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Count Münster.*

Draft.

Downing Street, November 14, 1805.

Sir—It being the King's intention, upon the arrival of the German Legion in Hanover, that its present establishment should be considerably augmented, for which purpose the necessary instructions have been issued; and it appearing to his Majesty's Government that the success of this measure, so important to the common cause, may be materially promoted by the countenance and co-operation of his Majesty's Electoral Administration, which they may feel it more consistent with their future as well as immediate interest and duty to afford, if assured of his Majesty's determination to restore, at a proper moment, to the service of the Electorate, all Hanoverian sub-

jects entering therein—I have received the King's commands to acquaint you that, within three months after the conclusion of any peace to which his Majesty shall be a party (or sooner, if to his Majesty it shall seem expedient), his Majesty will, upon a requisition to that effect, transmitted through one of his principal Secretaries of State, cause the entire German Legion, both officers and men, to be moved, at the charge of Great Britain, into the Electorate (so far as the same is composed either of Hanoverians, or of persons having engaged in the Hanoverian service), there to be discharged from the British establishment, and to abide such orders as they may receive from his Majesty in his Electoral capacity.

I am further directed to acquaint you that it is his Majesty's intentions that the officers and men liable, as above-stated, to service, in the Electoral army, should be delivered over as a corps in their then state of military equipment.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Count Münster.*

Downing Street, November 14, 1805.

Sir—I trust the letter which I have the honour to address to you cannot fail to prove satisfactory to his Majesty's Electoral Government.

The words of the Convention entered into with the Stadtholder in the course of the last war are evidently inapplicable to the present case. The Batavian troops then raised were to be restored, upon a requisition in one or other of two cases—either upon the *actual restoration* of the lawful Government of Holland, or *on the conclusion of any arrangement* in which his Majesty might have concurred.

With respect to Hanover, we have the satisfaction to know that the first case has actually already happily occurred, the lawful Government being restored even before the proposed augmentation is begun.

With regard to the second case, it is not difficult to conceive that circumstances might unfortunately arise such as to induce his Majesty, from a just regard to the separate interests of Hanover, to acquiesce in arrangements with respect to that country, in order to save it from greater evils, which might yet not justify his Majesty in depriving himself, at perhaps a critical period of the war, of the services of a valuable body of troops levied for the service, and at the expense of Great Britain; and, in such a state of things, a right existing in the Electoral Government to make the requisition would only expose that Government to be inconveniently pressed to make a demand which might be essentially injurious to the interest of both States.

At present, the King's intentions of transferring, upon the conclusion of peace, the Legion to the service of the Electorate, is absolute; and it is open to his Majesty to judge of the propriety of doing so at any earlier period, upon a due consideration of all the circumstances bearing upon the interests of Hanover, as connected with those of Great Britain.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, November 19, 1805.

My dear Lord—I trust this change of wind to the westward will enable the transports, laden with artillery and stores, at Portsmouth, to reach the Downs, as well as horse transports sufficient for embarking the remainder of the Light German Cavalry. I am, therefore, to desire that, so soon as this is effected, your lordship will forward everything then ready, with a proper convoy, to Bremerlehe, there to be disembarked: and, when this service is performed, unless the officer shall receive directions to the contrary from Lieutenant-General Don, he is to return with the transports to the Downs.

I am, &c.,

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CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby.*

Downing Street, November 19, 1805.

Dear Lord Harrowby—Since I last wrote, an uninterrupted series of easterly winds has very much impeded the progress of our military preparations. The troops embarked at Cork attempted to put to sea, but were obliged to return into port; and the cavalry transports, which are in readiness, both in the River and at the outports, have found it impossible to reach the Downs.

As you may wish to know what our means are likely to be so soon as the wind enables me to apply them, I enclose the latest return of the state of our unappropriated transports, by which you will see that, exclusive of the cavalry ships with General Don, we have accommodation for about 2,400 horses nearly completed. We propose to appropriate them as follows:—

	Horses.
Two Regiments of Hanoverian Cavalry.....	1,300
British Artillery .....	600
Two troops Waggon Train.....	270
Two skeleton regiments Hanoverian Cavalry	170
 Total .....	<hr/> 2,340

There are two regiments of British cavalry held in readiness to embark; but, as the Duke of York considers the horses for the artillery and the wagon train to be even of more importance, their going must depend on the return of transports, as I fear we cannot now reckon upon any very considerable increase to our tonnage being engaged and fitted before the winter sets in.

With respect to operations generally, my last letter, with its enclosure, will have apprized you that our decision must, in a great measure, depend upon what you are enabled to settle with the Court of Berlin. If Prussia will embark in the recovery of Holland, on however limited a scale, provided she

is prepared unequivocally to maintain and defend the conquest when made, there will be every disposition here to contribute largely to the effort, and thus to save her exertions for other objects, where they may be not less important. But we feel, until this point is distinctly understood, that it is difficult to determine on what scale our immediate co-operation should be arranged. Even without any satisfactory assurance to this effect, it is highly desirable to concur in an incursion into Holland, with a view of effecting a powerful diversion in favour of our Allies. But, as we cannot flatter ourselves that Holland, were it recovered, could be ultimately secured, either by Russians, Swedes, or British, much less by any military force which the country could itself maintain, without the active protection of Russia, it is material we should know how far this can be depended on, before we determine, at this season of the year, to transport any very considerable proportion of our disposable force to the Continent, beyond those already destined for this service; viz., those actually gone, together with the cavalry now under orders.

With respect to undertaking any external operations against the western coast of Holland, the same desire is entertained to carry them into effect as when you embarked; but, upon investigating the professional details, until some port is actually opened to us, either by the operations of the Allies, or by the temper of the country, called forth by the successful progress of those operations, it appears at this season a most hazardous attempt, and one that, at all events, ought not to precede, in point of time, the Continental attack; else, in addition to the hazard of the seas, we should be exposed to have the force in Holland, whatever it is or can be made, from the French troops disposable east of Boulogne, concentrated against us.

The insulated and consequently apparently defensible situation of Walcheren strongly incline us to attempt its reduction, even upon the chance of a co-operation. But it since appears that the fortress of Flushing, in itself essential to

the possession and defence of the island, is, from its marshy situation, difficult of approach; and it also seems doubtful whether Walcheren can be made secure against the enemy in force upon the adjacent points of Zealand and Cadsand, and whether they cannot, with shells, from those positions, deprive us of the advantage of it as a naval station; as ships in the road of Flushing, where the channel is broadest, and where they might best lie out of range, are apt to drive, when the wind is from the south-west, up the channel between Walcheren and South Beveland, where they would be much exposed. This narrows the advantage of Walcheren as a naval position, and renders it less practicable to establish an effectual cordon of naval force round the island, either for its defence or reduction.

The above remarks affect the ultimate value of Walcheren, in case of our again returning to a defensive war, rather than its immediate consequence in the scale of our present operations. But if it is not a point from which we could immediately operate with advantage against the interior of Holland—if its reduction would be attended with considerable risk to the health of our troops—if its conquest is likely to be much facilitated by the previous commencement of operations against Holland from the other side, and must follow almost as a matter of course, in case of any decided success—we are not disposed to encounter these difficulties, until we see reason to promise ourselves some more solid result upon the attack than the mere impression to be produced by a landing in that quarter. As the Allies advance towards the line of the Meuse, or with a view to operations in the Low Countries, it would certainly be a most important acquisition; but, for the purpose of producing a powerful effect upon the public mind in Holland, if a risk is to be run, it seems worth consideration, when the enemy's force is occupied between the Yssel and the Meuse, or is falling back to the latter river, whether we could not land a force nearer the seat of Government, without greater hazard than belongs to the other operation.

That you may see the extent of our disposable force, I enclose the formation of the army, as received from the Duke of York. Including the artillery, &c., it may be considered as an effective force of 50,000 rank and file, exclusive of the German Legion; and, in the mode of estimating armies on the Continent, namely, officers included, it will not fall short of 60,000 men.

Of the above force, nine regiments, amounting to about 8,000 men, are embarked at Cork, and may be expected in the Downs with the first westerly winds. We have tonnage for 10,000 infantry more, exclusive of any aid to be derived from the navy, and the troops are placed convenient to the place of embarkation: no difficulty can, therefore, occur in executing any plan that may be decided on; and hitherto the weather has rendered it utterly impossible to attempt anything, even had our determination been exclusively taken, or indeed to effect more in the shape of general preparations than has been done.

I trust this letter will enable you to satisfy the minds of our Allies that nothing has been omitted on our part which the weather permitted us to undertake; that we have the means and the disposition to employ them in any concerted and practicable effort; but they must recollect what the season is, and not expect us, as Count Tolstoy does, to land at once in the Netherlands, or to hazard the safety of our army without a due consideration of the risk and the object.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. I enclose a copy of my letter of this date, to Lieutenant-General Don, directing him to meet General Tolstoy's wishes. You will, of course, consider him in this, as in all other respects, subject to your superintending directions.

Upon reference to the treaty of Potsdam (I think Article VI.—I speak only from memory), Prussia is bound to insist on the evacuation and independence of Holland; and she is, in concurrence with the other Powers, to consider any infringement

of that independence cause of war. This might seem to answer the case stated at the outset of this letter; but, as we know how loose general guarantees are of this nature, more especially when the duty of interference belongs equally to several powers, we are desirous of having a more precise understanding with Prussia on this subject.

C.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don.*

Downing Street, November 19, 1805.

Sir—I have received a letter from Baron Decken, dated from Stade, on the 12th instant, reporting to me the steps taken by him up to that date, in pursuance of his Instructions.

It appears, from the above despatch, together with one from General Tolstoy, dated the 9th, from Schwerin, that his advanced guard was to pass the Elbe on the next day, followed by the main body of the army, as also by the Swedish forces. And the General states that he intended to remain upon the Weser no longer than was absolutely necessary to assemble the army in force; his determination being to move immediately into Holland.

The importance of acting against that country, before it shall be materially reinforced by the new levies now assembling in France, and the advantage it may be of to the Austrians to occupy the French forces, without loss of time, in the north of Germany and Holland, have determined his Majesty to direct that you do concert, with the Generals commanding the Russian and Swedish troops, the measures necessary for carrying the above operation into execution with the least possible delay.

The uninterrupted continuance of easterly winds has hitherto prevented us from sending forward the cavalry or artillery horses from hence. Part of the light cavalry belonging to the Legion is actually embarked in the Downs; and the heavy dragoons are now embarking at Sheerness. We have

at present tonnage engaged for about 2,400 horses, exclusive of those which sailed with you, and which we may hope will shortly return. On these we have determined, in the first instance, to embark the two regiments of Hanoverian cavalry, amounting to 1,300 horses; 600 artillery horses belonging to the guns, to be attached to the two brigades of British infantry; 270 horses, attached to two troops of the waggon train; and 170 horses belonging to the skeleton regiments of Hanoverian cavalry, to be filled up on the Continent.

The above arrangements will require accommodation for 2,340 horses, and be fully covered by the existing provision of tonnage. Two regiments of British cavalry are under orders; but their going must depend upon the return of the transports from the Weser, and, in a great degree, on the season.

Unless we receive an intimation from you to the contrary, the transports hereafter to proceed shall be ordered to Bremerlehe.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. I have entrusted the messenger with a map of Hanover, copied from a map belonging to his Majesty, which you will preserve with great care, and return to this Office, after the service is over.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, November 22, 1805.

My dear Lord—I hope this change of wind will enable you to complete, without loss of time, the embarkation of the German light cavalry, and to despatch them, together with the victuallers and ordnance storeships then assembled in the Downs.

As the whole of the British army, including the German Legion, will, by the time of their arrival, have taken up a position between Bremen and Verden on the Weser, I consider it absolutely necessary that the convoy should proceed to Bremerlehe, and not to the Elbe; and I have to request, in

case any latitude should have been given to the officer in charge of the convoy, and that the fleet should have put to sea before the receipt of this letter, that your lordship will by a cutter forward your orders, in conformity to the above suggestion.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Mr. Cooke to his Majesty's Consul at Embden.*

Downing Street, November 26, 1805.

Sir—I am directed by Lord Castlereagh to desire that you will acquaint me, for the information of his lordship, whether any orders have yet been received from the Court of Prussia for allowing the disembarkation of His Britannic Majesty's forces in the Ems; and that you will desire the officer who delivers this letter to return, with your answer, with all possible despatch. Should no such communication have arrived when you receive this, I am further to desire, that if, after the despatch of your answer, a communication to the above-mentioned purport shall arrive, you will take the most effectual measures for expediting the account of it.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

E. COOKE.

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*Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Duke of York.*

Downing Street, November 27, 1805.

Sir—His Majesty's confidential servants having suggested the expediency of sending an additional force to the Continent; and his Majesty having been graciously pleased to express his approbation thereof; and your Royal Highness, in consequence of the communication made to you thereupon, having received the King's pleasure that Lieutenant-General Lord Cathcart should forthwith proceed to the Continent, there to take the command of the forces in his Majesty's pay, as well as of the reinforcement which is above alluded to, with the rank of General, upon the Continent of Europe, I am now

to signify to your Royal Highness his Majesty's commands that you do issue the necessary orders for four brigades of British infantry, with such proportion of artillery, ammunition, entrenching tools, &c., as shall appear to your Royal Highness expedient, upon communication with the Master-General of the Ordnance, to be immediately embarked for foreign service, together with a medical staff, and a proper proportion of hospital stores.

As I conceive your Royal Highness will select the regiments coming from Ireland for making a part of this force, I beg leave to acquaint you that the Commissioners for the Transport Service have received orders to furnish them, on their arrival in the Downs, with such additional tonnage as may afford them more convenient accommodation. And they have also received orders to assemble in the Downs a sufficiency of vessels to receive the remainder of the troops which shall be selected for this service, and to obey your Royal Highness's orders respecting the embarkation.

I am to request your Royal Highness will order a communication to be made to me of the particular regiments your Royal Highness may destine for this service, as also of the quantity of tonnage which will be necessary for the medical staff and Hospital stores, and of the number of officers' horses which must be embarked; that arrangements may be made respecting them without delay.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby.*

November 27, [1805].

My dear Lord—In order to avoid the delay of reserving our decision here till a Report from you shall be received of the part Prussia will finally take, and, if she engages in the war, of the extent and nature of the concert which the Court of Berlin is desirous of proposing for our adoption, it has been

determined to send four brigades of infantry to the Ems with the least possible delay, and to entrust the present command of the whole army in British pay to be assembled on the Continent to Lord Cathcart, which will, on the arrival of this reinforcement, exclusive of any augmentation the German Legion may have received, amount, officers included, to at least 25,000 men.

I think it right to apprise you without delay of this determination. I enclose a copy of Lord Cathcart's instructions, also of my letter to Lieutenant-General Don, which will serve to explain, without troubling you with a longer letter, what it may be material you should know, in order to regulate any communications you may have to make either to Lord Cathcart or to me.

Lord Mulgrave will, no doubt, have informed you that, having made the important sacrifice of Lord Cathcart's services to the exigencies of our present military situation, Lord Harrington will replace him in the Extraordinary Embassy to Vienna. I am sure you will join with me in looking with the greatest confidence and satisfaction at having a command of so very delicate a nature placed in such efficient hands at the present moment.

As the messenger will convey to you the Gazette, it only remains again to congratulate you on the auspicious winding up of our great victory.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

[This draft is endorsed, "By Donaldson, the Messenger, by an express boat."]

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Downing Street, November 27, 1805.

My Lord—The great importance which the King attaches to the recovery of Holland in the course of the present season, before the enemy shall have been enabled by new levies to

provide for its effectual defence, and the desire his Majesty feels to afford to his allies on the Continent the most convincing proofs of his determination, not only to support them in the war by the most liberal subsidies, but also by the most active exertions of his arms, has determined the King, in addition to the corps of British troops now serving on the Continent, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Don, to direct a force of the numbers stated in the margin to be immediately prepared for service, and to proceed without delay, to the Ems, or to such other place of debarkation as may, upon the whole, appear the best suited to their forming an early junction with the army now there, the total strength of which will then amount to 25,000 men, officers included, exclusive of any augmentation the German Legion may, in the mean time, have received.

The King having been pleased to signify, through the Commander-in-Chief, his royal intention of entrusting to your Lordship, during the interval which may elapse before you are directed to proceed as his Majesty's Ambassador to the Court of Russia, the command of this corps, for the successful conduct of which, called on, as you will be, to act in concert with the troops of other powers, your Lordship's intimate acquaintance with his Majesty's actual relations with those States appears to the King to render you peculiarly qualified, I am now to convey to your Lordship, by his Majesty's command, instructions for the direction of your conduct on your arrival on the Continent.

With a view of possessing yourself fully of the actual state of affairs, as well as for the purpose of accelerating the arrangements necessary for enabling the troops to take the field on their arrival, it is his Majesty's pleasure that your lordship do proceed immediately to Embden, and from thence to the head-quarters of the allied powers, whether on the Weser or in advance; you will there ascertain with precision the numbers, state, and position, of the several corps, the extent of the

concert which exists, and the plan of operations which has been decided on.

You will also inform yourself of the actual state of equipment in which the several armies are, as qualifying them for a forward movement; also as to the facility of procuring for the corps now under orders to proceed from hence the necessary means of advancing from the place of debarkation; and, with a view to enable your lordship the better to estimate what will be required for this purpose, I enclose a statement of the equipment which will accompany the troops from hence.

Your lordship will take immediate measures on your landing (except in the case hereafter stated) for collecting every supply requisite to render the army moveable; and, in order to afford your lordship the means of doing so with effect, a Deputy Commissary is directed to embark under your lordship's orders.

The stipulations of the treaty lately concluded at Potsdam between Prussia and Russia, to which Austria has since acceded, seems to render it no longer to be presumed that the war will hereafter be carried on against France by the two latter powers, whilst the former preserves a neutrality.

Consistently with the engagements thereby entered into, Prussia must, upon the expiration of the period limited in that treaty (viz., about the 8th of the ensuing month), in case France shall not have previously acceded to the basis of her armed mediation, become a party in the war; or, in the event of France having acceded, an armistice, including the several contracting parties, will have taken place, and limits will have been assigned within which their armies are to remain inactive pending the ulterior discussions.

Should the latter, though, I trust, the least probable, alternative have unfortunately taken place, as his Majesty could then no longer hope to render any service to Europe by the employment of his troops on the Continent, and would, in that case, have no other duty to perform but to direct them to the

general annoyance of the enemy in some other quarter, it is the King's pleasure that your lordship should, in the case supposed, take immediate measures for causing the troops to return to England with the least possible delay.

In the event of Prussia being committed in the war, intelligence of the rupture may, at the latest, be expected to reach the army now on the Weser by the 15th of December, and earlier, if the negotiations with which Count Haugwitz is charged shall not have been protracted.

We have reason to know that, in the event of war, the determination of the cabinet of Berlin is to aim at the accomplishment, even before the close of this campaign, of the recovery of Holland, and the compelling the French to recross the Rhine. It is probable that they will have been additionally confirmed in their natural desire to rescue Holland, by the strong representations Lord Harrowby has been instructed to make, and by the assurances his lordship has been authorized to give, that his Majesty would be disposed actively to co-operate in such an undertaking, either by reinforcing his army in the north of Germany, or by landing a considerable force in Holland, so soon as the operations of the allies in the interior should have afforded a safe and convenient access for his troops.

From the despatches lately received from General Tolstoy, there is every reason to suppose that, even before Prussia shall have definitively taken her line, the Russian and Swedish army, with whom Lieutenant-General Don has been directed to co-operate, will have made a forward movement, with the countenance of Prussia, towards Holland; and I should hope your lordship, on your arrival, will find them advanced to the Ems, if not to the Yssel.

His Majesty has been principally induced to detach a force to the Continent under all the difficulties of the present advanced season of the year, and to join his troops to those of Russia and Sweden, with a view of enabling Prussia the better

to undertake operations against Holland, without weakening herself too much in the quarter of Franconia and Lower Saxony, where, by acting in force, she may contribute at once to the complete destruction of the enemy's army in its present advanced positions.

It has been a strong additional motive with his Majesty still further to augment that force, in the hope that he may thereby strengthen the confederate corps to such an extent as may render it, even without any aid from the Prussian army, fully equal to penetrate and to reduce the entire of Holland north of the Meuse and the Rhine, leaving the army under the Duke of Brunswick at liberty at the same moment to advance from Westphalia against the defences of that river; and, by interposing himself between the enemy and the Low Countries, either at once to carry those fortresses, or to secure their early fall for want of supplies, instead of suffering them, if the French are permitted during the winter to garrison and provision them without interruption, to become the most formidable impediments to any successful operations against France at the opening of the ensuing campaign.

His Majesty considers the value of time to be such at the present season of the year, and at this critical conjuncture of the war, as to feel himself called upon, where so much may depend upon his effectual support, to direct the corps now assembling in the Downs to proceed immediately to sea, even though, in the case of a cessation of hostilities on the Continent, his troops may be obliged to return without any opportunity having been afforded them of active service.

Lord Harrowby was directed, some time since, to apply to the Court of Berlin for permission to land troops in the Ems; and it is not to be presumed, connected as Prussia is with the allied powers, that any objection can now be made to such a request.

There is a case by no means probable in itself, but so far possible as to render it perhaps not altogether undeserving of

your lordship's attention. It might happen, should the Russians early move into Holland, and the advance of the allies from the Weser be uninterrupted by any resistance, that they might have advanced so much beyond the Ems, and so far into the interior, more especially if the troops should unfortunately be detained here by adverse winds, as to render it impossible for the reinforcements from hence landing in the Ems to join them before they had reached the Meuse, and secured the command of that river towards the sea. In such a case, it would be for your lordship to consider how far it would be desirable that the troops should follow the army by land through a difficult country, or whether it might not be more advisable, especially if still here, that they should be sent into Holland direct.

The King does not feel it requisite, in addition to the above outline, to direct me to furnish your lordship at present with any more detailed instructions. Your lordship's experienced military judgment and penetration will best suggest on the spot the inquiries which are to be made, and the measures to be pursued, for the good of his Majesty's service.

You will keep Lord Harrowby informed at Berlin of the course of your proceedings and observations; and, in order to facilitate my communications with your lordship, the Admiralty have been directed to keep a cutter at all times in the Ems, ready to convey to me any intelligence your lordship may have to transmit for his Majesty's information.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don.*

November 27, 1805.

Sir—His Majesty having been pleased to order four brigades of British infantry, with a proportion of cavalry and artillery, to proceed without delay to reinforce his army in the north of Germany, and it being his Majesty's pleasure that the British

army, which will then be assembled on the Continent, amounting, officers included, to about 25,000 men, should be placed for the present under the chief command of General Lord Cathcart, I am to acquaint you that his lordship will immediately embark for the Continent, in obedience to the King's commands.

It is Lord Cathcart's intention to land at Embden, and from thence to repair to the head-quarters of the allied army, as it is his Majesty's present determination (deeming it probable that the allied forces will, in the mean time, have advanced from the Weser towards the Yssel) that the troops should be landed in the Ems: and, it being of material importance to the King's service that his lordship, before he proceeds from Embden to the army, should be enabled to make such arrangements on the spot as may be necessary for the reception of the troops, and the rendering them capable of undertaking a forward movement with the least possible delay, I am to desire, in order that his lordship, in taking his measures, may have the best information, not only of the actual position and state of the armies, but of the extent and nature of the supplies which may be expected from his Majesty's Electoral dominions, that you will immediately, on the receipt of this despatch, send a confidential officer, fully informed on these points, to meet his lordship at Embden.

As it will be desirable that Lord Cathcart should at the same time receive information with respect to any plan of operations which may have been previously decided on, as well as of every circumstance which your own observation and inquiries, or communications received from Lord Harrowby at Berlin, may enable you to lay before his lordship, I am to request that you will, if possible, send your Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Colonel Murray, to Embden, for the above purpose.

I hope the transports with the light cavalry, the ordnance, victualling, and other stores, which have been long detained in

the Downs by contrary winds, will have sailed this morning. The shipment of the other cavalry regiment is proceeding with, and also of the horses for the British artillery, and will be despatched without delay.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Downing Street, November 27, 1805.

My Lord—The King having signified his royal pleasure that four additional brigades of British infantry should be embarked for foreign service, I have signified his Majesty's commands to his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, to this effect, and have requested his Royal Highness to communicate with your lordship as to the quantity of artillery, ammunition, and entrenching tools, which it will be proper to embark with them. When your lordship shall have settled the necessary arrangements with his Royal Highness, I am to request you will furnish me with an account of the quantity of tonnage which will be requisite, that orders may be given to the Commissioners of the Transport Service accordingly. In the mean time, they have received orders to send to Woolwich several transports, there to be laden; and they are instructed to obey whatever requisition they shall receive from your lordship and the Board of Ordnance.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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[Draft.]

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, November 28, 1805.

My dear Lord—I think it may enable your lordship to guard against either delay or embarrassment, in the execution of orders which may be sent from the respective departments, if you are acquainted with the general outline of what is intended, and in progress.

Four brigades of infantry are ordered for immediate service to assemble in the Downs; three of these are coming from

Ireland, and the agent of transports is ordered to supply tonnage, on their arrival, to place the men entirely at their ease, they being now much crowded. The fourth brigade is to embark at Ramsgate, unless you could manage to put them on board at once from Deal, by which means the basin at the former place would be exclusively applicable to shipping the cavalry. The present force, unless something should occur to alter our determination, it is intended to send to the Ems; and, as it is material that at least one regiment of British cavalry should accompany it, it is proposed to provide tonnage for the 11th regiment of Light Dragoons now at Deal, before the heavy regiment of German cavalry is embarked. I calculate that the transports now on this side of the water, and which, with the exception of a proportion ordered to receive two troops of the Waggon Train, and 450 horses for the artillery at Northfleet, will be assembling daily at Ramsgate, are sufficient to provide for the 11th regiment above-mentioned, calculated at 750 horses, leaving a surplus of from 150 to 200 horses. We may hope every day that the horse-ships from the Elbe will have returned to the Downs; we shall then have from 800 to 900 disposable; and I shall inform your lordship, in due time, whether you are first to embark the heavy regiment of cavalry, or another regiment of British Light Dragoons.

With respect to the embarkation of the 11th, I wish it to take place as nearly as you can time it, as the last of the infantry are going on board; so as, on the one hand, to guard against delay, and on the other, to prevent the cavalry being on board longer than is necessary.

The convoy from the Downs will consist of the infantry and cavalry chiefly. The artillery, waggon-train, store-ships, and, in short, all shipments from the River, will assemble at the Nore, and proceed at once from thence. With this view I am to request your lordship will immediately station a separate convoy at the Nore, to take charge of them, for which the

necessary directions will be given to the Admiralty. The transports from the Downs and from the Nore will be despatched as nearly as possible at the same time; if they join at sea, so much the better; if they do not, each will have its own protection. With respect to the nature of the convoy, I only wish to point your lordship's attention to the proximity of the Ems to the Dutch coast, and to the fort of Delftziel, which is within the river. Perhaps this may render it prudent to send a small squadron of gun-brigs into the river, to keep the enemy in awe.

I have been obliged to trouble your lordship of late for several cutters, and I must now request you will direct one to be ready to receive Mr. Bullock and two assistant-commissaries, who are ordered to be at Deal to-morrow evening, to proceed *direct to Embden*. I rather understood, from your lordship's letter of this morning, that the letter addressed to the Consul at Embden had been sent to Bremerlehe, to be forwarded from thence, which is, I conceive, in the present state of things, unnecessarily circuitous.

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Count Münster.*

Downing Street, November 28, 1805.

Sir—Permit me to recommend to your protection the bearer of this letter, Mr. Engelbach, who has been despatched to Hanover in the station of Assistant-Commissary, for the purpose of superintending the bakeries which may be necessary for the forces in the pay of his Britannic Majesty. For this service, it will be necessary to enlist a corps of bakers; and I am commanded by his Majesty to desire you will take every means to induce the Regency of Hanover to afford every facility and assistance for its enlistment, upon the most advantageous and economical footing.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to his Majesty's Consul at Embden.*

Downing Street, November 28, 1805.

Sir—Mr. Bullock, who has been appointed, *ad interim*, to act as Deputy-Commissary to a considerable British corps, which it is intended to disembark at Embden, will deliver to you this letter. And I am to desire that you will furnish him with every assistance and information in your power, with regard to the means of procuring supplies of provisions, carriages, horses, &c., and whatever other articles he may be instructed to provide, for maintaining an army in the field; and you will act with as little publicity as possible.

I am, &amp;c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Admiralty.*

Downing Street, November 29, 1805.

My Lords—A considerable corps of troops having been ordered to embark and assemble in the Downs, in order to proceed to the Continent, I am to signify to your lordships his Majesty's pleasure that you do issue the necessary orders for a proper convoy to be in readiness for the protection of their passage. It is proposed that such part of the equipment belonging to the above corps as may embark in the River should assemble at the Nore; and I am to desire that a separate convoy should be provided for this part of the expedition. I shall not fail to give your lordships a further intimation as to the particular destination of this force, before the final orders for its sailing shall be given.

I am, &amp;c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, November 29, 1805.

My dear Lord—Lord Barham writes to request your lordship will assist our inquiries about the safety of entering the Ems with a large fleet of transports, assuming always Prussia to give us facilities as well as permission.

As we are to presume the allied forces may have made a forward movement from the Weser in the direction of Holland, it is of importance that our reinforcements should meet them on the Ems, rather than have the unnecessary fatigue of following them from the former river. With this view, we are desirous of obtaining the best information as to the obstacles which could be thrown in our way from the Dutch shore, as also what precautions should be taken with respect to pilots, light-armed vessels, &c.

The necessary orders have been sent to the Admiralty with respect to convoy, both from the Downs and Nore. I have to request your lordship will give me a private intimation when all is likely to be on board, in order that the King's pleasure, with respect to their finally proceeding to sea, may be taken in due time. I have also applied to the Admiralty relative to a cutter to convey Mr. Bullock and his assistants to Embden.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Mr. Cooke to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, December 4, 1805.

My Lord—Lord Castlereagh, who is much hurried, desires me to inform your lordship, that it is intended to embark three additional regiments of infantry in the transports now in the Downs, and to change two of those which have arrived from Ireland; also to embark the heavy Hanoverian cavalry, reserving the embarkation of the 11th Dragoons for an ulterior operation. His lordship wishes the embarkation of the cavalry to be completed by the time the infantry shall be embarked.

As much of the ordnance stores, &c., are embarked, his lordship further requests you will inform him whether you have appointed a convoy to protect them from the Nore, and when it will arrive at the Nore.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

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E. COOKE.

[Draft.]

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Downing Street, December 5, 1805.

My Lord—In the event of the British army under your lordship's orders being employed in a conjoint operation with the troops of other powers, the principle his Majesty has thought fit to lay down, with respect to relative command, (where no special agreement exists to the contrary between the respective courts) is that the senior officer in rank should command the whole allied force. Although it appears to his Majesty that it is of the last importance to the successful conduct of operations in the field that the supreme command should reside in some one General, yet his Majesty trusts that to whatever nation the command may at any time fall, according to the rule above laid down, it will be conducted with all the forbearance, spirit of conciliation, and temper, which is so indispensably necessary to preserve harmony in an allied army; that the authority will be exercised, as far as possible, upon principles of the most unreserved confidence and communication with the officers in the chief command of the other corps; that it will not in any instance be pushed beyond what the absolute necessity of the case may seem to require; and that it be upon no account directed to any interference whatever in the internal system and management of the respective armies, which ought to remain exclusively under the direction and regulation of their own separate staffs.

His Majesty entertains the most confident hope and expectation that the good sense, temper, and prudence of the officers who may thus meet upon service will at once determine them not to suffer any minor difficulty or feeling to obstruct or impede their exertions, in a cause in which all are equally animated and interested; and that thus every embarrassment will be obviated. His Majesty deems it expedient, however, that your lordship should receive instructions for the direction of your conduct, in the event of his Majesty's just expectations in this particular being disappointed.

And, first, in case the rule of command above laid down (which is the same as that which was settled between his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, with respect to the Mediterranean) is not acquiesced in by the officers in command of other corps, your lordship will not suffer such a refusal on their part to disturb, in any degree, the cordiality and military concert between the armies, but you will endeavour to arrange with them a joint plan of operations, and to carry them into effect, supplying, as far as you can, by additional exertion of those qualities which your lordship so eminently possesses, for conducting a delicate task of this nature, the want of that unity of command and control which, where it can be established, is of the first importance in the successful conduct of any military operation.

Wherever the command may reside, his Majesty is persuaded that the operations to be undertaken will be determined on in concert, and with a due regard to the value of the object aimed at and the risks attending it. The King is desirous not to decline any effort from which solid advantage to the common cause may be expected to result. It is, however, of peculiar importance to the interests of this country, and to the strength of the confederacy in the ensuing campaign, that the corps of British and Hanoverian troops now sent to the Continent should not be improvidently hazarded or broken down by enterprises during the winter, which do not present a reasonable hope of accomplishing some result in itself of real importance.

Your lordship will hold this principle in view, in the arrangement of any measures to be pursued; and the King feels persuaded that your lordship's opinion and judgment cannot fail to have the greatest weight in any discussions which may take place with respect to military operations, should any decision be taken contrary to your lordship's opinion, but from the execution of which, under all the circumstances, you may not think it expedient to withdraw the

troops under your command. Your lordship having, in the most amicable manner, fully urged the considerations which influence your own judgment, will make such protest in writing as the case may appear to you to require. Should, however, the decision be of a nature which appears to your lordship seriously and unadvisedly to expose his Majesty's army, or to commit his Majesty's interests in any imprudent or unbecoming manner (however little the King apprehends that such an instance will occur), your lordship is hereby authorized, under a full confidence that you will never have recourse to such a measure, except under an adequate necessity, to notify to the allies any circumstances under which your sense of duty would compel you to withhold your co-operation till the special orders of your Court are received.

By the latest letters received from Berlin and Stralsund, it seems very doubtful whether his Swedish Majesty will be prevailed on to advance with his troops from the latter place. Should, however, the final determination of the King of Sweden be to join his forces to the British and Russian armies, his Majesty—having understood that his august ally, the Emperor of Russia, has signified his intention of placing his Russian troops under the King of Sweden's orders—is ready, as a provisional arrangement, under the limitations above mentioned, and previous to the British army being assembled in force upon the Continent, to place his troops also under the same command. And his Majesty recommends, in this event, that your lordship should, by all those marks of deference and attention which are due to the King of Sweden's exalted rank, and are peculiarly required by that monarch's temper and character, endeavour to conciliate and invite his Majesty's confidence, on which may principally depend your lordship's having that influence over the King's mind which is essential to the public service.

I am not aware what the precise rank is which Count Tolstoy holds in the Russian army; but, from every thing I

have heard of that distinguished officer, your lordship will find him animated alone by a desire to promote the public service. His zeal, courage, and manners, have conciliated the esteem and command the respect of all those persons with whom he has been in communication ; and I am persuaded your lordship will at once establish an understanding the most intimate and satisfactory with Count Tolstoy, through which the King is satisfied all difficulties which may occur in any other quarter will be most effectually overcome.

Referring your lordship to his Majesty's sentiments with respect to the recovery of Holland, as stated in my former despatch, I have only in addition to observe that, from the turn the war has since taken, the progress made by the enemy on the side of Moravia, and the additional necessity thereby imposed on Prussia of acting in still greater force than she originally intended on the side of Franconia, it seems doubtful whether, until the fate of the campaign is more decided in that quarter, the Court of Berlin will be disposed to undertake operations against Holland. It is, however, to be remarked that their final decision on this subject has not been received, and that, when the reports alluded to were made, they were in ignorance at Berlin of his Majesty's determination to carry his force in the North of Germany to the extent now proposed.

It will be for your lordship, upon your arrival on the Continent, proceeding in person to Berlin, if you should find it necessary for the purpose, to bring this important question to a decision, upon a cool and deliberate examination of all the means that can be applied to the object, compared with the difficulties, *local* as well as *general*, which you apprehend the enemy may be able to interpose. Your lordship will be aware that impediments may at one moment exist with respect to such an enterprise, which subsequent circumstances may in a great measure remove ; for instance, any decisive success on the side of Moravia ; and, still more, the French army being

driven toward the Rhine with great loss, whilst it must interfere with their arrangements for strengthening Holland, would probably increase the means of Prussia, as applicable to an immediate attack upon that country. It is also possible that the Swedish troops may yet advance, and that the Court of Berlin, in addition to the corps of 10,000 men, under General Kalkreuth, which is immediately to join the allied forces, may be induced, *upon representation*, to appropriate from its reserve a more considerable corps to this service. It is also possible, either from the dispositions of the people of Holland, or the occurrence of a frost, that the defences of that country may be in a great measure laid open, and the progress of an army thereby facilitated. The various combinations of circumstances which must determine the line of conduct to be pursued will best suggest themselves to your lordship's judgment on the spot.

You are apprised of the importance the King attaches to the early recovery of Holland from the dominion of France; your lordship is at the same time aware his Majesty is not less solicitous that his troops should not be *imprudently committed* in pursuit of any object, however valuable. Upon any case that may arise, admitting of the delay of communication, your lordship may avail yourself of the immediate directions of your government; but his Majesty has no difficulty in confiding to your lordship full power and authority to act without reference to home, upon a full consideration of all the circumstances, in such manner as may appear to your lordship most conducive to the interests of his Majesty's service; and his Majesty expects that your lordship will exercise freely this discretion, where prejudice might arise to his military service by awaiting directions from hence.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby.*

Downing Street, December 5, 1805.

Dear Lord Harrowby—I have only time for one line, to say that I shall this evening take the King's pleasure on the sailing of the troops, which may proceed, I should hope, on Sunday or Monday, if the wind serves.

I send you a copy of my further instructions to Lord Cathcart, which will best explain our present views and impressions. I hope Lord C. will get away to-morrow evening. Some doubts have arisen as to the facility of entering the port of Embden, without being exposed to the Dutch batteries. I rather hope, however, that these will be removed, and that we shall be able to debark at the advanced position of the Ems. I have not time to add more.

Yours faithfully,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, December 6, 1805.

My dear Lord—I am excessively anxious not to lose this favourable weather. The orders for sailing shall be sent to the Admiralty immediately. The whole, both from the Downs and the Nore, to proceed to Embden. The ordnance stores, horses, &c., will drop down, I hope, on Sunday, so as to sail on Monday or Tuesday from the Nore; but there is no reason for delaying the division from the Downs, if ready. Let me, therefore, beg your lordship to accelerate the embarkation of both infantry and cavalry, and send them off as fast as possible.

I enclose a short minute of intelligence as to the Ems, received from the masters of Prussian vessels belonging to the port of Embden. It seems to place the facility of entering and landing beyond a doubt. They do not speak of the Dutch having any armed vessels in the river. I should wish, how-

ever, six or eight gun-brigs, at least, to be sent, lest they should send something round from the Texel; and it may be advisable to send an intelligent officer, as before, to collect pilots to meet the fleet off the Ems.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*The Right Hon. William Pitt to Lord Castlereagh.*

Bath, Monday, December 6, 1805.

Dear Castlereagh—I return the box which I received this morning. I agree very much with you that, in the uncertainty of what may be the ultimate line of Prussia, it may perhaps not be to be regretted if Lord Cathcart should have directed the last division of our troops to return without landing. But, as far as I can trace, Lord Cathcart, when he wrote, had received only Lord Harrowby's despatch, written while the answer of Prussia was evasive. He will soon after have received that of the 23rd, announcing the positive assurance of security for our troops, on their observing the conditions specified, which are not unreasonable. Under these circumstances, I incline to think he will not have sent back any of the troops; and, if so, I confess I do not see how we can, in our instructions, make any distinction between the first and last divisions.

The reasoning which you state in your letter for our consenting to let the former remain for the present appears to me (under the general assurance now given by Berlin) to apply with equal force, and almost unanswerably, to the latter. I certainly feel a strong desire to see so valuable a body of troops at home; but I do not think the difference, at any rate, will be more than between the present time and early enough in the spring for any defensive purpose here. By bringing them away now, I fear we should hardly give a fair chance to the good disposition of Prussia, if any such really exist. Whenever the troops must come away, I think the arrangement you

propose respecting the Hanoverians is most judicious, and I am very glad it is approved. It hardly seems to me that we are yet ripe to send any fresh instructions to Craig.

My second attack of gout is now subsiding, and I hope to recover from it quicker than the former; but I am sorry to say that I have more ground to gain, before I am fit for anything, than I can almost hope to accomplish within a fortnight. Bath is no longer thought of use, and I shall move as soon as I can.

Ever yours,

W. P.

Pray have the goodness to mention what I have stated respecting the return of our troops. Whatever you and they, on consideration, decide, I shall be satisfied with.

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*Mr. Cooke to Lieutenant-General Don.*

Downing Street, December 7, 1805.

Sir—As the arrival of Lord Cathcart on the Continent will necessarily deprive Lord Castlereagh of the advantage of your official correspondence, his lordship has commanded me to express his hope that it will not put an end to communications of a private nature; and if at any time you shall have opportunities of transmitting advices which would be delayed by sending them through Lord Cathcart, who may possibly be at a distance from you, he wishes that you would be good enough to forward them immediately to me for his information.

I have the honour, &c.,

E. COOKE.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby.*

Downing Street, December 7, 1805.

Dear Lord Harrowby—Upon full investigation there appears no difficulty in sending a fleet into the Ems. Upon due consideration, however, of all circumstances, we have thought it best to make use of the Weser, for the following reasons:—

Firstly. As uniting in one point, viz., Bremen, all our supplies, which would be inconveniently divided, unless previously assorted with great care between two stations.

Secondly. As rendering it at once safe to send everything as fast as ready, and in succession; and relieving us from the necessity of those precautions, both with respect to entering the river, and when there, which the neighbourhood of Holland would enjoin in the Ems.

Thirdly. That upon a careful reference to the information received, particularly that sent by Colonel Anstruther to the Duke of York, which is in considerable detail, we see no probability of the armies being so far advanced as to make it difficult for the troops landing in the Weser to take up the positions for which they may be destined, without any inconvenient delay: whereas, if landed at Embden, they might have occasion to fall back, which, in point of impression, it is desirable to avoid. The resources of East Friesland may still be taken advantage of, either by meeting the army on its advance, or by being collected on the Weser.

I send you a Memorandum, which I laid before the King, to relieve his mind from all serious apprehension with respect to the safety and subsistence of his troops. It will serve to give you an outline of the extent and nature of the equipment which has been prepared to accompany the army.

Lord Cathcart's destination is now changed to the Weser. We shall send to Embden, to direct whatever information has been collected there to be sent to him at Bremerlehe. I think it not unlikely, after he has made his first arrangements, that he will endeavour to pass a day or two at Berlin with you, in order the better to see what can be done, and how it can best be done.

The two points as to the means of acting against Holland which it seems desirable to investigate (in case the policy should not be disapproved, with the utmost means that can now be procured), are, whether Prussia, by any effort not affecting

her strength imprudently in other quarters, can augment her army sufficiently on the side of Holland to make the gross allied force, under favourable circumstances as to season, capable of profiting of the weakness of the enemy, which seems to continue, notwithstanding reports of reinforcements. Secondly, whether Prussia could add some cavalry, so as to supply the deficiency which prevails in the Prussian corps, and must continue in ours till the horse-ships are returned, which I hope you have directed. The infantry transports are not much wanted here, and may remain as a precautionary measure, if you think it expedient.

I cannot close this without stating that, although we deprecate our troops being sent into Holland, on an ill-concerted errand, merely as a diversion, more particularly previous to a frost, whilst the country is in its *natural and impassable* state, we shall most deeply lament the necessity of abandoning its reduction till another year; and therefore hope that this operation may only be relinquished upon the most deliberate conviction of its impracticability and inexpediency.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Memorandum.*

Endorsed, "In No. 2 to Lord Cathcart, and private to Lord Harrowby,  
7th December, 1805."

December 5, 1805.

The Court of Berlin has signified its consent, in the most cordial terms, to his Majesty's troops being landed at Embden, as also to their being there supplied with whatever they may require. The Prussian Government has also given a formal assurance of protection to whatever portion of his Majesty's army may be landed in the North of Germany, under any contingency that may occur; which also has been extended to the Russian and Swedish troops.

With respect to the supplies and comforts of the troops, it appears that the Commissary, on his arrival at Bremerlehe,

found no difficulty in making a contract immediately for the furnishing bread and forage for 12,000 men and 3,000 horses for one month, and that Lieutenant-General Don had directed a further dépôt to be immediately formed at Bremen for the like number of men and horses, for six additional weeks.

In addition to the subsistence which the country may afford, salt provisions and biscuit have been embarked for 15,000 men for five months. The transports are victualled for above two months on an average, for the full complement of troops they are capable of receiving. In addition to the above, 12,000 bags of meal, equal to the supply of 50,000 men for three months, and 12,000 quarters of oats, equal to the supply of 12,000 horses for one month, are ordered and ready to proceed, making in the whole a provision to be sent from hence fully adequate to the British army, calculated at 25,000 men, for the next four months, independent of purchases to be made on the spot, of which the Commissariat will, of course, avail itself, reserving the British imports to be forwarded with the British army, in case they shall take the field.

With a view to the health and comfort of the men in the winter, a full supply of flannel waistcoats and drawers have been embarked, also of additional blankets to be used in cantonments: 30,000 pair of shoes have also been sent. Camp and hospital stores have been forwarded, for the full number gone and going.

Including the heavy regiment of the King's German Legion, now embarking, the cavalry horses sent amount to about 1,400. Those for the Artillery, including two troops of the Waggon Train, amount to 1,724, being the full field establishment of guns sent, trusting to find on the Continent the means of transporting the spare ammunition. Total horses sent, 3,124. A considerable number of horse-transports are in forwardness, which, with the transports expected from the Elbe, will forward an additional force in cavalry or draught horses, if thought more expedient. It does not, however, appear, from either

Lieutenant-General Don's or Brigadier-General Decken's reports, that any material difficulty has hitherto occurred in procuring waggons and draught-horses for transporting the stores and baggage of the army from the place of debarkation to the Weser.

Supposing the troops should not be advanced, it is understood that the cantonments behind the Ems and Weser will afford them ample accommodation. If a sufficient motive should exist for directing them to take the field at any period during the winter, there is every reason to hope that, from the fertile province of East Friesland, aided by the Electorate and Holstein, adequate means of rendering the army moveable may have been collected, within an early period after their landing.

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*Mr. Cooke to Mr. Bullock.*

Downing Street, December 7, 1805.

Sir—I am directed by Lord Castlereagh to intimate to you that it is now proposed to send the troops under Lord Cathcart's orders to the Weser, whither his lordship proceeds, and they will land at Bremerlehe. And his lordship desires that all information respecting the supplies and resources of East Friesland may be forwarded to him at Bremen, or, if he should not be arrived there, to Bremerlehe. It is desirable that you should meet his lordship there in person, as well as such officers who may be sent by General Don to communicate with his lordship. After your report shall have been received and considered by Lord Cathcart, he will send you back to England with as little delay as the public service will admit.

I am, &c.,

E. COOKE.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Don.*

Downing Street, December 7, 1805.

Sir—I have received your letters of the dates and numbers mentioned in the margin, which have been laid before the

King, and I am to express to you his Majesty's approbation of the measures you have taken for procuring information respecting the enemy, for acting in concert with the Generals of the allied forces, and for placing your corps in a situation to make a forward movement.

Lieutenant-General Lord Cathcart is proceeding to the Weser this evening; and the heavy regiment of German cavalry, with twelve British regiments, will immediately sail for the same destination. His lordship, upon taking the command of his Majesty's forces upon the Continent, will be happy to avail himself of all the facilities which your activity and talents will have opened. And I am persuaded you will not fail to put his lordship in possession of all the information you may have acquired, and to promote, with the utmost zeal and cordiality, the objects of his command.

I am, &c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

*Mr. Cooke to Brigadier-General Baron Decken.*

Downing Street, December 7, 1805.

Sir—Lord Castlereagh directs me to acknowledge your letter to him of the 15th ult., and to express his approbation of the measures you had taken. Lord Cathcart proceeds to the Continent this evening, in order to take the command, and you will, of course, act officially under his lordship.

It may happen that occurrences of importance may arise which could be transmitted by a quicker conveyance than through head-quarters. In such cases, I am to suggest that you would be good enough to make me a private communication for his lordship's information.

I am, &c.,      E. COOKE.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Admiralty.*

Downing Street, December 7, 1805.

My Lords—Referring your lordships to my letter of the 29th ult., I am to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure that

the troops and stores now assembling in the Downs and at the Nore do proceed to the Weser in such divisions as may be deemed most convenient, with the least possible delay. I am to request your lordships will give directions that the horse-transports should be first unloaded, on their arrival at Bremerlehe, and returned, with the utmost despatch, to the Downs, under a proper convoy; the infantry-transports to remain in the Weser, unless specially directed by Lord Cathcart, or the officer in the chief command of the King's forces on the Continent, to return to England.

As it is of importance to his Majesty's service that the means of communication with the army on the Continent should, under present circumstances, be facilitated as much as possible, I am to desire that your lordships will cause a proportion of light vessels to be at all times stationed in the Weser, giving directions to the naval officer in command on that station to forward to the nearest English port which the wind may enable them to reach any despatches which may be addressed to his Majesty's Government by the King's Ministers or general officers on the Continent.

The officers commanding such vessels to be directed, immediately on reaching a port, to forward, by a Post Office express to London, the despatches with which they are charged.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, December 7, 1805, 2 p.m.

My dear Lord—The importance of availing ourselves of this favourable weather to send off everything as fast as ready, and the advantage of making Bremen our main dépôt, has determined us to give up the Ems, and to send the troops, &c., to Bremerlehe. We shall thus be relieved, both in entering and after landing, from those precautions which the neighbourhood of Holland would enjoin with regard to the Ems.

Your lordship will receive orders, both by telegraph and by express, to send off, without loss of time, everything now ready in the Downs, which I take to be the seven regiments of infantry which came from Ireland, none of which are to be exchanged; the two which are to be changed, and the three regiments composing the additional brigade to be embarked from hence, may proceed with a separate convoy as soon as ready.

I am not aware whether the seven regiments above alluded to have been eased in their transports, as was intended: if not, it is better they should proceed as they are, the distance being short, than lose so fine a breeze.

I will take care the captain of the Regulus shall know when all the transports to be convoyed by her to the Weser have dropped down.

I am confident your lordship will get all this put in motion with the least practicable delay. You will order the horse-ships to be first unloaded, and immediately returned to the Downs. The infantry transports to remain, unless specially directed by Lord Cathcart to return.

I am, &c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Keith.*

East Sheen, December 12, 1805.

My dear Lord—I observe the 28th regiment has sailed, making, in the first embarkation, eight regiments of infantry, instead of seven, as referred to in my last. The 28th was one of the regiments intended to be changed for the 87th. The latter will now not go, and there are only four to proceed, viz., the 5th, 27th, 34th, and 91st, all of which, it appears from your lordship's letter of this morning, are on board. The wind is now blowing strong from the north, and nothing can, of course, stir from the Downs. The snow may bring the wind round, perhaps, more to the westward. I am myself at a loss to judge of the probability of the Weser's being obstructed by ice; but should rather hope the strength of the

wind, and its direction from the north-west, during the last three days, will have prevented the formation of ice.

I shall, however, send your lordship's letter, together with this, to Lord Barham, and request his lordship to state to you any doubts he may feel about the troops proceeding. If professional opinions are not against it, on political grounds it is much wished they should go without a moment's delay.

Horse-ships for 200 horses are on their way from the River to Ramsgate.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. William Pitt.*

Downing Street, December 13, 1805.

My dear Sir—I enclose the Duke's letter; from this it appears that, upon the Duke of Cambridge's arrival in Hanover, the active command of the whole British force is to centre in him—that Lord Cathcart will not have the power to draw money for the public service, or to order a court-martial. This view of the arrangement necessarily supposes the Duke's actual and constant presence with the army, which will not render him of much use in restoring *the Electoral Government*, or in bringing forward the resources of the country, which is the only motive alleged for his going at all. This will be the more evident when the first positions of the army are adverted to, on the verge of Hanover, with its advanced guard in the Oldenburg territory.

The Duke of York admitted that, however unpleasant to the Duke of Cambridge's feelings, his command was to be restricted to Hanover, and he proposed that any operation in advance should be undertaken by a detachment to be made by the Duke of Cambridge's orders, under Lord C.'s command. But, according to this idea, the advanced guard of the army is not, at the outset, under the command of the General-in-Chief of the army. But, supposing all these minor details adjusted, we come to the substance. Is the correspondence and the

discretion with respect to offensive operations to be with the Duke of Cambridge or Lord Cathcart? To give it to the former is inconsistent with every motive upon which Lord Cathcart was withdrawn from the special embassy to Vienna, and directed to take the field. And yet to give such a discretion, and that to be exercised without reference home, to any other officer than the one in the actual command of the army, would be to destroy every notion of real subordination; and, from the personal awkwardness to which it must lead, would expose the second in command to have it imputed to him that he moved forward in order to create a separate command for himself. And it is impossible for us to suppose that the Duke of Cambridge would look with very cordial feelings towards a measure which was to expose him to what he admits to be a great awkwardness; or that Lord Cathcart would not be thereby placed in a situation, with respect to the higher military powers, which it would be unfair in us to acquiesce in, exclusive of the influence it must have in counteracting and impeding the leading purpose we had in view in sending so considerable a force at the present moment to the Continent.

I cannot see why the Duke of Cambridge need be placed on the British staff, *at present* on the Continent. If the King considers his presence in Hanover for Electoral purposes indispensable, to that it is not for us to object. But the decision of so important a question as the command of a British army of 25,000 men ought not to be collaterally decided by any consideration of Hanoverian policy. Upon general grounds, it might be outstepping our duty to advise the King against employing any of the Princes of the blood on the staff of the army, until such time as the turn of the war may admit of the British forces being employed on a large scale. Till this happens, they will be placing themselves according to relative rank in subordination to Russian, Swedish, or Prussian Generals, as may happen. Whereas, should a field open for sending the remainder of the disposable force to the Continent,

the British army will then be sufficient to form a separate corps, in which they may be with less awkwardness employed than in all the cabals and intricacy of a confederated force. The natural destination for the Duke of Cambridge, if he must go, seems to be, to take upon him the government of Hanover. With respect to that government, the British troops, *including the German Legion*, can only be considered as standing in the relation of auxiliaries. As such, I see no objection to the officer in command being directed to report to, and confer with, the person at the head of the government, more especially if the King's son, being himself a British officer, is entrusted with it. But there are objections to the union of the situations; and, if the Duke of Cambridge is not actually on the British staff, there is no awkwardness in the command being in Lord Cathcart; nor is the presence of a regiment of which his Royal Highness is Colonel any reason for his serving on the staff.

Many thanks for your note. I have troubled you more in detail than was necessary, after knowing your sentiments. I was only desirous of opening, in some degree, the detail, with the view of your considering whether it is most expedient to propose that the Duke's departure should be delayed; or to suggest the objections to his serving, under the present circumstances, on the British staff, leaving it to the King to judge how far it is expedient to send him for purposes strictly Hanoverian.

I should be glad you would write to the Duke of York on the subject, at least to suspend the Duke of Cambridge's departure till this point has been fully considered.

I am, &c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Duke of York.*

Downing Street, December 19, 1805.

Sir—The present state of the weather has induced the Ministers in town, coupled with a note received this morning

from Mr. Pitt, in which the leaning of his opinion is strongly marked, to give orders for the transports to proceed from the Downs and the Nore, to the Weser direct, directing, however, that, in case of the wind becoming adverse or blowing hard, they should not contend against it, but return to the Downs.

I have the honour to enclose to your Royal Highness the substance of intelligence which has reached us in the course of this day. The accounts are not sufficiently authentic to place the result beyond the reach of doubt, but certainly create a strong presumption that the Allies have retrieved the first disaster.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby.*

Downing Street, December 21, 1805.

Dear Lord Harrowby—The messenger Donaldson, charged with despatches for you, having been cast away on the coast of Holland, I have thought it right to send duplicates; though you will probably have learnt from Lord Harrington, on his way through Berlin, and from Lord Cathcart, the substance of their contents. The letters themselves were fortunately destroyed by the messenger.

In order that no time might be lost in sending to the Continent the troops therein announced, eight of the nine regiments of infantry which came from Ireland being ready in the Downs, with the heavy regiment of Hanoverian cavalry, were ordered to proceed to sea; whilst one of the regiments from Ireland was exchanging, and three more embarking from hence. They sailed on the 10th, and met with a most severe gale of wind, which dispersed the fleet, consisting of sixty-seven transports. We have reason to apprehend that four have been lost: two near the Texel, one on the Goodwin Sands, and one near Calais. Such was the violence of the storm, that five have been driven from the North Sea even to Portsmouth.

In addition to the above disaster, on the 12th a most severe

and discouraging frost set in here, which seemed to leave but very slender hopes of our being able again to approach any of the rivers on the opposite coast during the winter. It has happily disappeared, after lasting for five or six days, with as great rapidity as it commenced.

However much our armament has been disconcerted by its late hardships, under a deep sense that it became us, at the present moment, to risk much for our allies, in the absence of Mr. Pitt, Lord Mulgrave, and Lord Hawkesbury at Bath, we determined to give the orders yesterday, the wind being fair, for every thing to proceed to the Weser without a moment's delay. This includes the four regiments which had not before sailed; also the artillery, waggon-train, and store-ships from the Nore, as well as every transport driven back which is in a state to put to sea. They will probably sail to-day, the weather being favourable.

I trust our allies will feel that no effort has been omitted on our part, which could either prove our zeal or contribute to their support. I hope you will make them understand how impossible it was for us, upon any military principle, to land a force on the enemy's coast at this season with any reasonable prospect of bringing them off again in case a retreat became necessary.

A *coup de main* against Boulogne would certainly have been an object of the first importance to our separate interests, and one we should have been most anxious to undertake; but no professional man would hear of hazarding the amount of force which alone could have given us a chance of success on the French coast in the months of November and December, without a port for them to approach, or a chance of re-embarking them without great loss, if the enemy were in any considerable force, even had we succeeded in our main object of destroying the flotilla.

You already know the grounds on which Walcheren was abandoned, after much consideration, and can also judge how

little effect its fall would have produced, unconnected with operations against Holland from the side of Westphalia. You also can fully estimate the imprudence of any attempt to disembark in the Isle of Voorn until the enemy were upon the point of being driven from North Holland. These were all hasty effusions of zeal and vigour, which would not bear the test of sober examination, more especially at this season, and in the present positions of the armies. We have, therefore, directed our exertions to the only quarter, namely, the North of Germany, in which we could give support without imminent danger of sacrificing our troops, and that without any prospect of adequate advantage either to the alliance or to ourselves ; and I hope, when our allies again inquire why we did nothing on the enemy's coast, they will ask themselves whether an army could possibly have been put on shore at such a season in a state of equipment which would have admitted of its moving ten miles from the coast. With respect to the time of our troops arriving on the Continent, if there has been any delay, it is attributable to the state of the winds, and to our ignorance of the real views of Prussia, and not to want of exertion on the part of the King's Government.

We first heard of the infraction of the Prussian neutrality, and of the disposition of the Court of Berlin to favour the advance of the allied troops about the middle of October : our first expedition of 12,000 men actually sailed the 5th of November from the Downs, and might have sailed some days sooner had the wind served.

Six regiments were embarked at Cork on the 25th October, and three more about the 1st November, destined to support, if necessary, the first expedition. These troops, owing to the uninterrupted continuance of easterly winds, did not reach the Downs (though under injunctions to accelerate their arrival) till the 6th or 7th of December ; and they sailed for the Weser on the 10th, the additional force from hence being embarked, and ready to follow, on the subsequent day, viz., the 11th instant.

From this it appears that, having at the outset determined to take our reinforcements, in the first instance, from Ireland, and allotted our transports accordingly, we remained for six weeks in daily expectation of their approach. It was not, however, till early in December that the resolution was finally taken to send the four additional brigades to the Continent; and, consequently, had these regiments been earlier within our reach, under the uncertainty that prevailed with respect to the political and military plans of the Court of Berlin, as things then stood, it is not clear that they would have been detached many days sooner. But, throughout the entire period in question, our means even of sending cavalry, which we were most desirous of doing, were impeded by the absolute impossibility of getting the horse-ships from the River, or the ports in the Channel, round to Ramsgate.

The supply of horse-ships, when we first determined to send a force to the Continent, in the middle of October, was certainly limited, from the little prospect which previously existed of our being able to act upon the Continent with any large equipment of cavalry or artillery. It did not exceed provision for the transport of 800 or 1,000 horses. But great exertions were immediately made upon the change taking place in the counsels of Prussia; and we have already actually shipped for the Continent 3,000 horses, leaving transports nearly completed for 1,000 more; being in tonnage not less than 40,000 tons for this branch of service alone.

The gross number at present engaged in the transport department generally, at home and abroad, is not less than 650 ships, measuring above 160,000 tons, all employed either in offensive operations of our own, or in the service of the Russians in the Mediterranean.

I have thought it necessary to trouble you with this outline, to enable you, from official facts, to correct misapprehensions prejudicial to the just claims of this Government, to have our exertions understood and acknowledged: and, as I observe the

same general language has been held both at the Russian and Austrian head-quarters, perhaps you will think it expedient to transmit the substance of this private letter to Lord G. Levison Gower and Sir Arthur Paget, in order that they may be enabled the more effectually to vindicate the character of the British Government with those Courts.

I am, &c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

Downing Street, December 23, 1805.

The disposable force intended for Continental service, including the German Legion, may be stated as follows:—

		Rank & File.
Tonnage required at 1½		
per man . . . . .	57,344	British Infantry . . . . .
		36,000
		Officers, &c., $\frac{1}{2}$ . . . . .
		4,250
		King's German Infantry . . . . .
		5,000
		Officers, &c., $\frac{1}{2}$ . . . . .
		625
		<hr/>
		Total Infantry . . . . .
		<hr/> 45,875
Horses, 5,528 . . . . .	55,280	Artillery—Officers, non-commissioned, and privates . . . . .
Guns, Stores, &c. . . . .	19,720	3,756
		Drivers . . . . .
		<hr/> 3,084
		<hr/> 6,840
		<hr/>
		Cavalry . . . . .
		9,800
		British officers, $\frac{1}{2}$ . . . . .
		<hr/> 1,225
		King's German . . . . .
		<hr/> 1,200
		Officers, $\frac{1}{2}$ . . . . .
		<hr/> 150
		<hr/>
		Total Cavalry . . . . .
		<hr/> 12,375
		Artillery . . . . .
		<hr/> 6,840
		Infantry . . . . .
		<hr/> 45,875
		<hr/>
		Total Combattants . . . . .
Horses, 2,000 . . . . .	20,000	<hr/> 65,090
	10,000	Commissariat . . . . .
		<hr/> 1,268
		Hospital Staff Corps. Wag.
		<hr/> 1,000
Total tons . . . . .	285,719	Men . . . . .
		<hr/> 67,358

*Tonnage already supplied for Troops sent to the Continent.*

Infantry	.	.	.	.	.	.	29,000
Horses	.	.	.	.	.	.	31,000
Artillery, exclusive of Horses	.	.	.	.	.	.	4,000
Stores	.	.	.	.	.	.	10,000
							<hr/>
Total	.	.	.	.	.	.	74,000

*Remain to be supplied.*

Infantry	.	.	.	.	.	.	28,344
Horses	.	.	.	.	.	.	167,655
Artillery, exclusive of Horses	.	.	.	.	.	.	15,720
Commissariat Stores, &c.	.	.	.	.	.	.	20,000
							<hr/>
							231,719

*There are now Transports applicable to Home Service as follows :*

Infantry	.	.	.	.	.	.	48,747
Cavalry	.	.	.	.	.	.	40,000
Stores	.	.	.	.	.	.	12,867

*Wanting to complete.*

Infantry and Stores	.	.	.	.	.	.	None.
Horses	.	.	.	.	.	.	127,655

From the above statement, which is sufficiently correct for all practical purposes, it appears that, supposing the troops and store-ships now employed on home service assembled on this side of the Channel, the present provision would probably enable us to transport the whole of the infantry and stores, without incurring the delay of waiting for their return and a second embarkation.

Supposing the whole of the horses for the army to be supplied from hence, the number still to go is about 17,000, requiring 170,000 tons of shipping, if they are to go in one trip. Supposing from 2,000 to 3,000 draught horses procurable on the Continent, the number to be actually carried will be about 14,000, requiring 140,000 tons.

Supposing the 11th and 13th regiments of Light Dragoons

now to go, a proportion of the Artillery horses and the whole of those for the Commissariat to be passed over to the Continent, between the present time and the period of the general armament sailing, there would not then remain above 10,000 horses, exclusive of those of the cavalry and the field horses belonging to the artillery, to be carried, immediately previous to the season for operations ; allowing transports three weeks for their voyage to the Weser and back, the whole of the 10,000 horses remaining, might be landed on the Continent in the course of five weeks, by a provision of horse-ships equal to the reception of 5,000 horses, that is, for 1,000 more than at present exists.

As the above equipment for infantry and cavalry will constitute a fleet of above 450 sail, its further extension in number would be more productive of expense and embarrassment in the embarkation and disembarkation than it would tend to facilitate the operations of the army.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Downing Street, December 23, 1805.

My Lord—Since I had the honour of addressing your lordship last, his Majesty's Government have received a communication from Lord Harrowby, of which I have the honour to enclose copies for your information, in which the numbers and position of the Prussian armies are detailed, as also the principles upon which it is proposed by the Court of Berlin that the first movements of those forces should be conducted. It is thereby confirmed that, for the present at least, all intention of operating against Holland is waved in favour of the main object of meeting the French army in force to the southward ; and, from some private channels of information, it may be collected that the Prussian Government has ever looked to the possibility, whilst the strength of their army is occupied towards the Danube, that the enemy might attempt a diversion

on their flank, and compel the army now stationed on the Weser to fall back towards Magdeburg.

The wisdom of making a great effort against the French, in the first instance, in Germany, does not admit of a question ; and, as a general proposition, it is certainly better policy to be exposed, for a time, in certain quarters, than, by attempting to defend all points, to be powerful and successful in none. But there are positions in themselves of so much importance as to enjoin the utmost attention to their protection ; and in this light, I have no doubt, the effectual defence of the Ems and Weser will have been felt by his lordship, and strongly represented as such in your communications with the Prussian Government.

I am induced the rather at this moment to call your attention to this object, with a view to your impressing it on the mind of the Court of Berlin, from observing that the enemy are assembling in some force on the line of the Yssel ; that we have as yet no assurance of the active co-operation of the Swedish troops ; and that the corps under General Kalkreuth, now stationed at Paderborn, which it was at first understood was to be attached to and act with the allies, may be further withdrawn by the events of the war to the southward. Had the reinforcement of British troops, which we may now trust will reach its destination in safety, been excluded from the Continent by the state of the rivers, there would have been additional reason to apprehend that the enemy might have made a successful irruption into the North of Germany.

Your lordship will at once feel the many important considerations which must weigh with his Majesty's Government in pressing for an effectual protection against such an attack.

1st. They cannot but feel a peculiar solicitude that his Majesty's Electoral subjects, severely afflicted as they have been without being, in any degree, original parties in the war, should not again be exposed to new sufferings, on account of the exertions they are now making in the common cause.

2nd. Any incursion into Hanover must materially interrupt the progress of those levies now making with considerable effect in that country.

3rd. It must expose our magazines on the Elbe and Weser, and compel the army, however good and safe the retreat upon Magdeburg may otherwise be, to depend for their supplies on an exhausted country.

4th. But it must have the still more serious consequence of interrupting the communication with England, and thereby of preventing us from choosing our moment for acting in force upon the Continent, as well as interrupting our pecuniary transactions at Hamburg.

Whilst I have thus pointed your lordship's attention to the leading considerations connected with the maintenance of our position in point of Hanover, I am by no means disposed to apprehend that effectual means will not exist consistent with the plan upon which Prussia is acting, and which appears perfectly well conceived, with a view to the general success of the campaign, of immediately counteracting any such attempt on the part of the enemy. Nor can I yet persuade myself that, consistent with the preservation of their army in the South, the French Government can as yet allot a force competent to the prosecution of offensive operations in the North of Germany.

Your immediate means of defence, on the side of Hanover, will, on the arrival of the reinforcements from hence, in British, Hanoverian, and Russian troops, not fall short, including officers, of 40,000 men, which, should the Swedes advance, will be increased to near 50,000. The corps of General Kal-kreuth, of 15,000, at Paderborn, and the corps under the Prince of Wirtemburg, of 17,000, now assembling between Magdeburg and Halberstadt, must be considered, in their present positions, as immediately bearing on your line of defence.

It is also probable that, in case the progress of the French, on the side of Moravia, is effectually checked by the allies, at

least a considerable proportion of the two corps of reserve now assembled in Silesia, viz., one of 15,000 men at Glogau, under General de Thiele, and one of 25,000 men at Glatz, under General Glawert, will be moved more to the westward, and, consequently, in positions to support the main Prussian army, without weakening themselves too much towards the Ems, or on the Lower Rhine, which is at present observed by the corps of 25,000 stationed at Ziegenhayn, under the orders of the Elector of Hesse. With such prospect of support, I do not feel it necessary to do more than desire your lordship will keep this view of our interests in mind, and that you will frame your concert with the Prussian armies, and make such representation, from time to time, as may appear to you best suited, in the first instance, to provide for the effectual security of the line of the Ems, and everything in its rear ; and, secondly, to accelerate the period when offensive operations may be undertaken against the enemy with a reasonable prospect of success. And, in order the better to enable the allied forces to pursue either course of policy with confidence and effect, I have to recommend to your lordship's consideration the adoption of such measures for strengthening the line of the Weser as may appear to you to be practicable with your present means, at a moderate expense, and within a limited period of time.

I am, &c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. William Pitt.*

Downing Street, Friday, 5 P.M.

My dear Sir—I send a letter from Sontag and another from Decken : the latter is written in a significant tone, and justifies the belief, as his correspondent is in the Prussian *Bureau de la Guerre*, that the military activity of that Government does not relax : this, however, may be merely with defensive views.

Harrowby's next letter will probably bring their policy more to a test. I wish his Note had gone to the two points,

namely, our being permitted to retreat through Prussia, if necessary, and "the line Prussia meant to adopt in respect to the North of Germany," independent of any more enlarged settlement of Europe. Upon the first he was entitled to require a categorical answer, before we exposed any more of our troops to be frozen up ; and upon the second, though it might require a little more deliberation, yet it is a point not less material to have cleared up, as, upon its decision, must in a great measure depend the policy, if not the *prudence*, of our locking up more force in Hanover than the simple custody of it may require, as we cannot hope that any force of ours, even with the aid of the Russians and Swedes, can secure it against France, if the enemy's army is no longer occupied in Germany, unless Prussia is decidedly determined, under the knowledge she now has that Russia will still support her, not upon any account again to permit the French to turn her flank by occupying Hanover.

I have thought it prudent to send four ships now at the Nore, loaded with meal, to the Weser. In the event of our troops coming away, they may return ; if otherwise, they will be much wanted, and I shall desire the shipments to go on till we hear further.

Ever yours, &c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. William Pitt.*

Downing Street, December 23, 1805.

My dear Sir—I have sealed and forwarded your letter to the Duke, and have prepared a letter to Lord Cathcart, which can do no harm, and will, I hope, quiet the King's mind. I enclose a copy of it.

I also send the intelligence of seven sail of the line and four frigates having escaped from Brest on the 13th. I have conversed with Lord Barham, and send you his arrangement. Until we hear whether Cornwallis has detached or not, and

to what destination, neither of these squadrons can put to sea, but both will be ready at a moment's warning, the one for the West Indies, the other for the Cape, touching at Madeira for intelligence.

Our fleet sailed yesterday with a fine breeze. To-day there is little wind, but it is fair and moderate.

We must now prepare everything for the greater movement to the Continent. I send you a rough sketch of the state of our equipment, and what is wanting. I do not trouble you with the official vouchers to support the statement.

We are yet without mails. The concurrence of accounts continues still strong in favour of good fortune on the 3rd and 4th. The silence of the Paris and Dutch papers, which are received up to the 11th and 15th, of anything after the 2nd, the details of which are not recurred to again in the letter, though the leading fact was received at the Hague on the 11th, is certainly favourable. I observe, by former letters of Thornton's, that they are in the habit of receiving intelligence from Olmütz, the sixth day, by estafette: they might, therefore, on the 19th, have letters as late as the 7th; and they might, on the 11th, have had news of the 5th, on which day the change of fortune was first circulated at Hamburg. It is not, however, so clear that Laforet and Bourrienne could receive information in seven days from Vienna, as the direct route is through Bohemia, and the circuitous route would occasion considerable delay. It seems incredible that they should have postponed till the 6th sending intelligence of such moment as that contained in the proclamation of the 3rd; and still more so, that all the letters, which might and must have reached Berlin and Hamburg, of later dates than the 3rd from Moravia, 100 miles nearer than Vienna, should not only be silent on everything beyond the first successes of the French, but all concur in further actions favourable in their result to the allies.

In haste, ever yours, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

If you can find the papers, which I have been in the habit of sending to Bath, pray send them back : if you cannot, it does not much signify.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Bremerlehe, December 28, 1805.

My dear Lord—We sailed on the 22nd, and had tolerably fair weather till the 25th, on which day, and the 26th, the fleet were in a critical situation. We were shut in between Heligoland and the sands, at the entrance of the rivers Weser and Elbe, with a strong gale from the westward and southward, and were obliged to keep under sail during that time in a very small space. The wind changed, however, yesterday morning, and I came in, in the course of the day, with about thirty transports. The remainder are still in the offing, but they will arrive in the course of this night. One transport, having on board part of the 5th regiment, was lost on the sands off the Texel. This ship, with others of our convoy, joined the Regulus, which sailed from the Nore nearly at the same time, and they went too near the Dutch coast.

In case you should send any more troops in this season, I recommend that you should send them in small numbers at a time, under charge of a sloop of war or gun-brig. If possible, let each ship have a pilot on board for the Weser, or, at all events, let the ship of war have one. The navigation of the river is the easiest I have ever seen ; anybody who has ever entered it may lead in a fleet ; but the want of such a person was the cause of our being in a very critical situation on the 25th and 26th, and might have been that of the loss of many men. At last, the sloops of war attached to the convoys under the Leopard and Regulus were obliged to lead in the transports, without pilots, for want of some effectual arrangement to procure these people. The ice has already appeared in the river, but has disappeared again. It freezes at this moment, and it

is expected that the river will be closed entirely in the course of a few days. It is not believed, however, that it will be in this state for any great length of time.

I cannot give you any news. The armistice between the Emperor of Germany and Bonaparte, the account of which has been published in the Hamburg newspapers, has occasioned the greatest consternation in this part of the country. It is not believed here that the Emperor of Russia gained a victory after his defeat of the 2nd ; but I must say, that they appear to have but little intelligence in this place, excepting what they receive from England.

Believe me, my dear Lord, ever yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Senior Naval Officer in the Downs.*

Downing Street, December 29, 1805.

Sir—I enclose the copy of a letter I have written this day to Lord Keith, and am to desire you will take the preparatory measures recommended therein for getting the light transports ready to sail as soon as Lord Keith's orders can be received.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*To Lord Keith.*

Downing Street, December 29, 1805.

My dear Lord—The French and Dutch papers, the former up to the 19th, and the latter to the 23rd, received this day, having fully confirmed the disastrous result of the battle of Austerlitz, and the conclusion of an armistice between the allied and the French armies, it appears of importance to take from hence such measures without delay, as may secure and facilitate the return of our troops from the Continent, in case Lord Harrowby and Lord Cathcart shall think fit to determine on that measure.

As it is possible that some of the transports which carried the troops from hence may have received damage, particu-

larly the horse transports, which sailed from the Elbe on the 18th, two only of which have reached English ports, I think it desirable to send immediately to the Elbe or Weser, whichever river they can first make, whatever light transports are now in the Downs, capable of receiving either infantry or cavalry. Of the former, I calculate there are from 3,000 to 4,000 tons, and of the latter sufficient for 200 or 300 horses, including those which have sailed from the River. It is the more material that this should be instantly done, while the weather is open and the wind favourable, as the German Legion has received an augmentation of from 3,000 to 5,000 men, since its arrival on the Continent, for which numbers, under given circumstances, additional tonnage may be required.

I consider it also desirable that two respectable squadrons of light-armed ships, each consisting, if possible, of a frigate and ten sloops or gun-brigs, should be immediately sent, the one to the Elbe, and the other to the Weser. Their services may be highly useful in protecting and regulating the transports, and in supplying a succession of convoys, by which the troops may be returned in small divisions, as fast as they are embarked.

Lord Barham being out of town, I trouble your lordship with these directions in a private letter to avoid delay, for which you will receive the official order from the Admiralty to-morrow; and, in order that no delay may take place in preparing the transports to sail, I send a copy of this letter to the senior naval officer in the Downs, that he may give them notice to expect your lordship's orders for immediately putting to sea.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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[Draft.]

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

December 29, 1805.

My Lord—Our suspense relative to affairs on the Continent has been very painfully relieved this morning by the confirma-

tion of the disasters of our allies, and the conclusion of an armistice, by which it appears that the Russian armies are withdrawn from the Austrian States.

In the absence of all official information from our own Ministers (three Hamburg mails being now due), it is impossible for me to add anything to the instructions, of which your lordship and Lord Harrowby are already in possession, and under which you will probably have taken a decision, upon communication with the Court of Berlin and General Tolstoy, before any orders from hence can arrive.

In the absence of Mr. Pitt, Lord Hawkesbury, and Lord Mulgrave at Bath, the only practical step it has occurred to me to take, is to order an additional number of light transports, both for infantry and cavalry, to proceed without delay to the Elbe or Weser, whichever they can first make. This may serve to replace any that have received damage, or to receive on board any augmentation that may have been made to the German Legion since its arrival in Hanover.

I have also directed two strong squadrons of light-armed ships to proceed, the one to the Weser, the other to the Elbe, to protect the transports, and to supply a succession of convoys, so as to enable you, if that measure is decided on, to send back the troops in small divisions, as fast as they are embarked.

Your lordship may rely upon hearing from me so soon as the mails arrive, in case any point should have occurred, on which you may have expressed a wish to receive the sentiments of his Majesty's Ministers.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Your lordship will be good enough to apprise Lord Harrowby of the substance of this letter, or transmit a copy for his information.

I also enclose a despatch I had prepared for your lordship's

guidance, wishing you to be informed of our sentiments on things as they then stood, although the events which have since occurred have materially changed the circumstances to which it applied.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Bremerlehe, January 1, 1806.

My dear Lord—As I hear that a packet will be despatched from Cuxhaven to-morrow, I write a few lines to let you know how we are going on. Since I wrote last, the frost has disappeared entirely from the Weser, and the fall of rain has been very severe. We have continued to disembark the troops, and to send them off to their cantonments along the Weser, between this and Bremen, and on to-morrow the third brigade will disembark and march. The troops are very healthy at present, and I hope will continue so, notwithstanding the weather to which it is necessary to expose them. The horses of the artillery and of the German Dragoons look very well.

Not one of the regiments of infantry has yet been joined by all its men, and some are very weak indeed; but I still hope that the losses will not prove so great as there was at first reason to apprehend. We receive no news whatever.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Ever yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Memorandum of the late Equipments.*

The total transport tonnage at home and abroad in the service was as follows at the following periods:—

	Ships.	Tons.
September 1	332	90,506
October 15	373	101,052
January 1	631	158,934

*Tonnage at Home.*

	Ships.	Tons.
September 1	174	40,149
October 15	212	49,783
January 1	397	102,306

The first expedition, under General Don, consisting of about 12,000 men ; embarkation completed the 29th October ; sailed 5th November from the Downs : all arrived safe.

Second expedition, of 12,000 men. Of this force, nine regiments were taken from Ireland. Orders for the preparation of the second expedition were given at the same time as the first expedition was directed to embark. Six regiments, making part of the second expedition, actually embarked at Cork the end of October, but could not sail for the Downs, owing to contrary winds, till 12th November, and did not reach the Downs till 2nd December, being obliged to put into Falmouth. Three additional regiments embarked at Cork the 19th November on the arrival of transports for their reception —sailed the 22nd November ; did not reach the Downs till the 2nd December, owing to the same cause.

The above regiments sailed for the Weser the 10th December—were dispersed and driven back ; re-sailed, with three additional regiments from England, 22nd December. Between the sailing of the first expedition, on the 5th November, and the 2nd, on the 10th December, a convoy, with cavalry and artillery, sailed on the 28th November, with the wind which brought the troops from Ireland to the Downs, but which did not continue. Thirty-eight light transports, ordered from Portsmouth to the Downs, were detained by easterly winds from October 20th to November 22nd. Thirteen ditto were detained by the same cause at Plymouth from the 1st November to the 29th of same month. A large proportion of tonnage was detained in the River by the same cause.

From the above official facts, it appears :—

1. That, previous to the middle of October, we had for home service 212 transports — tonnage 49,783 ; being more than sufficient for any offensive operation merely against the enemy's coast, exclusive of what the navy could supply—continental operations not then being looked to, the Court of Berlin being in appearance adverse.

2. That, between the 15th October, when Prussia first permitted the allies to advance through her territory, and the 1st of January, we had extended our transports at home from 212 to 397, and our tonnage from 49,783 to 102,306 tons.

3. That, orders for embarking the second expedition and its assembling in the Downs were given at the same time as for the first. It was then only meant that this force should be holden in readiness; but it was not actually decided that it should proceed to the Continent till the beginning of December; the Cabinet being desirous, before they sent more troops to the North of Germany, to be first assured whether Prussia would act or not; as on this must depend the success of any operation against Holland. Before, however, this could be ascertained, it was determined to send them, lest the frost should set in and exclude them altogether.

4. The prevalence of easterly winds through the entire of November prevented the troops from Cork, or the light transports from the river and outports, reaching the Downs. The second division could not, therefore, have sailed sooner, had the measure of sending a further force been even resolved on from the first.

5. The determination of the Government to make every exertion is sufficiently proved by the rapidity with which the equipment of so numerous a fleet of transports was pushed forward, and by their persevering in sending the second expedition to sea again, on the 22nd of December, after being driven back with loss subsequent to its sailing on the 10th.

6. Every precaution was taken for the security of the troops. None but the horse-transports were ordered back. The army had, consequently, always at hand the means of re-embarking and coming away. The sending a supply of light transports since the armistice was to receive the augmentation of the German Legion.

7. Of the entire fleet of transports, consisting of 257 sail and 61,561 tons, which have sailed for the Continent at different times under all the severities of the season, eight have been lost, seven of which had troops on board. There were in these transports about 2,000 men, of which, according to the best information, between 600 and 700 have perished: the remainder are prisoners. A cartel has been sent to the Texel, to endeavour to effect an exchange with regard to those in Holland, which compose the greater proportion of those made prisoners.

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*Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Duke of York.*

January 3, 1806.

Sir—To give some precision to the remarks I had the honour to communicate to you about the Austrian armistice, I shall shortly analyze the official despatches from which they were derived. These despatches are of three different kinds.

1. Five letters and postscripts from the Austrian Minister of the Foreign Department to Count Stahremberg. They are dated Teschen, the 7th of December, when the messenger was sent off; but it is evident that some were written before that day, though after the battle of the 2nd, except one which seems to have been minuted on the 29th of November. Already, on that day, and probably three days before, it was resolved to evacuate the western part of Moravia, on account of the want of provisions. Hence the fortress of Olmütz was put in a state of defence, and the Court repaired to Teschen. Ever since the 27th, did the combined armies advance to the southward, and the most sanguine hopes were entertained, as the forces were nearly equal. The battle of the 2nd did not answer these expectations, because the two victorious wings were obliged to retire in support of the centre. Nevertheless, no ground was lost; and, on the 3rd, the army, consisting of 85,000 men, advanced in the direction of Hungary, fol-

lowing their original plan of a junction with the Archduke Charles.

The French army in Moravia was supposed to be inferior to that number; and the Austrians had another army of 20,000, under the Archduke Ferdinand, at Iglau; while the third Russian army, under General Bennigsen, had reached Breslau on the 5th. No mention is made of subsequent engagements, though such accounts had officially reached Berlin.

On the 7th of December, the Austrian Minister, Count Cobenzl, received at Teschen the news of armistice, and promises to send to Count Stahremberg another messenger with the particulars. He speaks of it as of a measure of reciprocal convenience, without giving the least hint of despondency, or of any further negotiations; complains of the slowness and irresolution of Prussia, which he attributes to their wish of making an advantageous bargain for some part of the Electorate of Hanover; reproaches them with having caused a delay of one month in the march of the second Russian army, and continues in the same strain of warlike observations as in his former despatches since the beginning of September.

All these letters breathe the highest admiration of the Emperor of Russia, and praise his intimacy with the Emperor of Germany, as well as his noble conduct in his interview with the French aide-de-camp Savary.

2. The copies annexed to these letters give a complete information of all pacific overtures that have taken place since the surrender of Ulm, and it is clear that they were all approved by the Russian Ministers; as they had no other object but to avert some momentary danger, or to gain time. Nor would it have been possible to bring them to an issue, as Buonaparte was as wavering in his proposals or answers as the Austrian agents were averse to yielding the least point beyond their instructions and the necessity of the moment. The sincerest proposal of the Austrians was that of an armistice for three weeks previous to the capture of Vienna. But

the terms upon which Buonaparte would have consented were the same (localities excepted) which are now published in the French papers under Prince Lichtenstein's signature, and consequently they were rejected.

On all other occasions, Buonaparte was first in proposing, and the Austrians very careful in creating, new difficulties. Even on the 27th of November, the French proposed an armistice on the *status quo*, but the combined armies continued their offensive operations ; and the sending of two plenipotentiaries to Vienna had no other object but to watch the Prussian Minister, Haugwitz, whose designs were much suspected. No event has taken place to produce a change of opinions ; for the battle of the 2nd has rather turned the proportion of the forces in favour of the allies ; and it is evident that the Austrian Cabinet was not informed of the armistice till it had been concluded ; nor does it seem as if it were to extend beyond the armies in Moravia.

From the verbal communication of the messenger, we are to believe that nobody was afraid of the situation of affairs ; that the troops were most eager to fight ; that a peace was considered as impossible ; that the Russians retreated for mere convenience in the distribution of quarters ; that they were to remain on the frontiers of Hungary and in Austrian Silesia ; and that the Emperor Alexander was gone to Petersburg, in order to hasten the sending of more troops.

It is likewise remarkable that a bulletin, printed the 9th at the Austrian head-quarters, speaks of the Archduke Ferdinand's victory over the Bavarians on the 5th, at fifty miles' distance from the combined army, without the least observation about the armistice, adding even some hostile circumstances down to the 7th of December.

3. Three official letters of the 13th of December, from the Austrian Minister at Berlin to Count Stahremberg, state that the news of the battle of Austerlitz was received at Berlin on the 8th, and that a Council of State was assembled in conse-

quence thereof on the 9th; that it was resolved to send Colonel Pfuhl, the King's aide-de-camp, to the combined armies, in order to agree upon a plan of operations with the two emperors; that orders would be sent to Count Haugwitz at Vienna, not to deviate in the least from his instructions, grounded on the Convention of Potsdam of the 3rd of November, the term of which has already expired on the 11th ult.; and that the Prussian army would enter Bohemia on the 21st of December, and proceed by the shortest road to the flank and rear of the French army.

On the moment of Colonel Pfuhl's being ready to leave Berlin, a letter from Count Haugwitz, dated Vienna, the 6th, brought the most malignant exaggeration of the events at Austerlitz, as well as of the armistice; complaining, moreover, of the Austrian Plenipotentiary's departure from Vienna, whom he supposed to be going to sign a separate peace.

This brought every former arrangement to a momentary stagnation; however, upon the most active remonstrances of the Austrian and Russian Ministers, and on receiving another despatch from the Prussian Minister Finkenstein, dated Teschen, 8th of December, it was at last resolved that nothing should be changed in the decisions of the last Council of State, and Colonel Pfuhl set off accordingly.

These are the facts I have had an opportunity to authenticate; and, without adding any reflections, I presume they may be of service to his Royal Highness, by combining them with the information received through Sir Arthur Paget and Lord Harrowby.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. W. Pitt.<sup>1</sup>*

Private.                           Downing Street, Sunday [January 5, 1806.]

My dear Sir—As Lord Cathcart's letters were in a great

<sup>1</sup> This was certainly one of the last letters addressed by Lord Castlereagh to his illustrious chief, whose valuable life terminated on the 23rd of the same month in which it was written.—ED.

measure duplicates of those from Berlin, I have detained them for a day, in order that our colleagues in town might be acquainted with the state of affairs. I now forward them, in order that you may consider the arrangements Lord Cathcart has made, and suggest any directions which it may be right to add to those of which he is already in possession.

By his No. 4, it appears that he will probably have directed the troops last sent to return to England. Should he have done this of his own accord, under his former instructions, I don't know that there is any thing so promising on the Continent as to make us much regret that so much less will remain at stake on the game Prussia seems disposed to play; but, having now received the assurance of a safe retreat, qualified only by a condition, which it was not unreasonable for Prussia to attach to it, namely, that of our avoiding aggression pending the discussions, I should be sorry that any thing was done on our part which might have the appearance of either weakening Prussia, or leaving her in the lurch at a critical moment, if she either chooses or is forced to fight. And in this view I apprehend the troops actually in Hanover must remain, till we can satisfy ourselves that the line which Prussia takes is such as either clearly to justify or to induce us to withdraw them.

In this event, it is a great object as well as consideration, for the safety of the individuals, to bring away the Hanoverian troops with the British; and I am glad to find, from the Duke of York, that the King will give orders to his Electoral Ministers to this effect. It appears that above 4,000 recruits have been raised in Hanover. None of the old soldiers have joined, which is attributed to their considering that they have some claims for arrears of pay, which they are of opinion ought previously to be discharged. As far as a reasonable bounty would accomplish this, it might be expedient, perhaps, for us to come forward.

I have read the above to the Duke of Montrose and Hawkesbury; they are very strongly of opinion that Lord Cathcart

should be distinctly ordered not to land, but to return to England the troops last sent, upon the grounds that, under present circumstances, we should clearly not have sent them from hence, and that they are essentially necessary to our separate means of acting against France.

What may it be right to do respecting Craig? Can we look to Sicily without communication with Russia, and before the French re-occupy the *terra firma*? Are we ripe to send him any instructions at the present moment, or shall we wait to see what turn things take, presuming that he has retired in safety to Malta?

I send this by a messenger, in order that you may enable me, if you think it material, to write by Tuesday's mail; but this is not material, as I can send a cutter.

Ever yours, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. In case Hanover is to be evacuated, might it not be desirable that the rear-guard should be British rather than Hanoverian? Supposing we should find it necessary to leave a small corps to hold possession to the last, they may be too close pressed to retire upon the transports, and may find it necessary to fall back upon Stralsund or Magdeburg. If this corps is British, we shall get back by the Baltic every man the enemy do not lay hold of; but, if it is Hanoverian, they will either disband, or desert, or be *seduced by Prussia*, and we shall thus lose their services. My idea would therefore be to save the German Legion first, not as the most valuable, but as the best means of saving both; and, if we can bring away 10,000 Germans, we shall have made a good campaign of it.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Downing Street, January 10, 1806.

My Lord—Your lordship's despatches, noted in the margin, have been received and laid before the King. I have to

convey to your lordship his Majesty's entire approbation of the orders given, on your arrival in the Elbe, for the return of the cavalry transports, of the general instructions addressed by your lordship to the agent of transports for the direction of his conduct, and for the management of the troop-ships ordered to remain; of the arrangements made by your lordship on your arrival at Bremen; and, generally, of the whole course of your proceedings, as communicated to me in the despatches above acknowledged.

I am happy to learn, from the messenger who sailed from the Elbe in the Vestal on the 28th ult., since confirmed by the Leopard, arrived in the Downs, that the fleet of transports and store-ships, which sailed from the Downs and the Nore on the 22nd, arrived in safety on the 28th.

I am led to infer from your lordship's No. 4 that, in the then state of affairs on the Continent, your lordship would not have deemed it consistent with your instructions to disembark the troops lately sent, but would have given orders for their returning immediately to England. The King entirely approves of your lordship's view of this question under the circumstances known to your lordship, when your letter was written; your lordship not having at that moment received from Prussia assurance of support, or any security of retreat for the army under your command. But Lord Harrowby having since obtained from the Court of Berlin a positive assurance both of support and retreat (a copy of which I enclose) on certain conditions not in themselves unreasonable, it is his Majesty's pleasure, if the troops shall not have sailed on their return, and still remain on board the transports when this despatch arrives, that they be not sent back without previous reference to Lord Harrowby, to whom a copy of this despatch will be sent, unless it should become absolutely necessary to prevent their being frozen up. But, should they have been previously landed, it is then his Majesty's pleasure that your lordship should not re-embark them without hearing from Lord

Harrowby, unless your lordship should deem it on other grounds expedient to do so, with a view to their security.

The reluctance his Majesty feels to do any thing at the present moment which might have the effect of discouraging Prussia, or might have the appearance of abandoning her interests or those of the Continent, if her determination is actually taken, to pursue a manly and decided course of policy, has induced his Majesty not to convey to your lordship peremptory orders for the return of this division of his army, although the immediate operation, with a view to which they were sent from hence, namely, the recovery of Holland, must, at least for the present, be considered as at an end. But the services of these troops are of so much importance to his Majesty's interests in other quarters, that it is impossible for his Majesty to consent that so considerable a proportion of his disposable force should continue to be locked up, without receiving from the Court of Berlin an explicit assurance that, however her line of policy with respect to the general affairs of the Continent may be governed by circumstances, and depend on a concert with other powers, her resolution is absolutely and unequivocally taken to defend by arms at least the North of Germany, Hanover included, if attacked.

On this point his Majesty trusts that Lord Harrowby will have been enabled to bring the Court of Berlin to a distinct and formal explanation; as upon its decision must depend not only the further continuance of the troops in question, but his Majesty's policy with respect to the rest of his forces now on the Continent.

Although the force remaining on the Continent, supposing the troops above alluded to are returned, will be inferior in number to that to the command of which his Majesty originally destined your lordship when you were sent from hence, it is nevertheless highly satisfactory to his Majesty, in the present critical state of affairs, to have the advantage of your lordship's services in the chief command of his troops on the

Continent ; and I am therefore to convey to your lordship his Majesty's pleasure that you do continue, until further orders, to administer the trust which has been confided to your lordship by his Majesty.

In the present uncertain state of continental affairs, the King does not feel himself enabled to convey to your lordship any peremptory orders for the direction of your conduct. His Majesty is disposed to rely with confidence that your lordship, upon communication with Lord Harrowby, will, under the instructions which you have received, act according to circumstances, as may be most for the advantage of his Majesty's service.

I am directed, however, in the present despatch, to furnish your lordship with provisional orders, in the three following cases, which your lordship is, nevertheless, permitted to modify, provided any unforeseen circumstances should arise to render it advisable.

1. Should the discussions now pending between the Court of Berlin and the French Government terminate in a permanent arrangement, by which the latter is bound to respect the neutrality of the North of Germany, including the Electorate of Hanover, you are, in that event, to send back to England, without loss of time, the British regiments now under your orders ; transmitting a full report of the number and state of efficiency of the King's German Legion, which will then remain, together with your opinion as to what proportion of this force may be required for the internal service of the Electorate, but not taking any steps for the actual embarkation of any part of the Legion till his Majesty's pleasure is known.

2. Should your lordship understand from Lord Harrowby that the French Government has declined to enter into any understanding of the nature above alluded to, but that the Court of Berlin is nevertheless determined to resist any incursion of the enemy into the North of Germany, including the Electorate, (except so far as may relate to the fortress of

Hameln) you will, in that case, until your lordship shall receive orders to the contrary, continue to concert measures of general defence and precaution with the Prussian, Russian, and Swedish forces ; it being distinctly understood that the British troops, so long as they conform to the system laid down by Prussia of abstaining from previous aggression, are entitled not only to fall back on Prussia, but to the protection and support of the Prussian forces.

3. Should no arrangement have been concluded, providing for the security of the North of Germany, nor the Court of Berlin have either proceeded to act offensively against France, or made any explicit declaration of its determination to act in case the French troops shall attack Hanover, as, in that case, his Majesty's means of protecting his Electoral dominions against the power of France would be narrowed to the strength of his own immediate corps, aided by the dubious support of the Swedish troops, (the Russian troops being now placed under the orders of the King of Prussia) it will, in that case, be necessary for his Majesty to regulate the measures to be taken for the protection of the Electorate, with a due attention to the ultimate means of securing the retreat of his troops now there.

Including the recruits which the German Legion has received since its arrival in Hanover, his Majesty's forces on the Continent, independent of the reinforcement last sent, now amount to about 17,000 men, which number may be expected progressively to increase ; of which a certain proportion, however, cannot yet be considered as in an effective state for field-service. It is obvious that a force of this extent and description, unless assured of Prussian aid, cannot pretend to oppose, even with the aid of the Swedes, any effectual resistance against the enemy's army now assembling in Holland, if it should be pushed forward in force to raise the blockade of Hameln, and be afterwards directed to advance against the King's troops in the open part of the Electorate.

In order to be prepared for such an event, I am to suggest to your lordship the propriety of removing the new Hanoverian levies, which are yet unfit for service, (with the exception of the mere depôts necessary for carrying on the recruiting service) immediately to Stade, or to some other point where the transports may be stationed; so that, upon the first advance of the enemy, they may be directed to embark and drop down the river, out of the way of the other troops, and to a place of safety.

Should your lordship have reason to understand that a movement against the Electorate is actually determined on by the enemy, and be of opinion, from your relative means of defence, that all resistance must be ultimately ineffectual, it is the King's commands that the safety of his troops should not be hazarded by the evacuation of the Electorate being too long protracted.

In withdrawing the troops, it certainly would be desirable that they should be embarked in the Elbe or Weser, and returned directly to England. But, as this retreat may be denied to them, should the river be obstructed by ice, or the enemy press too closely on their rear, your lordship will take the necessary measures in due time for concerting your retreat either upon Stralsund or Magdeburg, taking previous precautions with respect to the subsistence of the troops, and directing such proportion of the transports to proceed round to the Baltic (so soon as the season will permit) as may be necessary for the reception of the troops.

You will not fail to advert to the critical situation in which his Majesty's Electoral subjects, both officers and men, who have entered into the British service, must be placed upon the return of the enemy, should they fall into their hands. They can, in that case, have no mercy to expect; and I am therefore to direct that your arrangements may be taken with a special view to their security and protection.

The latter part of this despatch proceeds upon the supposi-

tion of no arrangement with respect to the North of Germany having taken place, and of no active interference for its protection being held out on the part of Prussia.

As, in this case, (presuming upon an early attack from the enemy in force) the main point for your lordship's consideration will be the time and the mode of withdrawing without loss from the Electorate, I should recommend that, if only part of the troops can be embarked on the Elbe or Weser under the circumstances of the moment, although the transport tonnage already there is more than sufficient to receive the whole number, that the Hanoverians should be embarked in preference, in the first instance, as I consider the British troops more capable of effecting their retreat by the interior, without loss of numbers; that they individually hazard less if they fall into the enemy's hands; and that the chance is thereby improved of saving the greatest proportion of the whole corps now in Hanover, to be employed hereafter in some other quarter against the enemy.

Upon the whole, it is his Majesty's wish to continue his troops on the Continent, so long as their remaining there may afford a reasonable prospect either of contributing essentially to the general welfare, or to the immediate protection of his Majesty's Hanoverian dominions. But, as his Majesty has already been deprived of the services of many of his most valuable officers by a capitulation forced upon them by the enemy at the commencement of the war, his Majesty is peculiarly solicitous that a similar misfortune should not be again sustained by a retreat being too long delayed, after all effectual means of defence may appear hopeless.

Your lordship will confer confidentially with Count Münster on this subject, who will receive from the King the necessary instructions for the direction of his conduct, and act without further orders from hence, in such manner as the information you may receive from Lord Harrowby, or from any other quarter, may induce you to consider most for the advantage of

his Majesty's service. And your lordship will not fail to communicate, in such manner as may appear to you most suitable to the officers in the chief command of the other armies, the nature and motives of any movements you may think fit to make; applying to them for such aid and support as the case may require, and it may be in their power to afford.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby.*

Downing Street, January 10, 1806.

My dear Lord Harrowby—I enclose a copy of the instructions which I have addressed to Lord Cathcart, together with a private letter, which is no otherwise material than that you should be in possession of every thing I have written which may in any way influence his lordship's judgment.

Lord Cathcart's last letters were dated from the Russian head-quarters, at Neuburg, on the 25th ult.; he was not then in possession of Hardenberg's letter to you of the 23rd; consequently, as you will see by the extract of his letter which I enclose, would have deemed it his duty, as things then stood, to have returned the troops last sent.

Upon a review of our prospects on the Continent, perhaps we should not regret that Lord C., under his former instructions, had taken upon him to send the troops back; but the additional assurance since obtained from the Prussian Government, and other considerations which I need not enumerate, have induced the Cabinet to modify the instructions in the manner stated in the draft. The reference to you will enable you to make the continuance of this corps an instrument for bringing the Court of Berlin to a precise decision with respect to the North of Germany, if you should think favourably enough of their resolution, to consider an engagement on this point likely to be made, or, if made, acted up to; if not, you will have it in your power to explain that these troops, having

been sent for a special purpose, must be returned; and pursue your explanations with a view to the disposal of the rest of the army.

Our solicitude about this corps arises from considering that their presence augments the risk to us in a greater proportion than it adds to the strength of the Allies. There is little reason to hope that this part of the army, after it has suffered at sea, and with a portion of each regiment on this side of the water, can be for some time in a state of equipment to make them very moveable in the field. Indeed, I much doubt whether General Don's force, which has been so much longer there, is yet well appointed. This consideration not only bears upon the efficiency of the army opposed to the enemy, but, in a degree, on its faculty of effecting a retreat towards Stralsund or Magdeburg, in presence of a hostile force; but of this Lord Cathcart will be best able to judge.

It is enough for me to state, for the purpose of explaining the value we are bound to attach to the preservation of the army now on the Continent, that, in the event of our being obliged to maintain a separate contest against France, during the remainder of the war, I look upon our ability to carry on any *offensive operations* of importance against the enemy absolutely to depend on the return of the force now there without any material defalcation, and I even consider the internal power of our defence may be materially affected by any disaster that may happen to it, particularly in the by no means improbable case of our being called on for reinforcements both for the East and West Indies.

These considerations would certainly, in the present state of things, determine us not to hazard 25,000 troops, were it now a question whether they should be sent from hence; but, being on the Continent, they must not be withdrawn in a manner unbecoming the character of the country, or inconsistent with what we owe to the feelings as well as the interests of the Continent. I have stated the prudential considerations

as strongly as I feel them, because I know that, in the view you are likely to take of the subject, they will not be suffered to have more than their proper weight, which they will lead you to examine, and to provide, with additional jealousy, the means of security.

If Prussia is really in earnest, and feels that, sooner or later, she must have a question with France on the North of Germany, and that she is never likely to meet it in a state of better preparation and support, no speculative apprehensions for ourselves ought to induce us to hesitate in standing by her, at least to the extent of the force now on the Continent. How far we can venture to play a deeper game, by detaching additionally from hence, must depend on a variety of considerations, and remain for future discussion. But what it appears to me most desirable to avoid, is leaving a valuable stake embarked in a tedious and temporizing system of unexplained measures, where we are, at best, only operating as a make-weight, without being likely ultimately to establish any effectual principle of resistance against the encroachments of the enemy; whilst, in the mean time, our army may, by a rapid movement of the enemy, be placed in a situation from which a power so timid as Prussia, admitting her to be incapable of any base purpose, might not have either the resolution or the means of extricating us.

Looking to the evacuation of Hanover by the British army as a probable event, it may be a question, after all that has passed, whether it would be most for his Majesty's interest that it should fall into the custody of Prussia, or be abandoned to the enemy. As this point might, in a degree, influence the course of military measures to be pursued, I will endeavour to learn privately the King's sentiments upon it; as it might, under certain circumstances, enable you the better to give a direction to events.

It is not unnatural that a good deal of jealousy should enter into the consideration of this alternative; but, upon an under-

standing with Prussia, I do not suppose there could be any hesitation in preferring the former—the rather, as it is highly probable that France, in the present state of her power, would incorporate it with Holland, and thus extend her commercial dominion effectually over the northern rivers.

Believe me, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Copy.

Downing Street, January 10, 1806.

My dear Lord—I have endeavoured in my official letter to provide for your lordship's difficulties as far as I can foresee them. I own, from past experience, I do not feel much confidence in the firmness and decision of Prussia in the present disappointed state of the alliance. Every motive of interest, almost of self-preservation, certainly enjoins, while her armies are prepared and her auxiliaries numerous, to resent the re-entry of the French into the North of Germany. I shall not, however, be surprised to see any thing hazarded by her sooner than risk a shock from France.

As the giving us a squeeze must be a prime object of policy with the enemy, it behoves us to play our game with the more prudence and foresight, more especially if Prussia seems to hesitate upon repelling force by force. If the enemy's armies are henceforward to be unoccupied by Austria, we shall have enough to do, supposing Prussia resolves to defend the North of Germany; but, with Prussia wavering, the attempt is hopeless, and can only be productive of loss and disgrace.

I hope Lord Harrowby will have brought the Court of Berlin to a distinct and early explanation upon this point, as upon its decision the policy of our keeping any force in Hanover seems to depend; unless it may be just enough to hold possession for a time, till it can be seen whether its custody can be entrusted upon terms to Prussia, rather than abandoned to France.

We cannot, in the mean time, while the enemy is accumulating in Holland, but feel considerable solicitude for the safety of your valuable corps; and, though we are desirous of fulfilling every duty to the general cause, we trust that our situation, and the security we have to depend on, will be precisely and speedily ascertained, and, when it is, that a decisive proceeding correspondent to it will be taken.

In the present state of affairs, it is no small satisfaction to me that the conduct of the army is in such good hands; and I have no doubt Count Tolstoi will do every thing in his power to protect any movement you may think it necessary to make with a view to your retreat, so far as orders from Berlin do not absolutely tie up his hands.

I have the honour, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Downing Street, January 10, 1806.

My dear Lord—I think it may be satisfactory to your lordship to receive (of course for your own eye alone) a copy of my private letter to Lord Harrowby. It will the better enable your lordship to furnish him with any representation you may deem material to assist his judgment, with respect to the state of your army, its capacity of moving either against the enemy or in retreat, the facility or difficulty of re-embarking the troops, and the time within which it might probably be effected: in order that Lord H., should he be induced to express, on grounds of political expediency, a desire that the troops may remain, may, at the moment of his doing so, have before him your lordship's opinion of the danger or security which, in a military sense, is likely to attach to their continuance.

The articles published from the interior of Germany state that three divisions of the French army, viz., Bernadotte's, Ney's, and Augercau's, were on their march to the north of Germany. If this is correct, it is an additional motive for an

early decision. I am satisfied that it cannot be in better hands than in your lordship's, after you have learned from Lord Harrowby the political importance that he attaches to the disposal of the army under your orders.

Believe me, dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

The letter of yours to the Duke of York, alluded to in mine to Lord Harrowby, is that in which you state that you at that time had only been able to bring forward in a state of equipment two brigades and a half of artillery. This and some other letters I have seen have induced me to form not a very favourable impression of the general state of the army for any quick movement.

[Endorsed "By Robinson."]

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby.*

Downing Street, January 11, 1806.

Dear Lord Harrowby—Since the departure of the messenger Robinson, the enclosed information has confirmed what we before apprehended, and satisfies us that, whatever risk we may run by keeping our troops longer on the Continent, we are not likely to influence thereby the conduct of Prussia. Her line seems clearly taken, unless, contrary to her expectation, she is forced from it by France, to make the best terms with the enemy she can; and, although the assurances of security for our army given to us are referred to in this despatch, and distinctly admitted, yet I should not wonder if, in the state of their counsels, any thing was acquiesced in rather than fire a shot upon the French army.

I have thought it necessary to address the enclosed letter to Lord Cathcart, and conclude you will not hesitate, unless your information should lead you to form a different view of the state of affairs, to authorize Lord Cathcart to send back the troops without delay; regulating the evacuation of Hanover

in such manner as may appear to you most for the advantage of the King's Electoral interests, and most consistent with the safety of that portion of the army which may be destined to form the rear-guard, and to manage in some degree the question of occupation.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Draft.

Downing Street, January 11, 1806.

My Lord—Since the despatch of the messenger Robinson, last night, we have received convincing proofs that Prussia is determined to make the best terms she can with France; and, as I am fully persuaded that no motive will shortly remain for the continuance of our troops on the Continent, and can scarcely imagine that the situation of affairs will be such as to induce Lord Harrowby to delay their departure, I think it right to apprise your lordship of this important fact, in order that you may, in the mean time, accelerate your arrangements for the return of the troops.

The messenger is directed to proceed to Berlin with despatches for Lord Harrowby, and will charge himself with any communications you may have to make to his lordship. In the mean time, unless your lordship should be in possession of information which may not have reached me, I am to suggest to your lordship the expediency of immediately embarking the troops last sent from hence, which are now cantoned in the neighbourhood of Bremerlehe, as also the new Hanoverian levies, in order that they may be ready to put to sea on the return of the messenger, (unless Lord Harrowby should give directions to the contrary) and thereby make room for and facilitate the embarkation of the remainder of the troops.

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*The Duke of Montrose to Lord Castlereagh.*

Grosvenor Square, 7 o'clock, January 11, 1806.

My dear Lord—My anxiety must be my excuse for this letter; but I feel the power of this country acting with vigour,

both in our colonies, and even at home, so much depends on the return of the 10,000 men last sent, and that they were sent with such different objects from the first detachment, that I cannot resist again bringing before you the necessity of ordering the positive and immediate return of the last detachment, *without the North of Europe is unequivocally to be defended by arms both by Prussia and Russia.*

I feel the responsibility of changing what was determined by Mr. Pitt, whilst he is indisposed; but I also feel that, to my conception, circumstances and the colouring of affairs are materially altered since he gave his opinion, by the return of the Prussian ambassador, without any communication to Lord Harrowby, the publication concerning Prussia by Buonaparte, the formidable increase of the French force in Holland, and the march of Augereau towards that country or Hanover. The conviction of my mind, from the conduct of Prussia, is that Prussia will not fight the French, even for the purpose of allowing our troops to get safe from the Continent, notwithstanding her assurances; and five-and-twenty thousand British troops will induce Buonaparte to threaten and bribe in such manner that Prussia will not resist, should our troops to that amount not be removed before the appearance of a large French army in Hanover, or on the frontiers of Prussia.

I trust Lord Harrowby has ordered back to this country at least those troops last sent, lest a lingering negociation should allow the French to assemble in force before the departure of our troops; for I think, in that event, they will not be able to secure their retreat, nor be supported by a sufficient force to make an effectual resistance; though the Russians and Swedes make common cause with us.

Should you and Lord Mulgrave remain in your opinion, I shall fight for the wisdom of your decision, as if it was my own opinion; but, entertaining still a clear and fixed opinion, I state it that it may have the weight it deserves, though perfectly conscious, at the same time, that neither my situation

in the Cabinet, nor the question itself, requires me to do more than to represent my sentiments without reserve.

I really think that what I state is the feeling of Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Camden, and Lord Chatham, as to the propriety of recalling the last detachment.

I remain, my dear lord, &c.,

MONTROSE.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Downing Street, January 12, 1806.

My dear Lord—In my instructions of yesterday, my suggestion with respect to the actual embarkation of the troops, till the return of the messenger from Berlin, was confined to the troops last sent and the new German levies. This proceeded upon the idea that this would keep you pretty busy till you could hear from Lord Harrowby; but, of course, your lordship will not consider it as discouraging you from taking such measures with respect to the rest of the army as may appear to you expedient for their security, more especially with respect to the rest of the Legion, a proportion of which, I apprehend, is now stationed at Hameln, remote from the place of embarkation.

It seems desirable immediately to apply to Count Tolstoy to relieve these regiments, and to remove them towards the place of embarkation. Besides, there will be less risk of any unnecessary contest, as things now stand between the French and Russians, than between the former and the British; which consideration, together with his own generous spirit, will, I have no doubt, induce Count Tolstoy to lend himself with cheerfulness to any arrangement which your lordship may find it necessary to propose.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby.*

Downing Street, Sunday, January 12 [1806].

Dear Lord Harrowby—Since the despatch of the messenger Ross, I have been enabled to inform myself of the King's

sentiments with respect to the alternative of Hanover passing into the hands of Prussia, or falling again under the power of France. As the mode of our evacuation must necessarily decide this question practically, I did not think it right by the King to delay informing myself, in the most authentic manner, of his Majesty's sentiments, with which I cannot better acquaint you than in confidentially communicating to you a copy of the letter I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, written by the King's command.

I despatch this by a messenger to Yarmouth, in the hope of his being enabled to overtake Ross, who left town last night for Berlin by Bremen: if not, he is ordered to proceed himself by the same route.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*The Duke of York to Lord Castlereagh.*

Portman Square, January 14, 1806.

My dear Lord—In consequence of the conversation which I had with your lordship last Monday upon the subject of the policy of the British troops being left on the Continent, in the present critical situation of affairs, I have put down the ideas which immediately occur to me upon paper, which I herewith transmit to you, and trust that, from the haste with which they have been drawn up, you will have the goodness to excuse any casual inaccuracies.

Believe me ever, my dear lord,

Yours most sincerely,

FREDERICK.

Horse Guards, January 14, 1806.

In the present critical situation of affairs upon the Continent, the question of the policy of leaving his Majesty's troops in the Electorate can be viewed in three different lights:—

1. In case of a peace being patched up between Prussia and France.

2. Should an armed neutrality be proposed, for the protection of the North of Germany.

3. Should Prussia either enter willingly, or be forced into a war with France.

In the first case, whatever may be the terms of that peace, it cannot be doubted that the evacuation of the Electorate by the British troops will be made one of the first conditions; and indeed their continuance there would not be attended with any advantage, as the country must be considered, though certainly very delusively, as quiet, while their return to this country would become necessary for the protection of the United Kingdom; France having then no opponent upon the Continent, and therefore being enabled to turn the whole of her attention and force to the attack of one or both of these islands.

In the second case, though a large force would certainly be required to oblige the enemy to respect the neutrality of the North of Germany, yet, as France would equally be at liberty to employ whatever part of her troops she might think fit against his Majesty's dominions, it would be impossible to allow so large a part of our disposable force to be tied up when our own coasts are menaced, and therefore the return of the British army will be equally necessary, leaving only such proportion of it as might be indispensable for the police and internal tranquillity of the Electorate, should it not be possible, by some future arrangement, to supply that deficiency by assembling the soldiers of the late Hanoverian troops.

It would appear, therefore, from the above statement, that it is only in the third case, viz., that of Prussia either entering willingly or being forced into a war with France, that the question of the policy of the British troops remaining upon the Continent can be at all taken into consideration: with a view to which it is necessary to examine the relative state in which France will stand to the North of Germany, and her means of offence.

By the humiliation of Austria, and the intimate connexion

that exists between France and the three Electors of Bavaria, Wirtemburg, and Baden, who can only be considered as her tributaries, and obliged to act at her nod, the frontier exposed to France may be justly said to extend from Bohemia to Coblenz, and along the Rhine to Emerich, from where it advances along the Ems to Emden, presenting an elliptical line of upwards of 500 miles, without any fortress or town of any consequence to protect or secure any point whatever from attack. It must, therefore, be by the means of armies alone that protection can be afforded to it.

At the beginning of the late unfortunate campaign, when the line of attack was much narrowed, as it was supposed that France would respect the neutrality of Prussia, and when her disposable force was estimated at 300,000 men, it was judged absolutely necessary that the combined force of Austria and Russia should be 400,000, to enable them to commence offensive operations. It therefore cannot be thought unreasonable to assume that at least the same number of troops would be required to meet the arms of France upon this wider and more extensive line of operation, which must be so divided and stationed as to afford mutual support, and be able, if successful, to push their advantages.

The effective force of Prussia is estimated, with the Saxons, at 180,000 men. Russia may, it is thought, be able to bring forward and keep up 150,000 men, making, together, a force of 230,000, thereby leaving a deficit of 70,000 men, without which it is evident that Russia and Prussia united cannot, with any chance of success, enter into a war with France. This deficiency can only be supplied by Great Britain and the smaller States; the major part of which, however, must be provided by Great Britain.

It is a question of policy, which can alone be decided by his Majesty's Government, whether Great Britain can send so considerable a part of its disposable force to the assistance of its allies without risking its own security at home; though it

may be urged, from repeated experience, that, when France has been engaged in a Continental war, she has not been able to attend to her navy, and has given up all thoughts of invasion.

The present British force in the Electorate of Hanover is estimated at 22,000 men—a force, though considerable in itself, yet far beneath what is absolutely necessary to supply the wants of our allies, in the event of Continental war; and it will require the whole of the force originally destined to be sent to the Continent to render it adequate to that service.

From this statement, it may be reasonably concluded that either the present force should be augmented for the purposes above-mentioned, or that the whole should be withdrawn, as, in its present state, its services would be ineffectual, to our great prejudice, and without any adequate advantage to our Allies.

F.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Harrowby.*

Downing Street, January 14, 1806.

My dear Lord Harrowby—Having apprised his Majesty, through Colonel Taylor, that I had lost no time in putting you in possession of his Majesty's determination not to enter into any arrangement with Prussia for the custody of Hanover; and Colonel Taylor, in his answer, having expressed his Majesty's satisfaction that instructions had been conveyed to you to that effect: in order to guard against any future misunderstanding on a point of such delicacy, I thought it right to address the letter to Colonel Taylor, to be laid before the King, of which the enclosed is a copy, explanatory of the sense in which alone I had felt myself competent to make any communication to you upon a point of this nature, and to which letter I annex, in confidence, the answer I have received from the King.

I own I cannot but doubt the prudence of his Majesty's decision: but this is altogether a question of Electoral policy,

and upon which, if anything should be said to you by the Prussian Cabinet, I conclude you will refer them to his Majesty's Hanoverian servants.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*List of the Eight Transports employed on the Continental Expedition, which have been wrecked.*

Transport Office, January 15, 1806.

	Tons.	On board.	Wrecked.
Maria . . .	323	26th Regt.; 270 . .	{ Off the Dutch coast, about December 14: 26 saved.
Aurora . . .	378	do.; . . 280 . .	{ On the Goodwin Sands, December 19: all perished.
Peace . . .	166	30th Regt.	{ At Kessingland, near Lowestoft, December 19; all saved.
Isabella . . .	306	89th Regt.; 300 . .	{ Off the Dutch coast, about Dec. 14: about 160 saved.
Helder . . .	736	5th Regiment . . .	{ Off the Dutch coast: no particulars yet received.
Jenny . . .	174	30th Regt. . . .	{ Off the French coast: all
Ariadne . . .	401	9th do. . . .	{ made prisoners.
Adventure . .	246	No troops on board	{ On the Cockle Sand, December 26.

8 Ships.

Saved, 1,552      Lost, 664

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Copy.

Downing Street, January 19, 1806.

My dear Lord—In consequence of the despatches yesterday received from Berlin, it has been thought right to renew more pointedly the orders for the return of the troops. These letters were dated as far back as the 6th; but their contents, in addition to everything before known, leave us no room to expect that the politics of the Court of Berlin will, in the interim, have assumed so totally new a form as to induce your lordship, either, under the former instructions, to make use of the latitude given to you, or, in the present instance, to take upon

yourself to suspend the execution of the orders which you will now receive, till the King's further pleasure is known.

I was much disappointed to learn, by an extract of a despatch from Count Münster, communicated to me by Mr. Best, the Hanoverian<sup>1</sup> *chargé d'affaires* in London, that the recruiting of the Legion had been suspended. There is no point we have had more at heart than to augment that corps during its stay in Hanover; and I have to request your lordship will take the most effectual steps for withdrawing the Legion in the utmost possible strength, with the rest of the troops in the British pay, from the Continent.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Downing Street, January 20, 1806.

My dear Lord—Your lordship's despatches, No. 5 and 6, have been received, and laid before the King. Under the instructions transmitted to your lordship, bearing date the 8th and 12th of this month, as applied to the line of conduct which the Court of Berlin appears to have pursued, his Majesty entertains no doubt that your lordship will have already taken measures for the return of his troops to this country.

The despatches, however, received yesterday from Lord Harrowby and Mr. Hammond describe the language and conduct of the Prussian Government to be so unsatisfactory and mysterious, that his Majesty cannot hesitate in repeating his decision that the army under your command should be re-embarked for England without further delay. His Majesty is the more confirmed in the pressing expediency of this measure from the weak state of the Prussian corps in Westphalia, and the very equivocal answer returned by General Kalkreuth to your lordship's note of the 29th of December.

In the event of the navigation of the rivers being obstructed by ice, it will be for your lordship to consider in what position

<sup>1</sup> Hungarian in the MS. I suspect a like error in the name of the *chargé d'affaires*.—EDITOR.

the army can for the moment be most safely placed, with a view to its being embarked so soon as the frost disappears, or to its further retreat, in case that should become necessary.

I am, &c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Downing Street, February 4, 1806.

My Lord—I have received your lordship's letter, dated Bremerlehe, the 23rd ult., which has been laid before the King.

Lord Harrowby has arrived in England, and I learn, by a note from his lordship, that, previously to his leaving the Elbe, your lordship had received my despatch of the 19th January, conveying to you his Majesty's pleasure that your lordship should lose no time in embarking the troops under your command, and in directing them to proceed to England by divisions. And his lordship further stated that he understood the first embarkation was to take place on the 28th of January. This intelligence afforded me much satisfaction, as it confirmed to me that your lordship entirely understood the purport of my despatch, and was acting upon it with the utmost expedition in your power.

I was perfectly satisfied with the arrangements which your lordship appears to have made to enable you to embark the troops with celerity so soon as you should have decided upon that measure; I am particularly to state that the dispositions you have made for securing the embarkation of the whole of the German Legion and its dépôts have received his Majesty's entire approbation.

From the state of the wind, I am expecting the arrival of the first division with daily anxiety, and I have no doubt it will be followed by the remaining divisions in as short a period as the weather will permit.

I am, &c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

## EXPEDITION AGAINST THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

1805—6.

There is little to add to the details of this expedition given in the following Correspondence. The armament having, on its way to the Cape, put into San Salvador, in Brasil, for water and refreshment, proceeded for its destination, and on the 4th of January, 1806, anchored off Robben Island, at the entrance of Table Bay.

This important Colony, which had been restored to the Dutch in compliance with the treaty of Amiens, was not surrendered without a battle, which cost its defenders 700 men. The loss of the assailants was 15 killed, and about 190 wounded. The despatches announcing this conquest were received at the Admiralty on the 27th of February, 1806.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote.*

Downing Street, July 20, 1805.

Dear Sir—I was prevented from writing to you yesterday, as I wished. I find the Admiralty, under an impression that it was intended to adhere to a former purpose of sending the troops embarked at Cork under your orders, in the first instance, to Madeira, there to wait for further instructions, have

sent an order to the convoy, directing them to put to sea, which order will be annulled by the present conveyance.

Until we receive more authentic information than has yet reached us of the amount of force left by the combined fleet in the West Indies, his Majesty's Government cannot finally decide whether the regiments destined for West India service may with safety be withheld for the present, at least till the unhealthy season in the islands is gone by. In this case, I shall probably receive the King's commands, to desire you to proceed, without any reinforcement or further delay, to relieve Lieutenant-General Nugent in the government of Jamaica.

I take it for granted, before this can arrive, orders from the Commander-in-Chief will have reached Cork, directing the embarkation of certain regiments in the room of those before under orders; which force will be directed to proceed, under Sir David Baird, to the Mediterranean in the transports now at Cork; and the tonnage will be immediately replaced, in case we determine to detach to the West Indies. Directions have been given to strengthen the convoy which is to conduct the troops under Sir D. Baird to their destination.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Pitt.*

Downing Street, July 22, 1805.

My dear Sir—I think it right to send you a representation received from Sir David Baird, on the inadequacy of the force proposed for the reduction of the Cape, in which General Dundas appears to concur; also a Memoir of the General's, written on his return from the Cape in 1803, in which he then stated 8,000 men as requisite to command success. I own the reasoning on which this demand rests does not convince me. In proposing to extend the amount of force, the policy of the attempt itself becomes proportionably questionable. There is only one point of view, however, in which I should wish you to con-

sider this demand. It seems probable that one or two regiments must go to the West Indies, after the unhealthy season is over, to keep up our numbers. These troops might first go to the Cape, assist in its reduction, and reach Barbadoes about Christmas. The only inconvenience will be the loss of their services at home, or in the West Indies, in the intermediate period. The health of the men cannot suffer; and there is tonnage sufficient at Cork to receive them without loss of time, if this arrangement should be deemed advisable.

If you approve of the mode in which it has occurred to me to bring the question of the Cape under the consideration of the Cabinet, the papers may be circulated to-morrow evening and Wednesday morning, and a decision obtained at Lord Harrowby's on Wednesday.

Might not some time be saved by my writing to the King to-morrow, and receiving his conditional authority, the measure having been already considered by yourself, Lord Chatham, and Lord Barham?

Ever, my dear Sir, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Downing Street, July 25, 1805.

My dear Lord—If you see no objection to complying with the enclosed, I shall be thankful to you to send the necessary orders to Cork, to have the stores therein mentioned embarked without delay, and the necessary authority will afterwards be sent from this Office, as you may think expedient.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. The Diomede is ordered to convey the transport with the detachment of the 20th Light Dragoons from Portsmouth, and to call off Plymouth, to take under her care the transport ordered round to receive the company of artillery and artificers.

[Enclosure in the preceding letter.]

Five hundred rounds of ammunition per gun, instead of 300 ; 300 rounds of powder ; one million of ball cartridges. In addition, moulds for making musket-balls ; two petards.

D. BAIRD, M. General.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

Downing Street, July 25, 1805.

My Lords—Information having been received by his Majesty's Ministers which renders it expedient, in their opinion, to recommend to his Majesty that an expedition should be immediately undertaken for the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope, and his Majesty having approved thereof, and signified his pleasure that the military force mentioned in the margin<sup>1</sup> should be commanded by Major-General Sir David Baird, and that the naval force, as stated in the margin,<sup>2</sup> should, upon your recommendation, be commanded by Captain Sir Home Popham, I am now to enclose to your lordships a copy of the instructions which have been given to Sir David Baird for his guidance, and I am to signify to you his Majesty's commands, that you do take the necessary measures, in conformity with those instructions.

With this view, you will order Sir Home Popham in the Diadem to proceed ostensibly to Gibraltar ; you will also direct that the Diomedes should take under convoy a transport with 220 dragoons and four provision transports at Portsmouth, and touch at Plymouth for another transport with a company of artillery on board, and proceed ostensibly to the same destination.

Your lordships will issue the necessary orders for the Captain of the Belliqueux to proceed with the convoy to India without delay ; and, further, you will give instructions to the

<sup>1</sup> Not specified in my copy.

<sup>2</sup> Diadem, Diomedes, Belliqueux, Raisonable, Narcissus, Leda.

senior officer of the convoy now at Cork to proceed with the Narcissus and Leda, with the forces that are to act under Sir David Baird, ostensibly for the Mediterranean. You will, at the same time, furnish the said three officers with secret and sealed orders, to be opened in a proper latitude, to the following effect.

You will enclose to Sir Home Popham a copy of the orders which have been given to Sir David Baird, and direct him to proceed to Madeira, there to take under his command the Belliqueux and the East India convoy, and also the Narcissus and Leda, and the Cork convoy : and I herewith transmit to your lordships the necessary instructions from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company to the officers commanding their ships, which Sir Home Popham will communicate when he thinks it expedient.

Upon the union of the whole force at Madeira, Sir Home Popham will concert measures with Sir David Baird for proceeding against the Cape in the manner most likely to ensure success. You will issue sealed orders to the Commander of the Belliqueux to proceed, with the convoy under his charge, to Madeira, where he is to wait for the arrival of Sir Home Popham, and, upon his arrival, to place himself under his command. By sealed orders, your lordships will also direct the Captain of the Narcissus to proceed with the Cork convoy to Madeira, there to wait the arrival of Sir Home Popham, and to place himself under his orders ; and you will further issue sealed orders to the Commanders of the Diomede and Raisonneable. As the success of this enterprise may depend upon secrecy and surprise, your lordships will particularly enjoin the importance of not suffering the destination of this force to transpire at Madeira, or elsewhere, on its passage.

It is desirable that Sir Home Popham should be directed to sail with as little delay as possible ; the East India convoy may be despatched as soon as it is deemed safe for a fleet to proceed to the westward ; and the Cork convoy be ordered to sail for its ostensible destination as soon as Sir David Baird

shall arrive there, to whom your lordships will entrust the sealed orders which are to be sent to the Commander of the Narcissus, and your ostensible orders may be forwarded by the ordinary mail.

I have the honour to be, &c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

*Instructions to Major-General Sir D. Baird.*

Draft.

July 25, 1805.

Sir—In consequence of information having been received that the Cape is now defended by not more than 1,500 regular Batavian troops, not of the best description, and that the militia and the inhabitants look with anxiety for the arrival of a British force, and also from the facility afforded to an operation against that settlement, from the troops now embarked and proceeding to India being applicable, without inconvenience, to this service, in progress to their ultimate destination; it has been determined on to attempt the reduction of this Colony by the combined operation of a force from Cork, added to that now on board the East India Company's ships at Falmouth.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that his Majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for the command of this expedition, and that directions have been given to embark, with the utmost despatch, the regiments named in the margin,<sup>1</sup> in transports now lying at Cork. As the troops to be employed on this service are cantoned in the neighbourhood of Cork, and the transports are kept constantly in readiness, and victualled for six months, I have every reason to hope that the

1 24th regiment	.	504	rank and file.
38th	"	925	"
71st	"	768	"
72nd	"	730	"
83rd	"	750	"
93rd	"	890	"
Royal Artillery	.	160	"

armament will be in readiness to put to sea in the course of a few days.

As it is of the utmost importance that the object of this expedition should not transpire, and lest the enemy should be apprised of your approach, the troops at Cork have been directed to embark under your command *for the Mediterranean*, the India fleet has been ordered to proceed at once *to India*. Both fleets will sail with these ostensible destinations; but having sealed orders, to be opened at a certain latitude, directing them to rendezvous at the Madeiras, where the whole naval and military force, including the Company's ships, will be directed to place themselves under your orders and those of Sir Home Popham.

It is his Majesty's pleasure that you delay as short a time as possible at Madeira, and that even there every precaution be taken to prevent the immediate object of the expedition from being made public, which will best be done by giving out that the Cork fleet is to separate, at a certain latitude, for the West Indies. Having departed from the Madeiras, you are to proceed at once to the Cape, unless the officer in command of his Majesty's ships should think it advisable to touch at St. Helena, in which case you will use your utmost diligence to obtain the latest and most precise information with respect to the state of the Cape, its garrison, defences, means of subsistence, &c.; and you will confer with the Governor of St. Helena (who is directed to render you every aid consistent with the security of the island) as to the possibility of making any of the resources at his disposal applicable to the success of the expedition.

Having arrived at the Cape, you will, if you should have no previous reason to suppose that your approach has transpired, endeavour, by a vigorous and immediate attack (having previously summoned the garrison to surrender), to avail yourself of the probable neglect of due vigilance and precaution on the part of the garrison.

As it is not impossible, however, that two French ships of the line which sailed in May from Rochfort, with troops on board, and which are yet unaccounted for, may have thrown themselves into the Cape, with a reinforcement of from 1,000 to 1,200 troops, you will not rely with too much confidence on the enemy's means of resistance being confined to the number stated at the outset of these instructions.

Should you be of opinion that the reduction of the place may be facilitated by opening a communication with the inhabitants and persons in authority, you are authorized and directed, in conjunction with the officer in command of his Majesty's naval force, (taking care not to waste too much time in such negotiations) to grant the garrison and the inhabitants such favourable and liberal terms of capitulation as may appear to you best calculated to acquire the possession of the place in the most expeditious manner, and with the least loss or hazard to the ships and troops employed on this service.

Upon the surrender of the place to his Majesty's arms (taking possession of it in the King's name), and duly attending to the stipulations of any capitulation which may be previously agreed on, you will take upon yourself, under the title of Lieutenant-Governor, the civil government of the Settlement, till his Majesty's further pleasure is declared, and continue to carry on the administration (preserving to the inhabitants the enjoyment of their private property, usages, and religion) as nearly as may be according to the system laid down and established by his Majesty's authority during the late war, and under which the Colony enjoyed, till the period of its restitution, so much prosperity and happiness.

As I understand the troops now in garrison at the Cape are mostly Germans, and much disgusted with the Dutch service, you will take the earliest opportunity of inducing them to enter into his Majesty's 60th Regiment, attaching them in equal proportions as supernumeraries to the regiments in garrison, until measures can be taken for transferring and placing

them under their own officers. If, after using your best endeavours to procure the whole of these men for the King's service in the manner above directed, any foreigners, not being French subjects, having so declined to engage, should nevertheless be willing to enlist for service in the East Indies, you will engage them for the service of the East India Company, according to the terms of enlistment usual in the European branch of their army, a statement of which you will receive herewith enclosed.

As it is important that the Company's ships directed to co-operate in this expedition, and placed with a view to this special service under the orders of the naval officer in command, should be delayed at the Cape for as short a time as possible, I have his Majesty's commands to direct that you are to use your utmost diligence to have the troops and recruits destined for India expeditiously re-embarked, in order that they may proceed under the convoy of the Belliqueux to their ulterior destination ; notifying by them, or by the earliest opportunity which you can find, the surrender of the Cape to the several Presidencies in India, in order that the accustomed intercourse with the Colony may be opened, and such supplies received as may be required for the use of the Settlement.

In the event of circumstances arising, either to discourage you from landing the troops, or, in the event of your having made good your landing, to determine you to desist from the enterprise (contingencies, I trust, equally improbable), it is his Majesty's pleasure (the India ships being detached to their destination) that you do return, with the remainder of your force, to St. Helena, there to refresh the troops and squadron, and to receive further orders for the direction of your conduct.

In case you should not find any fresh instructions at St. Helena, continuing there not more than fifteen days, unless the refreshment of the squadron should render a longer stay indispensable, you will, at the end of that period, return to Cork, unless you should receive a different destination at the

Madeiras, where you are directed to call and inquire for orders.

His Majesty has entrusted to you the conduct of the military part of this service, under a full confidence in your experience, zeal, and discretion; and his Majesty implicitly relies on your cultivating the most cordial, good understanding with the officer to whom the command of his naval forces has been confided. The ultimate success of the expedition principally depending on the cordial co-operation of the respective services, his Majesty is persuaded that their united exertions will be such as to entitle them to his Majesty's gracious and unqualified approbation.

[Enclosure.]

July 26, 1805.

Previous to the Act of the 39th of his present Majesty, cap. 109, the Company in time of peace paid for recruits raised in London, or within 50 miles, from 3 to 4 guineas per man; and for men raised at a greater distance, the additional sum of half a guinea per man for every 25 miles, as far as 175 miles and upwards, for whom they paid about 8 guineas. For recruits raised in Ireland, the Company paid from 12 to 13 guineas per man, and in Scotland from 9½ to 15½ guineas per man, with an addition of about 5 guineas per man for Irish recruits, allowed for passage and clothes. For recruits raised in time of war, 15 guineas each, whether enlisted in London or the country. The recruits, in time of peace, were required to be lads under 20 years of age, 5 feet 3 inches high; and men under 30 years of age, 5 feet 6 inches high; and, in time of war, under 20 years of age, 5 feet 1 inch high; and, under 30 years of age, 5 feet 5 inches high.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Barham.*

St. James's Square, July 25, 1805.

My dear Lord—Having completed the necessary instructions to Sir David Baird, and examined those prepared by

your lordship's directions to the several naval officers, which appear to me perfectly clear and correct, I have nothing further to suggest, except the expediency of furnishing the expedition with two light cutters; they may be useful in the landing, and will, at all events, be requisite for sending intelligence to Europe and India. If they sail a week after the others are gone, they will reach Madeira before the expedition sails.

There are two officers now at Colchester, who served with the Hottentots, whom it would be desirable to forward by them. The Duke of York will take care to send them to the point of embarkation, upon your lordship fixing a time. I begged, however, his Royal Highness not to call upon them till all the main branches of the expedition were gone, as we have already called principally upon officers who have served in the quarter where we intend to operate, and it is better they should follow with sealed orders similar to those given to the other ships.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Barham.*

Lord Castlereagh presents his compliments to Lord Barham, and transmits to him enclosed a Memorandum which has been put into his hands by Sir David Baird, relative to the two officers at Colchester, mentioned in Lord Castlereagh's private letter to Lord Barham of yesterday.

St. James's Square, July 26, 1805.

*Memorandum.*

In case the additional regiments are granted, it may be proper to have a major-general as second in command, and another brigadier. It occurs to me, likewise, that Major Donald Campbell, of the 40th regiment, and Captain Duncan Stewart, of the 90th, both of whom are strongly recommended

by General Dundas as being well acquainted with the country, and as having lived long with the Hottentots, and understanding and speaking their language, might serve very usefully, in the first instance, as guides, &c. ; and afterwards, in the event of our being successful, be employed in forming a Hottentot corps. But, as both secrecy and despatch are highly essential, and these gentlemen, as well as the Major-General and Brigadier, may not probably be in readiness to embark with the troops, they might be sent after to the rendezvous in a sloop, or brig of war.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Sir D. Baird.*

Downing Street, July 26, 1805.

Sir—Having, in my instructions of the 25th instant, conveyed to you his Majesty's commands that, in case of failure in the expedition against the Cape, after detaching the East India convoy with the troops now on board, you should proceed, with the rest of the squadron, to St. Helena to refresh, I am now to desire, in the event of the naval officer in command of his Majesty's ships being enabled to select suitable transports from amongst those employed, and also having the means of victualling them from the rest of the squadron, that you do direct the 38th and 93rd regiments to proceed with the troops already destined for India, returning with the rest of the forces under your command to St. Helena, as set forth in my former instructions.

In case it should appear to the naval officer in command that it may be injurious to the health of the troops to permit them to sail at once for India, without refreshment; he will, in that case, direct them to touch at the Isle of Madagascar, there to obtain the requisite supplies.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Sir D. Baird.*

Downing Street, July 26, 1805.

Sir—Having signified to you, in my general instructions, that, in the event of your reducing the Cape of Good Hope to surrender to his Majesty, you should assume the civil Government of that Settlement, as his Majesty's Lieutenant-Governor, I am now to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure, that you are to receive, in that capacity, the same salary and allowances as are at present enjoyed by the Batavian Governor, until further orders.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Duke of York.*

St. James's Square, July 26, 1805.

Sir—In the event of the expedition failing against the Cape, the troops proceeding from Cork, in my first instructions to Sir David Baird, were directed to return to St. Helena, &c. As we must look at the necessity of supplying the East Indies, in the course of the ensuing year, with two regiments of King's Infantry, I have signified to Sir David Baird his Majesty's pleasure, that the two strongest regiments, viz., the 38th and 93rd, be forwarded to India, in this, I trust, very improbable event, under convoy of the Belliqueux, it not appearing at all worth while to bring these regiments back to Europe, to return an equal number by the ships of the next season. I trust this arrangement will, under all the circumstances, meet your Royal Highness's approbation.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Mr. Cooke to Sir D. Baird.*

Downing Street, July 31, 1805.

Sir—In the absence of Lord Castlereagh, I am to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure that you do not proceed to sea, with

the troops under your orders, until you shall receive the King's further commands for that purpose.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

E. COOKE.

*Lord Hawkesbury to Sir D. Baird.*

Downing Street, August 4, 1805.

Sir—The reasons which induced the suspension of the sailing orders no longer remaining, I am to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure, in the absence of Lord Castlereagh, that you should forthwith proceed with the troops under your command to Madeira; and you will signify to the Captain of the Narcissus, that he is to put to sea without delay, according to the instructions he has received from the Lords of the Admiralty.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HAWKESBURY.

*Lord Hawkesbury to Sir D. Baird.*

Downing Street, August 6, 1805.

Sir—Since I wrote to you yesterday by Johnson, the messenger, intelligence has been received by which it appears probable that a squadron of three sail of the line has escaped from Rochefort, with a view to cruise against our convoys. It therefore becomes necessary to take measures for your security. I am, therefore, to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure that you do not proceed to sea until further orders, and that you do communicate these his Majesty's commands to the Captain of the Narcissus.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HAWKESBURY.

*Lord Castlereagh to Sir D. Baird.*

Downing Street, August 20, 1805.

Sir—The King's commands having been signified to you that you should remain at Cork until further orders, I am

now directed by his Majesty to signify to you his Royal pleasure that you do forthwith proceed, with the troops under your command, to sea, in order to carry into execution the instructions which you have received from his Majesty. Orders have been issued to the officer commanding the convoy under whose protection you embark to sail without delay.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Sir D. Baird.*

Downing Street, August 20, 1805.

Dear Sir—I returned this day from Ireland, and am happy to liberate you from further detention, which the arrangement made by Admiral Cornwallis, with a view to watch both Brest and Ferrol, enable me to do. There is nothing to which you can now be exposed but the Rochefort Squadron of four sail of the line seen by the Naiad, on the 8th, off Ushant, which is not yet quite satisfactorily accounted for, though the information rather leads us to believe it has joined the combined squadron. Some risk must be run. I trust, however, in the present case, it is but small; and that the course you will steer will diminish the chance of your crossing upon them. I wish you every success, and I am, dear Sir, with great regard, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess Cornwallis, or Officer commanding his Majesty's forces in India.*

Downing Street, September 10, 1805.

My Lord—I have the honour to inform your lordship that an expedition under the command of Sir David Baird, consisting of the naval and military forces stated in the

margin<sup>1</sup> sailed from Cork, on the 31st ult., against the Cape of Good Hope.

The possibility of circumstances occurring in India which may render a reinforcement of British troops material to the security of our possessions in that quarter, before it can be furnished from hence, has determined his Majesty to direct the enclosed instructions to be forwarded to Sir David Baird.

His Majesty, entirely relying on the discretion with which such power is likely to be used by your lordship, is pleased not only to authorize you to make such requisition upon Sir David Baird, or the officer in command at the Cape, (should it have been surrendered to the British arms) as is pointed out in the instructions to that officer, and may be consistent with the retaining possession of the place, but, in a case of extremity, even to direct the absolute evacuation of that colony, and the transfer of the garrison to India; for complying with which requisition, on your lordship's part, Sir David Baird is

<sup>1</sup> *Naval Force.*

Diadem	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	64
Belliqueux	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	64
Raisonnable	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	64
Diomede	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	50
Narcissus	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	32
Leda	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	32

*Military Force.*

24th Foot	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	504
38th "	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	925
59th "	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1,000
71st "	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	768
72nd "	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	730
83rd "	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	750
93rd "	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	890
20th Light Dragoons	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	221
Artillery Artificers	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	320
Recruits	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	546

hereby directed to consider your lordship's order, accompanied by a copy of this despatch, as a full and sufficient signification to him of the King's pleasure to that effect.

In the event of your lordship feeling yourself compelled to order the garrison of the Cape, in the whole, or in part, to proceed to India, it is of the utmost importance that his Majesty's Government should be apprised, by the most expeditious means, both by sea and land, of the steps you have taken, in order that the arrangements may be made at home, before the enemy can be prepared to send a force from Europe against the colony, for the reinforcement or re-occupation of that important position by British troops. And, lest the enemy, upon a knowledge of the state of the Cape, should endeavour to proceed against it from the Mauritius, in the interval, your lordship will, at the same time that you send orders to the above effect to the Cape, notify the same to the officer in chief command of his Majesty's naval forces in the East Indies, who will be instructed, in such case, to send an adequate naval force closely to watch the Mauritius, till such time as he shall receive intelligence, either that reinforcements have reached the Cape, or that the colony has been re-occupied by a British force.

In case of the total evacuation of that Settlement, as it is of importance that the place should be left in such a state as may render it difficult for an enemy's force arriving in the mean time to render it strong against a future attack, your lordship will direct the officer in command to consider how far, by the removal of the guns to St. Helena, or by injuring the works in such a degree as to require time to make them again tenable, the recovery of the place by his Majesty's arms may be thereby facilitated.

The whole of this instruction, which I have received the King's commands to convey to your lordship, proceeds upon the principle that the true value of the Cape to Great Britain is its being considered and treated at all times as an outpost

subservient to the protection and security of our Indian possessions. When in our hands, it must afford considerable accommodation and facilities to our intercourse with those possessions ; but its occupation is perhaps even more material, as depriving the enemy of the best immediate position between Europe and India for assembling and preparing a large European armament for service in the East Indies, as well as of a more advantageous station for watching and intercepting our outward and homeward bound trade.

Your lordship will, I have no doubt, correctly appreciate, under any contingency that may arise, the relative advantage of the forces under Sir David Baird being employed at the Cape, or on the continent of India, as the paramount security of our Indian Empire may be thereby best consulted ; and his Majesty is fully persuaded that you will neither cause this important position to be materially weakened or abandoned, except so far as it may appear to you to be essential to the preservation of more important interests.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. Your lordship will perceive, in my instructions to Sir David Baird, that he is directed to return the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, to Europe, in case he should detach the main body of his army to India. The reasons for not sending forward the artillery and engineers are obvious. Your lordship will also perceive the objection, in a military point of view, to separating in stations so remote the 20th Light Dragoons, the remainder of the corps being now on service with Sir J. Craig, in the Mediterranean. As the same considerations would render it unavoidable for your lordship to order this part of the above force to proceed to India, it may, therefore, be left by your lordship to Sir David Baird's discretion to judge, from the temper of the Colony at the time, and other circumstances, whether even this small number of men, with naval protection, may not safely hold possession of the place, aided by such

force as the Governor of St. Helena can spare until reinforcements shall arrive from Europe.

C.

*Lord Castlereagh to Sir D. Baird.*

Downing Street, September 10, 1805.

Sir—The last advices received overland from India indicate a disposition, on the part of Scindia and the Rajah of Berar (in breach of the treaties subsisting between them and the East India Company) to enter into a hostile confederacy with Jeswunt Rao Holkar against the British power. Should such an event actually take place, and, contrary to all just expectations, our armies in India experience any serious check, intelligence of which may possibly reach you before it can be received in England, I have to convey to you his Majesty's commands that, in the event of your having acquired possession of the Cape, provided the exigency of the Company's affairs, upon the intelligence you may receive, shall appear to you to be such as to call for reinforcements, you do without delay, and at the hazard even of reducing your garrison for the time considerably below what is required for the complete defence of the colony, detach the 38th and 93rd Regiments, consisting of the numbers stated in the margin,<sup>1</sup> to the East Indies, transmitting immediate notice thereof to me, in order that adequate reinforcements may be sent out to join you.

It is his Majesty's pleasure that the above regiments do proceed in such of the transports now with you as may be best suited to the service, under a proper convoy (if possible, a ship of the line) on which subject the officer in command of his Majesty's naval forces will receive the instructions of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty; and that you do direct them to be landed either at Bombay or Calcutta, according as the season of the year and state of the winds may afford the best prospect of a safe and expeditious passage.

<sup>1</sup> 38th Regiment, 991; 93rd, 882.

Should you, from any unforeseen circumstances, be induced to desist from the enterprise with which you are charged against the Cape, you will, under the contingency above stated, in addition to the two regiments directed, by my letter of the 26th of July, to be in that case forwarded to India, make such further detachment as circumstances may appear to you to require, considering yourself authorized and directed (if there should appear an adequate necessity) to proceed to India with the whole force under your command, the Royal Artillery, Engineers, and Light Dragoons excepted, which you will return to England under convoy of a frigate.

The same precautionary principles which have induced his Majesty to direct the above instructions to be transmitted to you, have determined his Majesty to give authority to Marquess Carnwallis, or the person in the chief command of his Majesty's troops in India for the time being, to send to the Cape for reinforcements; and you are hereby directed to comply with any requisition you may receive to that effect.

You are not, however, to wait for such a requisition being made on you from Bengal, in case you should receive intelligence of the description alluded to in the former part of this despatch; and, in order to render it the more consistent with the security of the place, to detach largely from your garrison, you are to take measures, as early as possible, for sending to Europe such prisoners of war as you may not find it expedient to suffer to enlist into the British service, taking care to retain at the Cape as small a proportion as possible of the foreigners so permitted to enlist, should the number of your garrison be materially reduced; and with this view, you may attach a considerable proportion of them to the regiments proceeding to India. I trust you will find no difficulty in procuring tonnage at the Cape for the removal of the prisoners to Europe, without encroaching on the transports attached to your army.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Admiralty.*

Downing Street, October 18, 1805.

My Lords—The advices received from Bombay, of the 14th of May last, rendering it probable that a general pacification may have taken place in India, and that from this circumstance it may not be necessary for the Governor-General to make any demand upon the corps now under the command of Major-General Sir David Baird, beyond what is already destined for service in the East Indies, it will, under this view of the subject, be advisable that such of the transports as shall not be essential to the service at the Cape of Good Hope, in the event of its capture, should return to Europe. I have, therefore, received his Majesty's orders to give instructions to Major-General Sir David Baird not to retain any transports at the Cape which, in the event of pacification in India, are not likely to be wanted there, but to concert measures with Commodore Sir Home Popham for their return to Europe; and I am now to signify to your lordships his Majesty's pleasure that you do issue the necessary orders to Sir Home Popham to co-operate with Major-General Sir David Baird upon this point.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

**EXPEDITION AGAINST CONSTANTINOPLE.****1807.**

The decease of Mr. Pitt in January, 1806, occasioned the dissolution of the Administration over which he had presided, and the irreparable loss of a Statesman and First Minister, who never has been, and probably never can be, replaced, as also the resignation, by Lord Castlereagh, of an office for which, a Brother may assert, that he had proved himself eminently qualified. A ministry was then formed, under the auspices of Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox, and, during its short existence, the expedition against the Dardanelles and Constantinople was projected and executed. The narrative of this expedition, furnished in the letters of the Honourable Captain Blackwood, will be found not the less interesting, because it is communicated not in official despatches, but in offerings of the strictest private friendship: no one had a higher opinion of the great professional skill and merit of Captain Blackwood than Lord Castlereagh. I believe it may be said that never was a force, naval or military, destined for a service of such peril and importance, abandoned with such improvidence to the caprices of chance, or despatched with such neglect of all the means calculated to afford a prospect of success to its exertions, as the little squadron sent on

this occasion to awe imperial Turkey, and to work a change in the counsels of her rulers.

The invasion of Egypt by the French, in 1798, was followed by a declaration of war against the Republic, and by an alliance with Russia in December, 1798, and with England and Naples in January, 1799. The influence of the British and Russian Cabinets became, in consequence, predominant in the Divan. Egypt was reconquered and restored to the Porte by Great Britain. In 1802, France concluded peace with Sultan Selim; and a French party then began to acquire influence in the Turkish counsels; and this influence was extended and strengthened by the activity and intrigues of Sebastiani, whom Napoleon sent as his ambassador to Constantinople. In 1806, the Porte, having infringed the stipulations of the Treaty of Kutschuk Kainardje, the Russian Government ordered a force to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia; and the Sultan, instigated by Sebastiani, declared war against the Emperor Alexander, who was previously engaged in hostilities against Persia, and also against France, in conjunction with his ally, the King of Prussia. The British Cabinet now found itself called upon to prevail upon the Porte to rescind her warlike declarations, and to dismiss Sebastiani; and, on her refusal, the squadron, whose proceedings are detailed in the following letters, was sent to force compliance with these and other demands. At the same time, orders were issued for a corps of 5,000 British troops, under General Frazer, to proceed from Sicily and take possession of Alexandria; but the

deposition of Sultan Selim, which soon followed, and a rapid change of political circumstances and interests, prevented any further hostile demonstrations.

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*Lord Collingwood to Vice-Admiral Sir J. T. Duckworth.*

January 13, 1807.

Some late proceedings on the part of the Turkish Government, indicating the increasing influence of the French in their counsels, and a disposition in the Porte to abandon the alliance which has happily subsisted between that government and his Majesty, inducing a conduct on their part which it would be inconsistent with the dignity of his Majesty's Crown to submit to, have determined the King to adopt such prompt and decisive measures as are suitable to the occasion.

On the other hand, the last accounts, of the date of the 13th of October last, from his Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, stated the matters of difference to have been amicably adjusted; yet, as recent events may have an effect unfavourable to his Majesty's interests, it is necessary that a squadron, under the command of a judicious and skilful officer, should proceed to Constantinople, to be ready to act with vigour and promptitude, as circumstances and the state of affairs on his arrival may make necessary.

You are hereby required and directed to take under your orders the ships named in the margin,<sup>1</sup> which you are to collect as you arrive at the stations and ports where they are; and, having completed the provisions and water to four months at Gibraltar, proceed as expeditiously as possible to the Straits of Constantinople, and there take such a position as will enable you best to execute the following instructions.

On your arrival before Constantinople, you are to communi-

<sup>1</sup> At Sicily, Palermo—Pompée, Rear-Admiral Sir S. Smith. In the Archipelago, under the orders of Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Louis—Canopus, Thunderer, Standard, Endymion, Active, Nautilus, Delight, Royal Sovereign, Windsor Castle, Repulse, and Ajax.

cate with his Majesty's Ambassador as soon as possible; sending to him the accompanying despatches, and consulting with him on the measures necessary to be taken.

Should the subject of difference have been amicably settled between the Turkish Court and the British Ambassador, as was stated in the last accounts from him, the relations of amity are to be maintained. Should, however, the reverse be the case, or should the representations which Mr. Arbuthnot is instructed to make to the Turkish Government fail of their effect, you are to act offensively towards Constantinople.

But as, from a barbarous practice of the Turkish Government, it may happen that the Ambassador and the persons of his suite are forcibly detained, in such case, before you proceed to any actual hostility, you are to demand and to insist on the release of that Minister and his suite, together with all those who belong to, and compose part of, the British Factory; and, in the event of this demand not being complied with, you are to proceed to measures of hostility against the town.

If Mr. Arbuthnot shall not have been forcibly detained, or, having been detained, should be released in consequence of your requisition, you are then to communicate and consult with that Minister on the measures proper to be pursued, and govern yourself in your further proceedings by such communication.

Should the result of your communications with Mr. Arbuthnot determine, and he inform you it is his opinion that hostilities should commence, having previously taken all possible precautions for the safety of that Minister and the persons attached to his mission, and having disposed the squadron under your orders in such stations as may compel compliance, you are to demand the surrender of the Turkish fleet, together with a supply of naval stores from the Arsenal sufficient for its complete equipment, which demand you are to accompany with a menace of immediate destruction of the town.

At this crisis, should any negotiation on the subject be proposed by the Turkish Government, as such proposal will pro-

bably be to gain time, for preparing their resistance or securing their ships, I would recommend that no negotiation should be continued more than half an hour; and, in the event of an absolute refusal, you are either to cannonade the town, or attack the fleet, wherever it may be, holding it in mind that the getting possession, and, next to that, the destruction, of the Turkish fleet, is the object of the first consideration.

On the adoption of hostilities, the communication of that decision to the Commander-in-Chief of the British army in Sicily, and the officer commanding the squadron on the coast of that island, must be as prompt and immediate as possible, sent by a fast-sailing vessel; and, the more to ensure the immediate communication, a duplicate should follow in a very few days, orders having been sent to General Fox to detach 5,000 men, for the purpose of taking possession of Alexandria, as soon as he is informed that hostilities have commenced; which armament you must regard as acting within the sphere of your co-operation, and be prepared to give all the assistance which is in your power.

When hostilities have been entered upon in that quarter, it will be of the first importance to possess a naval station in the Archipelago. The island of Milo, from its situation and the excellence of its harbour, presents itself as best calculated for preserving the communication in the Archipelago, and such as will certainly be necessary in the Morea. In proceeding up the Archipelago, pilots are procured at Milo; and, when you are there for that purpose, it would be a favourable opportunity for you to examine how far the possessing yourself of it is practicable, and what force will be necessary to maintain it, and make such necessary communications to General Fox on the subject and request for troops as may be wanted to possess it.

His Majesty's ship the Glatton is stationed in the Bay of Smyrna, for the purpose of receiving on board the persons and property of the factors resident there, whenever circumstances make it necessary for them to embark; and, as this will depend

upon the operations at Constantinople, you will give Captain Seacombe and the factors timely notice for their security.

Having thus detailed particularly the situation of affairs at the Porte, and what are the instructions of his Majesty in the event of war with Turkey, yet, in a service of this nature, many circumstances will doubtless occur, which cannot be foreseen, and can only be provided for by an intelligent mind on the spot. In your ability a resource will be found for every contingency, and in your zeal for his Majesty's service a security that, for the execution of these instructions, whatever is practicable will be done.

The force which is appointed for this service is greater than the original intention, as it was expected that the Russians from Corfu would be ready to co-operate with you ; but, as its success depends upon the promptness with which it is executed, I have judged it proper, as delay may arise from the squadron not joining, to increase your force by two ships. I have, however, written to Vice-Admiral Siniavin, to request him to detach four ships, with orders to put themselves under your command. And that you may be possessed of all the force that can be applied to the important service under your immediate direction, you are hereby authorized to call from the coast of Sicily whatever can be spared from the perfect security of that island, as well as the despatch vessels at Malta. But, as little more naval force is at Sicily than is absolutely necessary for its defence and the convoy which may be wanted for the troops, a strict regard must be had that that island is not left in a weak state of defence. While employed on this service, you must take every opportunity of communicating to me your proceedings in as full detail as possible ; transmitting to me, by such opportunities, the general returns and state of the squadron.

In the event of your finding a pacific and friendly disposition in the Porte, so that the squadron under your orders is not required in hostile operations there, you are to detach a flag-officer, with such number of ships as are not wanted, which

detachment being made up of five ships of the line from those at Sicily, you will direct to proceed off Toulon, endeavouring to fall in with any squadron or ships which the enemy may have put to sea from thence. Not finding the enemy at sea, those ships attached to the service at Sicily are to return to their stations; and the flag-officer, with the others, are to proceed and join me at this rendezvous.

I enclose for your information copies of the orders delivered to Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Louis and Captain Seacombe, of the Glatton.

Given on board the Ocean, off Cadiz.

COLLINGWOOD.

*The Hon. Captain Blackwood to Lord Castlereagh.*

Malta, Ajax, February 2<sup>d</sup>, 1807.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—As this expedition, of which the Ajax forms a part, is likely to attract public attention, having promised to give your lordship any details worthy of attention, I shall begin by stating that to-morrow we sail under the command of Sir John Duckworth, with five sail of the line and two bombs, to join Sir Thomas Louis off the Dardanelles, who has three sail of the line and two frigates waiting our arrival, to attempt to force the passage of the Dardanelles, hitherto considered as impassable, push up to Constantinople, and there endeavour not only to awe the Porte into concessions to Russia, but to give us up her navy, to take care of till we have a peace with France, and to send Sebastiani away from Constantinople—terms which I cannot see how so limited a force as we have ought to expect to obtain, particularly as we have not a land-troop to take possession of and hold the forts in the Dardanelles, or a single resource within ourselves more than cruising ships generally have; at all events, if we do gain them, it will be more owing to the character and fear the Turks entertain of our navy, than to any physical advantage such a force can have over a nation possessing such strong

posts, with as many men as they choose to call for, so many ships in readiness, and with such entire resources as they have within themselves ; whilst we, shut up in the Sea of Marmora, cannot have any.

It is, however, our duty, whether we succeed or not, to make the attempt ; and so far, if I may judge by the promptness with which Sir John Duckworth appears to act, we are fortunate in having him as the chief. I cannot, however, be blind to the difficulties of the undertaking, and that, if the Ottoman Government acts with any vigour, they may not only set our utmost efforts at defiance, but also render our situation in the Sea of Marmora a very perilous one.

Government, however, thinks so differently, that their orders to Lord Collingwood were to send only five sail of the line in place of eight, which latter his lordship, not so entirely despising our enemy, sent ; with which, if we had 5,000 troops, some more bombs, and store-ships to supply exigencies, and to possess ourselves of the forts in the Dardanelles, or destroy the works, which would be preferable, as it would leave that force disposable ; and, so long as we keep the command by sea, the Turks could not repair their works or replace their guns ; consequently, the communication kept open. None of these points, however, which I feel persuaded your lordship will agree with me ought to have been attended to, seem in any shape to have been weighed ; we shall, therefore, have to take the bull by the horns, which now, from the armament caused by the Russian war, I conceive will be the more formidable. I should not commit thus freely to paper my opinion to your lordship of what is in hand of the measures adopted by Government, if I considered it wrong, and the communication was not confidential ; but, as I know I may build on the latter, and, with respect to the former, it is of so little consequence what my opinion may be as to measures wanting or adopted, provided I do my duty, that I shall not hesitate to offer any information as occurrences present themselves.

Our ships are uncommonly fine ones ; and, as the Admirals and Captains have generally seen service, it will not be arrogant to anticipate as much success as such a force has a right to expect. Though forcing so strong a passage, as I understand the Dardanelles are, is a very serious undertaking—so much so, that the Russians have hitherto, under the impression of its impossibility, never dared to attempt it—yet, were these passages the only difficulty, I conceive that, aided by a fresh wind, they may be surmounted. But what, according to the view I have of the service, and what ought to be provided against is, how, after our arrival off Constantinople, without any additional ordnance, in the face of batteries well placed on all sides, a superior fleet who, though they may decline coming out to fight us, would be ready and fully equal to seize any advantage the batteries might gain over us in the loss of masts and yards, which must be calculated on—how, without masts, ships, or cordage, to replace deficiencies, we are to succeed in bringing the Turks to our terms, is an enigma difficult to be solved ; add to which, whether successful or not, we must hold in view the means of retreat ; but, possibly, Government holds information that, if our squadron does but appear, no resistance will be made ; which, though it will leave us no laurels to gather, I wish may be true. Of this, however, I feel persuaded that, if such information is not in the hands of Government, it must be more owing to the supineness and ignorance of our enemy in applying the ample means of resistance they have, than to any thing eight sail of the line, two frigates, and two bombs, can do. I wish, however, and with which for the present I shall close, that the genius of Lord Nelson would, in this arduous task before us, assist the judgment of Sir John Duckworth, which, with every deference due to his talents, I think the service would be benefitted by.

Tenedos, Ajax, February 12.

Yesterday we reached this island, where we found Mr. Arbuthnot, who had been obliged to quit Constantinople so

suddenly in the Endymion frigate, with the English Factory, as to leave behind every thing but what he and his children had on them. Mr. Arbuthnot was anxiously waiting our arrival on board Sir Thomas Louis's ship ; and to-morrow, if the present wind holds, our service is to commence. This evening, we move hence to the entrance of the Dardanelles.

Royal George, February 18th.

Little, very little, did I suppose, when I laid down my pen on the 12th, that I should have had to communicate the melancholy and sudden loss of my ship by fire on the night of the 14th—an event against which, by various arrangements, I might fairly have considered myself sufficiently guarded. It is, however, but too true—the Ajax, one of the finest ships in the service, with 282 fine fellows, among whom were several officers and young gentlemen I felt particularly interested in, on the eve of a service no other fleet had ever attempted, and, what is singular, in sight of Troy and Ajax's tomb, was burnt in the most rapid and extraordinary way I believe ever was, of the rapidity of which your lordship can judge, when I tell you that, from the first moment of alarm, in twenty minutes she was on fire to the top-gallant-mast heads, which, of course, precluded almost all chance of saving her. Its cause, further than that it took place in the bread-room, a Court of Inquiry, which sat all yesterday, has not been able to ascertain. It appears, however, that the purser's steward and his mate, whose duty leads them to that place, were drunk ; and it is naturally inferred, as no combustible matter was kept there, that one of these men must have left a candle alight or badly extinguished in some improper situation, and, having locked the door on it, it gained such ground as to baffle every exertion of seven hundred officers and men, who resisted its progress, till they fell, with the fire-buckets in their hands.

In every point of view, but particularly with such a service

in perspective, and independently of my own private loss, which is above £1,500, the loss of such a ship, with 282 fine fellows, is heavy indeed. To lose one's ship in action, or in almost any other way, is what an officer may in time make up his mind to ; but to lose her by fire, which carries with it the appearance of a disorganized or lax discipline, on the eve of service, in which I had vainly set my mind on gaining as much credit as any brother officer, aggravated, too, by the loss of so many boys I had under my care, is a most heart-breaking event. I have, however, the comfort of feeling, and shall prove at my court-martial, that, in few ships, if in any, such precautions and arrangements had been put in force; as well as that, when it did happen, I made every exertion to rescue my ship from the flames, and afterwards my crew ; nor did I attempt to save myself by jumping overboard till the flames almost touched me.

But, though my heart is almost broke by such a misfortune, my spirit is not. I have, therefore, determined, since Sir John Duckworth has accepted of my services on board his ship, to witness the completion or failure of this most extraordinary service, an account of which I'll send your lordship. Mr. Arbuthnot is also on board the Royal George.

The weight of this misfortune, both in a public and private view, makes me now wish that, instead of coming abroad to join the Ajax, which cost me above £1,600, I had availed myself of the appointment your friendship gave me. I should not now have so many people to lament the loss of, but among whom, I am happy to say, your friend, Major Stark's son, is not one. It strongly shows that, in our service more particularly, we never know when we go too fast or too slow.

Mr. Windham, I understand, has not yet superseded my nomination ; but, though he refused some very strong applications to let me benefit by the appointment, when I proposed paying the fees and getting a year's leave of absence, he permits an officer employed on another service, which was his

objection to me, to reap all the benefit, but still allows me to hold the nomination, which certainly is rather hard: but this is not all his severity towards me. I have had the offer, through the Duke of Northumberland, who kindly interested himself with Lord Grenville for it, to be nominated, in place of an old officer, to a Government abroad which does not require residence, provided I will give a certain stipend of that salary to two nieces—an arrangement to which I consented: but Mr. Windham could not give it to any one else, as the officer in question will not resign but on the terms alluded to, and in my favour; notwithstanding both Lord Grenville and the Duke of Northumberland have expressed their wishes in my favour, he is inexorable, at least so it appears by my last letters from England. The officer I allude to is General Smith, a friend of the Duke's, and is paralytic; the Government, Fort Charles, in Jamaica, value £600 per annum—of course, in the nomination of the Secretary for the Colonies.

As my late losses make it the more necessary I should effect some point, being literally a poorer man than I was at the commencement of the war, though constantly in active service, and as your lordship was at the head of the Colonial Department, I enclose you the Duke's last letter, and shall be materially obliged by your considering the case, and giving me some hint what I ought to do to succeed. May I further request you will keep the Duke's letter till I have the pleasure of seeing your lordship, and that you will address me to the care of Lord Collingwood, off Cadiz, whom I hope to see soon after an answer can get there?

Mr. Arbuthnot has been good enough to charge himself with this, to go in his public packet; and, as the wind is fair for the execution of the projected service, I must close, and hope I shall in my next be enabled to give good accounts of our progress.

I am, &c.,  
HENRY BLACKWOOD.

*The Hon. Henry Blackwood to Lord Castlereagh.*

Royal George, off the Dardanelles,  
March 6, 1807.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—Though, I confess, it has not surprised me, it is yet a matter of sincere regret I cannot communicate to your lordship as great a proportion of success as I could wish. On the day after my last was closed, the 18th ult., we succeeded, and with no very great loss, in not only forcing the passage of the Dardanelles, strongly defended by ships as well as batteries, and in the most formidable parts not more than a mile and a quarter wide, but also in burning the whole of the former; for the particular details of which, as well as our retreat, as the despatches are to be forwarded to-morrow, I must refer your lordship [to them].

We repassed the Dardanelles yesterday, having succeeded, I may confidently say, in no one object but that of convincing the Turks a British squadron could force the passage; by which they have so entirely found out their weak points of defence, that I am inclined to think no other squadron will ever effect the same again; and that, had we not availed ourselves at the period we did of the means of retreat, such was the increase of batteries, that, in one week more, I question whether some would have succeeded in getting back; and, as it was, many have got most roughly handled by the immense stone shot, weighing from 300lb to 800lb, in diameter 6 feet 6 inches,<sup>1</sup> and in circumference nearly 7 feet. Pretty missile sort of weapons!

We are lying here to repair damages, which are pretty extensive; and are greeted by our worthy allies, the Russians, who, with seven sail of the line and two frigates, arrived only yesterday, though they ought long since, by their orders, and might, have arrived here to accompany us up to Constantinople,

<sup>1</sup> The writer probably meant to say 2 feet 6 inches. Every body knows that the circumference of a circle measures about treble the diameter.—ED.

failing in which they now press Sir John Duckworth to return, and in proportion as he is steady in his refusal, they become the more urgent. But the fact, my lord, is that, had the Russian fleet been here to accompany us to Constantinople, without troops to hold the passes in the Dardanelles, more than has been could not have been effected, or indeed so much ; for, so intricate was the navigation where the Turkish ships took up their position, I question much whether, if we had had a mixed force, we should have succeeded in their destruction.

To effect anything against Constantinople, the possession of the Dardanelles becomes absolutely necessary. We have therefore failed, and lost many gallant officers and men. How Government will receive the news remains yet to be seen ; but, as the measure was a child of their own, I conclude they will give it an air of victory, from our having destroyed nine sail of men-of-war, commanded in person by the Pacha—a service which was certainly very quickly and neatly performed, in the narrowest part of the Dardanelles ; and, under the fire of the batteries, though, without having a greater object in view, it was such as would not be considered equivalent for the risk which such an attempt created.

From my situation in the Royal George, I have had pretty well the means of seeing and judging of all that passed, as well as the means Sir John Duckworth had of succeeding ; and I am persuaded I do not deviate from accuracy in asserting that, at the time this expedition was undertaken, the enemy having twelve sail of the line and nine frigates ready, and the whole country in a state of defence and alarm, if we had had twenty sail of the line, frigates and bombs in proportion, but without land-troops, to possess ourselves of the Dardanelles, more than has been could not have been effected. Whereas, if, when Mr. Arbuthnot, above a year since, represented to Ministers the necessity of having a squadron in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, for the purpose of supporting our interest and

consequence, they had sent a few sail of the line and some smaller vessels, all would now have been well.

But, even so late as November last, we had it still in our power to remedy the evil. If, at that period, when Sir Thomas Louis was sent up by Lord Collingwood with three sail of the line and a frigate, the force which afterwards came up with us had been despatched to Constantinople, when Russia and the Porte were yet at peace, and no unusual armament by land or sea existed, Mr. Arbuthnot would still have swayed the counsels of the Divan, instead of M. Sebastiani, who now is everything; and I doubt not that even the war with Russia would have been prevented; whereas, by not making a prompt and vigorous effort at the proper time, when it could so easily have been done, we are involved in a serious war, our arms have not shown as we could wish them; on the contrary, we neither have nor could perform what was threatened—"the destruction of Constantinople and the Turkish fleet," unless they came into our terms, but have been forced to retreat; thereby acknowledging our inability, which naturally has infused spirits into the Turks, and put arms into the hands of Sebastiani, which he will exert in their counsels: and so strong will they now render Constantinople and the Dardanelles, that I am inclined to believe 20,000 men, with artillery, and twenty sail of the line, each with every necessary resource, would not now succeed; whereas, five months ago, when exactly the same cause for war existed, 3,000 men, with Sir John Duckworth's force, would have achieved all that could have been desired; which strongly proves the danger of procrastination in military operations.

All that is now possible will be the cutting off supplies from Constantinople, by blockading the Dardanelles and Smyrna, from which latter place the Ottoman Government draws a vast revenue, and the taking possession of Egypt, for which our expedition from Sicily has sailed, under General Frazer and Captain Hallowell: Sir John Duckworth will also

proceed thither in a few days, and leave the Russians here. Mr. Arbuthnot—who has not only been Minister but Admiral—for, without him, I am sorry to say, even what has been done would not have been attempted—has been dangerously ill, nearly from the time of our arrival in the Sea of Marmora—will proceed with his family in the Windsor Castle, one of the disabled ships, to Malta, whither I shall accompany him, and afterwards get to England as opportunity offers.

Although I may confidently venture to assure your lordship that the failure of the expedition is attributable to the half and half measures adopted, it is fair to state that, from its arrival near Constantinople, owing to the unavoidable casualties of winds and weather, nothing could be more unfortunate; and, in proportion as it acted against our views, it seconded every object the enemy could have in view. Your lordship will better understand this by my stating that, from the evening of the 20th, on which we reached an anchorage between Constantinople and the Prince's Island, to the 1st of March, we had but three or four hours of any wind that could have carried the squadron up to the situation intended to be taken up, off the Seraglio point, for the purpose of battering it; and during these few hours of wind, it happened that the most consequential negociation was going on through the Dragoman of the Porte, who so strenuously urged our squadron remaining where it was, which would preserve the Government from assassination, owing to the state of anarchy and confusion the appearance of such a squadron had excited, as well as expressing the decided wish of the Ottoman Government for peace, that Mr. Arbuthnot, considering the attainment of our demand preferable to war, decided we should preserve our present position, to give a fair time for adjustment.

From this period (22nd), it was a perfect calm; when the Turkish Government, having gained all the time they could wish, and, profiting by the weather, as favourable to their views of bringing out their ships into the Bosphorus and erecting

batteries, as it was contrary to ours, threw off the mask of treaty, and began to act offensively. It became, therefore, highly expedient the Admiral should decide whether his force, shut up in the Sea of Marmora, without a resource, and opposed by above 160 pieces of heavy ordnance, advantageously placed for flanking us in all directions, with a fleet of twelve sail of the line, nine frigates, and many fire-vessels, lying in a situation ready to seize any advantage the batteries might gain, was equal first to effect our views, and afterwards, whether successful or not, to force our passage back through the Dardanelles. On this point, it required little difficulty to form a decision ; and, on the 1st, we weighed with a fresh north-east gale, and, on the 3rd, repassed the Dardanelles, and anchored at the mouth, as before.

Such, my lord, are the leading features of our expedition, which, in confidence, I venture to offer ; but, though unsuccessful in almost every point, I am far from thinking that, with the friendly inclinations which I know Mr. Arbuthnot gives the Ottoman Government credit for towards England, we shall not succeed in bringing about an accommodation. It will, however, be difficult, from the amazing influence of Sebastiani, increased very much by our want of success ; but, as we have strong arms in our hands, by blockading Smyrna and the Dardanelles, thereby preventing supplies reaching Constantinople, and detaching the Greek islands from the Porte, whence vast supplies of provisions and seamen are drawn, and possessing ourselves of Egypt, whose inhabitants, as well as those of the Greek islands, ready to revolt, and anxious to be governed by the hat instead of the turban, it is to be expected, particularly if the Russians are successful by land, that we shall undermine the newly-acquired influence of M. Sebastiani, and ultimately attain our object. Much, very much, will, however, depend on the abilities of the Admiral sent to command ; and, though Sir John Duckworth is a gallant, good seaman, and would have proved an excellent second-in-command to such a man as

Lord Nelson, I am sorry to confess I am far, very far, from thinking him equal to a command where difficulties present themselves—good judgment and quick decision are necessary—which perhaps may surprise your lordship, but so it is.

From constant and generally successful employment, Sir J. Duckworth's abilities have been very much overrated, not only by landsmen, but in our own service—an opinion which I confess to be widely different from what I had of him previous to this service; yet I am sure I shall be borne out in it, even by many who had not the same opportunities that I had of seeing the effect which difficulties produced in him; but when I know how meanly Mr. Arbuthnot has cause to think of his powers of discrimination, deciding, and acting, as well as bearing up against unavoidable casualties, I really feel professionally ashamed; which conviction made me, in a former part of this, say that it was to the decision of Mr. Arbuthnot (who is equally mild and firm) that we undertook even what little was done; which, I trust, will screen our arms from that proportion of obloquy to which they would have been subject in the eyes of Europe and all the world, had the service not been undertaken at all, particularly after the threats which Mr. Arbuthnot was instructed to make to the Government of the Porte; and, with Mr. Arbuthnot, I feel persuaded your lordship will agree in the propriety and spirit of the answer he made Sir J. Duckworth, who appeared to hesitate in the execution of the positive instructions of Government; that, after the threats Mr. Arbuthnot had been instructed to make to the Porte, as to what our fleet would do, "It would be more for the credit of England the whole should perish in the attempt, than that it should not be attempted," which decided Sir J. Duckworth. Consequently, I say, that it was to Mr. Arbuthnot, and not the Admiral, we owe the act of going up the Dardanelles, as indeed we owe many other consequential decisions, even professional ones.

These, my lord, are opinions I should not venture to offer

of an officer so high and old in our service, were you either in office, or I had not cause to place every confidence in your friendship ; but they are opinions which, I am persuaded, were it necessary, Mr. Arbuthnot would second me in ; and a more unprejudiced man, I am sure, there cannot be ; for, not knowing Sir J. Duckworth but by general report, he had congratulated himself on the co-operation of so able an Admiral.

With this I shall conclude a communication which, I fear, will have exhausted your lordship's time and patience ; and, as my letters are to go off with the public despatches, I beg you to believe me, &c.,

HENRY BLACKWOOD.

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*Memorandum relative to Sir John Duckworth's Expedition to Constantinople.*

If it had been thought proper to join with the Expedition a body of troops sufficient to have occupied the Chersonesus, the fortifications of the Dardanelles could have been destroyed ; and, being assured, at all events, of a safe retreat, Sir John Duckworth might have gone to the greatest extremes.

SIR J. DUCKWORTH, BART.

## EXPEDITION AGAINST COPENHAGEN.

1807.

Scarcely had the disastrous campaign of the allied sovereigns of Russia and Prussia against France, in 1807, been terminated in the month of July by the peace of Tilsit, when the British Government found means to obtain positive information of the hostile plans projected against this country. Russia unfortunately acceded to the Continental system of Napoleon, and engaged to assist in compelling the minor Powers, and even Austria herself, to pursue a like course.

It was discovered that one of the first objects of France would be to secure the Danish fleet. A powerful armament was, in consequence, equipped with extraordinary despatch; and its commanders, Lords Cathcart and Gambier, were instructed to demand the surrender of all the ships of war, upon an engagement that they should be restored to Denmark on the conclusion of a general peace.

The Danish Government having rejected all proposals for an amicable accommodation, the British army invested Copenhagen; and, after the city had sustained a bombardment of three days, from the 2nd to the 5th of September, a capitulation was concluded; and all the ships of war, with the naval stores of every kind in the royal arsenals, were given up to the British forces, which, early in October, returned to England with their prizes.

The immediate effects of this energetic proceeding of the British Cabinet, which rejected the proffered separate mediation of Russia and Austria, were declarations of war with Great Britain from the States, under French influence—from Russia, Prussia, Denmark, even from Austria; and to which was to be added, in 1809, after the deposition of King Gustavus, and the conclusion of peace with Russia, Sweden herself.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Mulgrave.<sup>1</sup>*

Downing Street, April 22, 1807.

My dear Lord—The pressing instances received from Lord Hutchinson, as it appears, upon communication with General Benigsen, that a light British squadron should be sent into the Baltic, to keep up the communication between the several ports and posts occupied by the allies along the shores of the Baltic, and to repress the enemy's gun-boats and privateers in that quarter, make me very desirous of pressing this demand for naval aid upon your attention.

As a prompt compliance with this application seems to be of more importance than the magnitude of the force to be sent, perhaps your lordship could, without loss of time, appropriate a small squadron of frigates and light vessels to the object, which, from Lord Hutchinson's statement, it appears would not only render essential service in those seas, but afford a proof to our allies that we were not inattentive to their accommodation.

I am, my dear Lord, &c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

On board the Prometheus, off Elsinore, August 8th, 1807.

My dear Lord—I have written to Lord Hawkesbury by every opportunity since I left England, and you will have received from him all the intelligence which I have been

<sup>1</sup> He had succeeded Lord Barham as First Lord of the Admiralty.—ED.

enabled to give you. I see that the ship which was to have gone to England last night has not sailed yet; and, notwithstanding that I wrote to Lord Hawkesbury by her, I will not allow her to go away without writing to you.

Admiral Essington arrived yesterday evening, and, I believe, General Burrard; and, as I see some small vessels in the offing, I imagine that one of the divisions of transports has come into the Cattegat with him. I also see some vessels coming up the Sound from the southward; but we have hitherto had no accounts of Lord Cathcart of a later date than the 3rd of August, when he was preparing to embark his troops at Stralsund.

Since my arrival here, I have endeavoured to ascertain the nature and state of the Danish military establishments, with a view to calculate our chance of success. It appears that every male in Denmark is enrolled for the militia, and is liable to be called upon to serve till he is forty-five years old. The number enrolled may amount to 170,000 in the whole of the Danish dominions, including Norway. The militia in service are taken from the enrolment by districts, and are liable to serve, as some say, seven, as others, fourteen, years. They serve in the same corps with the regular troops, and are generally exercised during three weeks or a month in every year, and each corps is composed three-fourths of Militia, and the other fourth raised principally in Germany, but some in the Danish dominions. The numbers of the army thus composed are estimated to amount to 70,000 men, of which about 10,000 are cavalry, and about 3,000 are artillery.

About one half of the army are generally in Norway, and of the other half about 18,000 men are supposed to be in Holstein with the Crown Prince. The remainder, or about 17,000, supposing all to be complete in numbers, which I understand they are not, would be in the Danish dominions, exclusive of Norway. I believe that not more than 4 or 5,000 of this number are now in Zealand; and, considering that the whole of the

regular troops do not amount to more than 17 or 18,000 men, and that the army in Holstein is one prepared for service, I suspect that no more than the usual proportion, or one-fourth, of the troops now in Zealand are regular troops.

But I understand that, besides the regular army and militia, the Danish Government have lately formed a defensive corps, consisting of those men who have served their time in the militia, and have not attained the age of forty-five. There are some of these in every town; and it is said that the whole number of this description in Zealand is 12 or 14,000. I suspect that these troops are armed and clothed, and that the duty at Elsineur is now done by them, and I observe military clothing and accoutrements in nearly every house. It is obvious that additions may be made to these troops by calling upon the enrolment; but, if we are quick in our motions, we shall have effected our object before they will be embodied; and, at all events, the men enrolled cannot be armed and clothed, although the defensive corps may; and I intend to propose to Lord Cathcart to seize a dépôt of arms, which is not very far from this place.

Commodore Keats is in the Belt with all the craft, and I understand that nothing can come over from Holstein.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Memorandum relative to the Ordnance Appointments of  
the Baltic Expedition.*

Private letters from the Baltic having expressed doubts whether, in case Copenhagen was obstinately defended, the ordnance equipment was upon a scale adequate to undertake a regular siege, the detail of the preparation which had been sent was attentively reconsidered, and the result was a confirmed persuasion, in which Lord Castlereagh entirely participated, that it was not only sufficient, but abundant for the proposed service.

Lord Castlereagh was confirmed in this persuasion, from no requisition from the proper departments having been received, stating any wants, or calling for any additional supply.

Lord Cathcart, in his despatch of the 31st August, having very generally referred to a deficiency of resources, for carrying on a regular siege at that season of the year, as one of the considerations which had induced his lordship and Admiral Gambier, previous to the bombardment of the place, to propose the same favourable conditions that Mr. Jackson had been instructed to offer to the Danes, Lord Castlereagh deemed it due to the Ordnance to inquire of Lord Cathcart, in a private letter, in what particulars of the preparation the deficiency, if any, existed.

It was in reply to the question thus proposed that the observations were made, contained in Lord Cathcart's private letter of the 28th ult.

These observations did not strike Lord Castlereagh as reflecting on the Ordnance Department, else he would certainly have felt it his duty, previous to the circulation of the despatches, more especially before they were laid before the King, to have sent them to Lord Chatham, in order that they might be accompanied by any explanations his lordship might deem them to require.

Lord Castlereagh did not so interpret them—1st, because Lord Cathcart states, that the observations made by him in his despatch of the 31st August were made with reference exclusively to the means he possessed *on first landing*, and consequently did not apply to his situation *after the arrival of the Second Division* of artillery transports, which, owing to the circumstances hereafter stated, was prevented from joining the army till the 1st of September, although the convoy sailed the 13th of August from the Nore.

2nd. Because his lordship therein also states, that the extent of ordnance preparation sent was fully in proportion to the number of troops. He represents the inadequacy of his army

generally to the regular siege of so large a place as Copenhagen, *if well defended*, more especially if the island of Amack was to be occupied ; but does not attribute his want of means to a deficiency of ordnance preparation separately considered ; which equipment, on the contrary, he describes to have been not only in full proportion to the strength of his corps, but to have been most excellent and complete in all its parts and composition.

3. It is true, his lordship refers to possible cases, in which a want might have been experienced of entrenching tools ; and he recommends that an increased proportion of shells and engineer stores should hereafter be included in similar equipments. Lord Castlereagh did not, however, consider speculative observations of this nature, or professional suggestions with respect to alterations to be made in the established proportion of such articles, as affecting the unqualified testimony borne to the sufficiency of the equipment, as applied to the force of which it made a part, or to the strength of the place for the attack of which it was prepared, according to any information previously received of its capacity to resist.

4. Least of all, could Lord Castlereagh suppose that any insinuation of blame could have been meant to be conveyed, by what is stated with respect to the fleet having furnished Lord Cathcart with battering cannon, as this point was expressly settled upon full deliberation, before the fleet sailed, as an arrangement in no degree inconvenient to the navy, and equally effective for the army ; and was distinctly known to Admiral Gambier and all the chief officers of the Artillery Department, and must have been equally known to his lordship.

Lord Castlereagh feels it due to Lord Chatham to state, in the most distinct terms, that any delay that may have happened in the arrival of the Second Division of the artillery preparation in the Sound (from which, however, the public service did not ultimately suffer any inconvenience) was in no

degree attributable to the Ordnance Department, but to a proportion of the advanced storeships, which had been stationed at, and were ordered round from Portsmouth to embark the stores at Woolwich, being detained for several days in the Downs on their way to the River; and afterwards, when loaded, from their being further detained at the Nore by adverse winds. Whatever depended on the Ordnance was executed with unparalleled expedition; and, with respect to the measure of leaving to the navy the supply of such proportion of battering cannon as might be required, it was in no degree determined on, as any accommodation whatever to the Ordnance Department, but, in order to economize, at Lord Castlereagh's desire, the transport tonnage; which, having been prepared with a view to a more limited force, to be accompanied, in case it was sent on service, only by a field train, he was afraid might be insufficient to embark the increased force, then destined for the Baltic, together with the extensive Ordnance equipment necessary for the reduction of Copenhagen.

By the arrangement made, it did, however, so happen that the transport provision was found adequate to receive the whole force with its accompanying stores, &c.; and that, with the exception of the limited convoy, the delay of whose arrival has been accounted for above, the whole was despatched on the eleventh day from that on which the measure of sending an army to the Sound was determined on.

Lord Castlereagh is persuaded that any examination of this subject in detail must redound to the honour of the several departments with which it was his duty officially to communicate. They all exerted themselves to the utmost, and certainly none in a more conspicuous manner than the Ordnance. In truth, had the equipment supplied by the latter department been in any respect defective, Lord Castlereagh would have considered the responsibility, and, of course, the blame, as entirely his own, it not being in his power to furnish the Master-General with any precise information as to the defences of the

place, whilst he was obliged to urge the necessity of an immediate decision upon very imperfect data. It would give Lord Castlereagh great personal pain if, in the investigation of a point which he thought ought to be cleared up, any blame had in appearance been suggested as attaching to any branch of the public service, when all are so eminently entitled to praise. He is persuaded Lord Cathcart could not have intended so to express himself.

Lord Castlereagh, having been the occasion of calling forth the explanation which Lord Chatham, in the view taken by him of Lord Cathcart's letter, has very naturally considered himself called upon to give, could not satisfy his own feelings without accompanying it with the above remarks.

He deems it only necessary to add, in justice to Lord Cathcart, that, when his letter of the 28th August was written, he had then received the King's approbation of the capitulation, the stipulations of which, however they might interfere with the ulterior views entertained by his Majesty's Ministers with respect to the island of Zealand, founded upon circumstances not then known to Lord Cathcart, were declared in that despatch to be in strict conformity to, and to have executed to the utmost, the instructions under which Lord Cathcart acted. His lordship, therefore, could feel, as Lord Castlereagh conceives, no necessity of justifying the stipulation of withdrawing from Zealand, except so far as the time allowed might be insufficient for the equipment and removal of the Danish fleet. For this purpose, the six weeks appear to have been fully adequate; and for that object, as his instructions then stood, Lord Castlereagh apprehends his lordship was alone called on to provide.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.*

Wildernes, September 13, [1807].

My dear Wellesley—I was much obliged to you for your letter of the 12th ult. The estimate it gives of the enemy's

force appears, from subsequent report, not to have been far from the truth.

Relying upon a favourable result to your labours, and looking not only with great apprehension to the return of the Danish Government, probably accompanied by a French army, to Copenhagen, but also to the immense control it would give us over all the Baltic powers and interests during the remainder of the war, could we hold Zealand, I have written both to Admiral Gambier and Lord Cathcart, to desire to have their opinion on this point. I have addressed a few queries to the latter on this subject to-day, of which I enclose a copy, and shall be thankful to you to send me your confidential opinion upon the several points to which they refer, as well as any other that may suggest themselves to your own mind as bearing upon this important question. You will see we have made a very wretched figure at Buenos Ayres.

Ever yours, my dear Wellesley, very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Wildernes, September 13, 1807.

My dear Lord—The winds continue to retard all communications from the Baltic: much anxiety is naturally experienced, but we feel confident that your operations will be pushed with despatch as well as vigour, and rely confidently on the result.

I am sure your lordship's and Admiral Gambier's experience, in considering in detail the important subject lately referred to you, will at once enable you to present it, for the final judgment of his Majesty's servants, in all the points of view which the question professionally admits of. I am induced, however, to state the considerations upon which most anxiety has been felt here to obtain information, and to which we are particularly solicitous of directing your attention.

1. What is the state of the Belt, with respect to ice in ordinary winters ?
2. Is it possible for ships of war to find a secure anchorage in the Belts during the winter from the effects of weather ? In what number and of what description ?
3. What room for movement and facility of acting against an enemy attempting to pass into Zealand would they then have ?
4. Would not the small harbours in which the boats and vessels must assemble to convey troops into Zealand be then closed up with ice ?—Would not, therefore, the obstruction be greater to the enemy meditating the attack than to the intercepting squadron, occupying the channel ?
5. Is there any instance of the Belt being altogether frozen over ? and, if so, is there any chance of its being passable for an army with its artillery ?
6. How would a blockading squadron, stationed in the Belt, during the winter, receive its supplies ? Where could it water at that season ?
7. What is the situation of the Sound during the winter months ? Is the port of Copenhagen usually accessible at that period ; and, if not, for what period of time is it obstructed ?
8. During such period could a free communication, by any and what means, be preserved between Great Britain and an army stationed in Zealand during the winter months ?
- 10.<sup>1</sup> What number and of what class would be required for the same purpose, during the open months ?
11. Supposing the enemy, Danes and French, to hold separate columns of troops of not less than 15,000 men each, ready to be thrown into Zealand, from five or six different points in the range of coast which they will occupy from Stralsund to North Jutland, could they assemble boats capable of receiving so many troops, availing themselves of the supply from Hol-

<sup>1</sup> *9* is omitted in the copy in my possession.—ED.

land through the canal at Kiel? And, if they had the means of embarkation, could we destroy them in port or on the passage? Or is there reason to suppose that, being prepared at opposite points, and watching for a favourable wind and a dark night, they would probably succeed in throwing one or more of these divisions, without material loss, into Zealand?

12. Under all the circumstances above alluded to, coupled with the means and disposition of the people of Zealand to act against us, what amount of force do you consider as the *least* with which the occupation of the island should be attempted?

13. Supposing Copenhagen in our possession, would this post, with the island of Amack, secure to the army at all times a safe retreat, and the means of re-embarking in safety, after the enemy had possessed themselves of the rest of the island of Zealand, and were in sufficient force to invest Copenhagen?

14. Supposing it should be determined to endeavour to retain possession of Zealand, what supplies will be required, and within what time might they be sent?

May I beg of your lordship to communicate a copy of this letter to Admiral Gambier?

I am, &c.,                           CASTLEREAGH.

PS. I ought, perhaps, to observe that queries 8 and 9, with respect to the amount and description of naval force which the service of Zealand would require in winter and summer, it is not meant to include what may become requisite should Russia appear in force on the Baltic: this must be considered as a separate question, and the efforts of this country be proportionably increased.

Have the Danes made as yet any attempts, and with what success, to pass troops across the Belt? What means have they in the interior of assembling and equipping a force? What supplies can they draw from the island of Amack; and how is Copenhagen understood to be furnished with provisions and military stores?

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Downing Street [not dated].

My dear Lord—I send you the official approbation of your Convention, and the King's authority for carrying the same into execution. What doubts we may feel here upon the construction of parts of that instrument, when coupled with the peculiar situation in which we now are placed, and in which we may continue to be placed, towards the Danish Government, we cannot hesitate one moment in giving you and Admiral Gambier full powers to carry that arrangement into effect, so far as you consider your individual and the national honour pledged by its stipulations.

It may, however, be satisfactory to you that I should state the nature of the doubts that have occurred here with respect to the extent to which the obligations of that capitulation may be considered as binding; as this may assist you, should any extraordinary circumstances arise, in taking a decision upon [them]; as well as enable you to state, for our information, the mode in which you and Admiral Gambier are disposed to view this question.

And, first, I believe I am correct in stating that, at the time of its signature, it was not known at Copenhagen that the Danish Government had DECLARED war generally against this country. From the Castle of Cronenburg never firing upon our ships and other circumstances, I apprehend you considered the hostilities which had taken place as incident upon, and in a great degree limited to, the question of the fleet, and that you inferred, when that point was once disposed of, little difficulty could remain in putting an end to all military contest between the two States.

I hope this may prove to be the case: but there are many circumstances which lead us to apprehend not only that this may not be the case, but that, on the contrary, Denmark may connect herself closely with France, even to the extent of

admitting the troops of France into the island of Zealand, and into the fortresses, namely, Copenhagen and Cronenburg, which command the Sound.

However great, as a measure of present security, the possession of the Danish navy is, as far as I can presume to form an estimate of your relative military situation at the time the capitulation took place, I am disposed to think you would not have signed the Convention stipulating the evacuation of the island, and the restitution of the fortress, works, and docks of Copenhagen, in a perfect state, in contemplation of the continuance of war between the two Crowns, and the probable occupation of those defences by a French army. Circumstances might have fully justified, no doubt, the paying even this price for the immediate possession of the fleet; but I am inclined to believe your prospects at the time were such as would have induced you to contend for the surrender of the town as well as the fleet, if you had then been acquainted with the fact of the declaration of war, at least that you would have made its evacuation more precisely contingent upon a general settlement of differences between the two States.

How far, were the measure completely open to us in point of good faith, it would be either practicable or politic for us to engage in the defence of Zealand, is a question upon which at present I do not feel myself sufficiently informed to decide. The approaching return of our army from South America, and also of a corps of about 7,000 men from the Mediterranean, added to the very large addition now making by the measures in progress both to our gross and disposable force, certainly brings it much more within our reach, more especially if we could procure a subsidiary corps of Swedish troops to join our army; but, short of the permanent defence of the island, with Copenhagen in our hands, the possession might have been retained without hazard for a time, till we saw what line Denmark was disposed to take, and also till the views of Russia

were more disclosed; and if evacuation, Denmark, still remaining hostile, was ultimately decided on, having secured and sent home the fleet, we might have dismantled the works, and rendered the place a less formidable position in the hands of an active enemy.

These evils and these remedies were such as your instructions, previous to the signature of the capitulation, in no degree called upon you either to be prepared for or to provide against. You have done every thing that was required from you, having come up to the utmost extent of what we had desired you to contend for. I am now only bringing before you a new case; as you will, I trust, be assured in no derogation of the complete sense we entertain of all you have accomplished for us, but merely to draw forth your remarks upon the capitulation as connected with the line which Denmark may hereafter adopt.

We are bound to withdraw our troops from Zealand by the 5th Article of the capitulation in six weeks. Supposing Denmark chooses to persevere in the war, and to form an offensive league with France against us, they cannot claim, under the capitulation, a continued exemption for the island of Zealand from our hostilities; if not, when may our troops re-land and re-attack Copenhagen consistently with the fair import of the agreement? I put this case principally for the purpose of learning the sense in which you understand the concluding words of the 7th Article, viz., "that every thing *shall be done* which can tend to produce *union and harmony* between *the two nations*." Did you consider these words as applying to a general arrangement of subsisting differences, or only as enjoining within Zealand a line of conduct which should promote rather than impede accommodation?

You may rely upon being immediately apprized of any information which may reach us of the views or conduct of the Danish Government; and I shall hope to receive from you not only your confidential remarks on the points suggested in this

letter, but also such intelligence of occurrences in Zealand as you may consider as bearing upon this subject.

With respect to the time of sending back any part of your force, I do not feel that there is now the same inducement for pressing it as when I first wrote. Had Copenhagen surrendered without resistance, as we heard, *via* Holland, it had on the 20th of August, instead of on the 7th of September, from your letter it is plain we should have had our 12,000 men here before this time, with ample means for a further embarkation of troops. The season, though more advanced than one would wish for any operations to the southward, might, under favourable winds, have admitted of something being done; but now, supposing all other considerations out of the question, which may make the continuance of the troops in the Baltic desirable, as an order from hence could not possibly bring them here before the middle of October, I am of opinion that the intention of so employing them must, under present circumstances, be given up; and I have only, on this point, to express my acknowledgments for the steps taken by you towards a compliance with my demands.

Your lordship will receive nearly as soon as this letter a supply of victualling stores to the extent of one month's consumption for 34,000 men; also a quantity of hay—I think, 600 tons—and 5,000 quarters of oats. We shall hold further supplies in readiness, should they be called for.

Yours, my dear Lord, very faithfully,      CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

London, September 22, 1807.

My dear Lord—When my last private letter was written, I had not fully possessed myself of the whole of the intelligence from Russia. I endeavoured to add a few lines by the same conveyance, but the despatches were gone. What I meant to state is, that Russia does not show any disposition either to resent or to complain of what we have done at Copen-

hagen. The Emperor wants to be assured on two grounds: 1st, that the principles on which the measure has been undertaken do not apply to Russia; and, 2nd, that we are not, by the evacuation of Zealand, about to uncover Sweden to an attack from France, and, by letting a French army into Sweden, expose Russia to be menaced on the side of Finland.

The tone of the Russian cabinet has become much more conciliatory to us since they heard of your operations, partly, perhaps, from alarm for Cronstadt, partly, from the natural respect that attaches to a vigorous exertion against that power which they may dread, but must hate. The opinion of those best disposed and informed at that court is that, if we could maintain our position in the Baltic, the counsels of Russia would rapidly improve—at least, that she would not, in that state of things, lend herself to France, as a hostile instrument against us. How this can be done I know not. Your lordship and Admiral Gambier, judging on the spot, can best suggest the means, if any there be, compatible with our honour and our military means. You can best tell us what the fair import of the capitulation is, and whether, by any subsequent act on the part of the Danes, you consider the stipulations as having been so far infringed as to justify you in holding possession till Denmark can be brought to a general settlement, which would be the most satisfactory, I feel, for both nations.

You will probably learn, before we shall, how far Sweden inclines to engage in keeping the French out of Zealand. You will also have heard from Mr. Jackson whether the Danish Government has closed with France, or inclines to an accommodation with us. You also will have the best means of estimating your ability to hold the island with your present force, should the whole be reduced to a military question, and what may be the risks of remaining there late in the year. So far as the advanced period of the season may not in prudence enjoin an earlier embarkation, there can be no necessity, in

good faith, for your withdrawing before the expiration of the six weeks. Before that time, the whole state of things will have been, I should suppose, developed. You will receive every aid from hence for the regulation of your conduct, and we shall feel entire confidence in your doing the best you can for us where instructions cannot be waited for.

I should have forwarded this supplementary Note yesterday, but have waited to put you in possession of the nature of the negociation it is proposed to open from hence with the Danish Government. It is material that you should inform our Minister, without delay, not only of the mode in which you and Admiral Gambier interpret the obligations of the capitulation, but also how far you consider that arrangement to have been affected by subsequent events.

Upon the whole, your lordship will collect, from the private letters I have written to you, that we are satisfied with every thing that has been done; that we are, above all things, anxious to preserve our character for good faith untainted; but that, as far as it can be done consistently with the engagements entered into, we are desirous of converting our present position in Zealand into an instrument for keeping the French out of it. We have accomplished a British object of the first importance in getting the Danish fleet; but the Northern Powers will reproach us with having purchased a separate advantage at their cost—indeed, such is already the unofficial language of those in confidence in Russia, if the entry of French troops into Zealand, and subsequently into Sweden, should immediately follow our evacuation of that island.

If the neutrality of Denmark can be made the means of excluding the French, it is the best and most natural arrangement, and would in the end prove least onerous to us. If this should fail, with the aid of Sweden, I should not deem the assembling 30,000 men, including 10,000 Swedes, for the defence of the island, to be an effort beyond our means. If it is to be attempted exclusively with British troops, the incum-

brance would be serious : we should have hardly the means of occupying the interior of the island in force, and should probably find it necessary to confine our views to the occupation of Copenhagen and one or two other leading points, from which our retreat might be secured, and the works dismantled. If good faith prevents us from using our position at Copenhagen to bring Denmark to terms, we have only to submit and be grateful for what has been gained. If Denmark connects herself with France, and Sweden declines assisting in the defence of Zealand, we shall be the less responsible for what may follow, and less bound to run improvident risks with our own separate means : but it strikes me that, consistently with the most literal construction of the capitulation, as an inducement to an amicable adjustment, we are entitled to represent to the Danish Government as follows :—

We wish to make peace with you : we are of opinion that, by the spirit and true meaning of the capitulation, you are bound to give every facility to an amicable arrangement with us. We now offer you liberal terms : if you refuse them, it can only be from a deliberate determination to join France against us. The capitulation was never meant to favour your connexion with the enemy, but to promote a renewal of your connexion with us. It never was intended to introduce a French army into Zealand ; which we now see, from your refusing the terms we offer you, must be the immediate consequence of our retiring from it.

Since you decline to act up to the obvious import and fair spirit of the capitulation, we have no other course left but to regulate our conduct by the letter of that agreement. By the letter, we are not required to withdraw our ships from the Belt, or to suspend the blockade of the island ; during the six weeks we are not required to permit hostile preparations or assemblies of armed men within the island. We may be bound to withdraw our army within the time specified ; but, having re-embarked them, if you choose to continue at war with us, there

is nothing in the convention which prevents us from re-landing the next day, and resuming the siege of Copenhagen. Our wish is general settlement and peace. If yours is general war and partial truce, we are bound upon no principle to yield to you an advantage, for claiming which you can produce no express stipulation, and which is totally inconsistent with the declared purport of the agreement, viz., the restoration of harmony between the two States. Upon this alternative it is for you, the Danish Government, to decide ; and, if the sufferings of Denmark are to be protracted, the responsibility must be your own.

The extreme difficulty, as well as the importance, of this case, will, I am sure, reconcile your lordship to the perusal of this long letter.

Yours, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Sudborne Hall, Suffolk, September 27, 1807.

My dear Lord—Upon looking over my several private letters to your lordship, although they apply to circumstances too little defined to admit of detailed public instructions, yet I think it may be satisfactory to you and Admiral Gambier, that the basis upon which your future proceedings are to be regulated should be thrown into an official despatch, which you will accordingly receive by this conveyance. I have nothing further to add at present to my former communications.

Yours, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Hawkesbury.*

Sudborne Hall, September 28, 1807, 11 P.M.

Dear Hawkesbury—I send forward the despatches which I have just received from Yarmouth. I have written to try to catch Wellesley on his way to town, for a few minutes' conversation. I do not feel that any immediate instruction is necessary upon these despatches. Every thing is in progress, and Pierrepont's letters may be expected in a few days.

The tenour of both the public and private letters is certainly strongly against our retaining an adverse possession in Zealand. The necessity of having 12,000 troops to assist in bringing home the ships seems in itself almost to decide the question. The conclusion of Lord Cathcart's private letter seems to point to what our policy ought to be, namely, to couple the evacuation with the negociation (so far as it can be done without breach of faith, or hazard to the safe return of the fleet), so as to influence Denmark to act with us. I hope Mr. Rist will have lost no time in opening our views to his court.

Let me know if a Cabinet is wished on this subject, or if it is thought necessary that I should send any instructions. It rather strikes me that it will be safe to wait for a few days. I can, without inconvenience, be in town on Sunday, or sooner, *if necessary.*

Ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Hawkesbury.*

Sudborne Hall, September 29, 1807.

Dear Hawkesbury—I have had a full opportunity of going through, with Sir Arthur Wellesley, the Baltic question, as it stands both here and on the spot. I have put him in possession of every thing we have done, and he is of opinion that, having left to our officers an entire jurisdiction over both the capitulation and the military prudence of remaining or coming away, they will feel no difficulty in carrying on the service, and that they are likely to keep possession as long as they can consistently, with a due attention to good faith and safety. Wellesley does not think it would be difficult to persuade Denmark to acquiesce in our remaining where we are, till the discussion between the two governments was terminated.

Upon the whole, I recommend sending Wellesley back as speedily as possible, calling at Tonningen, with full powers to negociate with the Danish Government, if they are disposed to

receive him ; if not, that he should proceed to Copenhagen, with a full knowledge of our sentiments. If Mr. Rist were prevailed on to write instantly to apprise his Court that Sir A. Wellesley, properly accredited, would present himself at Tonningen, on his return to the army, Wellesley then would know, the moment he reached the Eyder, whether he was to be received or not. If received, it would be an additional inducement to Lord Cathcart and Gambier to gain, if possible, some time : if negociation was declined, he would then proceed on, and at once inform our officers that they must take their determination, which, under all the circumstances, must, I conceive, be to come away.

If this line should appear to those of the Cabinet who are in town, the best that can now be adopted, I should hope he might be despatched without the delay of assembling us together. Canning is in possession of our opinions on the basis of the terms to be offered to Denmark ; and, if he should concur in opinion that Wellesley's return and character afford a facility to bring the whole to a point, he might be despatched without loss of time ; and, as far as any instructions from me may be required, after I am acquainted with the sentiments of my colleagues, through you, he will receive them on his way to Yarmouth, if I should not previously have returned to town.

Ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Wellesley will be in town to-morrow evening. I send this by a Post-office express, that you may have an opportunity of consulting our colleagues at the Duke of Portland's to-morrow.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Hawkesbury.*

Sudborne Hall, October 1, 1807.

My dear Hawkesbury—The reasons you state are quite satisfactory for not entrusting the negociation to Sir Arthur Wellesley. The only objection that occurs to me to sending him back is, that we shall want him for Flushing ; but, upon

the whole, perhaps his going might facilitate even that object, as he would go possessed of our views and wishes, and might so arrange with Lord Cathcart, as to the mode and order of the troops coming home, as to furnish the corps to be thus employed in a moveable shape immediately on its arrival.

I hope no delay will occur in despatching both Merry and Wellesley. They will find me here on their way; and, as I know no person better acquainted with Flushing than Sir H. Popham, I shall write to Gambier, to express my hopes that he may feel himself enabled to spare him.

I shall be most anxious to hear the result of your mission to Walcheren. The question to examine is, what can be done towards bringing away the ships without reducing the place. Flushing is sufficiently defensible to require, as I believe, open trenches—a bombardment cannot be relied on. The island, late in the year, is excessively unwholesome; and, according to the intelligence last received, a malignant fever rages there at present. The object is certainly of a magnitude to justify every reasonable risk.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord [Hawkesbury].*

Sudborne Hall, October 1, 1807.

My dear Lord—Many thanks for your letter with its enclosure, which followed me to this place. I shall strictly attend to the injunctions which accompanied it.

I am grieved that any thing should have occurred to interrupt the quiet enjoyment which you are so well entitled to enjoy in the country. The times are not such as can wholly liberate any reflecting mind from anxiety; but I shall hope to learn that the domestic cloud has dispersed.

Our Denmark negociation is to be tried through Merry, and upon the basis you wished—neutrality, in the first instance—military concert as against France, if she should infringe it. Every inducement to be held out to Denmark thus to keep

the French out of Zealand, except parting with our dominion over the fleet. The proposition under this head is on no account to go beyond the alternative of the fleet, or its then value, *at the King's option*, three years after a general peace. There are letters from the Baltic of the 19th: fourteen sail of the Danish line equipped and ready for sea. Wellesley considers the capitulation as strictly military, and confined to Zealand. The Danes have executed it with the utmost good faith, having sent home all their militia, and withdrawn no one article of naval equipment. We have above 10,000 men daily employed in the arsenal, the contents of which are valuable beyond all calculation, and will be entirely saved. I fear, whatever Denmark decides, we must evacuate. Not less than 10,000 soldiers will be required, to assist in navigating the ships to England. Happily, the Danes are still greatly in our power.

Yours, my dear Lord, in haste, very sincerely,  
CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Sudborne Hall, October 2, 1807.

My dear Lord—Mr. Pole, who will deliver to you this letter, is much hurried in point of time, and I am unwilling to detain him longer than is absolutely requisite to convey to your lordship Mr. Canning's instructions relative to the proposed negotiations with the Danish Government.

Sir Arthur Wellesley left me yesterday morning. I had much satisfaction in receiving from him the information you directed him to communicate. When I return to town, early in the week, I shall have an opportunity of writing to your lordship more fully. In the mean time, you will use your utmost exertions to back the negotiation with which Mr. Merry is charged. I hope you may be enabled so to manage with General Peyman, as to avoid the state of hostile jealousy, which the expectation of approaching hostilities must necessarily occasion. \*

Upon the main question, whether, after having satisfied the stipulations of the capitulation by withdrawing the army from Zealand, the re-entry should be attempted if Denmark rejects all accommodation, is a point of too much moment for me to express an opinion upon, till I have had communication with my colleagues. In the mean time, you must avail yourself of the impression of such a determination; and your arrangements will be formed, as far as possible, in such a manner as not to discountenance the probability of such an attempt. You will, on the contrary, keep it so far in view as to have arranged in your own mind the best means of executing such a measure, should it be given you in charge.

Yours, my dear Lord, very faithfully,

CASTLEREAGH.

I hope on Wednesday next to have an opportunity of obtaining a decision on the above point, before which day it is probable Mr. Rist will have heard from his court; and I may have also had the advantage of receiving replies to some of my late letters to your lordship.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Sudborne Hall, October 2, 1807.

My dear Lord—The solicitude I feel, to be enabled, from the most authentic sources, to contradict any report which may be in circulation to the disadvantage of an army to which I must feel more than a common attachment, makes me desirous of apprising you that the conduct of the troops towards the people of Zealand has been represented as more than usually relaxed: that, in a large army, individual acts of outrage and plunder will occur, we all know; but I shall be most anxious to hear from your lordship that, upon a service which, in its nature, was necessarily calculated to embitter the feelings of the inhabitants beyond the course of ordinary hostilities, your lordship has not had occasion to regret that these sentiments have been aggravated by the licentiousness of the soldiers.

I am sure your lordship will enter into my feelings on this subject, and enable me to satisfy those of others. I feel confident that, whenever such excesses have been detected, they have been repressed by the severest examples.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH,

*Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Canning.*

Sudborne Hall, October 3, 1807.

Dear Canning—Pole is gone. Your instructions were so full as to render little necessary from me but their enclosure, with directions to co-operate. I send you the drafts, which you will have the goodness to send to my Office. Every point seems to be decided up to the final question of re-entry, under the case of unrelenting hostility and demanded evacuation. We must decide this finally on Wednesday.

I wrote strongly to Lord Cathcart, calling for explanation, and enjoining discipline with respect to the troops. I did not make my letter official; not deeming the grounds on which it was written sufficiently producible to warrant a public despatch reflecting on the army.

I quite agree to your reasoning for preferring Merry to Sir A. Wellesley. As we can settle nothing finally till our meeting on Wednesday, I shall not set out on my return till Tuesday. I shall sleep on the Tuesday night at the Petre Arms, Ingatstone. That I may make myself *au courant des affaires* before we meet, you will oblige me by directing the last week's arrivals to be sent me there in a box, together with any subsequent intelligence received through post.

I am, dear Canning, yours sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

I return your *brouillon*, of which Pole took a copy. As the despatches which he brought were the originals, he promised during the voyage to make copies, to go as enclosures in my letters to the naval and military commanders.

*Lord Castlereagh to the King.*

Downing Street, October 9, 1807.

Your Majesty's confidential servants, having fully considered the military opinions received from your Majesty's naval and military officers commanding in the Baltic, beg leave humbly to submit for your Majesty's approbation the accompanying instructions to be forwarded to Admiral Gambier and Lord Cathcart.

Should your Majesty's endeavours to put an end to the war with Denmark fail of success, your Majesty's servants are humbly of opinion that the defence of Sweden ought to be looked to by a corps posted in Sweden, rather than by an attempt to re-occupy and retain the island of Zealand. In order to give the fullest effect to this measure, they humbly beg leave to recommend that a respectable force may be employed in this service, and that Lord Cathcart should be directed for the present to remain in the personal command of it.

Should your Majesty be graciously pleased to sanction this arrangement, Lord Castlereagh will take care to have every requisite supply which can contribute to the health and comfort of the troops forwarded from hence; and he has the satisfaction to acquaint your Majesty that Sir A. Wellesley reports favourably of the capacity of Scania to furnish supplies.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

London, October 9, 1807.

My dear Lord—The difficulties you have stated to belong to the retention of Zealand against the Danes and the French, were the occupation even secured, in the first instance, without breach of faith, are such as to determine his Majesty's Ministers to defend Sweden in Scania, rather than in Zealand. We consider it of essential importance that this service should, in the first instance, be entrusted to your lordship's immediate superintendence, as we shall leave General Burrard your second

in command. If every thing goes well, after it has been completely set in motion by your lordship, I cannot but look forward to the pleasure of seeing you in England in the course of the winter. The instructions now sent provide for the case of the total failure of Mr. Merry's mission. I cannot but hope for a favourable result.

Yours, very faithfully,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.*

Downing Street, October 9, 1807.

My dear Lord—I am about to take a liberty, without having previously asked leave, which I hardly know how sufficiently to apologize for, and which I must trust to your lordship's indulgence to forgive, by sending with your son to the Baltic a brother of mine,<sup>1</sup> in the hope that your lordship will receive him during his stay under your auspices, and allow him to appear as an extra aide-de-camp in your family. He is an ensign at present in the Guards, just returned from Marlow College.

To remove him from the idleness of London, I had arranged his going out immediately to Sicily: circumstances have occurred for the present to postpone this arrangement; and, as I am very anxious to keep him on service, and more especially out of London, I shall feel it a great obligation if your lordship would have the kindness to permit him to pass this interval in your family.

Yours, my dear Lord, very faithfully,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. Charles Long.*

Priory, October 18, 1807.

My dear Long—Lord Cathcart, by his last letter, acquainted us that, if the army was continued in the Baltic beyond the present month, a further supply of dollars would be required.

<sup>1</sup> The Hon. Captain Stewart, own brother of the present Marquess of Londonderry, who died of fever in Spain.

As our arrangements may probably lead to about 15,000 men being continued in that quarter, and possibly throughout the winter, may I request that, taking the amount of subsistence, &c., requisite for such a force, the proportion which may be obtained at Gottenburg, or elsewhere, for bills, and the difficulty of communication during a severe winter, into your consideration, you will frame a scheme for the management of our expenses, upon the supposition I have stated. The next despatches will probably inform us of the result of Merry's mission, and the final distribution of the army.

I should wish to have a proportion of the specie immediately prepared for despatch, so that it may be sent from hence before the close of the month, if we hear nothing to alter the nature of the demand which we must now presume will exist. I shall be in town on Tuesday and Wednesday, if you wish for any further information on the subject.

Yours, my dear Long, very faithfully,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Colonel Wood<sup>1</sup> to Lord Castlereagh.*

Gatton Park, Ryegate, April 22, 1808.

My Lord—I beg leave to submit, for your lordship's consideration, a memoir on the subject of securing a post and harbour on the coast of Spain, and another respecting the recapture of Copenhagen, by means of obtaining possession of the Crown Batteries, and bombardment; aided, if necessary, by a strict blockade.

On my return to town, I will avail myself of the opportunity which you have been so obliging as to offer me of waiting upon your lordship.

<sup>1</sup> Colonel of Engineers in the service of the East India Company, in which he obtained the profitable appointment of Chief Engineer of Bengal. Returning to England, he purchased the estate of Gatton, to which was attached a seat in the House of Commons, and was subsequently created a baronet.

Aware of the importance of secrecy on similar subjects, I beg leave to apprise your lordship that, excepting with yourself, Lord Mulgrave, and Mr. Canning, I have never had any communication.

I have the honour, &c.,

M. WOOD.

*Memoir on the Recapture of Copenhagen.*

The history of the world, and the experience of ages, demonstrate that, in carrying on war between nations, there can be no mid-way, and that half measures, so far from forwarding the cause of humanity, are ultimately a prolongation of those evils inseparable from a state of war, and productive of additional calamities. Were it necessary to prove this position by any recent instance, I certainly could not refer to one more in point than that of Copenhagen. Never was a measure resorted to more wise, or more necessary for the security of England, or so clearly justified by every principle, not merely of self-preservation, but of actual aggression on the part of Denmark; for the situation in which the Crown Prince had placed his army demonstrated most clearly his determination to unite with France against England, and that he only waited the season when the fleets of England must necessarily quit the Baltic to put his plans in force.

Ministers justly deserve and have received the grateful acknowledgments of their country, for the foresight, wisdom, and energy of the expedition against Copenhagen; and, notwithstanding the unjust and unfounded clamour excited and kept alive by a desperate faction, in expectation of raising in the royal mind sensations of pity and contrition for the unavoidable consequences of this measure, yet this expedition must be recorded in the annals of our country, as one of the most brilliant ever sent from England.

Justice, however, demands that it should be stated that the Danish Government had positively refused to guarantee the

capitulation ; or, indeed, so soon as an appeal to arms became unavoidable, it would have been a wise and more benignant policy to have availed ourselves of the rights of war, and either to have retained Copenhagen, or, if this should have been considered ineligible, at least to have returned it to Denmark in such a state as never to have been rendered formidable against England.

If it could be useful to the present subject, I could prove that this opinion has not in the smallest degree been influenced by subsequent events, but that I judged exactly in the same manner before a gun was fired against Copenhagen. The situation of this place in the mouth of the Baltic, and forming, in a manner, not only the key into that sea, but a communication between Germany and Sweden, is most important.

The strength of its works and defences, the excellence of its harbour and dock-yards, render it a place of the very first importance, and which, if left in the hands of France, commanding, as she does at present, the whole of the naval stores of the Baltic, will, in the course of a few years, enable her to equip fleets of great and alarming magnitude. It will most likely be the policy of Buonaparte to temporize for another season ; and, until he subdues and settles the government of Spain, and has completely at his devotion the arsenals and ports of that country, as well as her immense resources, he may not send a single soldier to Zealand. We must not, however, suffer ourselves to be gulled by such fallacious appearances, but, with a similar energy and judgment to that which distinguished the last expedition, anticipate the designs of Buonaparte, while we have a little leisure to contemplate the formidable circle which he is now assiduously employed in drawing round this country.

Never was a fortified place more deliberately and systematically besieged than by the measures which are now adopting by Buonaparte for the destruction of England. With the possession of Carthagena, Cadiz, Corunna, Ferrol, and various

other Spanish ports, in addition to the ports of France, Holland, and likewise in possession of Copenhagen, the power of Buonaparte will be almost irresistible.

However much may be lamented the loss which must necessarily occur in again possessing ourselves of Copenhagen, yet, from the enormous power of France, the inveterate enmity of the Danes, and their total inability (were they otherwise well disposed) to resist the mandates of Buonaparte, it appears absolutely necessary, not only for the safety of England, but more immediately for the safety of Sweden, that this great and most important naval arsenal should not remain for a moment subject to the mandates of Buonaparte.

It is for the purpose of considering by what means this important object is most likely to be obtained, that I have taken the liberty of submitting, for the consideration of his Majesty's Government, the ideas which have suggested themselves to me on this subject.

From the plans lately published of Copenhagen, as well as from the information of officers who were employed in that expedition, the great security of Copenhagen against bombardment towards the sea are the Crown Batteries, one of which lies about 2,000, and the other 1,500 yards off shore. Those batteries are looked into and commanded by the guns of the works, particularly by those of the citadel, and are so constructed, that, even were we in possession of them, I know it to be the opinion of most respectable officers, that it would be impossible to maintain them. I have, however, the satisfaction of knowing that, in combating this opinion, I have the sanction of several respectable officers who were employed in the late service; and therefore I shall take the liberty of submitting my ideas with considerably less difficulty than what otherwise I should have felt.

The great protection of the Crown Batteries I understand to be the shoal water, not having more than eight feet of water close to the batteries, which therefore prevents the near

approach of line-of-battle ships. To obviate this difficulty, it appears to me that large floating batteries might be easily constructed, which, in the course of a few hours, would silence the Crown Batteries, and place them in our possession. Ample supplies of sand-bags and intrenching stores must be provided immediately as we are in possession of those batteries, to secure them as well against the guns of the town and citadel as against any attacks from the shore. The guns of the town are at too great a distance to do much execution, provided the two works, after capture, are judiciously secured; and our naval superiority will defend them from any formidable attack from the sea.

The floating batteries may be so constructed as that, the very day the Crown Batteries are in our possession, mortar batteries may be opened against the citadel and town. Those mortar batteries will be so secure behind the Crown Batteries, that it will be scarcely possible to molest them. In the course of a few hours, from those two batteries alone, the city and citadel of Copenhagen would be more easily destroyed than from the batteries which were so judiciously erected during the late siege. If still further modes of annoyance for the reduction of this place were judged necessary (although I take it for granted the army in Zealand will be too numerous to induce us to think of landing), yet there is a small island, separated from the island of Zealand by an arm of the sea, called Almog, lying immediately to the southward, on which, it would appear, a corps of 5,000 men might secure themselves, and construct not only mortar batteries, but batteries of heavy artillery, against any force in Copenhagen. This island is about seven miles in length, and two miles across. This, however, if we were in possession of the Crown Batteries, it appears to me, would not be necessary, but that the floating mortar batteries, stationed immediately behind the two Crown Batteries, would soon reduce the town to submission.

The great advantage of this plan of attack would be, that

very few land forces would be required for the expedition; and, if this plan could be followed up with that degree of judgment and exertion required, I have no doubt but that Copenhagen would soon be once more in our power. Another less prompt but almost certain means of compelling the Danes to surrender, would be by a strict blockade, with the assistance of an armed flotilla stationed in the Great Belt, supported by a few ships of war. The island of Zealand might be so strictly blockaded that, in the course of a few months, Copenhagen would be reduced to the necessity of capitulating.

The inhabitants of Copenhagen and Zealand exceed 150,000 souls, and the island itself does not produce subsistence for a tenth part of that number. As it is most probable that, during the last winter, the inhabitants will not have an opportunity of supplying their necessities, if a rigid blockade be observed, the town and island must be soon reduced to great difficulties. Most likely, if there be any French troops in Copenhagen, they will turn out the inhabitants, in expectation of the blockade being raised; but I trust that, if this means be resorted to, positive orders will be given not to relax. I am of opinion, however, that the possession of the two batteries, and several large floating mortar batteries secured in their rear, will be the most certain, as well as the speediest, mode of securing Copenhagen.

In the construction of those floating batteries destined for the destruction of the Crown Batteries, and which I propose shall be immediately after employed against the town and the citadel as mortar batteries, considerable ingenuity and judgment will be required. After having first determined upon the size, construction, and draught of water of those batteries, which I propose to be of that construction as not only to attack the Crown Batteries, but, after their capture, to be employed as mortar batteries, I beg leave to suggest that not only a complete model be made of such floating batteries, but that an able ship-builder be sent over to Sweden to superintend their con-

struction. In the course of two months, batteries such as I suggest may be completed, and, till that time, a strict blockade of the island of Zealand may be kept up.

Whenever the fortune of war shall again place Copenhagen in our possession, I trust that we shall profit by past experience, and retain it as a conquest of the first importance to England, and which no consideration ought to induce us to relinquish. I have no doubt that the whole of the inhabitants of Copenhagen and Zealand would prefer the dominion of England to that of any other power in the world; as, from their insular situation, they would derive not only a degree of protection but of opulence from foreign commerce, which Buonaparte himself cannot hold out to them. Exclusive of the important advantage of securing the key of the Baltic, and ample supplies of all sorts of naval stores, the harbour and dockyards of Copenhagen would be a most desirable nursery for the marine of England. The situation would also be admirable for recruiting our armies from all those various States which Buonaparte has conquered upon the coasts of the Baltic, and who are at present groaning under French tyranny and despotism. So long as we continue in friendship with Sweden, Zealand may be defended against all the powers of Europe.

Should we be so fortunate as again to get possession of Copenhagen, and circumstances ever occur that might render it expedient to entrust the custody of it to any other power, I confidently assure myself that it will be delivered over in such a state as never to be able to act hostilely against England. The whole of the defences towards the land may be suffered to remain as security against any aggression from that quarter; but, towards the sea, not only the Crown Batteries, but the sea-line of the citadel and town, must be razed to the foundations; so that every English man-of-war may anchor in as great security at Copenhagen as they would do at any other friendly port.

M. Wood.

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*Major Macdonald<sup>1</sup> to Lord Cathcart.*

*(Enclosed by the Major to Sir Arthur Wellesley, and by him to  
Lord Castlereagh.)*

London, November 25, 1808.

My dear Lord—After a long silence respecting our Copenhagen affairs, I have the honour to acquaint your lordship that the Navy Board has, at last, transmitted to the Admiralty, for the purpose of being submitted to his Majesty's Council, the valuations affixed to the ships and naval stores; but the details which depend upon the ordnance department are by no means in the same state of forwardness, and it is quite uncertain when they will be completed.

The Board of Commissioners appointed for the management of Danish property, captured previous to the declaration of war, has been authorized to receive and sell all the *unserviceable* naval as well as ordnance stores belonging to our concern; but, *at best*, the amount of these articles will be trivial, compared with that of the valuations already furnished; and the mode of proceeding adopted by this Board leaves us no room whatever to expect that any *early* account will be rendered of its transactions.

Under these inauspicious circumstances, and bearing in view the injurious effects to be apprehended from the arrangement of suspending a distribution until the minor items are brought to account, it is decidedly the interest of the captors that Government should at once allow the sum at which the Danish fleet and naval stores have been valued to be distributed; leaving the produce of the ordnance stores and the receipts of the Danish Commission to constitute together wherewith to make a second payment.

Your lordship will, no doubt, be mortified to hear that the valuations fall short even of the very lowest calculation that

<sup>1</sup> The agent of the army for the property captured at Copenhagen.

despondency itself could have anticipated ; the whole amount of those now before the Admiralty being only about £650,000 ; and I rather expect I shall be found to have exceeded the mark, when I estimate the produce of the ordnance property at £50,000 more. I shall hazard no specific guess at the amount of the *unserviceable* stores, while I feel confident in saying that it will be very inconsiderable.

The general issue, therefore, falls so very short of common justice and of the most limited expectations of any individual concerned, that my Lord Gambier has besought Government to make us reasonable amends for the glaring inadequacy of the valuations, by recommending to his Majesty graciously to award us the whole amount thereof, instead of retaining any moiety in lieu of a Droit to the Crown.

His lordship has addressed this admirable appeal in favour of our cause to Lord Mulgrave, and it is strongly suggested to me by Lord Gambier's representatives here (by whom I have been favoured with the perusal of his statement), that your lordship's making, as soon as possible, a strenuous application to Lord Castlereagh, on similar grounds, may be the means of materially strengthening our pretensions ; for these two Ministers are supposed to take the lead in Cabinet discussions that involve the immediate prospects of the branch of service which they respectively superintend.

The facts upon which Lord Gambier rests our claim to the full sum at which the capture has been valued are, in substance, the following, and I hope your lordship will equally impress them in the other quarter, viz. :—

That, though the valuations imply the Danish ships to be fitter for hulks and firewood than for active service, yet it is indisputably true that every one of them (the Neptunus, which was lost in sight of Copenhagen, by accident, excepted), made a safe passage to England at the most boisterous season of the year, without discovering a symptom of inefficiency, in the course of a regular succession of gales, and though heavily

laden with articles, the solidity of which must very soon have proved the unworthiness of the ships, had they been really defective.

That the excellence of the Danish ships is confirmed by the readiness with which they have been commissioned, and the uniform satisfaction which, it is understood, they have given their commanders.

That, though no *direct* imputation of partiality can be attached to those who surveyed and valued the ships and stores, it is nevertheless notorious that a very strong prejudice existed at Portsmouth in particular against the political object of the expedition, which became the more detrimental to the captors, inasmuch as the principal part of the captured property was sent to that place. Moreover,

That, notwithstanding the manifest disadvantage to us under which the Portsmouth valuations were formed, the Navy Board was pleased to reduce those reported from Chatham to a level with the former—a measure which deprived the capture of £25,000 of its declared value, and which it would be difficult to justify upon any hitherto adopted principle.

That the public, at this rate of valuation, have the ships for infinitely less than their actual value, and the stores at less than half-price.

That, there being almost 50,000 men to share, the individual shares will come very low, if anything short of the whole sum is allotted.

That, in consequence of a formal declaration of war on the part of Denmark before the surrender of Copenhagen, the capture ought, in fact, to be deemed a regular reprisal, and that, taken in this light, it would be contrary to usage to make any deduction from the amount of the valuation.

That, while the nation has thus derived an enormous benefit, it is hoped that the most liberal interpretation will be given to the circumstances under which the capture was made—circumstances altogether so unusually favourable to the views of the

captors, that it is presumed no public inconvenience can possibly be produced by not coupling them with former claims, or, in other words, by not judging on its own merits a case supported by facts so peculiar to itself, and which any future occasion can scarcely assimilate.

Having satisfactorily established these points, Lord Gambier solicited that the Navy and Victualling Boards should be now directed to issue the usual bills in payment of the ships and stores, observing that, as the property has been duly condemned, delivered, and valued, these Boards may, consistently with their accustomed mode of doing business, issue the money without the interference of Parliament.

His lordship concluded his letter with a request, that the payment of the valuations already delivered may not be retarded on the ground of the ordnance returns not being given in, the latter being, though comparatively small, not likely to be made up for some time.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

JOHN MACDONALD.

PS. It may be proper to inform your lordship that it was thought advisable for me merely to adopt the substance of Lord Gambier's reasoning, without adhering to his lordship's precise expressions, lest, when the two Ministers come to *compare notes*, the correspondence should be thought to resemble a collusion between the Commanders-in-Chief.

PROJECTED OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH OF  
GERMANY AND SWEDEN.

1807—1808.

In the famous conferences at Tilsit in 1807, between the Emperor Alexander and Bonaparte, the latter had dazzled the Czar by the prospect that he should not withhold his assent from the immediate execution of a favourite plan of the Russian Cabinet, the acquisition of the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the eventual division of the rest of the Ottoman Empire in Europe between them. Another boon which the victorious dispenser of crowns and countries proposed to the never-sated ambition of Russia was to rend the extensive province of Finland from the Swedish monarchy; and this he proposed with the more sincerity, inasmuch as he should thus make his new ally a tool for wreaking his vengeance on the King of Sweden, for his stedfast adherence to the alliance which bound him to England. Alexander was far from disdaining this less enviable but yet valuable addition to his overgrown empire.

The King of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, was a prince of a chivalrous spirit, endowed with the noblest and most estimable qualities, but which, it is true, he was too apt to push to an excess not exactly com-

patible with the interests of his country, and sometimes seeming to border upon insanity. Scorning alike both promises and threats, he had firmly adhered to his alliance with Great Britain, and when, in the spring of 1807, our Government was equipping a force for the purpose of making a diversion in favour of the efforts of Russia and Prussia for recovering the dominions of the latter. In the middle of May, Gustavus landed at Stralsund, before which a French army, under Marshal Brune, was lying; and, on the 3rd of July, put an end to the armistice concluded with the latter, confidently looking forward to a continuance of the war, and encouraged by the arrival of Blücher and Schill with about 6,000 Prussian troops, and the arrival of the Hanoverian Legion at Stralsund. The news of the peace, so suddenly patched up at Tilsit, thwarted the hopes founded on these circumstances. The Prussians retired; the English troops re-embarked, to be employed against Denmark; the King, having sent off all the artillery and stores, withdrew to the island of Rügen, and thence returned to Sweden; and, after a siege of a few days, Stralsund surrendered to Marshal Brune, whose troops then overran the whole of Swedish Pomerania.

In the beginning of August, the Russian Cabinet signified to the British Government the conclusion of peace with France, and offered its mediation between that power and Great Britain. Mr. Canning, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, solicited the communication of the secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit, which was refused by the Russian Minister and his

successor. After the news of the result of our operations against Denmark had reached Petersburg, Alexander still showed a disposition to defer a complete rupture with England; but Savary, Napoleon's representative at the Court of Russia, being charged to remind the Czar of his promise given at Tilsit, on the 7th of November, a manifesto was issued declaring the adhesion of Russia to the principles of the armed neutrality and the Continental system. In consequence, Lord Gower, the English Ambassador, left Petersburg, and Tolstoi set out as Russian envoy for Paris; nevertheless, Alexander, who had no scruple to play a double part in politics, gave secret assurances to the British Cabinet that he wished to continue in good understanding with it.

At the same time, the Czar failed not to take advantage of the clause in the Treaty of Tilsit directed against Sweden. He desired the co-operation of King Gustavus against England, and, this being refused, a Russian army prepared to invade Finland. This whole procedure seems to place the assurance given to the British Government in the true light, and to show that it was a mere artifice for withholding it from assisting Sweden to repel the threatened invasion.

In February, 1808, the campaign against Finland was opened by the entrance of the Russian army, under the command of General Buxhöwden. Notwithstanding the active preparations of the King to repel the invaders, it was easy to foresee what must be the result of this too unequal struggle. A British

corps of 10,000 men, under Sir John Moore, was sent by our Government to the aid of our ally; but, after waiting for some time at Gottenburg for the King's instructions, it was recalled, and sailed on the 3rd of July for Spain, where it could be employed to better purpose. Finland, rent in one campaign from the Swedish monarchy, was annexed to the dominions of the Autocrat of all the Russias.

The dissatisfaction arising from this national humiliation, and from various unpopular measures on the part of the King, occasioned his deposition, in the following year; the transfer of the crown to his uncle, the Duke of Sudermania; and the ultimate elevation of a French revolutionary general to the throne of Sweden.

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*Report of a Mission to the North of Germany, by Captain Kuckuck, of the Hanoverian Legion, to Lord Castlereagh.*

London, May 30, 1807.

I have the honour to inform your lordship that, having arrived at Altona on the 9th instant, in the morning, I took all possible dispositions to inquire after everything your lordship had commissioned me with. I sent immediately an officer, a Hanoverian of my acquaintance, on a journey along the coast, to inform himself of the measures of defence employed by the enemy at the entrances of the rivers Elbe and Weser, and also of the number of troops placed on both sides, and I obtained the following information.

At Stade is garrisoned a battalion about 600 strong, who have four four-pounder cannon, with a powder-waggon. There are no cannon besides these, either at this place or on the ramparts. On the battery at Brunshausen are placed three iron three-pounders, with a guard of 12 men. Near Twietenfleth is a battery, with three six-pounder guns and one twelve-pounder,

three of which fire over the river, and one over the road that leads to Brunshausen. The battery is defended on both sides with palisades. A guard of one officer and 36 men is stationed very near the dike. Below the battery lies a cutter, of 12 guns, six and twelve-pounders. The cutter is provided on both sides with stakes shod with iron, and fastened together by chains; in consequence of which the cutter cannot be approached except from before or behind. The crew consists of 40 men.

Below Stade, at a place called Grauer Ort, the enemy began a battery a few days since, and, according to report, six guns are to be mounted on it. At this place the enemy is extremely vigilant, particularly at night.

At Freyburg is garrisoned a company of light infantry, who only bear the name of riflemen; but, in this quality, they are neither skilful nor well exercised, and, moreover, have only muskets, and not rifles.

At Gebestorf, one company garrisoned.

At Neuhaus, two companies. At this place is quartered the Colonel of these troops. His name is Walter.

At Belum, one.

At Oltendorf, three.

At Altenbruch, two.

At Grone, one. The light infantry furnishes the guards and outpost.

At Cuxhaven, three. In this place, there is a battery provided with four six-pounders and a twelve-pounder. This battery is guarded by 48 men. Upon the light-tower is placed a sentinel.

At Dosen, about half a league from Cuxhaven, is a strong detachment.

At Altenwalde, on the road to Bremerlehe, is also stationed a detachment, with two four-pounders.

At Dorum, one company of light infantry.

At Bremerlehe, two companies, and three guns on the battery called Carlstadt. From this place to Bremen, all the troops

quartered there amount, according to the battalions, to 4,000 men. A company ought to consist of 120 men, but very seldom there are more than 70 or 80. The cause of this diminution is the very great desertion. On reckoning in such a manner the strength of the battalions, the whole could not amount to more than 3,000 men. All these troops are moved very often from one place to another, at which they are highly discontented; so that they declared publicly that, as soon as the English made a landing, they would go over to them. All the inhabitants of the places through which this officer passed expressed to him their dissatisfaction with their present situation, and hoped that the report of a landing of the English might soon be realized, to enable them to show their attachment to their King and country, for whom they were ready to risk their lives, to deliver themselves from the yoke under which they laboured.

The enemy provisioned the fortress of Hameln for six months, a business which was executed by the Regency of Hanover, in consequence of a severe order from the French commanding general. The garrison at this place consists at present of one battalion of the Grand Duke of Baden's troops, and another of Dutch troops, the whole amounting to 1,100 men.

Nieuburg is totally demolished, in such a manner as to leave no appearance of a garrison stationed in it.

At Wesel are quartered two dépôt battalions of Dutch troops; about 700 strong, mostly invalids. This fortress is provisioned for six months.

In East Friesland, there are not at present any troops stationed.

At Lübeck, there is a garrison of 700 men. At this place are left many wounded soldiers from the battle, under the command of General Blücher. The fortifications are left absolutely as before, and no new works are erected.

Near Travemunde is a great battery with 16 iron cannon; but no other fortifications, either on the Trave or the Ems, or near Emden, are to be found.

At Hamburg, there was a garrison on the 23rd of May, of one battalion of the six Dutch regiments, about 6 to 700 strong. The whole garrison, of about 3,000 men, marched on the 21st of May to Mecklenburg.

The enemy have no magazines of provisions whatsoever, because they victual themselves by requisitions. The only dépôts of arms and ammunition are in the fortresses of Magdeburg and Hameln.

To give your lordship an idea of the real state of the tendency to insurrection, I enclose herewith a translation of a paper written in the German language, in his own hand, by a Hessian officer, whom I sent for, and, on his arrival at Altona, acquainted, as a friend, with the object of my mission ; and I flatter myself that your lordship will find that this was the shortest way to obtain, in a fortnight's time, every information from the north of Germany, of which the enemy is at present in possession, and which I could not have gained if I had travelled in only one part of the country.

The spirit of insurrection appears conspicuous in the whole North of Germany, but these people expected from England a severe blow for the French with a considerable expedition as soon as possible. Every day's delay, therefore, was a loss to the English arms, because the enemy was daily reinforcing himself, and the Swedish force singly is not sufficient to act long with energy against the common enemy ; and a part of the expedition, at least five or six thousand men, must land in the river Elbe or Weser, to keep up the communication with the Hessian and the Westphalian insurrectionary armies, and to receive numerous recruits from the Hanoverian and Brunswick territories.

It is impossible to find a way at present to bring recruits to Stralsund, so long as the enemy is in possession of Mecklenburg, though great numbers of recruits wish to enter the English service ; and it is equally difficult to bring them through the Danish territory, for, without a valid passport, a man is not

allowed to pass, but sent immediately out of the country. A single individual may perhaps occasionally succeed in getting on board the packet through the Danish country; but this is very expensive. It is likewise impossible to bring recruits down the river Elbe in small boats, the French cutter stationed at Twietenfleth not allowing the smallest fishing-boats to pass without search, and all English levies are forbidden upon pain of being immediately shot when taken—a sentence executed on the 15th of May upon one poor fellow.

Marshal Brune has taken the command of the troops in Mecklenburg and Pomerania, in place of Marshal Mortier, who is called with his troops to the grand army in Poland. He collected there, with the utmost expedition, an army composed of Dutch, Baden, and Saxon troops, consisting at present of 18,000 men. He took his head-quarters, on the 14th of May, at Schwerin, and immediately ordered that Rostock should be fortified. There are expected, in the middle of June, two French divisions, Bonnet's and Molitor's, from Italy, both consisting, according to authentic report, of 11,000 men; and there is also expected a Spanish corps, 15,000 strong; but it is in general believed that those troops are only 5,000 men, and from Etruria; though the Regency of Hanover is ordered to furnish subsistence for 15,000 men on their route, which they would take through Nordheim: they also want 400 draught horses for this army; but there is no account whatever that Spanish troops have yet crossed the Alps.

The Dutch park of artillery likewise marched on the 22nd of May for Mecklenburg, and passed over the pontoon bridge at Atlenburg on the 23rd. After the passage of that park, Marshal Brune ordered the pontoon bridges thrown over the Elbe at Atlenburg and Lauenburg to be broken up, and again thrown over higher up the Elbe, so that one of them shall cross the river at Domitz.

General Wauning is arrived at Stralsund with two regiments of Prussian troops, and General Rüchel is every day expected

with a reinforcement of Russian and Prussian troops. The King of Sweden is arrived at Stralsund with a reinforcement of troops, and it is much talked of that hostilities will begin again on a very early day.

I made every inquiry about obtaining horses and provisions, in case of an expedition, and I learned that horses at present are very scarce and dear, as well in the Danish as in the Hanoverian provinces, but not so the provisions necessary for an army; and I herewith enclose a proposal from two respectable gentlemen, both Hanoverian subjects, and the first of them in the service of the country.

These reports, and the proposition of an insurrection in the Hessian and Westphalian countries, I thought it my duty to bring over myself to your lordship, and now request to receive your lordship's further commands and instructions.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

A. KUCKUCK, Captain.

[Enclosures.]

*Report of the State of the North of Germany, by M. von Lossberg.*

Captain Kuckuck, of the 3rd Battalion of the Hanoverian Legion in England, having informed me of the plan of the English Government to send an expedition of considerable force to the Continent, not only to give a diversion to the enemy in favour of Russia and Prussia, but also to relieve the oppressed States of Germany, which, trusting to peace, have been overrun by French armies, contrary to all justice and the law of nations, and which, after the deposition of their lawful Sovereigns, have been treated precisely as conquered nations—

I am determined to assist the said Captain in the execution of his commissions as far as is in my power, from the knowledge which I have of the country, as well as in every other respect, feeling myself bound to it as a German, and still more as a Hessian, to whom his country, his prince, and the honour of the corps so much wronged and abused,

and in which he served seventeen years, are dear to him above everything.

I thought it necessary to mention this, in order to prevent any misconstruction. At the particular request of Captain Kuckuck, and in consequence of my promise to him, I shall put down my opinion how an insurrection, or levy *en masse*, particularly in the Hessian territory, may best be organized, and, at the same time, supported by England in the most easy manner; being confident that Captain Kuckuck will be answerable upon his honour, whether something will be undertaken or not, I shall not be in any way prejudiced or injured by so doing; and I also request that he will be careful in the use of what I write. And the Captain being instructed to inform himself respecting the rank and abilities of persons who may offer themselves for such an undertaking, this will apologize for my introducing a few observations concerning myself. I shall then proceed to state the disposition of those oppressed people, and conclude with stating, to the best of my ability, the ways and means by which the before-mentioned plan may jointly be best executed.

I have been in the army seventeen years, as hinted before; served in the campaigns from 1792 to 1795 in the grenadier guards; have been Captain for these four years in the Swiss body guards; and, before the dissolution of the Hessian army, I was put upon the staff as Brigade Major to Lieutenant-General de Wurmb, who commanded the corps near Ziegenhain, there assembled to keep up and defend that unfortunate neutrality. In this line, and in particular from my last employment, I am known to the whole army. To this effect, it has also contributed that my late father was Lieutenant-General, Minister of War, and Governor of Cassel, the metropolis; and my late uncle, likewise a Lieutenant-General, commanded the Hessian corps in the American war. By means of these circumstances, and by using them to the best advantage, I have pretty well acquired the confidence of all classes of people in Hesse, but

in a more particular manner than that of the army, and I flatter myself that I am honourably spoken of by them all.

If the inhabitants of Hesse are not quite so favourably disposed to such an undertaking as they were some time ago, the reason is that every hope of being released from this state of slavery is given up, the more so as the idea of a landing by the English is almost extinguished, and it is only mentioned as a rumour in the papers. As another reason may be considered the insurrection which happened five months ago, composed of such military as refused to enlist into the French service, and the ringleaders of which were, in consequence of it and the measures prosecuted by the French Government, shot, others condemned to the galleys, and all the infantry officers who had not enlisted in the French Hessian regiments (which will never be completed, at least not with Hessians) were sent to France as prisoners of war. The subaltern officers of cavalry, as French Hessian infantry regiments only were to be raised, were not called upon to serve, and, of course, remained in the country. I escaped this danger, along with all the foreigners who had property in countries belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine, my father having bought an estate in the country of Lippe, to which I retired. But though, in consequence of these events, the self-confidence and spirit of this nation have been somewhat weakened, yet I know my countrymen so well that I can give the most positive assurance they will do every thing out of love to their prince, and hatred against every thing bearing the name of French, as soon as they perceive England making real and serious preparations for their relief; which disposition has since been augmented by the late unhappy and distressing occurrences. Yes, truly, England may still relieve Germany, place her princes again on the throne, and prepare death and destruction for Napoleon and his armies, which have advanced so far.

During my residence of five months in the country of Lippe, I found opportunity to inform myself also of the disposition of

the inhabitants of the adjoining Prussian provinces in Westphalia; and among them, those of the duchy of Minden and of the counties of Marck and Ravensberg are assuredly the most affectionately devoted to the house of Prussia. They are all highly incensed and provoked; they only want a little support to make them confident, and to give full scope to their suppressed rage and vengeance. Every thing might be undertaken with them.

Mr. Gobert, the French Governor of these provinces, residing at Minden, fearing the like revolts to those in Hesse, tried every possible means either to enlist for the French service those privates, who, after the reduction of the Prussian fortresses, had retired into the country, or to transport them to France as prisoners of war; but they all assembled, and sent him word that they should oppose by force any such measures, whereupon that plan was dropped. Hence there are in these countries upwards of 8,000 soldiers, all of them enraged to the utmost.

But all the other classes of the people equally hate their present slavery, but more particularly so all those Prussians who formerly held places under the Crown, and who, receiving no pay, are reduced to the most wretched situation when they have no property of their own. This is also the case in Hesse, where only a part of the pay at most is now and then received; and how much a man must in this case be distressed who has a family to provide for may easily be conceived.

In order to contrive to raise the insurrection, immediate preparations are requisite, for the purpose of acting jointly and upon preconcerted plans, in such a manner that, as soon as the signal is given, an attack may be made on every point: I shall, therefore, proceed immediately to Hesse, and cross the country in all directions, with all possible caution increase my party, which is already pretty strong, to put anonymous letters in circulation here and there, and to appoint a general rendezvous for my adherents. A friend of mine, who was in the Prussian

army, and served in the campaigns from 1792 to 1795, but does not yet wish to have his name introduced here, though he is known to Captain Kuckuck, undertakes in the same view a journey into the Prussian provinces in Westphalia; and, after our utmost endeavours have proved successful in as secret a manner as possible, we shall wait for the return of Captain Kuckuck, and the answer of the General commanding the English expedition to the following questions, which may be considered as conditions, and highly advantageous to a general execution of the plan.

1. This enterprise is engaged in wholly and solely for the benefit of our lawful sovereigns.

2. England furnishes money and arms for the insurrection, the enterprise itself being so closely connected with her own interest; and, from the very first day of the rising, the pay and every other expense is to be provided for by England. It would be well if Captain Kuckuck were to bring along with him an English proclamation to that purpose, which, at the same time, might prove his credentials, if required: in which proclamation, however, it should be a main point to state that the only view of the whole undertaking was the restoration of the sovereigns to their people. It would also prove of infinite advantage, if an authorization both of the King of Prussia and the Elector of Hesse could be procured, or even a letter from General Rüchel at Stralsund, authorizing us, in the name of his Prussian Majesty, or at least taking upon himself in some measure the responsibility of the undertaking.

3. Where will the English expedition effect a landing? Most undoubtedly the mouth of the Wesel would be the most proper place, in order to form a junction by means of the Westphalian insurrections.

4. To what place will arms and all requisite stores be sent? In regard to assembling and organizing the levy into regiments, I must here observe that there will be a want of officers, particularly of Prussian, as those who are prisoners of war, and were

allowed by the French Government to remain in the country, cannot well be employed. It is not the same in Hesse, where the subaltern officers of cavalry are still in the country, and will do very well for the beginning; besides, the officers of the militia, all of them veterans, may be employed.

A train of artillery, with the proper officers, is wholly wanting; and, though they may be dispensed with in the beginning, yet they are of the utmost consequence afterwards. There are numerous artillery privates, who all remained in the country after the regiment, 1,500 strong, was disbanded.

5. Though we are both convinced that, should any unforeseen misfortune happen, England will not refuse an asylum to us, our families, and such a party as we may at that time have assembled, and grant a proper subsistence to every individual, yet, to make ourselves perfectly easy on that score, and not to expose ourselves to any reproach from our families, being both married, and having estates in the country, we must request a written assurance on this subject, including, at the same time, the promise of a pension to our wives and children, in case we should perish in the attempt.

Having received a decisive answer on all these points, and after another interview with Captain Kuckuck at the rendezvous appointed, where I shall further report to him the situation of our affairs, then every one is to hasten to the place assigned him, in order to strike the following blows, if possible, on or about the very same day when the English troops will land, or undertake any thing against the Dutch army.

The towns of Minden and Cassel, both the residences of the French Governors of those countries, and a castle in the former place, must be attacked and carried together. Two other columns must disarm the military in Bückeburg and Lippe-Detmold, in order to get possession of some thousand stand of arms which are in store there.

Should circumstances be favourable, every effort must be made against Hameln. With regard to the first two opera-

tions, the only difficulty is to keep all the preparations secret, so as not to be discovered before every thing is ripe for execution, because the gendarmes are spies not easily to be misled or deceived. The execution itself will be no great matter, both places having but weak garrisons. An attempt upon Hameln can only be undertaken as soon as it is known that the garrison is not strong, and composed of troops of the Confederation of the Rhine, who generally are not well disposed towards the French army, and may be gained ; but then the attack must be as vigorously and as well supported as it possibly can be. An understanding with the inhabitants, as well as the garrison, must determine this *coup de main*.

If matters are thus far advanced, particularly if we should have the good fortune to carry Hameln, but even without that, it will certainly not require a master-stroke of strategy to effect a junction with the English army. It would then prove very advantageous if the insurrection were to be joined by a small English corps, in order to facilitate its final formation ; and the more so, if it were to receive again its former regulations. The most severe discipline only can secure the existence of this corps.

I, as well as my friend, shall then very willingly serve under an able and experienced general, in expectation how and in what rank we shall be employed after our conduct has been approved of. A desire to shine and to act a conspicuous part does not tempt us to this undertaking : we are influenced solely by the wish to contribute as much as is in our power towards a restoration and rescue of our much wronged and oppressed country, or to perish in the attempt.

V. LOSSBERG.

Altona, May 22, 1807.

In consequence of a proposition of our friend, Captain Kuckuck, concerning a supply of horses and other necessaries for the army which is destined to land in Pomerania or elsewhere, we hereby comply with his wish, by proposing the following articles.

We are of opinion that magazines of no kind can be established before the army has landed on the Continent, because the enemy will not allow stores to be amassed any where, unless the purpose of them were satisfactorily accounted for. Horses can be procured as soon as the army has landed; but then it is absolutely necessary to know the place of landing a fortnight beforehand, to provide ourselves with them in the neighbourhood of the army, because a long transport through a country in possession of the enemy would be suspicious.

The small number of the enemy in the neighbourhood of the coast renders it very probable that the army will advance with rapidity, and this circumstance will be sufficient to diminish every obstacle to its subsistence.

As we are both native Hanoverians, it is not necessary to speak of our attachment to our King and native country. We thought it right to premise thus much to the following articles, because nothing would be more disagreeable to us than if difficulties which we are obliged to mention could be considered as motives for lucre and profit.

Horses are at present very scarce and dear in every part of Germany, because every province has been obliged to supply the French with a great number; and this is the case above all in our unhappy country, for four years past in the possession of an insatiable enemy; and a considerable number for the Saxon army has also been contracted for. It is, therefore, very probable that horses fit for cavalry service cannot be delivered at a lower price than 24 or 25 pistoles, and those for the transports and artillery than 19 or 20.

Every kind of forage is at present not very dear: it is, however, very probable that the price will rise as soon as the news of a landing is published. Captain Kuckuck told us that he should probably come back soon: we assure to make such contracts with him as will satisfy both parties.

C. A.R. WEDDIG.  
JULIUS WITTE.

*Explanation of a Proposed Expedition against the Texel.*

June 6, 1807.

1. *Objects of the Expedition.*

In the first place, it appears that the occupation of the Texel, and the other small islands in front of the Zuyder Zee, embraces a variety of distinct and important objects. The mere taking possession of these islands, for which 3,000 troops are conceived to be sufficient, ensures, at all events, the destruction of the works and shipping on them—the latter amounting to many hundreds, and of the most dangerous description to this country in case of invasion, as the Dutch craft are all capable of carrying a number of men under deck, and of keeping the sea in all weather.

It holds out also a most reasonable prospect either of destroying the Dutch fleet by fire-vessels, carcasses, and fire-rockets, in the Mars Deep and New Deep; or, of compelling it to surrender by continually harassing it with mortar-boats, &c., in the narrow channels of the Zuyder Zee, where it cannot act with effect. The naval force at the Helder is at present stated to be two ships of the line ready for sea, in the Mars Deep, and four or five fitting in the New Deep. The latter cannot have their guns on board, and consequently the first two alone are capable of any defence.

It embraces further the destruction of the arsenal. This arsenal has been constructed at an immense expense in the New Deep, and will be found, on reference to the Survey, not to be at all protected by the batteries of the Helder, but to be entirely open in the rear, having no defences of its own to prevent a continual repetition of attacks from mortar and rocket-boats. In this arsenal all the stores of the Dutch fleet are collected, and near it lie the four or five ships of the line above-mentioned, together with one ship on the stocks; so that the whole seems to be greatly exposed to the effects of fire-rockets and carcasses, and to hold out great temptation for such an attack.

The possession of the Texel gives, moreover, the power of bombarding the town and works of the Helder, which are now carried to a great extent : for it will be seen, by reference to the Survey, that the whole of this line is within range of 13-inch sea-service mortars, from a headland on the Texel island, from which it may night and day be bombarded, by placing there ten or more mortars, to be carried for that purpose, and without any corresponding risk ; for, while our shells are directed against an extensive town and works, theirs have only a few men and mortars to retaliate upon, scattered on the open sands, and completely out of gun-shot.

It gives also the greatest facility, at any time during its occupation, of blocking up the Dutch fleet, and, at all events, neutralizing it for a season, if we should not succeed in destroying it. This was proposed to have been done at the close of last war, by sinking a number of large old vessels in the channels ; but it is evident that the possession of the Texel and Vlie passage would render it a work of greater ease and certainty.

It opens also the way to extend the destruction of the Dutch craft throughout the Zuyder Zee. It has already been observed that this description of craft would be highly useful to the enemy in case of invasion ; and, when it is further considered that there are some thousand of them spread about through the different ports of this inland sea, and what facilities they thereby possess of embarking large bodies of troops, and of collecting them so embarked, without observation, or danger of attack, these vessels in the Zuyder Zee ought ever to be considered as objects of the greatest jealousy to England.

Finally, the occupation of the Texel and these islands may be considered, in the present moment, as of the greatest importance in a military point of view, as establishing a most central post on the enemy's frontier, and in the rear of his armies. If it be determined to maintain it, in defiance of him,

which it is conceived that no very large force (perhaps an army not exceeding 5,000 men) would be capable of doing ; and if the island were defended by temporary works, and by a proper description of naval force—a post most admirably calculated as a *point d'appui* for any operation this country might hereafter enter upon either against Holland or the North of Germany, as it commands the rivers Ems and Weser, and even the Elbe—a post, moreover, which, though it might be defended by so few, would, at all events, operate as a powerful diversion, by calling forth a large force on the part of the enemy, to watch our further movements, or to attempt our expulsion.

Such, then, are the various, and, it may be said, important objects, which the proposed expedition appears to embrace, with a great probability of complete success, as to the whole, and a moral certainty of accomplishing more than one of them : such as the destruction of the works and shipping on the islands, and the blocking up the different channels, at least for one season ; and yet either of these objects may be fairly considered as equivalent to the means proposed to be employed in the attainment of the whole ; while the very nature of the expedition ensures a safe retreat under any circumstances that may ordinarily be calculated upon.

## 2. *Naval and Military Means required for the Accomplishment of the Expedition.*

### NAVAL MEANS REQUIRED.

Frigates, 2.

Praams, 2.

Gun-brigs, 10.

Small gun-vessels, as many as can be easily collected, drawing but little water.

Cutters, 2.

Launches, carrying 8-inch howitzers, 20—of ships of the line, to be collected from the dock-yards, and fitted with marine

howitzers, of which there are now 20 ready at Woolwich. These howitzers are to throw the newly-invented shells, each containing a carcass, and bursting by contact. The launches are also to be fitted with rocket-frames; it having been proved that such a launch is capable of throwing 30 8-inch shells, and 36 rockets, in less than four hours. It is proposed to man these launches by raising 300 men from the guard-ships at Portsmouth, the Downs, and Sheerness, by which means all delay or additional expense is avoided.

Launches armed with caronades, 10. These are the proper launches belonging to the North Sea fleet, which it is proposed to put in requisition for this service. They will therefore be manned from their respective vessels, and will each of them be armed with a rocket-frame, in addition to their caronades.

Boats. As many six and eight-oared boats as can be collected and manned from the North Sea fleet.

Small fire-vessels, 10. There are a number of vessels of this description lying in the Medway.

Mortar vessels, 3. Comprising two ordinary bombs and the Project mortar-vessel, now lying in the river Thames, and constructed according to a plan proposed by Mr. Congreve; for, as she draws but six feet water, and yet carries two 10-inch howitzers, it is conceived she would be peculiarly well adapted to acting in the shoals of the Zuyder Zee.

A store-ship, to carry over about 40 12-pounder caronades, to be mounted on board the schuys, &c.

A store-ship, to convey the rocket stores, and the shells and carcasses for the howitzer launches.

A set of signal flags, for the Texel Island, to communicate with the flotilla.

#### MILITARY MEANS REQUIRED.

It is conceived that 3,000 men will be sufficient to take possession of the islands, and 2,000 more to maintain them. This army is supposed to comprise two troops of cavalry, one com-

pany of artillery, and engineers to put the Texel in the best possible state of temporary defence, by removing to it all the cannon from the other islands, and throwing up such works as may be required, in addition to the present sea-batteries.

Ordnance. Ten or more 13-inch sea-service mortars are required to be carried over, to establish mortar batteries on the Texel, for the bombardment of the Helder.

It is proposed to supply the transports with three months' provision for the above force.

### 3. *Plan of Operations.*

The troops should be landed with a south-west or south wind on the outside of the Texel, Vlie, and Schelling Islands, at the same time, and take post on the nearest sand-hills, till formed and in numbers, when they would advance and secure the sea-batteries of the Vlie passage, which are open in the rear. By this passage, which will admit small frigates, the naval force above-mentioned should enter, and the other islands be taken in succession, the cannon being removed from them as soon as possible to the Texel and Vlie Islands, there to be mounted on temporary works for the greater security of the troops and defence of the Vlie passage, where all the transports, &c., will find convenient anchorage.

Great exertions must also be made to collect and arrange all the small craft taken over into regular divisions of a flotilla, a certain number of them being classed to the different praams and gun-brigs, and to increase, without a moment's delay, this description of force, by seizing upon the schuyts and other such vessels as are to be found on the different islands in our possession, for the purpose of equipping them with the caronnades taken over for that purpose.

And here it seems important to show the reasons for believing that we should be able, without difficulty, to organize a superior force of this description to that which the enemy will be able to collect in time. In the first place, the praams

and gun-brigs are in themselves a host against any kind of vessels the Dutch have, or can procure, on the spur of the occasion, to act in shoal water. It is true they have the means of arming a few gun-vessels at the naval arsenal; but they cannot, with the same facility, collect the necessary craft at that spot in the face of our force, neither can they so easily procure seamen; because these people are principally to be found on the islands, which being supposed to be immediately taken possession of by the English, it is not probable that the inhabitants will afterwards quit their families for this purpose: and to this must be added the natural indolence of the Dutch character, as well as their disaffection to the present Government. In fact, when the enemy had ten sail of the line lying in the Mars Deep, they had not even then sufficient energy to organize any force for the protection of their islands, which were continually insulted by our cruisers, whose boats, at any time, would enter the Zuyder Zee, and either take or destroy their vessels without opposition. At that time, Captain Mackenzie, with 150 men, took possession of the Island of Schermonikoog, and held the batteries, till all the craft around it were either taken or destroyed. In the present posture of affairs, indeed, it is not probable that any regular troops would be found in this part of Holland, and very few regular seamen; the only opposition, therefore, to be expected, either at the first landing, or in the consequent formation of any armament to impede our progress, is from the militia, which is composed of the Dutch fishermen, who are notoriously a most tame and unwarlike set of people, and who, in the different rencontres in which they have occasionally been engaged, have scarcely ever waited for a second discharge of musketry.

But, even if fewer of these difficulties existed, the formation of such a force, on the part of the enemy, as the expedition is presumed to combine, would be a work of longer time than is required for the accomplishment of most of its objects. And it is not believed that, *at present*, the Dutch have in the

Zuyder Zee twenty vessels equipped that could act against us, and those not better than our worst class of gun-vessels. In any operation with our flotilla, therefore, it appears that there is little to be feared from the enemy opposing it with a similar description of force.

Things being thus arranged, and the mortar batteries having been erected on the most convenient points of the Texel, for commanding the Helder and the outer anchorage of the Mars Deep, the attack of the line-of-battle ships may be proceeded upon the first neap tides; and if the fleet should have remained in the Mars Deep until that time, it is conceived that the united fire of the mortar batteries, bomb-ships, howitzer and rocket-boats, must very soon render this anchorage untenable, were the enemy's number greater than it is; for it must be remembered that all the missiles proposed to be used against them will take effect far beyond the reach of gun-shot; and that, if the enemy should get under weigh, which he can only attempt in the daytime, then our small craft will immediately retire into shoal water, still keeping up their fire; and, in fact, the narrowness of the channel in a short time places them in security, while it prevents any important manœuvre on the part of the enemy. It is probable, therefore, that he would retire either to the New Deep, or to the Vlieter.

If he takes up the former position, he is still liable to a continuance of the same species of attack, which combines the bombardment of the fleet and arsenal, and holds out the most reasonable prospect of the destruction of both.

If the ships retire to the Vlieter, they must pass very near the inner part of the Vlie passage, and thereby run the gauntlet of all the cannon collected on shore, in addition to the fire of our small craft, in shoal water, following them; nor can they escape the incessant renewal of this harassing warfare in their new anchorage. Higher than the Vlieter, ships of the line cannot proceed without taking out their guns, which, should they in this case attempt, they must immediately fall, as our

boats would then close on all sides, and pour in the most destructive fire without hazard to themselves. Thus far, therefore, it appears that there is every hope of success by the means proposed, let the enemy move which way he will.

It is perhaps needless, in the present stage of the business, to detail minutely the further proceedings of the expedition, which, it is conceived, would immediately result from the foregoing operations. It may, therefore, be sufficient to observe that, next to the attack of the fleet and arsenal, the whole effort of the expedition should be directed to the demolition of the small craft spread in such quantities throughout every port in the Zuyder Zee, and surrounding every island; nor can it be fairly doubted, left, as it is so highly probable the whole of this country is, to the defence of its own inhabitants, that, by employing both the naval and the military means in the service, this work might proceed in different directions at the same time; for, while the whole line of islands might be cleared, one after another, by the military force, there is not perhaps a single port in the interior of the Zuyder Zee that is not assailable by the fire of mortar and rocket-boats.

Neither is it necessary to say more of the bombardment of the works of the Helder, and the blocking up the principal channels into the Zuyder Zee, than that they result, as operations the most simple and certain, from the occupation of the Texel, and that, should the plan of destroying the fleet not be completely successful, there still exists an absolute certainty of shutting it up at least for a season. It only remains, therefore, to devote a few lines to consider the proposed expedition in a military point of view; and, in so doing, it must be stated that the objects appear of the greatest magnitude.

The Texel seems to be the right flank of a chain of islands commanding the Zuyder Zee, and the rivers Ems, Weser, and Elbe—a chain of islands which therefore appears naturally marked out as the advanced post for this country to occupy in

any war where a co-operation on the Continent is to be looked to, and especially in the present posture of the contending armies. It is on this line that it should seem a British army of a certain force, independent of innumerable advantages, immediately resulting from their capture and possession, might maintain itself in defiance of the enemy; might keep up a constant and extensive communication with the Continent; and be ready, on the shortest notice, to land in full force on the most important points of action. Even in a mercantile point of view, it is conceived that the possession of this chain of islands would open a very extensive communication with the Continent, if arrangements were made to facilitate it.

Considering, therefore, the various objects with which this expedition seems to be connected, and the moral certainty of accomplishing so many of them with a moderate force, or of extending them so greatly by a proportionate increase of means, it would, perhaps, be difficult to find a situation where any given force could act with so much effect, with so little risk, or with more solid advantages to the country.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

London, April 29, 1808.

My dear Lord—I have perused the instructions to Sir John Moore and Colonel Murray, which are, I think, as full as they can be made. In respect to Zealand, the question is exactly one of relative force; and I don't see why you should not give the General a discretionary power to co-operate with the King in this expedition, in the same manner as you have in the other operations which his Majesty may undertake. In the existing state of uncertainty respecting the strength of both the parties, I don't think you can decide upon this operation against Zealand with satisfaction to yourself; and I think you may safely confide in the discretion of Sir John Moore.

As for the operation itself, it must be viewed, by the King and those who will undertake it, in reference to the risk which

Sweden will run while it is in progress, and to the probability of its own success. The risk of Sweden might be diminished by an increase of the naval force in the Cattegat, if that were possible: for it may be depended upon that every effort will be made by the enemy to land a force either in Sweden or Norway, from either side of Jutland, with a view to divert the attention of the King from this attack. As for the operation itself, it will be one of a nature entirely different from that which we undertook in the last year. The King of Denmark will, of course, have an army in the field, which it will be the object of the King of Sweden to defeat, in the first instance; and afterwards to make himself master of Copenhagen and Cronberg. The conquest of Zealand will be an operation of some difficulty; and the King will find it no easy matter to retain his conquest during the winter. I doubt also whether his conquest will give him any very great additional security for Sweden. These are points, however, for his own consideration; and I am convinced that you cannot refer the decision on the part which you will take in the operations to which they relate to a person more capable of forming a proper decision than Sir John Moore.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Memorandum on the Defence of Sweden.*

Circumstances appearing to preclude all hope of undertaking any effectual operation on the side of Finland, which might tend to the recovering of that country, it appears expedient to adopt a strict defensive in that quarter. It is proposed, therefore, that General Klingspor should be instructed to make such arrangements as seem best calculated to prevent the further advance of the Russian forces, without hazarding any step, however, which might commit his own troops; and he should be made aware that it will be impossible to spare any reinforcements for his support during the summer.

The protection of Sweden, along the coasts of the Gulf of Bothnia, must be trusted as much as possible to naval defences ; and in that view it is to be understood that the Swedish fleet, consisting of eleven sail of the line and five frigates, is to charge itself with the blockade of the Gulf of Finland, within which it is understood that the Russians have at Cronstadt from ten to thirteen sail of the line and three frigates, and in the ports of Russian Finland a considerable flotilla, besides that which they may have acquired by the surrender of Sweaborg.

It is supposed that, the station of the Swedish fleet being off the point of Hangaard, it would be enabled at once to confine the fleet of Russia, and to hinder the entrance of the enemy's flotilla into the Gulf of Bothnia. It is further to be understood that the Swedes are to station in the Gulf of Bothnia a sufficient number of small ships of war to prevent any collection of boats being formed by the Russians, or to prevent any attempt being made by them to throw troops across the Gulf into the northern parts of Sweden.

The cruizing station of the British ships, it is proposed, should be in that part of the Baltic which is opposite to Courland, and from thence to the North Sea ; the British Admiral having thus in view to cover Sweden from any descent from the coasts of Poland or Germany, and further to secure it on the side of Zealand, to blockade that island, to hinder any assembly of vessels in any of the ports of Jutland, and to preclude all intercourse of the enemy with Norway.

If it should happen that the force the enemy have landed in the island of Gothland is not immediately reduced by the expedition sent against it, it is presumed that things should be suffered to continue in suspense in that quarter, rather than that the operations there should interfere with the main object of the campaign. This object is the invasion of Norway.

It being understood that the chain of mountains between Sweden and Norway, all the way from the northern extremity

of the frontier, at least as far as Dalecarlia, are impassable for troops from the time when the snows begin to melt till about the middle of July, the whole of that line may be left to its natural defences during that period ; or, at least, its protection may be trusted entirely to the loyalty and bravery of the armed inhabitants. The corps, therefore, of Monsieur Bergenstrall should be immediately drawn to the southward, and should reinforce General Armfeldt's army ; General Armfeldt should also be further reinforced by all the troops that can possibly be spared from the south and from the centre of the kingdom.

It is understood that the army now on the Norwegian frontier could be augmented in three weeks by the addition of from four to five thousand men, and that a further force of reserve battalions could be pushed forward so as to be in second line to that army. Successive arrivals of troops, thus taking place from the interior of the country, and pushing forward by degrees those who had preceded them, either to enable the army to act with greater vigour, or to repair the losses it might have sustained, a Swedish army then, consisting of 16,000 men, will be in readiness to commence offensive operations with vigour on the side of Norway by the 1st of the month of June ; being, at the same time, fully provided with every requisite for the field ; and arrangements the most certain being established for supplying it with provisions in all its movements.

The co-operation of the British forces, it is proposed, shall be by a disembarkation on the coast of Norway. The precise point of disembarkation is not, however, here fixed, because sufficient local information has not yet been obtained on that head. There appear, however, to be several military considerations sufficient to determine that it ought to be to the westward of the Christiania Fiord. It is scarcely to be doubted that the double attack which will thus be made upon Norway will occasion some embarrassment on the part of the enemy.

It is probable that he will either move with the main body

of his troops against the Swedish army, in the hope of gaining such an advantage as may free him for a time from apprehensions in that quarter; or that he will move rapidly in great force upon the English corps, in the hope of driving it at once by a vigorous effort out of the country; conceiving that such an operation would prove decisive as to the issue of the campaign, or, at least, very much retard the operations of the allies, and discourage them from future attempts against Norway. It seems expedient, therefore, under the above view of the probable line of conduct that may be adopted by the Norwegians, that the allied armies should take such precautions on both points of attack as may render it matter of difficulty for the enemy to force them in either quarter to a general affair, unless when circumstances appear to offer a fair prospect of a successful result. The character, however, of the plan of campaign of the allies, on the side of Norway, being that of vigorous offensive operations, the defensive attitude, though assumed for a moment, must be relinquished the instant that circumstances will permit; and that of the two armies, which finds itself opposite to a force not decidedly superior to itself, must operate, by its exertions, the most effectual diversion possible in favour of the other.

If the principal force of the Norwegians is opposed to the Swedish army, the English corps must subject as great an extent of country as possible, and must make such movements towards Christiania as will menace most strongly the rear of the enemy. The progress of the English will be limited or retarded in no other respect than this—that a connexion must at all times be maintained with the fleet, and that the means of conveyance must, in part, be assembled in the country; the army being but partly supplied, in that respect, on account of the difficulty of transporting by sea a large establishment of horses and waggons.

If the main body of the Norwegian army is carried against the British, in that case the Swedish corps must endeavour to

push forward to the Glommen, and thence to Christiania, if circumstances permit, bringing forward as great a proportion as possible of the reserve battalions, and advancing, as far as it can be done, a part of the armed inhabitants, to sustain its rear, and to secure its communications. The circumstances which may limit or retard the movements of the Swedish army are the passage of the Glommen in front, and the difficulties of its communications over the mountains in the rear, as also the necessity of observing the fortified places, which the enemy have upon the flanks of the line to be attacked.

It appears a thing to be desired that the allies should be able to postpone undertaking the siege of any of the strong places in Norway, until they have either obliged the army the enemy may have in the field to retire beyond the mountains which separate the province of Christiania from those of Bergen and Drontheim, or have dispersed it, or obliged it to seek shelter in the fortresses of the country, and under their walls. It would probably be an advantage that the Swedish army should put itself in communication with the sea, after having penetrated some way into the enemy's country, and perhaps its supplies of stores and provisions might then, in part, at least, be conveyed to it by water.

If an opening should present itself for attacking the enemy's flotilla by a combined operation by sea and land, it would be advisable to avail ourselves of it, as the capture or the destruction of these vessels would contribute probably a great deal towards the success of the enterprise which it has been determined to undertake.

Although the 1st of June is mentioned as the period when the Swedish army could be reinforced to the utmost, and when every arrangement for its supply could be placed upon a footing the most complete, it is yet to be clearly understood that the active operations of that army are to commence the moment that the English corps approaches the coast of Norway, to effect its disembarkation. The intercourse between the

two armies must be kept up by sea, by means of small vessels allotted for that purpose, and must be as frequent as possible.

*Memorandum—Sweden.<sup>1</sup>*

No. 1. If the Swedish army on the Norwegian frontier should act upon the defensive until the arrival of the English troops, by what time can these be expected, bating the delays occasioned by contrary winds?

No. 2. If English troops are sent to Sweden, are they to form alone the left wing of the combined army, and to make the attacks and undertake the siege of the different forts and places that may come within the operations of that wing?

No. 3. If so, are the English troops to take along with them the necessary things for that purpose, as, for instance, battering train, pioneers' tools, &c., and what quantity of horses will be required for transporting the same, and is that the only assistance wanted from us?

No. 4. Supposing some time should elapse before the whole of the English armament may be got ready, could not the projected less considerable diversions be effected in the mean time, as likely to have a material influence on the enemy's preparations?

These diversions or disembarkations on the most exposed points of the coast would, without being in the least degree hazardous, prevent for the moment every attempt of the enemy to act on the offensive; whereas, if neglected, the consequences might be of great moment, and every subsequent attempt, if not altogether fruitless, at least be subject to numerous difficulties.

The Swedish commander has probably foreseen this case, and been careful not to lose the advantages of the attack—determined upon it, notwithstanding the superiority of the enemy's force.

This determination, perfectly consonant with the character

<sup>1</sup> Such is the endorsement on this paper, which is without date, written in a foreign hand, probably by some Swedish official.—EDITOR.

and spirit of the Swedish nation, will, I trust, like every other instance of boldness and celerity which modern military history offers, be crowned with success, and the Norwegians be induced to see in it a preconcerted plan of operation between the allied powers. These supposed secret combinations, which are always impressed on the minds of attacked enemies, must, however, be soon realized, if they are not to produce ultimately an exalted confidence.

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*Memorandum relative to Operations in Sweden.*

[Without date.]

1st. Demand—That a notice of from eight to fifteen days shall be given previous to the recall of the British troops, that he<sup>1</sup> may make arrangements with a view to his own security ; and that his Swedish Majesty should have a reciprocal right to return the British succours, or to withdraw from combined operations, on a similar notice, when he thinks fit.

2nd. That the condition which requires the British troops, as far as possible, to act as a separate corps, and in connexion with its own fleet, should not prevent combined operations between the forces of the two powers.

3rd. That the British troops, when actually within Sweden, should be under the King of Sweden's command.

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*Remarks on the Military Operations of Sweden against Norway  
and Denmark.<sup>2</sup>*

BY GENERAL DUMOURIEZ.

La campagne des Suédois en Norvège est manquée et au moins suspendue jusqu'en Novembre par les inondations pro-

<sup>1</sup> This reference seems to show that this is only the conclusion of a paper, the first part of which I have not met with.—EDITOR.

<sup>2</sup> This paper, in the handwriting of Dumouriez, is without date or signature ; but internal evidence shows that it must have been written in 1808.—EDITOR.

duites par la fonte des neiges par l'extrême chaleur de l'été, qui conserve les eaux stagnantes dans les vallées, et par la saison des pluies, qui, dans ces climats, au commencement du mois d'Aoust. Connaissant ces obstacles naturels, le Roy de Suède, pour réussir à penetrer jusqu'à Christiania, aurait dû donner au Général Armfeld vingt à vingt-cinq mille hommes au lieu de huit à dix ; alors les Norvégiens, attaqués à l'improvisée par une force aussi supérieure, n'auraient pas pu arrêter le progrès de ce Général, qui se serait trouvé posté dans cette capitale vers le tems où le corps Anglais, commandé par Sir John Moore, se serait présenté à l'entrée de la profonde Baye de Christiania. Alors la jonction se serait faite facilement, et pendant que l'armée combinée aurait assiégué à son aise Frederiksham, des détachements, secondés par une partie de la marine Anglaise, auraient soumis facilement Berghen et Drontheim, et auraient achevé en peu de tems et sans beaucoup de difficulté la conquête de la Norvège.

Tout ce plan est manqué ; les Suédois ont été repoussés jusqu'à la frontière ; tout est à recommencer de leur côté lorsque la saison le permettra, et les Anglais ne peuvent pas seuls tenter de forcer par mer leur passage jusqu'à Christiania, parceque la cessation forcée, pour deux ou trois mois, de toute operation de la part des Suédois, attireraient sur ce corps d'armée trop faible toutes les forces de la Norvège, débarrassées pour longtems des Suédois.

Ainsi l'armée Anglaise, qui très prudemment n'est arrivée qu'à Gottenbourg, pour y attendre que les operations de la Norvège fussent au point de rendre utile la combinaison du plan de campagne, s'y trouve arrêtée au moins pour deux ou trois mois avant que ce plan puisse être répris.

Le Conseil du Roy ne peut pas laisser son escadre et ses troupes dans cette inaction, dans un parage aussi dangereux par son climat que celui de Gottenbourg. Les chaleurs y sont excessives en Juillet et Aoust ; le pays à dix lieues la ronde ne présente que des roches arides et des sables stériles ; le bois y manque

ainsi qui les végétaux ; et, soit qu'on laissât les troupes à bord, soit qu'on les débarquât pour les camper ou les cantonner, ce corps d'armée perdrait plus de monde pendant ces deux mois d'inaction que par la campagne la plus vive et la plus meurtrière.

Il faut donc prendre un parti, regarder l'expédition de la Norvège comme manquée, abandonner ce plan vicieux dans son principe, nouvel exemple du danger des grandes opérations de guerre *combinées*, qui manquent toujours de précision, et donner bien vite à l'armée et à l'escadre Anglaise une autre destination plus utile à la cause commune.

On dit que le Roy de Suède veut reprendre en personne l'expédition de la Norvège : elle est devenue plus difficile, parceque les Norvégiens revenus de leur première surprise, encouragés par leurs succès contre la première invasion, auront eu le tems d'arranger avec plus de méthode leur défensive contre les Suédois et qu'ils auront moins de danger du côté de l'attaque des Anglais, que les deux mois d'inaction à Gottenbourg auront rebutés et affaiblis, et dont l'approche de l'hiver rendra la diversion plus courte, plus molle, et plus douteuse. On peut donc regarder l'expédition de la Norvège comme entièrement manquée et la reprise de ce plan comme un projet irréfléchi, qui ne peut qu'être suivi de grands désastres. Serait-il prudent de sacrifier une escadre et un corps d'armée à l'obstination dangereuse de notre allié, pendant qu'on peut les employer plus utilement pour luy-même ?

Si le Roy de Suède s'attachait au plan très incertain de l'invasion de la Norvège, certainement il ne lui resterait pas assez de forces pour reconquerir la Finlande, parceque les Russes en amèneraient toujours contre lui beaucoup plus qu'il ne pourrait en présenter. Quant à cette grande Province, on doit la regarder comme perdue : la Suède ne peut la ravoir que par un traité de paix. Il est possible qu'à force de courage, les Suédois reprennent tout le centre du pays, chassent les Russes d'Abo, et y fassent une guerre égale. Mais la lache

reduction de Sweaborg a décidé le sort de cette Province, qui restera de fait à celui des deux partis qui restera maître de cette place, que les Suédois ne peuvent ni assiéger ni reprendre. Dans aucun cas les troupes Anglaises ne peuvent être employées en Finlande, quand même le Roy de Suède l'exigerait : ainsi pour ne pas les rendre inutiles, et pour ne pas les laisser se ruiner à Gottenbourg, il faut leur donner promptement une autre destination, ou les ramener en Angleterre, dernier parti, qu'il faut éviter, parcequ'il amenerait des conséquences funestes pour notre allié.

Le parti à prendre pour éviter cet abandon qu'on nous reprocherait, et qui ferait triompher Buonaparte, est de reprendre l'attaque de la Seelande et des autres îles Danoises, pour les donner au Roy de Suède en indemnité de la Finlande et du projet échoué de conquête de la Norvège.

Si l'Angleterre à reçu réellement des Norvégiens la proposition d'une neutralité parfaite, il est certain que le Conseil ne peut pas mieux faire que de l'accepter, malgré la repugnance du Roy de Suède, en lui faisant entendre raison sur le danger et l'incertitude de s'obstiner à la conquête d'un pays que la Nature ne rend pas susceptible d'être conquis, à moins que les habitans n'y consentent, et ils viennent de prouver qu'ils y sont contraires, et que seuls, sans secours des Danois, ils suffisent pour la défense de leur pays.

On peut lui représenter "que la prise et la possession des îles Danoises, avec le secours de la marine et des troupes Anglaises, est plus facile et plus utile que l'invasion de la Norvège ; qu'il lui faut au moins trois mois pour arranger ses moyens d'invasion, ce qui donne aux Norvégiens le même tems pour arranger leur défense ; que l'escadre et les troupes Anglaises ne peuvent pas rester tout ce tems dans une inaction destructive à Gottenbourg, et qu'il faut nécessairement les employer et en tirer parti pendant cet intervalle ; que le meilleur parti pour l'intérêt des deux alliés est d'attaquer sur le champ les îles Danoises ; que la Norvège se rendra plus facile-

ment au possesseur de la capitale du Dannemark qu'à un Roy voisin, qui a déjà manqué une fois son invasion ; qu'ainsi le traité de neutralité des Norvégiens, utile en ce moment-cy, parcequ'il rend au Roy de Suède la disposition de son armée, dont ce projet d'invasion occupe une grande partie, tombera de luy-même lorsque les Norvégiens n'auront plus l'appuy du Gouvernement Danois." Ces raisons, accompagnées de la menace d'être forcé de retirer l'escadre et les troupes en Angleterre, doivent déterminer le Roy de Suède.

Pendant le cours de cette négociation, pour ne perdre ni du tems ni des hommes, l'escadre et les troupes Anglaises partiront de Gottenbourg, et se rendront dans les Belts pour cerner la Seeland.

Il parait qu'il vaudrait mieux, pour lui couper toute communication avec la terre ferme, attaquer d'abord l'isle de Fuhnen. Deux motifs militent pour cette opinion. La première est qu'on y trouverait une partie du corps Espagnol, et en envoyant avec Sir John Moore un des députés Espagnols, il leur communiquerait toutes les pièces relatives à l'insurrection de l'Espagne, et les déterminerait à se réunir aux Anglais, sur l'assurance qu'on leur donnerait les moyens de les ramener sur le champ dans leur patrie. Le second motif est que l'isle de Fuhnen peut être regardée comme la place d'armes et le dépôt de tous les approvisionnements de tout genre faits par Bernadotte pour son projet d'invasion de la Scanie. Une fois l'isle de Fuhnen prise, la Seelande entièrement bloquée, ne pourrait pas se soutenir, attaquée à la fois par Corsoer et par Copenhague.

Alors le Roy de Suède ne balancerait pas à rononcer à son projet de conquête de la Norvège, et à entrer avec l'Angleterre dans le traité de neutralité avec les Norvégiens. Alors n'ayant plus besoin des troupes de ce côté, il ferait descendre en Scanie l'armée qu'il destine à cette conquête et elle passerait de là en Seelande et dans les isles adjacentes, pour nous aider à les soumettre, et pour les occuper pour son propre compte.

N'ayant alors qu'une guerre défensive au Sud pour le

soutien de ces îles, que sa marine et celle de l'Angleterre couvriraient, il pourrait employer toutes ses forces en Finlande *et même ailleurs*, pour y faire une guerre offensive vigoureuse, qui, jointe aux évènements intéressants qui doivent se passer en Espagne, changerait nécessairement le système politique de la Russie, et peut-être le sort de tout le Continent.

EXPEDITION FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE  
ISLAND OF WALCHEREN.

1808—1810.

The motives which prompted this Expedition, the plan adopted for its execution, and the circumstances attending it, are so amply detailed in the Papers composing this section, as to render any explanatory remarks on those subjects quite superfluous.

I shall, therefore, merely observe that, if any reader should be surprised that so powerful and well appointed a force as that destined for this expedition failed to accomplish the principal object for which it was sent out, he need only turn to the manly and friendly letter of Mr. Henry Vernon to Lord Castlereagh, (see p. 328) to be fully enlightened on that point. It was this failure that led to the circumstances which produced the unfortunate rupture between Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning, in September, 1809, and the resignation of office by both.

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*The Right Hon. Robert Dundas to Lord Castlereagh.*

Downing Street, July 7, 1808.

Dear Castlereagh—Mr. Bruce, Keeper of the State Paper Office, was with me this morning, and I desired him to state in writing his communication. Accordingly I enclose

it, though it is not likely to be of any service to you. A copy of the enclosed Report is probably in your Office.

Yours most sincerely,

ROBERT DUNDAS.

*Mr. Bruce to the Right Hon. Robert Dundas.*

State Paper Office, Whitehall, June 7, 1808.

My dear Sir—Referring to our conversation this morning, when I mentioned my Report, in January, 1798, on what in naval language is termed *Conjunct Expeditions*, and the private letter which accompanied it, in the form of a result from evidence of the means which Great Britain might employ against the common enemy, framed at the desire of Mr Pitt and your father, we agreed that I should transmit to you a copy of the Report, and with it an extract from the private letter, as far as it might be applicable to the existing state of affairs. I mentioned to you also that I meant this communication to go through you to Lord Castlereagh, both because I have not the honour of being known to his lordship, and because, of all men, I am the last who would appear officious.

The extract from the letter I shall confine to one point—*the Island of Walcheren*; because, looking at the present state of Europe, the importance of giving a rallying place to the distressed inhabitants of the former United Provinces, and of the countries between their ancient limits and the Elbe, is obvious. This would oblige the common enemy to withdraw part of his forces either from Spain or Portugal, or from Prussia and the Germanic Circles, and thus facilitate the defence which Spain must make, and which Austria may be obliged to make.

It will occur to his lordship that the island of Walcheren, however favourable for our experiment and open to the attack of our armament, should it return from the Baltic, is in a very different state from what it was in 1798; the French, since their possession of it, having fortified it in the strongest manner: but, if this circumstance be against making the experi-

ment, it also, should the experiment succeed, and the Dutch resort to it, is not less favourable to its retention as a station which it would be impracticable for the enemy to recover.

Yours most sincerely,

JOHN BRUCE.

*Extract of a Letter accompanying the Report on Conjunct Expeditions, framed by desire of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Secretary Dundas.*

December 25, 1797.

Sir—The leading measure of Queen Elizabeth, in her instructions to her officers, was *to find her enemy employment at home*. For this purpose, she drew a line of distinction between the means she employed before and after the discomfiture of the *Invincible Armada*. Before that event, she availed herself of the prepossessions of her subjects ; put her whole kingdom in *array*, ready to resist the enemy, if he should attempt an invasion ; and she granted roving commissions to individuals, who might choose to equip fleets and engage adventurers, to attack her enemy's foreign and European coasts, and where he least expected it. After that event, she employed the Bands, which had been assembled to resist the Armada, in expeditions against the sea-ports, in which the new Armada was preparing, resolved to destroy the fleets intended for her destruction.

Practice and experience seem to unite with the actual circumstances of Britain and of its enemy, in pointing out that, as we can no longer divide the armies of France by continental wars, we ought to attempt the destruction of the armaments in the havens where they are preparing for invasions, and thus oblige the French Directory either to find new plunder from their own subjects, or from among their oppressed allies, to support their armies, or to run the risk of those armies turning on the upstart rulers of their devoted country.

Britain has at this time three great fleets in actual service—that off Lisbon, that off Brest, and that off Holland.

1. The first conjunct expedition I would propose belongs to the first class stated in my Report. The island of Walcheren, in Zealand, recommends itself for its destination, and the armament can be covered in its operations by the North Sea fleet. The situation of this island, with regard to the mouths of the Scheldt, is such that, in the event of obtaining it, we could completely command the navigation of that river, and render the possession of the other Zealand islands and the countries bordering on them of no value, because we could control the former Dutch and Austrian Netherlands.

Flushing, situated on the southern extremity of the island, is the best naval port on the north coast of the Netherlands, and the place from which attempts to attack Britain could be best made, because it could send out large transports and men of war to protect flat-bottomed boats and the port also, which, in the hands of Britain, would dispose the Dutch, if restored to them, more than any other circumstance to return to their former state, or to yield readily any of their foreign possessions in exchange for this key to their country. The inhabitants of Zealand, besides, detest the present French oppressors of Holland, and have for two hundred years been zealously attached to the Orange interests. Their trade, particularly that of Middleburg and Flushing to the North Sea and to the Indies, is completely ruined.

One of the first steps taken ought to be the stationing of gun-boats round the island of Walcheren, to prevent provisions or reinforcements being sent from Bergen-op-Zoom. After debarking, the first attempt should be to get possession of Middleburg, the capital, preventing, if possible, the garrison retreating to Flushing. If this measure should succeed, the invading army would probably be joined by the inhabitants in expelling their oppressors from Flushing, and such of them as refused to join ought to be sent out of the island. In order more effectually to conceal this plan, a squadron of light frigates, bomb-ketches, and gun-boats, might make a feint

attack on the mouths of the Texel, while the main attack was made on Middleburg.

The appearance of the Prince of Orange, and the calling the States of Zealand to meet and form an alliance with England, would call forward many adherents, and, indeed, would bring from all quarters the Dutch, either expelled from their homes, or groaning under contributions and domestic misery, to a place where they could either preserve their property, or retreat with it to England.

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*Memorandum for the consideration of the Cabinet, respecting an Expedition to Walcheren.*

BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.

[Not dated.]

Upon a detailed examination of all the information in the Office, corroborated by other inquiries, it appears that the troops stationed in the island of Walcheren, more especially those not habituated to such a climate, are liable, particularly in the months of November and December, before the frost sets in, to suffer in point of health. It also appears that there is not covering in the island for more than 7,000 men, and that even this number must be crowded in their cantonments in a degree to render the health of the troops more precarious. It appears that any forward movement from Walcheren, at this season of the year, would be more difficult than from the side of Hanover or Westphalia, and that any attempt to be undertaken against Helvoet or the Helder might be made with equal facility by a force held in readiness in the Downs.

Under the above circumstances, it may perhaps be prudent to confine the operation against Walcheren, in the first instance, to such an amount of force as may be deemed fully equal to its reduction and subsequent defence, which number may be accommodated on the island, with a due attention to their health; holding the disposable corps, which was at first

intended to make a part of the expedition, in complete readiness to move either to Walcheren or any other point to which it may be thought expedient to send them.

With a view of encouraging Prussia to act against Holland, it seems material to show her that we are prepared to second her on this side. If Walcheren is seized and held by 5,000 men, and 10,000 are held in readiness to move at the shortest notice, this end appears sufficiently answered. But it may very materially encourage Prussia to move into Holland, if she finds she can determine the fate of that country, without narrowing her efforts too much in the direction of Franconia and Lower Saxony, where she may have to meet the enemy in force. The strongest inducement to Prussia perhaps would be, there being such a corps assembled in Hanover as, by moving to the Yssel, would relieve her from the necessity of employing any of her force for the more northern part of the operation.

With a view to this object, it may be desirable that the force, as originally intended, should proceed to the Elbe. The troops now embarked, with the cavalry under orders, will furnish a corps of from 13 to 15,000 men; and, taking the Russians and Swedes advancing from Stralsund at 25,000, an army of 40,000 men may be immediately assembled in Hanover. Assuming that the internal security of the Electorate might speedily be provided for, when once recovered, by the re-assembly of the Electoral troops, now in the country, nearly the entire of the above force might be moved towards the Yssel.

Upon the supposition of the two Brigades of British troops now embarked proceeding, as was at first intended, to the Elbe, the force for Walcheren must be supplied from hence; and any number of infantry which may be deemed requisite, not exceeding 7,000 men, can be furnished without occasioning any delay beyond that which the naval arrangements will require.

Should it be thought expedient to entrust Sir John Moore

with the conduct of the expedition, and to give him his own brigade as a part of the force to be employed, it seems very desirable not to lock up so efficient a corps in a garrison in the island after the service is performed; but to bring the General and his brigade back immediately, and to attach them to the six regiments now coming from Ireland to the Downs, which would then form, under Sir John Moore, a moveable corps of about 8,500 men, ready to execute any active service which might be determined on.

With a view to securing Walcheren, at the least possible hazard to the flower of our army, an excellent brigade for this service might be formed of the following garrison battalions:—

4th, rank and file . . . . .	902
6th, " " . . . . .	606
7th, " " . . . . .	864
Total . . . . .	2,372

which might be prepared, and sent to relieve Sir John Moore's brigade.

The conquest of Walcheren would then only tie up, of our disposable infantry, strictly so called, whatever it might be deemed prudent to leave at Walcheren, in addition to the Veteran Battalions, which, with strong naval protection to Flushing, probably need not exceed two regiments, or about 1,500 men.

The above arrangements for effecting an attack upon the Yssel, by an army of 40,000 men, the reduction of Walcheren, and the holding an active corps of 8,500 men ready in the Downs to take advantage of any opening, does not suppose the application, in any case, of above 15,000 of our disposable British infantry, and does not calculate upon more than 7 or 8,000 of these being on service after Sir John Moore's return from Walcheren, unless some further operation should be attempted this winter against Holland by sea. This arrange-

ment does not appear to place too much at hazard, compared with the importance of the objects to which it is directed.

Whatever force is sent in cavalry to the Elbe, or in Veteran Battalions for securing Walcheren, during the winter, is not considered as any reduction of that portion of our army disposable for general service, which forms, in fact, the limit, as well as the means, of undertaking future operations.

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*Memorandum relative to an Attack on Walcheren.<sup>1</sup>*

BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.

The grounds of objection stated to an attack upon Walcheren, at the present season of the year, may be considered under the following heads :—first, the naval difficulties of effecting a landing, and placing the fleet in safety, without much delay, after their arrival off the coast ; secondly, the obstacles to be encountered on shore by the troops, after they shall have been landed.

With respect to the naval part of the enterprise, it seems to have been ascertained that the landing cannot be attempted within the channel between Walcheren and Cadsand, in the present state of the defences. It is also admitted that a fleet cannot enter the Veer Gate channel, until the Fort den Hack has been previously carried. Information is rather contradictory with respect to the nature of this battery, whether it is open or close to the river ; but it seems to be admitted that it is not capable of opposing resistance to an enemy when once landed.

The landing must be made on the external coast, between East and West Capell, and can only be attempted in clear and moderate weather, with a wind more or less off shore. With a south-west wind, ships are much exposed, when at anchor, in the channel between Walcheren and Cadsand, even as high up as Flushing. Supposing a force landed as above, in carrying

<sup>1</sup> This paper is not dated ; but, from the mention made of Sir John Moore, who fell on the 19th of January, 1809, it cannot belong to a later period than that.—EDITOR.

the sea-batteries as high up on the Cadsand side as the Nolle, a position for disembarking the heavy artillery, stores, &c., while the weather continued moderate, might be secured; it would not, however, open a safe retreat for the ships, in case it came on to blow; whereas, in directing the first operations against the other side of the island, including the Fort den Hack, a channel is opened, in which it is supposed they may lie in safety.

Supposing the two objects of a landing and a roadstead provided for, the remaining naval desideratum is, the being able to establish a line of circumvallation round the island, capable of cutting off all communication, and the introduction of supplies, reinforcements, &c.

This depends on and necessarily supposes the previous reduction of the fortified posts within the island, which are three, viz., Flushing, Rammekens, and Campveere. The landing on the outer coast depending at this season on the contingency of favourable weather, the chance of being disappointed in this, and of being obliged to return without having effected anything, has been suggested as a further objection.

Supposing the intelligence from the Continent should announce that such an effort was to be made against Holland, aided by Prussia, as rendered a further co-operation on our part, in addition to that now proceeding to the Elbe, important to the common cause, and that it was thought desirable, in case no preferable line of operations presented itself, to send an additional force, either to the Elbe, the Weser, or the Ems, into the North of Germany, if the reduction of Walcheren, all circumstances considered, should be deemed more advantageous than the extension of our force in the above quarter, the fleet might, without any apparent abandonment of its purpose, go off Walcheren in the first instance, and take its chance of the weather being such as the service might require: if disappointed in this, it might proceed on to its ulterior destination. With an ulterior purpose, and with instructions not

to attempt to land, unless under the most favourable appearances of weather, both of the above objections seem, in a great measure, removed. The chance of the attempt not being made on Walcheren at all may be considerable, but the risk of making it, as far as the naval question is concerned, is reduced to the chance of an actual change of weather taking place during the progress of the operation, which would probably be completed during the course of the day, so far as landing and securing an anchorage.

The second branch of the question is that which seems to have been hitherto least examined, viz., what obstacles a corps, having landed near Dorberg, having carried the Fort den Hack, and thus introduced their fleet into the Veer Gate, is likely to meet with in making themselves masters of the rest of the island, and within what time there is reason to expect that this can be accomplished.

This would seem to depend on a few leading facts, not very difficult to be ascertained from persons who have a general knowledge of the island and its defences: 1st. Whether the posts of Flushing, Rammekens, and Campveere can be carried by assault, without bringing up cannon and making a breach. 2nd. Whether these places can be approached at this season but by the great roads. 3rd. Whether the land immediately round the works will now admit of troops taking post on it, and erecting batteries; and, if not, whether, with so small a front as the roads afford, possibly bearing on the strongest and not the weakest part of the defences, a practicable breach is likely to be quickly effected. 4th. What covering the troops can depend on during this interval, and what influence this may have upon their health. 5th. What means of manning the defences the enemy have, in addition to the regular troops, what sailors or burghers. 6th. What the delay is likely to be of receiving small reinforcements from Bergen-op-Zoom, or the Hague, supposing the troops at those places not previously occupied by an attack from the side of Hanover or Westphalia.

In the present reduced state of the enemy's force, the reinforcements which they could supply may possibly be of an extent to improve their actual means of resistance, but cannot be of a magnitude to enable them to act offensively against a corps of 5,000 men once landed. In this view of the question, the attempt seems limited to the chance of failure and retreat, and the injury the troops may experience in point of health: serious loss is not to be presumed.

Upon the whole, it seems necessary that the line of operations to be adopted, after a landing is effected, against the three fortified posts, should be examined and reported on by Sir John Moore and the officer who is to command the artillery, in case the service is ordered to be undertaken. All the requisite preparations should be prosecuted with the utmost activity in the interim, as if the attack was absolutely resolved on.

The next advices from the Continent will probably ascertain whether the Court of Berlin is disposed to concur actively in measures for the expulsion of the enemy from Holland, or whether, if expelled by the British, Russian, and Swedish troops, Prussia would subsequently protect its independence. We may also learn to what extent the allied army in the North of Germany is likely to be carried, either upon the supposition of a Prussian army actively taking the field, or the secondary powers, such as Denmark, Saxony, and Hesse, with the acquiescence of Prussia, entering into subsidiary arrangements with us. The presumable effects of a diversion on the external coast of Holland may depend, in a considerable degree, on the above circumstances, as well as the moment when it may be undertaken with the least risk and the greatest chance of success.

Upon the military estimate, above recommended to be obtained, of the probability of carrying Walcheren, after the landing has been effected, coupled with the motives for reinforcing the British army in the North of Germany, must pro-

bably depend the final determination whether the expedition so prepared shall proceed to either, or successively to both the points of destination above alluded to.

*Memorandum respecting the Expense of Transports.*

April 1, 1809.

The hire of transports is now 25*s.* per month. The expense, therefore, of one hundred tons for a year is £1,625. One hundred and fifty tons is required for every hundred soldiers, with their arms, baggage, and accoutrements.

A 74-gun ship, armed *en flute*, having a frigate's masts and yards, 20 upper-deck guns, and 10 quarter-deck guns only, and fitted with a spar-deck,<sup>1</sup> will carry 800, or (if necessary) 850 soldiers, with their baggage, accoutrements, and field-pieces. Her annual expense, including fitting, may be estimated at £6 per man per month,<sup>2</sup> which per annum, for a complement of 250 men . . . . . £19,500

The expense of 850 troops in transports will be . . . . .	21,090
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Difference in favour of the flute, exclusive of the saving of half-pay to the sea-officers . . . . .	1,590
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A 64-gun ship, armed and fitted in the same way, with a complement of 200 men, may be estimated, at the same rate, to cost . . . . . £16,500

She will carry 700 troops, &c., which, in transports, will cost . . . . .	17,050
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Difference in favour of the flute, besides half-pay to the sea-officers . . . . .	550
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<sup>1</sup> The spar-deck could not be attended with much expense. The expense of fitting must depend on the state the ships are in.

<sup>2</sup> Pay and provisions are now nearly £4 a man, including the pay of the officers. This would not leave more than £7,000 a-year for equipment and wear and tear for a 74, which is probably underrated.

A 36-gun frigate, fitted with a spar-deck, a complement of 125 men, with the masts and yards of a sloop of war, and carrying only 10 guns—the expense per annum may be estimated at . . . . . £9,750

The 36-gun frigate will then carry 450 troops, with, &c., the expense of which, in hired transports, will be . . . . . 11,170

Difference in favour of the flute, exclusive of saving on half-pay . . . . . 1,420

According to these statements, it would require to carry 2,000 troops—one 74-gun ship, one 64 do., one 36 do., with 575 men.

To carry 20,000 men, 10 of 74, 10 of 64, 10 of 36, with 5,750 men. At an expense for that number of £448,500.

To perform the same service in transports, allowing a ton and a half per man,<sup>1</sup> it would require 30,000 tons, which, at the present price of 25*s.* per ton, would be £487,500; which 30,000 tons of transports would probably require 1,500 men. According to which estimate there would be an annual saving of about £40,000 a-year, and an excess of men required of 4,250.

In truth, therefore, some inconsiderable additional expense would be incurred, instead of a saving being effected; as the £40,000 would not be equal to the first expense of repairs of the ships, and making such as would be necessary from time to time. But the advantages to the service and to the country would be incalculable. They have been so often considered, and are so apparent as to render any *detailed* observations upon them quite unnecessary.

The additional number of those that would be wanted should not be considered as a drain upon the Navy, because these ships would not only render it unnecessary to employ so many men-of-war as usually accompany transports on expeditions,

<sup>1</sup> The allowance, I believe, lately to Spain was two tons a man.

but would be excellent ships for convoys, when not wanted to carry troops.

The comfort with which the troops would be carried ;  
The expedition with which they would be conveyed ;  
The trouble and delay that would be avoided to the men-of-war convoying the transports ;  
The facility that would be given in landing and re-embarking troops.

It would give a relief to the merchants to such an extent as transports could be spared, who are in the utmost distress for ships to carry on the trade of the country,<sup>1</sup> as British ships are now employed in some branches of it in which foreigners were almost exclusively employed, exclusive of any increase of the commerce that has been experienced, or may take place.

If two tons are allowed for every man in a transport, the expense of shipping of 20,000 men in the present mode would be £597,000, to set against £448,000 in the old men-of-war.

*Memorandum.* The freight of British ships to America last year was £6 10s. to £7, now £10. Of sugar from our islands the increase of freight is still more. The price of coals is increased very much, too, from the quantity of North Country ships in the transport service.

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*The Earl of Chatham to Lord Castlereagh.*

Hill Street, May 18, 1809.

My dear Lord—I received your letter of this morning, and feel sensibly the kind manner in which you have proposed to me the command of the expedition now under consideration, and I am much gratified by the concurrence in your sentiments expressed by the Duke of Portland. Of course I should be

<sup>1</sup> We have now 226,000 tons of transports employed, which, of course, include the transports in the regular service of the Navy, Victualling, and Ordnance, in carrying stores only; for which, however, the old men-of-war are equally adapted. This quantity of transports cost £3,672,500, for the hire of the ships only, at 25s. a ton per month—which, some years ago, was only 18s. to 15s.

at all times ready, when called upon, to obey his Majesty's commands ; but, considering this proposal as an option given to me confidentially on your part, I can only say that I should be very anxious to have some further conversation with you on this subject, before I venture to give any decided answer to it. I am better, but still confined. I should, therefore, be happy if you would have the goodness to call here at any time most convenient to you.

Believe me, &c.,

CHATHAM.

*Memorandum upon the supposed practicability of destroying the French Ships and Vessels in the Scheldt, and in the Arsenals at Antwerp.*

BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GORDON.

Horse Guards, May 31, 1809.

The only practicable modes by which an attempt to this effect could be made with any prospect of success appear to be : First, by a conjoint operation of the navy and army ; the former acting in the river, and the latter landing upon the coast, and moving direct by land upon Antwerp : secondly, by a maritime operation exclusively, from our ships and vessels in the river Scheldt, and acting from them with our land forces against such places on either bank of the Scheldt, as may be necessary to facilitate the operation upon the city of Antwerp.

The primary considerations upon both of the above modes are the extent of our means compared with those of the enemy, and the obstacles which we should have opposed to our attempts both by land and water.

There does not appear to be any datum that can lead to any probable guess at the extent of the force which the enemy may possess at Antwerp and the strong towns adjacent, or even at the extent of the armed population or militia of the neighbouring districts ; but it is imagined, from various concurring testimonies, that the whole regular force has been drawn off towards Germany ; and that the country in the vicinity of

Antwerp has been left more destitute of troops than at any former period. This appears to be the utmost extent of our information, and upon the accuracy of which must depend the success or failure of our project.

The means which we could employ upon this service are as follows, viz. :

Ships of the line, capable of containing each 500 soldiers . . . . .	22
More ships of the line . . . . .	8
Ships of the line . . . . .	30

Frigates and smaller vessels of war, capable of containing 14,000 soldiers, making conveyance on board ships of war for an army of 25,000 infantry.

The utmost extent of land force that could be spared from the United Kingdom for this service is as follows, viz. :

Infantry . . . . .	30,000
Cavalry . . . . .	6,000
Total of land force . . . . .	36,000

To this must be added the usual proportion of field artillery, say twelve brigades at least, and four troops of horse artillery: the horses for which may be calculated at least at 2,000. To this must be added a certain proportion of guns of larger calibre, which, with their equipages, might require 500 horses more. If to this we add 500 horses more for the staff, and other services of the army, the land force will amount as follows, viz. :

	Men.	Horses.
Infantry . . . . .	30,000 . . .	500
Cavalry . . . . .	6,000 . . .	6,000
Ordnance . . . . .	2,000 . . .	2,500
	38,000	9,000

Of the above, the ships of war could convey 2,500 infantry; transport tonnage must therefore be provided for 13,000 men and 9,000 horses, besides the ordnance and camp stores. The

whole of the above force being embarked, it must then be conducted to its final destination, which may be supposed nearly as follows, viz. :

It must be evident that if a land operation is to be attempted, no part of the above force can be spared for any purpose of co-operation with the seamen, by partial descents from the fleet upon the shores of the Scheldt ; but it must be wholly and solely appropriated for the attainment of its object, by a march through the enemy's country. The places for the disembarkation of this land force appear to be Ostend and Blankenburg ; and, though it may be supposing a great deal, it must, to render the project at all feasible, be supposed that Ostend, on the appearance of such an imposing force, opens its gates without opposition. The army could not move forward, without having a *place d'armes* for its stores, &c., and, least of all, leaving a strong place of defence in its rear, in the hands of the enemy. It must be, therefore, a fixed thing that, before the army moves forward, Ostend must be in our possession.

From Ostend to Antwerp there are two great roads, viz. : The one by Bruges, Ghent, and Lokum, and the whole distance about 60 miles ; but it must be observed that this route, besides leading through a low country intersected with canals, only brings you to the banks of the Scheldt, *opposite* to Antwerp ; and, the means of passing the river having been probably removed, very considerable delay must ensue before even an attempt could be made by us towards the object of our enterprise. This route, therefore, must not be followed. The other road, and that by which the army must march, leads from Ostend, through Thoroux, Oudenarde, Alost or Deynse, Malines, to Antwerp, and is about 100 or 110 miles.

When it is considered that the undermentioned capital towns, or rather fortresses, are within three days' forced march of any part of our line of operations, viz., Lisle, Tournay, Valenciennes, Mons, Oudenarde, Ghent ; it must be evident that, even admitting the utmost possible success to

attend our advance, a retreat by the same route would be, if practicable, one continued battle throughout the whole march, against the collective force of that whole country.

If this reasoning is correct, it follows that, against the destruction of the enemy's fleet at Antwerp, must be put the risk of the loss of the whole disposable force of the empire, and, with this addition to the comparison, that the risk may be suffered, and the object not attained; and that, unless the army could embark at Antwerp, and proceed down the Scheldt, the loss of the greater part of it would be almost certain. It must also be observed that, in the foregoing estimate of the enemy's resources, no stress has been laid upon the force he might bring from the other side of the Scheldt, from the neighbourhood of Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda. In how far the navy might co-operate with us by entering the Scheldt, and how far they might be able to navigate it, must be left for naval opinions to determine; but it would appear that, unless we were in possession of Walcheren, Cadsand, or the shore on *one* bank of the river, our own ships of war could not afford us any effectual, or indeed any assistance at all.

Now, to enable the fleet to possess themselves of any of the above advantages, the assistance of a floating land force is indispensable; and it has been shown that we have not sufficient force for that purpose. The whole success of this operation would depend entirely upon our military means, the extent of which, and the probable mode of employing them, if disposed of for this purpose, has been already fully set forth.

The second mode for consideration is, the maritime operation by acting with a land force from our ships and vessels of war, on the banks of the river Scheldt. The force for this purpose may be selected from that above mentioned, to the extent judged necessary. The first operations that would be necessary appear to be the possession of Walcheren and South Beveland, or of Cadsand and South Beveland; the possession of the latter appears to be indispensable. It is imagined that

the disembarkation of the troops might be protected as high up as Sandvliet, if possessed of both banks of the Scheldt, which is within twenty miles of Antwerp. If this could be done, and a landing in some force effected at Sandvliet, it might be possible to march direct upon Antwerp, at the same time that a corps endeavoured to take possession of the forts and batteries upon the river, and that the boats of the fleet, well manned, armed, and towing launches with troops, proceeded with the tide direct to the city.

That this would be a most desperate enterprise cannot be doubted, and that, in the attempt, whether successful or otherwise, a very large proportion of our naval and military means would be put to imminent hazard; but it appears to be an enterprise of less risk, and one which would be brought to an earlier issue, and attended with less expense than that considered in the first part of this paper.

J. H. G.

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*Memorandum relative to the projected Expedition against  
Walcheren.*

BY MAJOR-GENERAL THE HON. ALEXANDER HOPE.

Horse Guards, June 1, 1809.

In the following observations, it is assumed that the danger is acknowledged of attempting an internal operation on the Continent, without a previous participation in continental resources: that the difficulty is admitted of landing and equipping an army upon a hostile coast; as also that of feeding its future operations by resources to be derived from shipping.

It is further assumed that the extent of preparation required has been duly weighed; that the force employed is adequate to its object; and that the means of transport are such as to convey with the army its requisites of movement and of existence. Laying aside, therefore, these primary but indispensable considerations, the operation which it is proposed to consider is an advance upon Antwerp, with a view to destroy the maritime resources of the enemy in the Scheldt. For the attain-

ment of this object, one of two plans may be pursued; it being taken for granted that armaments to carry on two distinct lines of operation at the same time could not be provided—the one, to land upon the coast of Flanders, there to secure a port preparatory to the equipment of an army, in order to effect the conquest of a district of country sufficient to give temporary possession of Antwerp and the left bank of the Scheldt; the other, to overwhelm, by the combined operation of a large naval and a military force, the islands of Walcheren and of North and South Beveland, with a view to proceedings which shall hereafter be described. Upon the comparative merits of two such plans, the following observations arise.

In a landing on the coast of Flanders is to be observed the absence of any port adequate to receive and give security to a large armament; next, the difficulty of the country through which the operation is to be conducted, and the facility with which the enemy could improve its natural obstacles; lastly, the time which would be afforded him for this purpose, as also to collect his force, by the delay necessarily attending the equipment, after the landing of a large army. It will also immediately occur to any military man, that an army which had once made its point upon the coast of Flanders would be exposed not only to the accumulated force of the enemy, not only in the Netherlands and French Flanders, but also to the army in Holland, which would be conveyed across the islands of Zealand, or through the different channels which divide them, to the left bank of the Scheldt.

Upon the other hand, it is to be observed that, by preferably possessing the islands which have been named, and consequently the passage of the Scheldt, the force of Holland would alone be opposed to us in the first instance, that of Flanders having a circuitous movement to make by Malines or Antwerp. In Flushing, also, we should obtain a port adequate to receive the armament, and in the island of Walcheren a dépôt to place in security the extended resources which must necessarily

accompany the army. The possession of South Beeveland would add to these resources, secure naval co-operation along the greater part of the Western Scheldt, and bring the troops, without any other risk than what attends the first operation of possessing Walcheren, within a shorter distance of the main object in view.

If it is objected that the possession of these islands still necessitates another embarkation previous to the main attempt, it is to be remembered that it also gets rid, in a great degree, of the multiplied difficulties and dangers of the former operation from its infancy. With a view to the retreat of the army, much security also is thus gained by a close connexion with the navy, and by an insular position being maintained, from whence to re-embark the troops and stores in comparative security.

When to these local advantages is superadded that, by possessing the islands on the Scheldt, a part, at least, of the object of the expedition is obtained in the outset, while *all or nothing* is the alternative attending a landing in Flanders—when it is also borne in view that, our force once committed in Flanders, the enemy may again pass his ships down the Scheldt, from Antwerp or Terneuse, to Flushing, or some other situation not depending upon the left bank of that river; it is presumed that the more brilliant but more precarious plan of landing in Flanders will give way to the different considerations which favour the occupation of the islands in Zealand.

It is then to be considered, in the event of the latter plan being adopted, what are the general operations which might be attempted. In the first place, the force is supposed to be sufficient for the occupation, at the same movement, of the islands of Walcheren and North and South Beeveland, so as to possess the country between the Eastern and the Western Scheldt, and thereby facilitate the progress of the smaller vessels of our navy, and ensure the capture of whatever boats and naval resources were placed upon the shores of these islands. Should

this operation succeed, and a considerable quantity of schuyts and boats be collected, it might then be investigated how far it was practicable to take advantage of a flowing tide, and, by an embarkation from the point of South Beeveland highest up the river, to attempt Antwerp by a *coup de main*, landing at the same time smaller bodies of troops at Sandvliet on the right, and some corresponding point on the left bank of the Scheldt, to spread alarm, and to operate as a diversion in favour of the more serious operation.

The flotilla, in its progress up the Scheldt, would necessarily be accompanied by gun-boats, which should attempt to check the forts and batteries on either side of the river. The capture of forts Lillo and Liefkenshoeck would be of great importance to the security of a retreat. Such an operation, it is evident, would be attended with great risk to the force employed, without, perhaps, any adequate security to the attainment of its object: at the same time, if executed with decision, immediately after the occupation of South Beeveland, supposing the enemy unprepared, it might have some chance of success.

It is material to observe that the possession of Walcheren is pre-supposed, at least so far as to have the command of such batteries as might affect the entrance of the fleet into the Scheldt; Flushing and Middleburg being, if not captured, placed in a state of blockade. It is, however, to be presumed that the intention of possessing these islands would not be limited to the possibility of this operation, the practicability of which would be ascertained within a few days of landing, such an enterprise not requiring the complete equipment of the army. A continental operation, for which the islands of Zealand were the intended dépôt, would render it expedient to possess the island of Tolen, in addition to those named, thereby to obtain a command of the narrow passage between that island and the main land, in the vicinity of Bergen-op-Zoom.

The disadvantage of such a line of operation upon Antwerp would be the vicinity of that fortress: on the other hand, if it could be masked, the line is shorter, the country more open for cavalry, and presenting altogether fewer obstacles to the march of an army in all its branches, than that between Antwerp and the coast of Flanders. The capture of Bergen-op-Zoom, by blockade or otherwise, would ensure the tranquil possession of the islands of Zealand, and open views of a nature more extended than it is the object of this paper to consider.

Ostend is 66, and Nieuport 75 miles, in the shortest line from Antwerp. Bergen-op-Zoom is 24 miles only from the latter place. Further, let it be considered that the risk and serious difficulties of the army commence upon the coast of Flanders, where it lands; in the other case, that the army proceeds in comparative security, until it crosses from the island of Tolen. In the Flanders plan, the die is cast at landing, and the risk of losing the army cannot but be run. But, in what is proposed for Zealand, no continental risk arises until the army quits Tolen, before which, time is gained to acquire information; and the operation against Antwerp need not be undertaken, if it is deemed that any very serious consequence is likely to attend its failure.

Lastly, upon the general subject it may be remarked that, should an expedition end with the temporary possession of the islands of Zealand, a considerable diversion to the cause of the Continent would still be effected, from placing an army in a situation from which it alike threatens Holland and Flanders, while it necessarily must capture the enemy's maritime resources in such islands of Zealand as are occupied, and possibly afford the opportunity of attempting from thence his smaller arsenals, upon the left bank of the Scheldt.

A. H.

*Lieutenant-General Brownrigg to the Commander-in-Chief  
(Sir David Dundas).<sup>1</sup>*

Horse Guards, June 2, 1809.

Sir—In obedience to your orders, directing me to put on paper, in a cursory manner, general circumstances that occur relative to landing an army of 30,000 men, with their equipment, on the Flemish coast, and hence proceeding by land to Antwerp, by the route of Malines; and the probability of their return either by the same route or by any other—I have the honour to state, with the greatest deference, what appears to me would be those circumstances, and the probable result.

I shall suppose the force to consist of 5,000 cavalry, and 25,000 infantry, and that Ostend is seized upon as the most convenient point of debarkation, affording the only place calculated for a dépôt on the coast, and from whence the army could most easily commence its operations.

Supposing the army attended by the most contracted proportion of artillery and commissariat train, and taking it for granted that the army would be able to forage itself on the route, that the troops are without tents and blankets, and that the soldiers carry their camp-kettles, the number of horses to be taken with the expedition would be necessarily as follows:

Cavalry . . . . .	5,000
Artillery . . . . .	1,500
Commissariat train, sufficient to carry four days' bread, being 90 waggons, at four horses each . . . . .	360
Hospital waggons, two to every 1,000 men, with four horses each . . . . .	240
General officers, general and regimental staff . . . . .	700
	7,800

<sup>1</sup> In consequence of the Parliamentary inquiry, in which Mrs. Mary Anne Clarke figured so conspicuously, the Duke of York, early in 1809, resigned the office of Commander-in-Chief, and Sir David Dundas was appointed his successor.

A period of five days would probably elapse before the army found itself in a state to move forward, after having possessed itself of Ostend; as that time would be occupied in landing horses and stores, collecting boats, and making other necessary arrangements.

The route would lie as follows, advantage being taken of the canal at Bruges:

	Leagues.	Days.
To Bruges . . . . .	6	1
To Ghent, by Belem, keeping the line of the canal . . . . .	12	2
The citadel of Ghent being a respectable fortifi- cation, and the town difficult to approach, from the defence that its high ramparts, dikes, and canal afford, its reduction ought not to be calculated upon in less than . . . . .	0	3
To Oordegham . . . . .	4	1
To Ashe, by Alost . . . . .	5	1
To Malines, by Villevorde . . . . .	5½	1
To Antwerp . . . . .	6	1
Supposed detention at Ostend . . . . .	0	5
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	38½	15

But if the enemy is enabled to assemble a force sufficient materially to obstruct the progress of the march at particular points, and that the people of the country are hostile, which may also be expected, it is hardly probable that the army can reach Antwerp in less than fifteen days after its landing.

That it may penetrate that distance, under the presumption of the absence of the French armies in Germany, cannot be doubted; but so much time would be afforded to the enemy to assemble troops from Holland and the fortified places immediately in the vicinity of Antwerp, that its being able to effect its object is by no means certain: should it not do so, a retreat by the route which it took in its advance seems nearly impos-

sible, as an army must be expected to be formed in its rear of the militia and the gendarmes of the country, and from the garrisons of at least twenty fortified towns of West Flanders, none of which are at a greater distance than seven days' march from Ghent, which would be retaken, and would probably be the point of assembly, while it would be pursued by that which opposed it at Antwerp.

If I am justified in the foregoing reasoning, it appears that the loss of the whole force is risked by such an undertaking. But if the destruction of the enemy's arsenals at Antwerp and his fleet in the Scheldt is the object in view, I am humbly of opinion that this can only be effected by our fleet being able to sail up the Scheldt, having 10,000 troops on board, to land occasionally, to possess forts and batteries placed to obstruct the navigation. Should this be deemed impracticable, the possession of the island of Walcheren seems the most likely step to lead to the accomplishment of what is so much to be desired. By possessing the anchorage of Flushing, the enemy's fleet in the Scheldt would be rendered useless and exposed to such modes of attack as might, from that point, be decisive for its destruction. It would operate as a diversion in favour of the north of Germany, by preventing the Dutch from sending troops to that quarter, and might encourage the spirit of discontent which, it is believed, must still exist in the United Provinces. Probably, 15,000 men would be an ample force for the capture of Walcheren; 10,000 might be sufficient to maintain it, with the assistance of the navy; and a disposable corps would remain to be employed against the enemy in the Scheldt and neighbouring islands, as opportunity offered.

Should it be thought right from thence to attempt the destruction of the arsenals at Antwerp, a force, passing over to South Beeveland, would take possession of Sandfleet, on the main land; and from thence, the distance being about six leagues, might succeed in taking it by a *coup de main*; or,

being masters of the Western Scheldt, the force for this enterprise might proceed by sea to Sandfleet.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ROBERT BROWNRIGG, Quarter-Master-General.

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*Memorandum relative to the projected Expedition to the Scheldt.*

BY MAJOR-GENERAL CALVERT.

Horse Guards, June 3, 1809.

The difficulties which would attend a debarkation of a corps of the magnitude necessary for the performance of the service in question on an open beach, and from thence commencing so important an operation through a large tract of country whose natural strength has been augmented by all the science and military skill of the last century, have been so ably and so decisively stated, that I apprehend it remains only to consider of the possibility of the same service being effected by a conjunct operation of the navy and army; and, in this case, the Hondt, or West Scheldt, naturally presents itself as the channel through which it must be conducted.

It is wholly impossible to enter into any detailed reasoning on this part of the subject, without previously ascertaining to what extent local circumstances would admit of naval co-operation, which, depending on tides, soundings, and other points immediately connected with that service, can only be learned by a communication with officers of the navy; but, on a general view of the *locale*, it would appear indispensably necessary to possess ourselves of the south end, if not of the whole, of the island of Walcheren and of South Beveland, and from thence, with the aid of the navy and an extensive command of small craft, it might, I conceive, be possible to land a body of troops at Sandvliet competent to effect its march to Antwerp, and to the reduction of Lillo and the other forts on the right bank of the Scheldt.

It must, however, be remarked that the citadel of Antwerp

is formidable, and the works of the town itself such as would demand regular approaches and a train of artillery, which could not be transported without much time and labour, unless we could secure the navigation of the Scheldt, which could only be assured by the possession of the forts on the left as well as on the right bank of the river.

From the moment our fleet and army appeared off Walcheren, the enemy must necessarily be apprised of the object of the enterprise; and, having once ascertained how large a portion of our disposable force was engaged in it, he would be at liberty to concentrate all his means of defence, which could be facilitated by the canals of the country and the general course of the rivers.

Having no data to go on, in respect to the enemy's force, no argument can be entered on, on that point; but it may be presumed that, on such an occasion, he would not hesitate immediately to draw all his troops from the fortresses in Holland, the Netherlands, and French Flanders, and from more remote quarters, if he had sufficient time for the purpose.

The service would be arduous, and the troops employed on it must unavoidably be exposed to considerable risk; but I humbly conceive the operation, in this point of view, does not present the same *insuperable* difficulties, which I must be of opinion would attend an attempt to perform the same service by a debarkation at, or in the vicinity of, Ostend, and by a movement from thence to the point of attack.      H. C.

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*Memorandum respecting the intended Expedition.*

BY SIR DAVID DUNDAS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

June 3, 1809.

The enemy have assembled a considerable fleet, and formed a great naval establishment in the Scheldt: they are augmenting both, and taking such measures as tend to render it, at no very distant period, a maritime position, not only formidable to the

security of Britain, but invulnerable to attack. It therefore becomes a matter of the most pressing importance to strike a blow, if possible, against the enemy's naval resources in that quarter, including the destruction of their arsenal at Antwerp and the ships of war stationed in different parts of the Scheldt between Antwerp and Flushing.

No accurate state of the enemy's force in the northern parts of France, Flanders, or Holland, is known; but that tract is represented as drained as low, if not lower, than at any former period; and we can never expect to find the enemy more exposed or more assailable in that quarter than at present.

The object to be attained is a most important and desirable one, but the force we have to employ must be considered; and the difficulties and risks they have to encounter, from the enemy's strength and local advantages, must be well weighed. Our utmost means may be reckoned at about 25 or 30,000 infantry and 5 or 6,000 cavalry, besides the usual additions arising from the equipment of the peculiar service.

There appear to be two routes by which such an army might undertake to approach from the coast to Antwerp: 1st, from Ostend, or its neighbourhood, by a march of above 100 miles through the country of Flanders, and by Allost, Vilvorde, and Malines; 2nd, by naval and military operations within the Scheldt, and along that river to Antwerp, first occupying the islands of Walcheren and Sud Beeveland, and probably the opposite banks of the Scheldt.

Every calculation or prospect of successful attack can only be founded on a knowledge of the relative situation and strength of the enemy's country, fortresses, and armed men that can be brought in defence of both. If the route of the army is, therefore, to be taken, as in the first case, through Flanders, the country is known to be one of the most intricate in Europe for military operations, being everywhere intersected with deep running rivers, large canals, and considerable ditches and enclosures; at the same time that the passes and important

points are guarded by fortresses and walled towns, the most inconsiderable of which are capable of making a resistance against an army scantily provided with siege artillery. Of the first class are Nieuport, Ostend, Ghent, Oudenarde, Dendermonde, Brussels, Malines. The progress of military operations in Flanders, from the difficulties of advance, are well known never to have been rapid.

With our state of preparation and numbers, an attempt by this first route of marching through Flanders, to arrive at Antwerp, would certainly be most singular, and perhaps without example. For a very considerable fleet and army would arrive and anchor on an enemy's coast, which is at all times flat, dangerous, and without bay or shelter of any kind. To land on the open beach, between two of the enemy's fortresses (Nieuport and Ostend), above 30,000 men, 7 or 8,000 horses, and a considerable artillery, and perhaps other carriages and horses, medical, commissariat, and baggage, to give up all communication with their shipping, and to march immediately, without tents, for no means of carrying them could be provided—without hospital equipment—with only a scanty supply of bread for a few days—through a hostile country, most intricate and difficult in its nature—where the use of the canals could be so easily impeded—where the bridges, which are numerous, would be destroyed—where the enemy would immediately be in front, rear, and on both flanks, being enabled so to do from the situation of his strong garrison towns—where the sick and wounded must be abandoned, whenever they became so from want of carriage—where necessity would produce rapine, plunder, and great loss—where, if such an army was not sooner arrested in its progress, it must arrive, after a march of above 100 miles, at its destined point, and before a great town, (Antwerp) sufficiently fortified to require a regular siege, and which it could not carry on, unless the exertions of the fleet and of another considerable body of troops had opened and ensured a communication by the Scheldt.

During such a march, had some of the defensible towns even opened their gates, it is evident such an army could not diminish its numbers by leaving garrisons to occupy them, and thereby attempting to keep up a communication with the original point of landing, where possibly a fortress (Ostend) may have been secured, but where no such one exists as can effectually cover and secure the re-embarkation of a considerable corps. Supposing, after such a march, the main object of the expedition to have been attained, in the destruction of the enemy's fleet, it is evident that the army could not calculate (from the time and force the enemy must have acquired) on returning by the same route, but must trust, from the previous measures taken and its own exertions, to return (having accomplished its object) by the Scheldt.

If it, therefore, appears that the advance through Flanders is attended with very great difficulties, and that, at any rate, a return by the Scheldt is the most expedient and eligible, it would follow also that the attack should be directed from that side, and be a combined naval and land operation, the detail of which must be well considered and arranged by both services.

In whatever way Antwerp is to be approached or taken, the service is one of very great risk, and in which the safe return of the army so employed may be very precarious, from the opposition made, and the length of time consumed in the operation, which enables the enemy to assemble in a short time a great force from every part of the Netherlands and Holland, and even from Westphalia and the course of the Rhine, as well as from the frontier of France.

D. D.

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*Sir Home Popham to Lord Castlereagh.*

Charles Street, Tuesday evening, June 13, 1809.

My Lord—It did not occur to me on Sunday to mention that, as fast as the reinforcements could be spared from the operations on Walcheren, they would naturally relieve the

western regiments on Beeveland, and the easternmost would by signal cross from Batz to Sandflet, their posts being occupied by the western regiments successively, by which the reinforcements in series would join the Antwerp column within an hour after they could be spared from Walcheren.

As I trust your lordship is satisfied that my mind is never at rest upon any subject which I take up till it is completed, you will, I am sure, excuse the anxiety I express upon the present occasion. I see the season advancing fast; and, if we are imperceptibly led on till the midsummer fine weather is past, we shall have the most dreadful of all difficulties, the elements, to encounter; and those difficulties will be materially increased by the number of transports which will, I fear, attend this enterprise.

Transports are the greatest clog to every sort of expedition, particularly those in which promptness and celerity are so essential to success. On this persuasion it was that I so much pressed the dismantling some of the line-of-battle ships, and embarking the troops in brigades, in proportionate divisions of men-of-war, with all their appointments and equipments, and the number of horses necessary for them to go into action on the first moment of their landing. When I have the honour of seeing your lordship again, I think I shall be better able to satisfy you of the expediency of this measure, especially when it applies to an object, the success of which should not be hazarded by too strict a consideration of matters of mere formality.

I expect a person, in a few days, in town, from whom we shall derive much information as to the state of the landing-places in the river, which will be a considerable relief to me, as I do not like to place implicit confidence in my own recollection after such a lapse of time.

I again venture to press on your lordship how important it is to save even an hour, and to seize the favourable moment which is presented to us for accomplishing an undertaking not

inferior in national importance to any on which the resources of this Empire have ever been employed.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HOME POPHAM.

*The Earl of Chatham to Lord Castlereagh.*

Hill Street, June 13, 1809.

My dear Lord—I return you Popham's letter, and I agree with him that, as great preparation and previous arrangement are required to accomplish the object in view, every day lost is a loss of much valuable time. I think we should get on faster, if I could communicate privately with Popham, but I do not know where he is to be found, and I did not like to make any inquiries. If you would desire him to call upon me in Hill Street, or to send me his address, I would appoint him the first leisure moment I have. I shall see Sir Eyre Coote again to-morrow before the levee, and I will try also to see Pole, but I was unlucky in missing him to-day.

I had a good deal of conversation, after we parted this morning, with Hope, on the subject of his Paper. He considers the possession of Tolen to be necessary, as conceiving a landing in any force at Sandfleet as impracticable, and a retreat that way out of the question. His idea is that you must pass to the main land between Steinberg and Bergen-op-Zoom; but this operation would require the transports with the troops to proceed by the East Scheldt, which is quite a new way of looking at the subject, and which makes me more anxious to see Popham. I ought to add that Hope has himself embarked at Sandfleet, which he represents as a very narrow creek indeed.

Believe me, &c.,

CHATHAM.

*Lord Castlereagh to the King.*

St. James's Square, June 14, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh begs leave to acquaint your Majesty that your Majesty's confidential servants, having considered the

information which has been collected relative to an operation against the enemy's naval resources in the Scheldt, are humbly of opinion that, by employing an adequate force of not less than 35,000 men, the attempt may be made with every prospect of success, provided the practicability of a landing at Sandfleet can be assured. Till this point can be further investigated, they are desirous to postpone receiving your Majesty's final commands upon the measure, requesting, in the mean time, your Majesty's permission to proceed, with as much *secrecy* and *expedition* as possible, with all the preliminary arrangements, which, when completed, will contribute to render the troops equally applicable to any other service.

Your Majesty's servants are desirous of humbly submitting to your Majesty that the conduct of the proposed expedition should be entrusted to the Earl of Chatham.

Lord Castlereagh lays before your Majesty the Report received from Brigadier-General Decken relative to the state of affairs in the North of Germany.

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*His Majesty's Answer.*

Windsor Castle, June 16, 1809.

The King approves of Lord Castlereagh's proposal that the preparations for an expedition to the amount stated should be made with as much secrecy and promptitude as possible, and that Lord Chatham should be entrusted with the command of it.

GEORGE R.

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ADMIRALTY MEMORANDUMS, RELATIVE TO THE SCHELDT  
EXPEDITION.

*Naval Operations in the Scheldt.*

Admiralty, May 16, [1809].

It is proposed to leave a squadron of nine sail of the line, unencumbered by troops, to watch the enemy's force in the Scheldt.

In addition to the above ships, it is proposed to provide  
Troops.

20 Sail of the Line, to convey . . . . .	10,000
20 Frigates . . . . .	4,000
3 Ships, armed <i>en flûte</i> . . . . .	2,000
4 Troop Ships, which are now the sta- tionary Flag-ships . . . . .	2,400
36 Sloops of War . . . . .	1,800
32 Gun-brigs . . . . .	900
6 Bomb-vessels . . . . .	300

Number of Soldiers conveyed in the Ships . 21,400

It is also proposed to have 87 gun-boats, which will be manned from the twenty line-of-battle ships aforesaid. Each gun-boat will have a lieutenant, midshipman, and 20 men. The fleet will be attended by 26 cutters and small vessels. There can be no doubt of the whole of this force being ready before the 10th of June.

2. *The co-operation of the Fleet with the Army, in the Attack on Antwerp.*

Admiralty, May 18, 1809.

The obstacles to carrying the army up the Scheldt appear to be very material, as well from the time which must be lost in conducting so numerous a fleet, as from the great exposure to fire-vessels and other means of annoyance, which the enemy have the power of providing in great abundance in the river.

In case the military authorities shall decide that these obstacles are greater than those which might present themselves if the army were to be landed at Ostend, or at any other given point that ought to be determined upon by the General, it appears to the Admiralty that, in order to enable the naval force to act with effect, in co-operation with the army, it would be necessary to occupy the island of Cadsand, as a secure anchorage could be obtained for the fleet, by the possession of

the left bank of the river at that point; and it is presumed that a communication might be kept up with the army, and the ships might be pushed up the river, as circumstances required.

The force to be landed at Cadsand should be sufficient to keep possession of it, and to co-operate with the Navy in taking any other posts higher up the river, from time to time, as the ships might be enabled to move up, to assist in the operations of the army. By this means the fleet would be so placed as to give assistance to the army, if it should, at any time, be found necessary to retreat to the left bank of the Scheldt; and, if Antwerp should be got possession of, the fleet might be enabled to take the army down the river, if it should be found more eligible for them to come off in this manner than by Ostend, which town, it is supposed, would be held in our possession.

#### A.

##### *3. Arrangement for conveying Troops in Men of War.*

June 9, [1809].

18	Seventy-four gun-ships, to carry 550 men each	9,900
8	Line-of-Battle Ships, to carry 250 men each .	2,000
9	Flutes, to carry 600 men each . . .	5,400
14	Frigates, to carry 250 men each . . .	3,500
30	Sloops of War, to carry 50 men each . .	1,500
30	Gun-brigs, to carry 30 men each . . .	900
20	Vessels, collected from Dock-yards, Victualling establishment, Transport Board, &c., to carry 50 men each . . . .	1,000
		24,200

Seventy-two gun-boats, carrying 24-pounders, will attend the fleet, also six and twenty cutters and small vessels. These gun-boats should be provided with Shrapnell's shells, and a detachment of artillery ought to be appropriated to them.

In further aid of the transport service, it would be proper

to collect as many revenue vessels as possible; and, when the expedition is about to sail, we should lay hold of all Folkestone and Deal cutters, all Berwick smacks that may be on the river, and such Harwich packets and vessels of that description as can be procured.

#### 4. *The Expedition against Antwerp.*

Admiralty, June 9, [1809].

The paper marked A contains a statement of the number of ships and vessels of war that may be employed in the conveyance of troops on the intended expedition.

It is the opinion of the sea Lords of the Admiralty that, in the first instance, the island of Walcheren should be taken. They do not take upon them to say where the landing should be made, or how the military force should be distributed: this should be arranged between the General and Sir Richard Strachan. The fleet may be broken into divisions, calculated to convey, protect, and land any given number of troops at any given point: and it is presumed that we shall be able to master any floating force the enemy can produce, and to assist the army in the attack of any batteries that may have been erected on the banks of the river. In going up the river, it may be expedient to take possession of Terneuse, on the left bank. But the right bank must be secured as the armament proceeds; and, having obtained it as far as Batts, the naval force would be capable of protecting and conveying the whole army, in a very short space of time, to Sandfleet, or any other point below the narrow part of the Scheldt, at which the General may think it proper to land. An arrangement may be made for putting on shore, by flat boats, launches, &c., about 14,000 men at the first trip, and the remainder of the army might follow from ships to be anchored close in shore.

The fleet can also undertake to bring the army off from the neighbourhood of Sandfleet: but the fleet cannot go into the narrow part of the Scheldt, unless the army are in possession

of both banks of the river above Sandfleet. Fire-vessels, however, will be prepared, and every means held in readiness for taking any advantage that may offer, of acting against the enemy in the narrow part of the river for the destruction of their ships.

Sir Richard Strachan is ordered into port, and all the details of the expedition should be settled between that officer and the General who is to command. The naval force destined for the service is in such a state of forwardness, that, if an embarkation return were furnished, the ships could, in a very few days, be at their stations.

#### 5. *Landing Troops between Sandfleet and Lillo.*

Admiralty, June 19, [1809].

The Board of Admiralty having made inquiry respecting the practicability of effecting a landing between the point of Sandfleet and Fort Lillo, and having received Reports upon the subject from Captain Sir Home Popham and from Captain Plampin, intelligent officers of rank in the navy, who have had opportunity of acquiring knowledge on the spot, are prepared (upon the information received from those officers) to undertake that the troops shall be conveyed, when the island of *Beeveland, including Batts*, is in our possession, to the dike between Fort Lillo and Sandfleet, and landed, as far as the question of landing depends on the nature of the place, with relation to the approach to the shore of boats and other vessels capable of receiving troops.

#### 6. *The Attack on Antwerp.*

June 19, [1809].

Sir Home Popham was at Antwerp in 1793-1794, with the army. There did not appear to him to be any impediment to a landing on the dike between the point of Sandfleet and Lillo in considerable force; nor does he conceive that any obstacles can be presented to a landing there, that the navy will not devise expedients to remove.

Captain Plampin was at Antwerp in 1794, commanded the Albion, armed ship, and went up to Antwerp with the army. From what he recollects of the dike between Sandfleet and Lillo, he thinks a landing of troops there was practicable at that time, supposing the island of Beeveland, including Batts, to be in our possession.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the King.*

Downing Street, June 21, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh has to submit to your Majesty the Report of the Board of Admiralty on the practicability of effecting a landing in force within the Scheldt, between Sandflet and Lillo. Under the sanction of this opinion upon the principal point which had been reserved for investigation, your Majesty's confidential servants, not disengaging from themselves the general difficulties of the enterprise, but deeply impressed with its importance, feel it their duty humbly to recommend to your Majesty that the operation should be undertaken.

Lord Castlereagh would humbly propose to your Majesty that the regiments most remote from the points of embarkation should be immediately put in motion. It is intended to embark at Portsmouth, in the ships of the line, about 17,000 men, a proportion of which force, in order to mark the operation as destined to the westward, will be moved from the Eastern District; and, as the troops from Essex will require fourteen days for their march and embarkation, it is presumed that the embarkation and equipment of the whole force, including ordnance, stores, &c., so far as it depends on tonnage now at home, may be completed within that period, counting from Monday next.

The principal part of the equipment, which depends on the return of ships from foreign service, is the transport of a proportion of the horses. As a fleet was under orders to sail from Lisbon on the 5th of this month, Lord Castlereagh presumes to hope that no delay will ultimately be occasioned by

this deficiency of means, which his utmost exertions have not been able to remove.

*His Majesty's Answer.*

Queen's Palace, June 22, 1809.

The King acquiesces in the proposal of his confidential servants, submitted by Lord Castlereagh, that the operation to the Scheldt should be undertaken, although his Majesty could have wished that the information upon which the practicability has been finally decided had not been so imperfect.

GEORGE R.

*Lord Chatham to Lord Castlereagh.*

Hill Street, Friday evening, June 23, 1809.

My dear Lord—I have been necessarily occupied the whole day with the multiplied details which it has been necessary for me to go into, to put all the arrangements in progress, that I have only been able very cursorily to look over the draft you sent me, and which I should be happy to converse with you upon the first moment in my power. As far as I can form an opinion respecting the instructions, I should say that they are either a great deal too much in detail, as pointing out what it must be hereafter, as I conceive, the duty of the Admiral and General to decide, according to circumstances and information on the spot; or they must be a great deal more precise, and with accurate information on all the points alluded to. The latter part of the instruction opens a very large question, and I should doubt whether the previous arrangements to be made on such a view of the subject would be consistent with the celerity which seemed to be thought so essential towards the execution of a service, in itself deemed one of great splendour and importance.

Upon looking over attentively the list of the regiments destined for the expedition, I fear the whole will not amount to any thing like the number you stated; and, as the oph-

thalmia is appearing again in two or three corps, the defalcation may be still greater.

I understand there is no reason to suppose that the corps under orders from Ireland for Portugal can have yet sailed, and possibly the regiments from Jersey and Guernsey may not also have sailed; in which case it certainly appears essential to me that their destination should be changed, in order to make up the number you had allotted for the proposed operation.

Believe me, &c., CHATHAM.

*Lord Castlereagh to the King.*

St. James's Square, July 15, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh, in submitting to your Majesty the accompanying Instructions and Minutes of Cabinet, begs leave humbly to acquaint your Majesty that it is hoped the force embarking at Portsmouth will be enabled to sail on Tuesday next, and that the armament which is to assemble in the Downs will be collected and in readiness to proceed by the time the fleet from Portsmouth arrives. The remainder of the cavalry transports have arrived from Lisbon, and, being complete in forage, were enabled to proceed on to Ramsgate, without the delay of coming into harbour at Portsmouth. The number of sail, when the whole is assembled, will amount, as nearly as can be calculated, to 616, of which 352 will be transports, and 264 ships of war.

Having completed, as far as depends on him, all the arrangements in town, Lord Castlereagh proposes, with your Majesty's permission, to absent himself for a few days, with a view of meeting Lord Chatham on the coast, and of accelerating, as much as possible, the departure of the expedition.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, July 16, 1809.

My Lord—As it appears not improbable that the service upon which your lordship is proceeding may be greatly facili-

tated by your having the means of making pecuniary advances of a secret nature, your lordship will consider yourself as possessed of a discretionary power to order advances of this nature, or to enter into engagements for services to be performed, which you may think material to your success.

Of any disbursements or engagements of this kind which your lordship may judge it prudent to make, your lordship will keep a separate account; as it will be necessary that whatever sums are expended under this head should be discharged before the auditors, by your lordship taking an oath that they have been disbursed for secret service.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, July 16, 1809.

My Lord—The King having, by his Royal Commission, appointed your lordship to be commander of his forces in the conjoint expedition which his Majesty has determined to send to the Scheldt, and his Majesty having, by his Royal Instructions, signified to your lordship his pleasure with respect to the objects and execution thereof, I am, in obedience to his Majesty's command, to enclose to you all such statements and particulars of intelligence in any degree connected with the proposed service, which are to be found among the Records of this office, or which I have been enabled otherwise to procure. I also transmit a statement of the amount of force, both naval and military, which has been ordered to proceed on this conjoint expedition.

I am commanded to state to your lordship that his Majesty feels assured that his army and navy will vie with each other in giving effect to an enterprise than which none has been confided of greater importance to their united efforts; and, as the surest means of successfully surmounting every obstacle, his Majesty trusts that the utmost spirit of concert and harmony will prevail throughout the whole of their operations between the respective services.

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*The King's Instructions to the Earl of Chatham.*

George R.—Instructions to our Right Trusty and Right Well-beloved Cousin and Councillor, John Earl of Chatham, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Lieutenant-General of our Forces. Given at St. James's, 16th July, 1809, in the 49th year of our reign.

Whereas we have thought fit to appoint you to command a large division of our forces, which we have directed to be assembled and transported to the Scheldt, in order to attack and destroy the naval force and establishments which the enemy is so rapidly accumulating in that river, in the island of Walcheren, and at Antwerp; you are, therefore, upon the receipt of these our Instructions, to repair, with our said troops, to the above destination, and there to carry into effect the following orders in conjunction with the Commander of our Naval Forces, who shall accompany you in this expedition.

You will consider that this conjoint expedition has for its object the capture or destruction of the enemy's ships either building at Antwerp and Flushing, or afloat in the Scheldt, the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards at Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing, the reduction of the island of Walcheren, and the rendering, if possible, the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships of war.

If the attainment of all the above mentioned objects should be rendered impossible by the enemy collecting in such strength as to render perseverance inconsistent with the security of your army, you are, in that case, to use your utmost endeavours, in concert with the officer commanding the naval forces, to secure as many of the objects as circumstances will permit; and, so soon as the service shall be completed, or such part thereof as is attainable, you will take immediate measures for re-embarking the army, and returning with it to England, leaving a sufficient force to maintain possession of the island of Walcheren, till our further pleasure shall be signified.

During your continuance on this service, you are to send or cause to be sent to Us, through one of our principal Secretaries of State, constant accounts of all that passes, and you are to follow all such orders and directions as We shall send you, either under our Sign Manual, or through one of our principal Secretaries of State.

G. R.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the King.*

Downing Street, July 17, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh begs leave to submit to your Majesty the substance of the Reports this day received from the several points of embarkation, by which your Majesty will perceive that the whole force, with the exception of the cavalry, which is to embark at Ramsgate, will be on board to-night, and that the service has been carried on without any accident occurring hitherto.

Lord Castlereagh humbly submits for your Majesty's consideration the Instructions which have been framed for the guidance of your Majesty's Commanders, with respect to the supply of the army on the proposed service; and he trusts your Majesty will not consider that the rights of war in an enemy's territory have been pushed beyond the necessity of the case, regard being had to the very limited amount of specie that can be sent with the army, and the present unfavourable state of the Exchange with the Continent, which is at the present moment so much depressed, that the Dutch ducat, which is intrinsically worth, and which is issued to the troops at nine shillings and sixpence, costs the Treasury, when purchased by a Bill upon England, thirteen shillings and fourpence.

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*His Majesty's Answer.*

Windsor Castle, July 18, 1809.

The King approves of the Instructions which have been submitted by Lord Castlereagh for the guidance of the military and naval Commanders of the proposed expedition, in regard to

the removal of stores and the supply of the army, as the necessity of the measure is obvious to his Majesty.     GEORGE R.

*Mr. Huskisson to Commissary-General Robinson.*

Treasury Chambers, July 17, 1809.

Sir—There are some points not adverted to in your General Instructions from the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, to which I am now directed by their lordships to call your attention.

As it will probably be necessary for the subsistence of the army, as well as for the forwarding the operations in which the troops may be engaged, to make requisitions, in the enemy's country against which the expedition is intended, for provisions, straw, forage, and probably fuel, also for labour, draught horses, and the means of conveyance both by boats and waggons, or other carriages, which the country may be able to supply, the rule by which you are to govern yourself in making and enforcing the requisitions, subject, however, to be modified by the Commander-in-Chief, is this :

If provisions, or any other articles, are required to be delivered, your requisition should be addressed to the magistrates or other existing civil authorities of the country, specifying the quantities required of each article, and the time and place of delivery ; and all articles so delivered, upon the production of proper receipts and certificates, are to be paid for at such prices as may be notified by you to the magistrates, at the time of your making the requisition, taking especial care that such prices do, in no instance, exceed the current average price of similar articles in the country, prior to the disembarkation of the forces. You will, therefore, use every endeavour to ascertain those prices ; and to prevent any imposition being practised in this respect. In making such requisitions, you will of course take care to apprise the parties to whom they may be addressed that, in case of non-compliance, the military aid will immediately be called in to enforce the delivery of the

articles required ; and that, in the event of your being compelled to resort to it, no payment will be made for such supplies as are withheld until procured by that painful expedient.

With respect to requisitions for labour, or for the use of horses, carriages, or boats, they are, in like manner, to be addressed to the magistrates or civil authorities of the country, specifying the number of labourers, of horses, &c., required, and the time and place at which they are to assemble. But it is to be understood the labourers will be allowed a ration (the same as is issued to the British soldier), for each day they may be detained from home, and that all drivers, boatmen, and others so detained, will be subsisted in like manner, and the horses to be supplied from the public stores with such rations of forage as may be ordered by the Commander-in-Chief, taking care that such ration does not exceed that of the draught horses of the army. The allowances are to be confined to these issues, and no pecuniary compensation, either in the shape of wages, or hire, or for the wear and tear, or loss of tools, horses, harness, &c., while so employed for the service of the army, is to be made to the parties. Of course, you will take especial care not to detain any persons or means of carriage so procured longer, or to take them any further from their homes, than may be absolutely necessary. If, in any instance, you should find it necessary to require of the parties furnishing horses to provide their own forage, you will make them an allowance for the same, not exceeding the price of the ration to which they would otherwise have been entitled.

You are already apprized of the extreme difficulty with which foreign coin can be procured, and that the sum which is now consigned to you for the expenditure does not exceed £125,000, namely, about £60,000 in dollars, and £65,000 in Dutch ducats. This sum, their lordships are aware, would not be sufficient for the ordinary and extraordinary expenses of so large an army for any length of time ; but, as the troops have received their subsistence till the 24th of August, and the Batt

and forage money has been issued here, their lordships trust that no very heavy demands will be made upon the military chest, in the first instance.

As it will, however, be impossible to send any more specie from this country, it will be your duty, as soon as the army has acquired such a footing in the enemy's country as will admit of operations of exchange being attempted, to concert with the Commander-in-Chief the means of raising money by your bills upon their lordships; and, for this purpose, it is also judged necessary that you should be armed with power to make requisitions upon any towns or districts which may fall into our hands. These requisitions are to be made for the delivery at a time and place to be specified, either at once, or by two or more instalments, of such a quantity of specie as, according to the information you may possess, can be raised within such town or district without extreme pressure; and the sum delivered is to be paid for by you in bills upon their lordships, divided into such sums of not less than £100 each, as may suit the convenience of the parties, and to be calculated at the same rate at which the dollars and ducats are to be issued in payment to the army, namely, 4s. 6d. per dollar, and 9s. 6d. the ducat; and, in the event of the payments being made in any other foreign coin, at such rates as may correspond to those prices, upon a comparison of the quantity of fine gold or silver which they may contain respectively.

By this mode of procuring specie, it will be raised, not according to the present course of exchange, which is so extremely disadvantageous to this country, and which would become much more so, if your bills of exchange were sold in the ordinary mode; but upon terms corresponding as nearly as possible with the par of exchange, and precisely with the rates at which the payments are made to the army.

Their lordships trust that, by this course of proceeding, you will be able, from the period you may be enabled to enter upon it, to keep the military chest constantly supplied with a sum

of from £150,000 to £200,000 in specie, without looking to a further aid from this country; and it would certainly be desirable, with a view to any future operations, to procure as much more as can be had without any great pressure upon the towns or districts to which you may apply.

It is of so much importance to economize as much as possible the issues of specie, in the first instance, from the military chest. It will be also deserving of consideration, how far the payments for some of the supplies of provisions, &c., which you may have occasion to call for (when the sum is sufficiently considerable to admit of it) should not be made in bills upon England at the same rate of exchange, instead of being satisfied in specie; you will, therefore, not lose sight of this idea, if it should be practicable, and should meet with the approbation of the Commander-in-Chief.

I am, &c.,

W. HUSKISSON.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, July 18, 1809.

My Lord—I have the honour to enclose herewith, for your lordship's information, a copy of the instructions which have been given by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Strachan, who has been appointed to command the naval part of the expedition to be employed in the execution of the instructions under his Majesty's royal sign manual, transmitted to your lordship in my letter of the 16th instant.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, July, 1809.

My Lord—The importance of checking the naval power which the enemy is so rapidly accumulating in the Scheldt, and of making a powerful diversion in favour of the Austrian arms, at the present moment, has determined his Majesty to direct the efforts of his naval and military forces to that quarter.

The accompanying statement will inform your lordship of the amount of force of the respective services which has been ordered to proceed on this conjoint expedition, the chief military direction of which his Majesty has been graciously pleased to confide to your lordship.

Although the effect that may be expected to be produced on the general scale of the war, by the employment of a large British army of not less than 40,000 men, in a quarter where the enemy has so many and such important interests at stake, has had a principal share in determining his Majesty's Government to undertake the present enterprise, your lordship will consider the operation in question as, in its execution, more immediately directed against the fleet and arsenals of France in the Scheldt.

The complete success of the operation would include the capture or destruction of the whole of the enemy's ships, either building at Antwerp or afloat in the Scheldt, the entire destruction of their yards and arsenals at Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing, and the rendering, if possible, the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships of war.

As the accomplishment of these important objects in their fullest extent must in a great measure depend upon the rapidity with which the enterprise is carried into execution, it has been deemed advisable to appropriate such an amount of force to this service as may enable you, at the same time that you occupy Walcheren and South Beeveland, to advance at once a considerable corps against Antwerp, which may be reinforced so soon as Flushing is invested, if not actually reduced.

As the attainment of the entire of the objects which his Majesty has in view may ultimately be disappointed, should the enemy have the means of assembling in such strength upon Antwerp as to render perseverance on your lordship's part inconsistent with the security of your army, your lordship will, in that case, use your utmost endeavours, in concert with the navy, to secure as many of the objects above pointed out as the circumstances of the moment will permit; and, as the posses-

sion of the island of Walcheren and the port of Flushing may, in themselves, under certain contingencies, be acquisitions of the utmost consequence in the further prosecution of the war, I am to signify to your lordship the King's commands that, in the event of your being obliged to retire from the more advanced positions on the Scheldt, you do maintain the island of Walcheren till his Majesty's further pleasure is signified.

I forbear to enter into any details with respect to the execution of the service with which your lordship is entrusted. These will more correctly suggest themselves to your lordship's military observation on the spot. There is only one case which I deem it necessary to provide for—namely, that of the service in all its parts having been completely effected, and the moment arrived when a decision must be taken whether the army shall descend the Scheldt, or retain some position in advance.

In considering this important question, your lordship is aware that the state of the campaign on the Continent does not, at the present moment, permit his Majesty's Government to contemplate the possibility of commencing operations with a British army from a point so much in advance towards the frontier of France as Antwerp; neither is there any allied force as yet in the field in the north of Germany, of sufficient magnitude, with whom an advance from thence could be combined; nor has it been deemed consistent with the celerity of movement on which the success of the intended attack may depend, to send the army equipped upon a scale which would qualify it to enter immediately upon a campaign.

The expedition must therefore be considered as not, in the first instance, assuming any other character than that of a *coup de main*. While the operation is in progress, other prospects may open themselves, and events occur which may induce his Majesty's Government to extend their views.

The proximity of the scene of action will, it is to be hoped, enable his Majesty's Government to furnish your lordship, in

the progress of the service, with instructions immediately applicable to the circumstances of the moment; but your lordship will consider, in the event of such instructions not reaching you, that it is left throughout to your judgment, according to the movements of the enemy, either to retire the army to Walcheren and South Beeveland, or to maintain a more advanced position, till its ulterior destination can be decided on, with reference to the then state of affairs. Not only on this, but on every point connected with the general conduct of this important service, his Majesty is graciously pleased to confide to your lordship the fullest discretion to act as you may deem most for the honour and advantage of his Majesty's service.

His Majesty feels assured that his army and navy will vie with each other in giving effect to an enterprise, than which none of greater importance has ever been confided to their united efforts; and, as the surest means of successfully surmounting every obstacle, his Majesty trusts the utmost spirit of concert and harmony will prevail, throughout the whole of their operations, between the respective services.

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*.The Earl of Elgin to the Right Hon. Spencer Perceval.*

Piccadilly, July 25, 1809.

Sir—Long residence in the Low Countries and in Holland, at a period when great military movements were carrying on there, and political sentiments universally alive and active—three years and a half's detention in France during this war, in which time the feelings of the country and its Government were frequently discernible on the various operations which England might be able to direct against it—and a good deal of recent communication with officers going on the expedition, place me under the insuperable necessity of submitting the enclosed observations to your consideration.

You will, I am confident, sir, do me the justice to believe that; in doing this, I am actuated by no motive but that anxiety which every Englishman must feel at this conjuncture:

and, if I subscribe my name, it is not with any intention of asking any reply whatever from you, but merely that you may the better appreciate the opinions here offered; and to say that, should you desire any personal communication or further information from me, I shall at all times be most ready to obey your summons.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ELGIN.

Had I been able earlier to conjecture what was the destination of the expedition, my ideas would not have appeared before you in their present very imperfect state; nor should I this morning have put them thus hastily on paper, had not the prevalence of the easterly wind still suggested a hope of some possible utility from them.

London, July 25, 1809.

If the operation of besieging Flushing and Middleburg, and occupying the island of Walcheren, of going up the Scheldt, taking Antwerp, and returning, after the delay necessary in the undertaking, be sanctioned by able military characters in this country—if the difficulties which, in all former wars, were found in acting in that country, from the frequent ferries, narrow paths, numerous small forts, and formidable fortifications, with which it abounds, have been fully weighed by such authorities—if it has been considered not what regular troops spies may report as being now within reach, but what resources Bonaparte has, or may have already collected, what strength of National Guard (which is organized in every department) he can bring, and he certainly can bring them in great numbers, to act in defending the banks and passes of rivers, harassing convoys and detachments, interrupting communications, and obstructing such operations as this expedition must be engaged in—if all the delays which the enemy and the operations themselves will create, all the losses of men by sieges, the diseases to be apprehended from detention in swampy grounds, and the nature of such service, so uncongenial to British soldiers—if

all this has fairly been taken into consideration, then the question remains, what benefit such an operation will promise to the separate interests of Great Britain, or in reference to the present critical conjuncture of Europe.

It is obvious that, as no arsenal existed at Antwerp in the year 1795, if France has established one there, and has already built so many ships there, under all the disadvantages of the war with England, a very short time will suffice for Bonaparte to repair all the damage we can do. If the island of Walcheren were taken, still a great force would be required to maintain it; and, as soon as frost came, the enemy could certainly pour in far more troops than we could withstand. And, considering the importance of his present occupations, is it probable Bonaparte should interrupt them, in any degree, in order to prevent the loss of shipping, of which he has ever shown himself so prodigal, or to prevent our army being locked up in the midst of fortresses, from among which it could not penetrate to reach the great theatre of war?

On the other hand, if Bonaparte, by the battle of Aspern and the defence made by Austria, has found it necessary not only to suspend his operations against Spain, but now to have remained forty days inactive at Vienna, there can be no doubt that he depends for resources of men and money solely on France. Indeed, France, and particularly Paris, it cannot be denied, must at all times be the centre of his power, his influence, and his resources. He himself has, in every instance, directed his attack against the capital of his enemy. Can it, therefore, be doubted that, were the force now prepared under Lord Chatham to land unexpectedly on the coast of France, in a way to menace Paris, the effect against Bonaparte would be, beyond all comparison, more severe than he could dread or feel by any other means.

It is indubitable that the present Government at Paris, if such a British force were landed on the coast, would not and dare not send one livre or one man to Austria or Spain. There

is no force in France at this time at all capable of meeting 40,000 British troops, acting in a body, in the field. Nor does the face of the country, from any part of the coast between Boulogne and Cherbourg, present difficulties such as would prevent such a force, if not from reaching Paris, at least from making such progress in that direction as to dictate terms to it.

On such a service, every description of armed force in England would most cheerfully put themselves at the disposal of Government, amply qualified not only to keep up communications, and in such a way as to enable the army to remain together undivided, but certainly also equal to cope with such National Guards as the drains of the conscription have left in the country of France.

The measures of severity and of precaution which Bonaparte adopts, to ensure the tranquillity of France, where he naturally dreads commotion far more than in any conquered province—his reluctance to put arms in the hands of the inhabitants—his declarations to the Senate, after the last Austrian campaign, when he distinctly asserted that “the landing of 5,000 British troops at that time would have rendered it impossible for him to have fought the battle of Austerlitz”—these are matters of great leading importance: not that any consideration could require or justify a British force at this time espousing any party, or taking any part in the internal politics of the country. But as in every *chef lieu de département* is concentrated the direction of its separate police, revenue, and conscription, so, by the mere movements of the army, the occupation of any *chef lieu* would of itself, and to that extent, totally unhinge that most arbitrary system by which alone Bonaparte is enabled to rule the country, to provide money, and to supply his army with men. In the same way, confusion created in Paris would paralyze all public business throughout his dominions.

Peace with Austria, or even the impression existing in the public mind that an attack on Boulogne may possibly be made after the operation in the Scheldt, would raise up great diffi-

culties in the course of a few weeks ; whereas, at this moment, while the enemy is so fully convinced that another operation is to take place, a sudden attack on the coast of France would afford every possible prospect of success.

The destruction of the flotilla and of the preparations for invading England would be far more humiliating to Buonaparte, and would probably relieve our disposable land force, in a view to the continuation of this war, as much as any attack on the Scheldt. And the influence of such an operation as here suggested, in reference to the general politics of Europe, would be inappreciable, by proving to the world that France is vulnerable from England ; whereby our co-operation would acquire far more value with the continental powers than it could otherwise have, and a necessity be created for France to maintain at all times a great armed force solely for the protection of her extensive coasts.

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*Captain Taylor to Lord Castlereagh.*

Windsor, July 28, 3 P.M. [1809].

My dear Lord—I have had the honour of reading to the King your lordship's letter, dated from Dover last night, and of receiving his Majesty's commands to return you many thanks for the information which it conveys relative to the motions of the armament, and the objects of its first operations, which has proved both interesting and satisfactory to his Majesty, who is persuaded that there has not been any delay which is not attributable to the weather. God grant that wind and weather may continue favourable, and that our anxiety may be soon relieved by the most satisfactory reports !

I have the honour to be, with great regard, &c.,

H. TAYLOR.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the King.*

Dover Castle, July 29, 2 P.M.

Lord Castlereagh begs leave humbly to acquaint your Majesty that Admiral Otway sailed this morning, with the

division of the fleet destined for the attack of the island of Walcheren, from the Downs. Want of pilots for some of his ships prevented his moving, in obedience to his orders from Sir R. Strachan, with the two divisions which sailed yesterday. . The wind is so fair, and the breeze now sufficiently strong to enable the whole force, with the exception of the reserve, under the Earl of Roslyn, to reach the rendezvous before night. The reserve will proceed to-morrow.

Lord Castlereagh submits to your Majesty a statement from the Transport Board of the equipment and force of the expedition, and proposes to return to his duty in town to-morrow morning.

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*Memorandum relative to Mr. Johnson.<sup>1</sup>*

Draft.

[No date; probably July.]

Lord Chatham being of opinion that Mr. Johnson's assistance may be materially useful in carrying into execution the service with which he is entrusted, Lord Castlereagh authorizes him to employ him on the following terms: he is to receive      shillings a day, while employed, and travelling charges at the rate of      per mile.

Mr. Johnson having represented that he has a plan, which he has undertaken to carry into execution in person, by which he conceives Flushing can be taken by a *coup de main*, upon Lord Chatham and Sir R. Strachan certifying that this object has been accomplished by Mr. Johnson's means, he will receive full pay at the above rate, or the value of it, for life. For any other extraordinary service Mr. Johnson may render of less importance, he will receive such reward as his services may appear to Lord Chatham and Sir R. Strachan to merit.

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<sup>1</sup> A noted smuggler, of whose intimate acquaintance with the Dutch coast and enterprising character the Government availed itself in this expedition.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, July 29, 1809.

My Lord—I transmit, for your lordship's information, a variety of papers and documents, according to the annexed schedule, which may be material to assist your lordship's judgment, in carrying his Majesty's commands into execution. They consist—

Firstly, of plans received at different times, and from different naval and military officers, for the reduction of Walcheren, and for an attack on the enemy's naval force and establishments as high as Antwerp.

Secondly, of intelligence received of the number, state, and position of the enemy's naval and military forces, at the times specified, in the vicinity of the Scheldt.

Thirdly, of communications, received from the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief, with reference to the proposed enterprise, in the former of which you will find specified the aid the navy will require from the army in occupying the right bank of the Scheldt as high as Batz, so that the fleet may enter and navigate the Scheldt with security; which aid the navy consider as indispensable, to enable them to carry the army up the river, to land it between Sandfleet and Lillo, and to bring it off when necessary.

Your lordship will observe that the recent alterations made by the enemy in the defences of the island of Walcheren, including those of Flushing, are not described in any of the intelligence latterly received with that precision which could be wished. There is no reason to believe that hitherto the attention of the enemy has been directed either to the construction of any new works upon the river above Walcheren, or to the improvement of those which before existed. Antwerp itself, the forts of Lillo, Liefkenshoeck, and Batz, are described as being, at this moment, as when the British army was in Flanders, in the year 1794, when they were seen by several officers of both services.

Upon a due consideration of the whole of this information, his Majesty's Government have felt it their duty humbly to recommend to his Majesty the adoption of the intended enterprise on the following grounds:—

1. In a confident hope that the difficulties of the attempt (the extent of which they do not disguise from themselves) may be overcome by the skill, perseverance, and bravery of the respective services; and that the whole of the important objects to which the expedition is directed may be successfully accomplished.

2. That, if disappointed in this hope, to its fullest extent, they see strong reason to expect that important services may still be performed, calculated, in their consequences, to add to the security of Great Britain, and to improve our means of prosecuting the war against France; while the defensive efforts by which alone the enemy can succeed, either in circumscribing or defeating the attempt, must be made upon a scale which cannot fail to relieve our allies on the Continent from much of the pressure to which they must otherwise be exposed in their present struggle for independence.

3. That, while the present expedition combines a powerful diversion with the immediate pursuit of objects of the utmost value in themselves, it enables Great Britain to employ a larger proportion of its disposable force against the enemy than it could attempt to do in any other mode, *or in any other direction*; regard being had to the extent of force already employed on foreign service: the present state of the Continent, and the limits necessarily imposed upon the military exertions of this country at the present moment by the state of the exchanges and the scarcity of specie; and, lastly, that, as the naval and military branches of the armament will continue to act together throughout the operation for their mutual support and protection, the safety of neither will be hazarded in a greater degree than the legitimate risks of war in the pursuit of objects of such magnitude will justify.

I have thought it right, in transmitting to your lordship the accompanying papers, thus shortly to recapitulate the views with which the present service is undertaken; fully persuaded that your lordship will realize those important views, as far as the means confided to you and the circumstances of the moment will permit.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, August 8, 1809.

My Lord—I have the satisfaction of acknowledging the receipt of your lordship's despatches of the 2nd and 3rd inst., from Middleburg, which were immediately submitted to the King. His Majesty has commanded me to signify to your lordship his most gracious approbation of the promptitude with which your lordship has commenced, and the vigour with which you have conducted your operations against the enemy. The rapidity with which possession has been acquired of the islands of South Beeveland and Walcheren, with the exception of the fortress of Flushing, is the best proof of the zeal and energy with which the ulterior objects of the expedition will be prosecuted. The honourable testimony borne by your lordship to the enterprise, courage, and discipline, which have marked the conduct of the troops in presence of the enemy, has afforded his Majesty the highest satisfaction.

Your lordship will be pleased to signify to Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote, the general and other officers employed on this occasion under your lordship's personal command, as also to the troops in general, the sense his Majesty entertains of their services, and the confidence his Majesty feels in their future good conduct.

I fulfil, with great personal satisfaction, the duty thus assigned to me, of conveying to your lordship the King's entire approbation of the whole of your proceedings, in the execution of the orders which your lordship has received from his Majesty.

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*The Earl of Chatham to Lord Castlereagh.*

Middleburg, August 11, 1809.

My dear Lord—I shall, by the present conveyance, content myself with writing you a few lines, to offer you my best thanks for your letter, accompanying your despatch of the 8th instant, the contents of which afforded me great satisfaction. I shall not send home your messenger by this opportunity, as I am in constant expectation of the return of some confidential persons sent into Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, and on whose report, if they succeed in the object of their mission, I may be enabled to enter a little into the subject of our future prospects—a point on which you must be naturally anxious to receive information; but, as yet, our intelligence is so vague and unsatisfactory, that any opinion I can now venture to give must be formed on very insufficient grounds.

By an officer, who was taken yesterday, attempting to pass out of Flushing to the opposite shore, it appears (if his account is to be credited), that peace had been signed between Austria and France. Nothing could be collected from him about the state of Flushing, except that the garrison consisted of upwards of 6,000 men, and which account is confirmed by all the deserters who have come in.

With regard to the probable duration of the siege, it is difficult to form any conjecture till after our batteries open on the place, and that their means of resistance are a little more ascertained. The troops, upon the whole, continue healthy, though they have been exposed to the heaviest rain I ever saw.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

CHATHAM.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, August 12, 1809.

My Lord—Your despatches of the 7th and 8th instant have been received, and laid before the King. His Majesty

has observed, with satisfaction, the continued good conduct of the troops, as manifested in the spirit with which the sortie on the part of the enemy, on the evening of the 8th, was repressed by the Brigade under the orders of Major-General Graham. It is much to be regretted that the weather has proved so very unfavourable, more especially to the naval branch of your operations : I trust, however, the last few days may have afforded an opportunity to the fleet effectually to cut off the communication between Cadsand and Flushing, and to make arrangements on the West Scheldt for protecting the movements of the enemy in advance.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, August 12, 1809.

My Lord—I have the honour to transmit to your lordship the copy of a despatch received by Mr. Secretary Canning from Heligoland, announcing the probable arrival of the Duke of Brunswick's corps from the Weser at that island, with the directions which have been given for the ulterior situation of that corps.

Your lordship will make such temporary arrangements with his Serene Highness, should he determine to proceed to Walcheren in person, with respect to his own rank and the services of his troops, as you may deem most for the advantage of his Majesty's service, till a final arrangement can be made on these points ; and I am to signify to your lordship the King's pleasure that this corps should be subsisted by the Paymaster of the Army, according to the rate of pay they are now entitled to receive, till further orders. Colonel Dubourg, the officer who was sent by the Duke of Brunswick to signify his Serene Highness's desire to place himself and his corps under your lordship's orders, has been charged with the communication to his Serene Highness of his Majesty's pleasure on the present occasion.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Downing Street, August 17, 1809.

My dear Lord—I trust I may congratulate you on the fall of Flushing. The arrival of this intelligence through other than official channels was to be expected; and the reports are so numerous and particular, that I cannot doubt the truth of this most important and gratifying fact, which I have ventured to communicate to Windsor, knowing how truly acceptable it will be there, even before I can present it under your hand.

When I inform you that we do not possess the power of sending you from hence a single foreign coin of any sort, and that, in the last extremity, rather than disband the army, that British armies must be sent, you will not be surprised that you should receive peremptory orders to enforce the system agreed upon before you left London. If any comparative indulgence can be shown, perhaps it may be advisable to manage the feelings of Walcheren people most, if we are to keep the island, not by applying a different system, but by making South Beeveland contribute most to the wants of the army. I need not suggest what the impression in England would be if guineas were going out to pay our army abroad; besides, it could not be done without an Order in Council and other proceedings, which would embarrass.

I shall not detain this communication, the speedy reception of which at head-quarters presses.

I hope the weather will treat you better than it has hitherto done. It looks settled.

I am, &amp;c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

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*Mr. Huskisson to Commissary-General Robinson.*

Treasury Chambers, August 17, 1809.

Sir—Your letters from Middleburg, of the 3rd, 8th, and 11th of August, have been received, and laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury.

Upon the receipt of your letter of the 3rd, provisions for 20,000 men, and oats for 3,000 horses for 7 days, were ordered ; and, immediately upon the further requisition contained in your letter of the 8th, a further supply of provisions for 20,000 men for a month (except spirits) was directed to be shipped, and forwarded to you with all possible expedition, as well as a supply of coals.

Your letter of the 11th reached me last night, and the flour you are desirous to have will be ordered by their lordships this morning. With respect to fresh meat for the army, my lords are aware that the supply of so large a body of men, and the presence of a numerous fleet in the Scheldt, must occasion a very great consumption, and that the means of continuing it from the stock of cattle upon Walcheren and the adjacent islands would fail, if the demand, to its present extent at least, were to be continued for any considerable length of time. This, however, my lords trust, is not likely to be the case ; and they therefore hope that, by making proper exertions to compel the people to bring in their cattle for the supply of the army, no serious deficiency is likely to be experienced. It may, however, be deserving of consideration whether it would not be expedient to issue salt provisions to the army (except the sick) two or three days in each week, in order to prevent any serious inconvenience, in the event of the whole of the army being detained longer than it is now expected to be upon this service.

My lords cannot participate in the alarm you seem to feel on the subject of biscuit and salt provisions ; as they find, upon inquiry, that the men-of-war, when they left England, were complete to four months of their complement, and the transports carrying troops to six weeks' full allowance, upon an average, for the number of troops they were calculated to carry, in addition to fifteen days' meat, and thirty days' bread for 40,000 men, on board the victuallers.

Respecting the mode of procuring supplies on the island, and

the prices to be paid for them, which forms the most material subject of your letter, my lords have directed me to refer you to the distinct and positive Instructions contained in my letter of the 17th July, and to express the surprise they cannot but feel at the view you appear to have taken of the subject, when you state, in your letter to Lieut.-Colonel Carey of the 8th instant, that "it appears to you but reasonable that the price should be in proportion to the great demand made upon the inhabitants." My lords were well aware that the inhabitants would endeavour to take advantage of the presence and wants of our army, to raise the price of every article ; and that, independently of this disposition, it would be the natural effect of such an increased consumption ; and it was on this very account you were particularly instructed to "take especial care that the prices to be fixed and paid by you for the supplies furnished should, in no instance, exceed the current average price of similar articles in the country prior to the disembarkation of the forces."

The obvious effect of your proposition would be that the subjects of the King's enemies, instead of being called upon to make any sacrifice for the support of his Majesty's armies forcibly occupying their country, as a hostile territory, would be thereby enabled to enrich themselves at the expense of this country, by obtaining for the supplies furnished by them prices much beyond what they could otherwise procure in any other quarter. The regulations prescribed by their lordships for your guidance in this respect, as well as for the procuring of money, are far more lenient than those observed by the King's enemies in countries occupied by their armies, where requisitions are frequently made for all supplies that are wanted, without any payment at all, and where heavy pecuniary contributions are exacted and levied with the utmost military rigour. And my lords cannot but conceive that the difficulties which you have experienced, or may hereafter experience, must be much aggravated by the departure from their Instructions,

in placing money on account in the hands of the Burgomasters, instead of requiring the delivery of the articles, and making the payment in the manner prescribed in the letter above referred to.

My lords, therefore, direct me to repeat to you their expectation that you will act strictly according to the tenour of your Instructions above referred to, of the 17th of July; and that, without carrying the measures of rigour further than may be necessary for enforcing the delivery of such articles as you may require from the magistrates, you will distinctly apprise them that, in case of any delay or failure, force must be resorted to; and that you will apply to the Commander-in-Chief for the means of exercising such coercion as may be necessary for this purpose. This Instruction you will equally understand to apply to the payment in Bills of Exchange and the procuring of specie, of which no further supply can be sent from hence.

Out of the sum now in hand, or such as you may procure for your Bills, you will, in order to reserve as much as possible for the extraordinaries of the army, furnish the Paymaster with the means of issuing the subsistence to the army for one fortnight only, instead of a month, from the 24th instant; and you will make application to the Commander-in-Chief to cause it to be notified in general orders that the remaining fortnight will be issued at the expiration of the first, so that no interruption may be experienced by the troops in the regular receipt of their pay.

I am, &c.,

WILLIAM HUSKISSON.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, August 21, 1809.

My Lord—Your lordship's despatch of the 16th, entrusted to Major Bradford, was immediately laid before the King. His Majesty has cominanded me to express to your lordship the great satisfaction with which his Majesty received the

intelligence of the surrender of the fortress of Flushing, in consequence of exertions so honourable to those employed on the occasion, and which his Majesty observes with pleasure have not been attended with any serious loss to the army and navy.

It is his Majesty's command that your lordship should signify to Lieut.-General Sir Eyre Coote, the general and other officers and troops employed, (and particularly those of the artillery and engineer departments) his Majesty's gracious approbation of their services, in terminating so honourably an operation which has presented so many occasions of proving their courage, discipline, and skill, in presence of the enemy.

His Majesty rejoices that this serious obstacle to the vigorous prosecution of the ulterior objects of the expedition has thus been seasonably overcome; and his Majesty feels persuaded that those important objects will be followed up without a moment's loss of time, with the same energy, perseverance, and rapidity, which have hitherto distinguished the course of your lordship's operations.

His Majesty has been pleased entirely to approve of the terms granted to the garrison of Flushing, and has observed, with particular pleasure, the powerful effect, as well as the marked cordiality, with which the army and navy have combined their exertions on the present occasion.

I am, &c.,      CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, August 21, 1809.

My Lord—I send for your information intelligence received at the Foreign Office, with respect to notice given by the Austrians of the rupture of the armistice, and also with respect to the chief command of the Austrian army having been given to Prince John of Lichtenstein, the Archduke Charles's resignation having been accepted.

One of these letters, your lordship will observe, is addressed to the General commanding his Majesty's troops on the Continent, and was forwarded to the Elbe under a conception that the late occupation of Cuxhaven had been effected by the advanced guard of your lordship's army.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, August 26, 1809.

My Lord—I have conferred with the Treasury and the Board of Trade upon the internal system it may be most eligible to adopt in the island of Walcheren, with respect to revenue and commerce. In the state of ignorance in which we are at present, with respect to the existing duties and revenues of the island, it appears to those who have considered the subject that the only safe course to pursue will be to continue the collection of all the duties and taxes, as they have hitherto been, until further orders. I have, however, to request that your lordship will cause to be transmitted to me, with as little delay as possible, a tariff of those duties and internal taxes, with the best account that can be stated of their ordinary produce, and the manner in which they have been appropriated. Your lordship will continue their collection, so far as there may be no objection to the individuals, in the hands of the officers appointed by the Dutch Government; removing, however, any that may have been appointed by the French Government. You will also appoint some competent person to examine the accounts and superintend the collection of the revenue, until proper persons can be sent from hence.

Your lordship will also give directions not to permit any vessels (ships of war and vessels in his Majesty's service excepted) to enter at or clear out from any port of the island of Walcheren, unless such vessel shall be furnished with a proper licence from his Majesty's Secretary of State, or from the

Commanders-in-Chief of his Majesty's sea and land forces, except such vessels as may enter from some of the islands in the Scheldt occupied by his Majesty's forces, or shall clear out for the same.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Downing Street, August 29, 1809.

My Lord—Your despatch of the 20th instant has been received and laid before the King. The several capitulations entered into by your lordship's authority since the arrival of the British force in the Scheldt, together with the Instructions from the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to the Commissary-General, of the 17th July, having been referred to the King's Advocate, a copy of his Report is herewith enclosed.

Upon the grounds therein stated, your lordship will perceive that, in the opinion of the King's Advocate, the good faith of the British army is not pledged to abstain from making any such requisitions as the exigency of the service may require; that the principle upon which your lordship's Instructions were prepared is, in no respect, varied by the capitulations entered into; and that the engagement therein contracted is only to be understood as assuring to the inhabitants that their property shall neither be given up to be plundered by the troops, nor confiscated as booty to the captors.

Were the import and obligation of the Article above referred to different from what is here represented, the effect of it, so understood, would be at once to supersede the entire system, which had been discussed and settled in full conference with your lordship, previously to your leaving England, for the guidance of the Commissary-General, and which was determined on, not only as justifiable in principle, but as indispensable, in the present scarcity of specie, to the progress of the public service. If such had been its obvious import and construction, his Majesty's Government, when they received it,

would not have been prepared to express at once the unqualified approbation they did of the Agreement entered into by your lordship ; nor do they conceive that your lordship would have transmitted home such an instrument without some explanation of the grounds on which you had been induced to forego so extensively the right of carrying the Instructions you had received into effect, at the risk, possibly, of placing yourself and the army under your command in a situation of serious pecuniary embarrassment ; for, although your lordship had stated your objection only to the particular requisition of money, if the principle upon which that objection rests is of right established by the Article referred to, it must be conclusive against the system generally ; and the inhabitants of the respective islands might, under such a construction, equally claim a protection for their provisions, for their cattle, and their labour, against any system of requisition, by which they were required for the use of the army, without their consent, at an arbitrary, and, as they might contend, an inadequate indemnity, imposed upon them, in breach of their capitulations.

Had your lordship's objections been directed to any particular regulation in those Instructions, which appeared to you to press with unnecessary severity upon the inhabitants, or to throw upon your lordship greater difficulty in their execution than was inseparable from the nature of the service, there would have been, as there is, every disposition to consider, and, as far as possible, to comply with any suggestion of this nature. But, as the whole of your lordship's reasoning is directed to the principle of the Instructions, I am only enabled to acquaint you that his Majesty's Government does not consider that any sufficient reasons have been adduced to determine them to recall those Instructions.

The Treasury has been enabled to make a purchase of about £40,000 in dollars since I wrote last, which will be forwarded immediately for the use of your army.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, August 29, 1809.

My dear Lord—I am sorry it has not been in my power to reply to your letter sooner; but, when I brought it under the consideration of the Cabinet, they deemed the representation received from you to be of too great importance to decide on without the King's Advocate's advice, which has necessarily occasioned some delay.

In considering any possible modification of the original Instructions, which could give facility to their execution, the only one that has occurred as admissible is that, instead of the bills to be given in payment for deliveries of the army, either in produce or *money*, being issued at par, the average discount with the Continent at the commencement of your operations, which, by the exchange of Hamburg and Amsterdam, I believe, at the moment, amounted to 12 or 14 per cent., should be allowed.

If the Cabinet had been induced to suppose that, in your lordship's judgment, a modification of the original orders to this extent would have been productive of facilities in conducting the supply and payment of the army, I have no doubt they would have willingly adopted it; but, if no such convenience is likely to result from the alteration, not being prepared to recede from the general principle, it did not appear to them that any advantage would arise from bringing forward such a proposition.

The same considerations which induced them to be of opinion that, without involving the country in a ruinous and an unreasonable expense, it was impossible to leave the price of articles supplied for the army to the market rate of the day, or rather to the discretion of the proprietors, render it impossible, in their judgment, to leave the value of the bills to be regulated according to the current exchange within the islands now occupied by our troops, which would soon lead to an extent of depreciation that must deprive them of nearly all

value. If, then, a rate is to be fixed, the only standard which is not only arbitrary, is either the nominal value of the paper, (an arrangement not very harsh towards hostile islands, which have now the means of opening a direct intercourse with England, and, of course, of using that paper in purchasing British or colonial produce at its full value) or of our issuing it at its standard value on the Continent, *before* that value was *disturbed* by our arrival in Zealand, and to which it will, no doubt, soon return, at latest, whenever our operations are terminated. Between these two alternatives, the consideration of saving the discount at the expense of the inhabitants is not a motive which would induce an adherence to the former arrangement, if any material advantage was likely to result from the substitution of the latter; but the Cabinet are of opinion that the only medium which we possess at present for carrying on the public service, namely, bills upon the Treasury (for, to the sending guineas, objections increase the more the subject is considered), *must be forced* into circulation at an equitable value; and that, in deciding what the value shall be, it must not be left to the fraud or to the caprice of so confined a market as that in which its rate would be otherwise regulated; but that it must be ascertained and declared by the authority representing the State.

The small supply of silver which has been procured at an extraordinarily high price here, and which is the only foreign coin at any price now in the market, is too limited to exonerate us from the necessity of using any possible expedient to confine its application exclusively to the subsistence of the troops. We are not insensible to the real practical difficulty which your lordship may experience, in compelling the inhabitants of districts where the amount of cash may not greatly exceed the daily circulation, and where even the excess may be denied to exist, to pay in through the magistracy any considerable sum, receiving in exchange what may not in itself be an entire equivalent; but, upon the success of such an operation much

may depend, as we cannot expect, for some time to come, any arrival from Vera Cruz; and certainly the difference between the value of the specie and the bills given for it, considered as a contribution, cannot be deemed a very onerous one, when, in the usual course of warfare, the whole might be extorted without any recompence at all. In the payment of all other supplies, and which, being of a more tangible and visible description, are more easily made amenable to your orders, I should hope no difficulty can arise in rendering this system of payment available.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Chatham to Lord Castlereagh.*

Batz, August 29, 1809.

My dear Lord—I have only time to offer my best acknowledgments for your very kind letter on the subject of Major Bradford; and indeed I am not aware that I have any thing to add for your information beyond what my public despatch contains. I am sorry to say that I receive every hour the most alarming accounts of the progress of sickness among the troops. This island is by far the most unhealthy, and so much so, that even such of the natives as can leave it at this season of the year.

A large force must remain at Walcheren, in the first instance, at least—I think not less than from 12,000 to 15,000 men. Our general officers drop off fast: we have no less than four incapable of duty, besides Frazer, who is gone home. I am hitherto very well.

Believe me, &c.,

CHATHAM.

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*Commissary-General Robinson to Lord Chatham.*

August 29, 1809.

My Lord—I am honoured with your lordship's letter of the 28th inst., enclosing the copy of Instructions to the Commissary-General of the British forces in Holland, of the 17th of

July, with copies of certain capitulations of Middleburg of the 31st of July, of the fortress of Veer of the 1st of August, of the fortress of Ramakins of the 3rd of August, and of the towns of Zerickzee and Brower's Haven, and the islands of Scowen and Driveland, of the 15th of August, and of the town and fortress of Flushing of the 16th of August instant; and directing that I would take the same into consideration, and report to your lordship my opinion whether, after these capitulations, and particularly adverting to the second Article in the capitulation of Middleburg, and the corresponding articles in the other capitulations, the Commander of his Majesty's forces is justified in requiring the delivery of cattle, forage, and other necessaries, for the subsistence and moving of the army, upon the terms prescribed in the said letter; or whether he must be bound to enter into such terms of contract as the parties possessing the articles required may demand; 2ndly, whether, after those terms of capitulation, adverting to the said Articles in the capitulations, the Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's forces is justified in requiring a contribution of money from the inhabitants comprehended within the capitulation, upon the terms specified in the said letter; and, lastly, whether such instructions were originally justifiable by the laws of war, or whether they are in any respect rendered unjustifiable by the terms upon which the islands have now been occupied by the army, in its progress to its ulterior objects.

In obedience to your lordship's directions, I have considered the same with the attention which so important a question requires, and I have the honour to report that the right of a belligerent over the property of his enemy *is absolute in principle, and almost co-extensive with his power*; and, although the practice of modern warfare abstains, in many instances, from the exercise of this extreme *right*, the principle in itself is never to be put out of sight, as the basis of the reasoning which must ultimately decide on pretensions advanced to

restrain the right of conquest, and to entitle the conquered country to particular exemptions.

On this principle, connected with the necessities *inseparably incident* to military operations in an enemy's country, the practice of exacting contributions of particular articles and of particular *services* is considered by public writers rather as a mitigation of an acknowledged right, than as admitting of doubt as to the legality of the measure. The time when this right can only be enforced with regularity and order is when the country is so far reduced and subdued, as to justify the *public functionaries* in rendering this submission and service to their enemy.

The description which Vattel gives to the situation of such a country is in these terms : “ Pourvu que les habitans se soumettent à *celui* qui est *maitre* du pays, qu'ils payent les contributions imposées, et qu'ils s'abstiennent de toute hostilité, ils vivent en sûreté, comme s'ils étoient amis ; *ils conservent même ce qui leur appartient.*” (Liv. iii., c. 8, § 147.) It is a right, therefore, which is not superseded by general submission, nor is inconsistent with the privileges of personal protection and security of property.

On these grounds, I am of opinion that the Instructions were originally justifiable by the *laws of war*, and that they will continue to be so, unless something special has intervened to alter the relative *situations* and rights of the parties.

The demands of the British army would remain, it may be presumed, as before, so long as the chief object of the expedition was yet in prosecution. The parts subdued could not by possibility be relieved from the pressure of *military* operations, in the same manner as a detached *settlement* or colony might be, where, when the object of attack is attained, further operations, and the *necessities and burdens* arising from them, immediately cease. Here, on the contrary, it was matter of necessity that ulterior operations must proceed, or the object of the expedition be altogether abandoned. His Majesty's forces con-

tinued in that state of public exigency which must either justify the continuance of corresponding rights and powers, for the purposes of present support and defence, or must give merchants of the country exorbitant advantages for no public purpose whatever, but merely *lucrandi causâ*, if it can be held that they have a right to exercise an unlimited power over the markets, so as to make the urgency of the demand the measure of the prices of articles rendered indispensable, and consequently so advanced in price only in consequence of such operations. Under this alternative, an advantage so important would not reasonably be supposed to be granted away by capitulation, unless the terms were special, and express to that effect.

On examining the several capitulations, it does not appear that they are of that import. The second Article of the capitulation of Middleburg, to which reference is principally made, grants "*protection* to property, as far as relates to private property;" but it is material to observe in what view that is granted, viz., in contradistinction to *confiscation*, as explained by a reference to the corresponding proposal, "that *all property should be protected, without exception whatever.*" To which the answer is, that "all public property shall be confiscated, but *private property shall not.*"

It would carry such a concession, I conceive, further than would be warranted by the situation of the parties, or by their own conceptions, to interpret this answer so as to exempt these military stations, so surrendering, from the conditions ordinarily belonging to *non-combatants*, reduced to a peaceable submission to the enemy.

The immediate object may more naturally be conceived to be to exempt the property of those in arms from *special* confiscation, but not from ulterior demands, in the nature of pre-emption at a reasonable price, as is expressed with regard to particular articles in the sixth clause of the *Treaty of Flushing*, which stipulates that "the British Government shall be at

liberty to make use of military stores belonging to individuals, on paying a just remuneration to the proprietors."

This clause seems to describe accurately the different rights intended to be exercised over public and private property. For, in times of particular exigency, one article would not be more an article of military use than *another*, so as to make it subject to different laws affecting the right of property. Under particular circumstances, articles of general use, such as provisions and money, may be included in the technical description of articles of military use, as applied to contraband; and, by the same reasoning, being equally or more essential to the success and self-defence of an advancing army, they seem not to admit of any distinction arising from the nature and quality of the thing.

On these grounds, I humbly submit it to your lordship as my opinion, that the right assumed is one which has always been held to accompany the necessities of military operations in an enemy's country; that the Commander, or rather his Government, is the sole judge of that necessity; that it is a right not considered as opposed to *personal protection* and security of *property*, but as the price and equivalent by which they are purchased; that the Instructions were therefore originally justified by the laws of war, and continue so to be, notwithstanding the surrender of particular fortresses, and the capitulations which have taken place; that, as a measure of present relief, the Commander of his Majesty's forces is justified in requiring the delivery of cattle, forage, and other necessaries, for the subsistence and moving of the army, upon the terms prescribed in the Instructions; and that he is not bound to enter into such terms of contract as the parties possessing the articles required may demand; and it appears to me that the same principle applies to *money* as to other articles of indispensable necessity on such occasions.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

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C. H. ROBINSON.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, August 29, 1809.

My dear Lord—As it will be desirable that an early decision should be come to on the practicability and expediency of retaining the island of Walcheren, I shall be anxious to receive from you such information as may enable me to bring this important question before the King's servants : in which you would naturally include a statement of the revenues and expenses of the island ; the amount of garrison you consider competent to its defence ; and the means of procuring covering for that garrison ; also, some estimate of the expense of repairing or improving the defences of the island.

It is the opinion here that, between the Engineer and Quartermaster-General's department, a survey of the proposed barrack arrangement could be made fully better than by any person the Barrack department could send over. Barracks out of England not being within their province to superintend, they would be unwilling to charge themselves with the arrangement. I understand that Middleburg affords extensive buildings, both private and public, which could easily be converted into barracks. It will be an object to avoid the necessity of erecting any new buildings, if possible ; and, when some sketch of the plan and expense is prepared, it is desirable it should distinguish what additional artificers beyond those the army can supply, as also what materials, will be required hence.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the King.*

Downing Street, September 2, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh having brought the despatch of the Earl of Chatham under the consideration of your Majesty's confidential servants, it has appeared to them that, under the circumstances stated, it only remains for them humbly to recommend to your Majesty that the army, with the exception of the force requisite for the security of Walcheren, should be ordered to return to England. They have not deemed it

advisable, under the circumstances stated, with respect to the health of the troops, to suggest any further operations in that quarter, beyond those contained in your Majesty's original Instructions, as the enemy's naval force in the Meuse does not appear to them of sufficient magnitude to justify them in recommending protracted operations at this season in an unhealthy climate, for the chance of effecting their destruction.

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*His Majesty's Answer.*

Windsor Castle, September 3, 1809.

The King entirely concurs in the opinion of his confidential servants, which Lord Castlereagh has submitted for his Majesty's approbation, and sanctions the Instructions prepared in conformity to it for Lord Chatham.

GEORGE R.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft.

Downing Street, September 2, 1809.

My Lord—Your lordship's despatch of the 29th, from Batz, has been received and laid before the King. Under the opinion stated by your lordship that the ulterior objects of the expedition (so far as relates to operations against Antwerp and the enemy's fleet) are no longer practicable, in which opinion the Lieutenant-Generals of the army appear unanimously to have concurred, I have only to convey to your lordship the King's command that, after providing effectually for the security of Walcheren, you do return, with the remainder of your army, to England. I am to express, however, to your lordship his Majesty's confident persuasion that, previous to your return, and in conformity to your Instructions, your lordship will co-operate with the navy, in giving effect to any measures Sir R. Strachan may think fit to adopt for obstructing the navigation of the Scheldt; and that your lordship will also confer with that officer upon the practicability of destroying any works the enemy may have constructed at Terneuse, should they be found of sufficient importance to justify the undertaking.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft. Downing Street, September 2, 1809.

My Lord—The order transmitted for the return of the army, with the exception of the force requisite for the defence of Walcheren, makes it desirable that I should receive from your lordship a full Report of the state and defences of that island, without loss of time, for the consideration of his Majesty's Ministers; also with respect to the amount of force that may be requisite to defend it, and the expense which it may be necessary to incur for covering the troops and repairing the works.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft. Downing Street, September 3, 1809.

My Lord—I am to acquaint your lordship that the Lords of the Committee of Trade have prepared an Order, to be submitted to his Majesty in Council on Wednesday next, by which no vessel shall be permitted to import into and export from the island of Walcheren, except British vessels under his Majesty's licence, and vessels (French excepted) proceeding from or bound to any port between the Swyn and the Meuse, under licences granted by the Commander-in-Chief of the island of Walcheren.

A copy of this Order will be transmitted as soon as it shall have received his Majesty's approbation. In the mean time, your Lordship will cause the regulation to be adopted.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.*

Draft. Downing Street, September 3, 1809.

My Lord—I have received his Majesty's command to signify to your lordship his Majesty's gracious permission to return to England with the troops ordered home, or so soon after as your lordship may have completed at Walcheren the arrangements which the public service may appear to you to require.

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*The Earl of Chatham to Lord Castlereagh.*

Middleburg, September 8, 1809.

My dear Lord—I received your letter (marked private) in which you state the reasons which have induced his Majesty's Ministers not to instruct me to undertake any operation against either Williamstadt or Helvoet. The intelligence which I had received seems to be very much the same as that to which you refer, except that it makes *two* old ships at Helvoet, and states that the *three* serviceable ones which had been some time ago at Helvoet had gone to some other port of Holland. In this state of things, there did not appear to me to be much temptation; nor, in our actual situation, was there any favourable opening for such enterprise. Had it appeared to me that, from this or any other attempt, under the present circumstances, any advantage could have been derived to his Majesty's service, I should not have failed to have communicated the same to you, and asked his Majesty's commands thereupon.

Believe me, &amp;c., CHATHAM.

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*Mr. George Harrison to Commissary-General Robinson.*

Treasury Chambers, September 15, 1809.

Sir—Having laid before the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury your letter of the 13th instant, enclosing, by direction of Lord Castlereagh, extracts from a despatch from the Earl of Chatham, and also a memorandum by Lieutenant-General Brownrigg upon the subject of providing barrack accommodation for the troops in the island of Walcheren, I am commanded by their lordships to acquaint you, for the information of Lord Castlereagh, that they have directed the Commissary of Barracks to send over to that island, with the least possible delay, an Assistant Inspector-General of Barracks and three other persons of intelligence, and conversant in the whole duty of a Barrack-master, for the purpose of setting on foot and establishing at the barracks in that island, as far as the same can be done, the King's regulations for the

management of barracks here, and of instructing such persons as may be appointed by the officer commanding his Majesty's forces there to superintend the barracks and buildings used as barracks, in the duty of a Barrack-master, as regulated in the Barrack department here, and also to instruct the said Assistant Inspector-General and three other persons to report themselves to the officer commanding his Majesty's forces in the island of Walcheren, immediately upon their arrival there, and to report to their Board, from time to time, fully the state and condition of the barracks, and also the arrangements adopted for the conduct and management of the Barrack service there, for the information of their lordships; and I am to request, as the service of the Barrack department in this country will sustain considerable inconvenience from the absence from their duties here of the several officers sent on this service, that you will move Lord Castlereagh to instruct the officer commanding his Majesty's forces in the island of Walcheren to appoint proper persons to superintend the barracks there, who may relieve the persons sent from this country as soon as they shall be sufficiently instructed in their duties.

And I am further to acquaint you that my lords are of opinion that the expenses attending the superintendence of the Barrack service in the island of Walcheren should, from time to time, be defrayed as an extraordinary service, under the warrant of the officer commanding the forces there.

I am, &c., GEORGE HARRISON.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Sir Eyre Coote.*

Draft.

Downing Street, September 18, 1809.

Sir—I have received your letter of the 12th instant, enclosing to me an application from the Mayor and Councillors of Flushing to Lieut.-Colonel Mosheim, on the subject of the distress under which the town laboured, and desiring to be furnished with instructions respecting the points contained therein. The chief subjects of their application are three: 1st,

as to the laws and form of police under which the town is to be managed ; 2nd, as to the method of obtaining funds for the support of their police ; 3rd, as to the receiving advances from the British Government for the maintenance of their public establishments and the repair of their buildings.

It is not possible for his Majesty's Government at present to make any final decision respecting the town and territory of Flushing. I am therefore to authorize you to adopt such a system of regulations as the respectable inhabitants and authorities of Flushing shall advise and you approve. Whether they shall prefer to remain under the French regulations, for the present, or to adopt the Dutch system, now in operation in other parts of the island, the decision may be left to their own judgment, provided the law, as to property, be not altered ; and, in regard to appeal in such cases where appeal is necessary, the appeal may lie, if no objection appears to you, to the superior tribunals of Middleburg.

In regard to finance, the presence of the garrison and of his Majesty's squadron in the Scheldt must, doubtless, produce that circulation of trade which will be sufficient to enable the municipal authorities of the town, which shall be put into activity by your direction, to levy sufficient contributions for the support of the magistracy and police.

In regard to issuing advances for the support of the establishments, and the repair of the buildings of Flushing, his Majesty's Government does not consider itself obliged to acquiesce in that measure, under existing circumstances.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the King.*

Draft.

September 19, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh, having used his best endeavours to inform himself, from the Earl of Chatham and other officers lately returned from the Scheldt, of the actual situation of your Majesty's troops in the island of Walcheren, and of the circumstances connected with the occupation of that island, deems

it his duty humbly to represent to your Majesty that an early decision upon the expediency and practicability of keeping that island does appear to him to be of essential importance to your Majesty's service.

In the very peculiar situation Lord Castlereagh at present stands in your Majesty's Councils (the nature and extent of which was wholly unknown to Lord Castlereagh when he last presumed to address your Majesty on that subject), your Majesty will be graciously pleased to consider how very incompetent he must feel himself to form and submit, for the consideration of your Majesty's confidential servants, an opinion upon a question of so much importance, and upon which it is so desirable that those who may be entrusted prospectively with the conduct of your Majesty's affairs may find themselves in a situation to exercise an unfettered judgment.

Lord Castlereagh humbly begs leave to assure your Majesty that he will continue to employ his most diligent endeavours to provide for the health and comfort of the troops.

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*Cabinet Memorandum relative to Sickness at Walcheren.*

[Without date.]

Lord Castlereagh regrets to have to bring before his Majesty's Servants the accompanying Report of the increase of sickness among the troops in Walcheren. As Lord Chatham may be hourly expected, he has delayed till his arrival assembling the Cabinet on this unpleasant subject. Lord Castlereagh has called for an official explanation from the Commander-in-Chief of the delay which has attended the execution of his orders with respect to sending out an increased proportion of Medical Staff, &c., which were pressed in the most earnest manner.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. Spencer Perceval.*

Downing Street, September 28, 1809.

Dear Sir—As the enclosed correspondence arose out of transactions immediately affecting the Government, and as I

found myself obliged, in the performance of a painful duty to my own character, to allude to the conduct of certain members of the Government, I do not feel that I can in propriety withhold from you or from them a knowledge of the sentiments I have expressed. I therefore take the liberty of transmitting to you the letters which have passed between Mr. Canning and myself. I leave it to your discretion to make such use of them as you may think right; requesting only that they may be returned to me without any copy being taken.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. Spencer Perceval.*

Downing Street, September 23, 1809.

Dear Sir—I understand from Mr. Cooke that you have summoned a Cabinet for to-day, on the despatches from Walcheren. If the object of your deliberations is to determine on the expediency of maintaining or evacuating that island, the enclosed note to his Majesty, and his Majesty's answer, will explain to the Cabinet the grounds on which I decline attending, unless they should be of opinion that any information I may possess can assist their deliberations on this important subject.

If it is only intended to consider what measures it may be most advisable to adopt, with a view to the better carrying on the public service in Walcheren, I shall, in that case, feel it my duty to attend, and to execute any measures which may be determined upon for that purpose.

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*The Right Hon. Spencer Perceval to Lord Castlereagh.*

Downing Street, September 23, 1809.

My dear Lord—I desired a Cabinet might be summoned to-day, immediately on the impression made upon my mind by the despatches received yesterday. The only immediately practicable object undoubtedly is the providing for the army there at present. Whatever mention may incidentally occur as to maintaining the island, nothing can, as I apprehend, come

on for decision upon that point; I hope, therefore, you will feel no objection to attending it. I am but this minute come into my house, and found your letter. I hope this answer to it will reach you in time.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very truly,

SPENCER PERCEVAL.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Sir Eyre Coote.*

Draft.

Downing Street, September 24, 1809.

Sir—I have received and laid before the King your despatch of the 17th instant, brought by Captain Worsley, respecting the sickness, which seems increasing among the troops under your command.

Your first representation did not fail to excite the most immediate exertions for alleviating the calamity by which the army was visited. You are already in possession of the orders which were at first given upon the subject; and I now enclose to you a Report of the measures which have been taken here, and also a copy of the letter which I yesterday addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, the directions of which you will follow, likewise a return of the transport tonnage, which either remains at Flushing, or has been ordered thither.

When you consider the number of medical assistants already sent to Walcheren, and reflect upon the previous necessity of succouring the demands for aid to the wounded in Spain, you must feel how extensively difficult, if not impossible, it must be to provide an adequate and immediate supply for a calamity so sudden and so extensive. Every possible exertion has been made, and will continue to be made, for the relief of the troops, and I have no doubt that you will not fail to call in the aid of every assistance which can be procured from the resources of the island for their comfort.

That part of your despatch which relates to the decreasing state of security of the island from an hostile attack is under consideration.

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*Mr. Henry Vernon to Lord Castlereagh.*

Wentworth Castle, Barnsley, Thursday, February 1, 1810.

My dear Lord—Finding that your lordship has been attacked in the House of Commons for the expedition against Walcheren, which has long been in my mind a necessary place for attack, I have made it a point to learn how far I was right in my conjecture. General Pigot, who is my brother-in-law, commands at Litchfield; by such means I got a long interview with General Monnet at Litchfield last December. He was at that time much afflicted with his situation, having been condemned without a hearing or a hope; and a son, twelve years of age, whom he doted on, in France; and his property confiscated. General Monnet told me, in plain terms, what the real situation of Flushing and Walcheren was; that if the British troops had immediately attacked Antwerp, they must have succeeded in taking that place, and in the destruction of the French fleet. They sent him, he said, to Flushing 3,000 men from Antwerp of such troops as they had, the same as his garrison was composed of, men of all nations, who would not obey his orders, and who had fired on him and his officers.

He told me that men of the city of Antwerp, and all the neighbourhood, they collected from report, might have amounted to 35,000 men; that was the most: few, if any of them, had seen service, and they had no officers to command them. He said Lord Chatham had been led by his spies into error as to their discipline, number, and strength; for he might, at any time, from the appearance of our fleet on the coast to the hour of his departure from Flushing, have taken Antwerp.

I feel sensibly for your lordship's situation, which is the most honourable in my sight. I am a man retired from the world; but, if I can be of any service to your lordship, prove it in the most agreeable manner by laying your commands on me. I can at all times see General Monnet; Litchfield is but seventy miles from this place; and, in so just and honourable a cause as your support, I will do every thing in my power to

bring facts to light. Monnet's evidence will be clear and beyond all dispute with your lordship.

General Grosvenor was at Litchfield a few days before I had my interview with General Monnet, and was misinformed as to Monnet's representations. Let Lord Chatham call for the testimony of that General, and you will be made sensible of my good wishes for the public good and your welfare. No soul living shall ever know from me that I have wrote to your lordship on this subject, unless you think proper to make me useful to you; in such case, I would attend night or day, to be any use to you.

HENRY VERNON.

*Memorandum from the Surgeon-General's Office, relative to the Supply of Medicines for Walcheren.*

Surgeon-General's Office, February 12, 1810.

The only returns received by the Surgeon-General from the Apothecary, who had charge of the medicines at Walcheren, are a General Return of all Medicines, received and issued from the commencement of the expedition to the 19th of November; and a separate Statement of Receipts and Issues of Bark only. By the first Return the quantity originally supplied and received by the Apothecary is stated to be

	lb	lb	lb
Of common bark . . . .	1,840		
Yellow ditto . . . .	140		
	<hr/>		
	1,980		
In this he does not include bark received in 13 spare regimental chests . . . .	260		
Do. in 36 spare detachment do. . . .	144		
	<hr/>		
Total of original supply . . . .	404		
Add bark sent from Harwich by Diana Packet, 13th September, and received 17th . . . .	2,384		
	<hr/>		
Total	2,70		
	<hr/>		
Total	2,654		

No return has been received, which can show the exact consumption up to any given date prior to the 19th November, 1809; but we know, by a letter from the Apothecary (Mr. Newton) to Deputy Inspector Burrows, dated Veere, 22nd September, 1809, that he had then *in store* 500lb of bark, which he considered as a fortnight's consumption. By this, Mr. Newton means in dépôt at Veere, from whence he issued medicines to other stations. There was another store at Middleburg, and one at Flushing, the quantities in each of which at that period we know not.

We have another memorandum, that the Apothecary had in store, on the 28th of September, 407lb of bark, although Deputy Inspector Burrows, in his letter to Sir Eyre Coote of the 29th of September, states that on that day there were only 300lb.

On the following day, 30th September, we know that the apothecary received from the purveyor 400lb.

That five days afterwards he received also from the purveyor 1,060lb.

That in six days afterwards, on the 11th of October, there arrived by King George Packet 800lb.

And four days afterwards, on the 15th, by the Ann Transport, which had been ordered on the 18th September, 1,000lb.

A want of bark was, therefore, wholly impossible, unless 407lb could have been consumed in one day (the 29th), and we know that 440lb is the largest quantity ever issued from the dépôt in any one week, and that the greatest average daily consumption was about 80lb. We know also, by the foregoing statement, that the lowest quantity to which the store was ever reduced, after providing for the current consumption, was 300lb, with the means of increase existing to any amount. That there was in effect no want, may be testified by every medical officer who was at Walcheren.

The total consumption of bark, to the 19th No-	lb
vember, is stated, by the above-named Return,	
to have amounted to . . . . .	3,132

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The total original Supply was . . . . .	2,654
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The consumption, therefore, exceeded the original Supply by only . . . . . 478

Ample means for meeting which were received from England in the early part of October, as above stated.

As the apothecary's Return here alluded to does not account for the consumption of the 1,460lb of bark purchased at Middleburg, I have not noticed that quantity as part of the means ; but, allowing the whole to have been consumed, it leaves the same balance of 478lb to be provided for before the 19th November.

The delay in the arrival of the 1,000lb of bark, ordered on the 18th September—a delay certainly not attributable to the Medical department, (which has no more control over the Transport service than that department has over the winds and tides) was sufficient to justify purchase as a precautionary step ; but it does not appear that any application was made to another ample source of supply without purchase, namely, to the Naval Department, for a temporary loan, until supplies arrived from England—mutual assistance between the medical departments of the navy and army being usual on every foreign service.

It is possible that, if the Surgeon-General had known the destination of the expedition, he might have added to the quantity of bark. But, after its arrival at Walcheren, the foregoing statements evince that there were no grounds for his deviating from the usual orders, viz., to send supplies only upon requisition—especially after the severe censure of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, in their 5th Report, upon his sending any supplies whatever unasked for. It became the duty of the Inspector of Hospitals with the expedition to

watch the consumption, and to apply for every thing necessary to replenish the stores. The Surgeon-General depended upon him to do this, and his confidence was well placed ; for, at a very early period, the 11th September, before one fourth of the original supply was consumed, Mr. Webb did apply for 1,000lb of bark. The Surgeon-General received this on the 18th September, and the very same day gave orders to the Apothecary-General to supply it, and to the Storekeeper-General to ship it ; although his assistant had, on the 5th September, anticipated this requisition in part, by sending 270lb of bark from Harwich, which reached Walcheren on the 17th ; and, as I have before stated, neither the Surgeon-General nor Mr. Webb are responsible for the non-arrival of the 1,000lb of bark, ordered on the 18th September, until the 15th October. From this delay, however, it has been shown that no distress whatever did occur.

In the separate schedule of the receipts and issues of bark, the Apothecary has given credit for a quantity rather below that with which he debits himself in the former Return alluded to.

Exclusive of the bark contained in regimental and other chests, the quantity stated by the Apothecary in this separate Return, having been originally received, is—

August 1.	By various Transports . . .	1,770lb
September 17.	By Diana Packet . . .	270
October 11.	By King George do. . .	800
„ 15.	By Ann Transport . . .	1,000
„ 17.	By —— Packet . . .	500
„ 18.	By Adriatic Transport . . .	500
„ 26.	By Redbreast do. . .	500
„ 27.	By Rebecca do. . .	500

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Total 5,840

The above is exclusive of 1,460lb purchased, and of 500lb shipped on the Tucker transport, which arrived, but was not landed at Walcheren.

As to other medicines, I have documents to show that there never was and never could be any want. I can show, that, during the whole of the expedition, the original supply in two articles only was expended ; that a fresh supply of those two arrived at Walcheren on the 15th October, and that some of the original packages of these two had not been opened so late as the 3rd of November.

As to the bedding, the original supply was equal to the ordinary provision for 34,000 men, with an addition of 310 sets—that is, 3,710 sets, besides the Regimental Hospital and Quartermaster-General's bedding ; to which were added, on the 6th September, in anticipation of future probable wants, adverted to by Mr. Webb, in a letter of 27th August, received 2nd September, 1,000 sets, and on the 6th October 1,000 sets more, and 400 on board three King's ships.

These sets, exclusive of the last mentioned 400, comprised 15,430 sheets, and 14,130 rugs and blankets ; besides which, a very large supply was reported by the Storekeeper-General to be at the disposal of the Quartermaster-General's department, in Walcheren. And on the 12th October, to give a perfect change, the Surgeon-General recommended 12,000 sets to be sent out.

As to the want of medical officers, it was felt in that class only which did not exist, namely in Hospital-mates. And if a sufficiency of medical men could have been found to take the appointments, it did not rest with the Surgeon-General to appoint them.

ROBERT KEATE, Inspector of Hospitals,  
Assistant Surgeon-General's Department.

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*Remarks on the Practicability of taking Antwerp by a  
Coup de Main.*

BY COLONEL SONTAG.

March 2, 1810.

The fortifications of the town of Antwerp appeared in 1794 in a neglected state, principally the citadel. Even on the day

of the evacuation by the British troops, some Austrian artillery-men being employed in removing powder, which was to be thrown into the ditch, a large quantity by accident took fire, and two or three casemates were blown up, and twenty-six men were killed or wounded.

The citadel appeared to have outworks on the south side, towards Brussels. On the side towards the town, it has a very high rampart, a very broad ditch, but no extended glacis, only an esplanade surrounded by houses, under the protection of which approaches may be carried on, and mortar and howitzer batteries erected.

As it has been reported that a great number of houses have been taken down, to establish the slips for the building of men-of-war under the protection of the citadel, the men-of-war and magazines, even under that protection, might have been easily destroyed by rockets, howitzers, and other combustible materials, as soon as the town should have been taken, as the houses would cover and protect the execution of this measure.

The town of Antwerp is surrounded by a high rampart, with a *revêtement*, a broad ditch, in some parts full of water, at least on the side of the gate leading to Holland, which is on the north side. The gate on the east leads to Louvain : in the ditch there was none or but a very small quantity of water ; even at that time some part was converted into gardens. It did not appear, as well as I can recollect, that the ditch was frised or palisadoed.

In the front of the gate leading to Holland are some advanced works very much out of repair : a paved road, at least 24 feet broad, leads to the barrier, and from thence to the gate. From the barrier to the gate, the road, or *chaussée*, forms an elbow ; and, although the ditch is very broad, the *chaussée* runs nearly to the gate, from which it is only separated by a drawbridge. The gate has a long archway, bomb-proof, leading to the town. The Louvain and Mechlin, or Brussels gates, are nearly on the same principle. In front of the gate leading to

Holland, between it and the Louvain gate, are some public and private houses within the reach of cannon; also some windmills on elevated ground, commanding, more or less, the works, which may greatly favour an attack.

The masonry appeared, in many places, very defective, and even the rampart was in an indifferent state. About four years ago, I had opportunity to make inquiries concerning the state of Antwerp; and, as far as I can recollect, was informed that no material repairs had been done to the works of the town. I was also informed that the French were establishing a basin, arsenal, and magazines, near the Scheldt, towards the north part of the town, not under the protection of the citadel, which, of course, could be destroyed as soon as the town is taken.

The fortifications of Lillo and Liefkenshoek were also, by all accounts, much out of repair, and not in a state to resist a siege or a vigorous attack. They were ceded by the Dutch to the Emperor Joseph in 1785, and by him greatly neglected. No positive information has come to my knowledge that they have been re-established. Even if a consequence may be drawn by analogy, the fortifications of Flushing were in the same state as they were twenty-five years ago on the day of surrender, except two small ravelins erected in front of the two gates; therefore, it gives a strong ground to conclude that, as the fortress nearest and most exposed to the sea had been so much neglected, those up the river were not better attended to; and all subsequent information confirms this well founded supposition.

Having been appointed, by his Majesty's command, to serve under the orders of Lieutenant-General Lord Chatham, as Brigadier-General, it will be requisite for me to state that I have been consulted by several of his Majesty's Ministers at different times, from 1796 until 1807 and 1808, relative to an attack upon Walcheren. Subsequent to my appointment, I had confidential communications of the intended attack upon

Antwerp, with Lieutenant-General Brownrigg, Quartermaster-General. I was consulted by him relative to the internal state of Walcheren, and the mode of attack : I observed, in conversation, that I conceived the operation upon Antwerp, between so many fortified towns, rather hazardous ; but, upon the idea that there was no force in that vicinity, I concluded it feasible, if it could be executed with celerity. A confidential conversation I had with Mr. Cooke, in which he communicated to me the strength of the enemy in Walcheren, Antwerp, and other places, (which statement I found, by subsequent information, nearly correct) confirmed me in the opinion that a *coup de main* could be executed.

I beg leave to observe, that, if circumstances did not admit of the execution of such an undertaking, by the joint co-operation of the navy and army with despatch, and if the attack was to take place by successive and regular movements, my humble opinion would have been that it was not advisable.

The basis of my opinion was founded upon the idea that the greatest part of the forces intended for a *coup de main* could have been landed in a few days after their arrival off Walcheren, at or near Sandvliet : that Lillo and Liefkenshoeck could have been attacked by a small part of the army, in conjunction with a naval force, as no ultimate success could be expected but by the mutual support of the navy and army—the principal part of the army to proceed to the immediate investment of Antwerp, which, being a town containing between 55,000 and 60,000 inhabitants, having a bad or weak garrison, and, not being prepared, might have been attacked in such a manner as the commanding General might have judged best, according to circumstances and locality.

It is to be observed that, if the investment of Antwerp could have been accomplished, the daily reinforcements which were sent to that place could not have entered ; that the French would have been forced to assemble their army at a certain distance, which certainly might have greatly retarded the col-

lection of an equal force, and the town of Antwerp been taken, the dock-yard, arsenal, and magazines destroyed, before such a force was collected.

The attacks upon fortified towns by a *coup de main* are not usual, but there are many instances that they have succeeded, with places garrisoned by a small force. In the Seven Years' War, Schweidnitz was taken in one night by General Laudon. In the last war, the town of Frankfort, fortified nearly in the same manner as Antwerp, except not having a citadel, garrisoned by 2,300 French soldiers, and General Custine being at Mayence, only eight leagues distant, was attacked by General Kalkreuth, and taken in one day.

JOHN SONTAG.

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*A Brief Exposition of the Causes, Symptoms, Treatment, and Consequences, of the Fever that lately affected the British Troops in Zealand.*

BY ROBERT RENNY, ASSISTANT-SURGEON TO THE FORCES.

Medicus est minister, Natura mediatrix,  
Deus fons salutis.

Selsea Barracks, March 3, 1810.

All flat countries, while uncultivated, are full of marshes that cannot be drained, and intersected with ditches that can never be emptied. Hence the air is constantly damp, frequently foggy, and always unhealthful.

Such is the constitution of the human frame, that a certain degree of heat is necessary to its existence, and a certain degree of purity or dryness of atmosphere essential to its health. When the air is extremely moist, the usual secretions and excretions, especially the latter, which are essentially necessary to the health of the body, are either prevented, or diminished, or destroyed. When this is the case, the extreme vessels of the body shrink, become contracted, and are unable to receive those particles and those quantities of the blood which they were before accustomed to do, according to their intended office,

and which are essentially necessary to the health of the system. In this situation the body becomes weak, the mind loses its energy, and the usual functions of the human frame either cease, or are performed with difficulty and irregularity: in other words, the body is affected with fever. In what manner these causes produce their effects on the human frame, whether by a superinduced lentor of the fluids, according to the opinion of Boerhaave, or by means of a spasm, according to the theory of Cullen, or by any other mode of action, I shall not at present attempt to investigate, especially as it is a question of more curiosity than usefulness.

The two islands of Walcheren and Beeveland are, like all the Dutch European territories, flat and watery. Their inhabitants are consequently subject to those febrile diseases which a marshy soil and a moist atmosphere never fail to produce. And when those who are born in the country are affected with the unhealthfulness of the soil, season, and climate, it is not surprising that strangers, who have hitherto breathed a comparatively pure and healthful atmosphere, should be subject to febrile diseases, and more especially in autumn, when, from the heat of the sun, and the putrefaction of vegetable bodies, the effluvia from marshes are more active, more plentiful, and more obnoxious than at any other season of the year. These considerations will in part account for the unhealthiness of the troops lately employed in Zealand, among whom disease raged to a degree unprecedented in history, at least for extent and duration, if not for fatality.

But these causes of soil, climate, and season, however certain in their effects, and however extensive in their operations, are still inadequate to account either for the nature of the disease or the number of the sick. It may safely be asserted, being consonant to my own observation and experience, which were pretty extensive, as well as to those of others on whose judgment and veracity I can rely, that considerably less than one half of the cases admitted into hospital in Walcheren and

Beeveland were of an intermittent kind. Many were of a typhoid type: while the greater number were of that continued form denominated by nosologists Synocha. And with respect to the number of the sick, above three-fourths of the army employed in Zealand have been affected with fever and admitted into hospital.

The following seem to me to have been the causes which have tended to produce this alarmingly extensive sickness among the troops: 1st, the nature of their food; 2ndly, the quantity of their liquor; 3dly, their carelessness and irregularity—especially their indulgence in unripe fruits and tank-water; 4thly, the dampness of their lodging, which was too frequently, though necessarily, in houses, or churches, or barns, neither dry nor well ventilated. These causes are sufficient of themselves to have produced the fever; and, with due submission to those of greater experience and higher rank in the service than myself, some of whom entertain a different view of the subject, have been, in my opinion, more active agents in the production of the disease than either the season of the year or the nature of the climate.

The food issued to the troops, those in hospital excepted, consisted of salt beef,<sup>1</sup> or pork, and ship's biscuit. The animal food was extremely salt, and the biscuit was far from being easy of digestion. Thirst was a necessary consequence. The men now had recourse to their spirituous liquor, (rum, gin, or brandy) which they too often drank with more haste than prudence dictated. A partial intoxication and extreme thirst succeeded. Tank-water was now had recourse to, and drunk without limit. Pain in the head, back, and limbs, anorexia, heat of skin, quickness of pulse, and the other symptoms of fever, succeeded; and they soon in great numbers required hospital treatment and comfort.

Fruit was so plentiful and so easily procured, that it was almost impossible to prevent the soldiers from indulging in it,

<sup>1</sup> Called very expressively, by the men, salt junk.

even though unripe, to excess. The stomach, becoming thus overloaded with matter that afforded neither a proper kind nor a sufficient quantity of nourishment, was incapable of performing its usual and necessary functions, and powerfully assisted the operation of the other causes of fever.

The unhealthful nature of their places of residence, consisting of old and damp houses or churches, was also another cause of the extensive sickness among the troops. These places were seldom dry, generally ill ventilated, and frequently admitted both wind and rain. This, if not always the case, was very frequently so, and was, indeed, a necessary consequence of the system adopted of never billeting the men upon the inhabitants.

These, as far as I could observe, were the causes, which, combined with the season and the climate, produced the fever in Walcheren; and, having concisely enumerated them, I shall now endeavour to describe the symptoms which usually made their appearance in the commencement and during the progress of the disease.

The patient generally felt a confused pain in the head, chiefly in the forehead, for two or three days before he reported himself sick. This pain gradually increased, became at length fixed and severe, and extended to the spine and ossa femorum. His tongue was now covered with a white crust, extending from the centre to the edges; his pulse was quick, full, and hard; his skin was preternaturally hot; his eyes were sunk, his look was languid, his cheek pale; his bowels were costive; he had no appetite, felt great nausea, was affected with unquenchable thirst, and became so very weak, that he was scarcely able to stand. He was now, therefore, admitted into hospital. These were, with occasional modifications and a few exceptions, the appearances of the fever on its commencement.

The indications of cure were necessarily various, according to the nature of the attack, the stage of the disease, the age, constitution, and state of the patient: but in every case it was

found advantageous to clear the primæ viæ, either by the administration of an emetic, or the exhibition of purgatives.

The emetic most generally and most beneficially employed consisted of fifteen grains of pulvis ipecacuanhæ, and one grain of antimonium tartarisatum. This dose generally operated safely and effectually, the tartarized antimony assisting the operation of the emetic downwards, which never failed to induce beneficial effects. The purgative most generally employed consisted of that preparation of mercury well known by the denomination of calomel, which, for the mildness of its operation and the certainty of its effects, is undoubtedly the best of all purgative remedies. Five grains of calomel at night were usually found a sufficient dose; and, to aid its operation, and be certain of a purgative effect, a dose of magnesia vitriolata, or rhubarb, was exhibited next morning. The good effects of this mode of treatment seldom failed to be apparent; the collection of crude, indigestible matter in the stomach being removed, and the collected fæces, either putrid, or tending to putrefaction, being expelled, the system was in some degree restored to its former state; the peristaltic motions of the intestines were renewed; and the interrupted secretions and excretions were once more allowed to proceed in their usual course. This was, in almost every instance, the first medical treatment which all those affected with fever received on their admission into hospital.

The subsequent treatment depended entirely on the form which the fever assumed. If it was of a typhoid type, which, from severe duty, deficiency of clothing, exposure to night-air, depression of spirits, or idiosyncrasy of constitution, was frequently the case, it became necessary to support the patient by wine and other tonics. But these were never had recourse to till all inflammatory diathesis had been subdued by strictly antiphlogistic diet and regimen. The disease of this type, and especially that species of it denominated typhus mitior, (for the typhus gravior was more dangerous and de-

structive) when carefully managed, was seldom fatal, and generally disappeared, though often slowly, under the administration of proper remedies. And it is a remarkable fact, and highly to the honour of the Inspectors of Hospitals,<sup>1</sup> as well as the other medical officers employed on this memorable service, that this form of the disease, though in its nature contagious, whether typhus gravior or typhus mitior, never displayed the smallest activity of contagion. This was owing to the strict and uniform attention to cleanliness displayed by every medical officer. The wards were kept constantly clean, being regularly washed and frequently fumigated, and were always, if possible, kept in a state of complete ventilation. The hands and face of every patient were, agreeably to the hospital regulations, washed every morning; clean shirts were regularly served out to them, and every bed was, as far as possible, carefully supplied with clean sheets. The good consequences of this prudent conduct were remarkably apparent. No jail-fever, or hospital-fever, as it is called, ever made its appearance; which, owing to the goodness of Providence and the exertions of the medical officers, has saved thousands of valuable lives to their country.

When the disease was of that form distinguished by the appellation of intermittent, the patient generally felt all those sensations, and displayed all those symptoms, already described, except that his head was more free from pain, his nausea was less complete, and his strength less impaired, than those who were affected with synocha; while his periodical shiverings, whether quotidian, tertian, or quartan, displayed nothing different from the ague, as it is described by Sir John Pringle,

<sup>1</sup> It is only justice to mention particularly the active, indefatigable, unremitting, and enlightened exertions of Mr. Grant, Deputy-Inspector of Hospitals, to whom the service on that occasion is greatly indebted: Dr. M'Gregor was not less anxious and active. But his zeal, abilities, and exertions in the service are already so well known, as to require no mention here.

Cullen, and other authors. It frequently yielded to the administration of Cinchona, which was found to be by far the most efficient remedy; one dram, given in substance three or four times a day, was as much as the patient's stomach could bear. When given in greater doses, nausea, vomiting, and purging, sometimes succeeded; and smaller quantities were found inefficacious. Small doses of opium, either in a solid or liquid form, when exhibited a short time before the commencement of the cold stage, seldom failed either to prevent its recurrence or to shorten its duration. Quotidians were numerous, tertians still more so, and quartans least of all. When the disease remained purely intermittent, it was less fatal than in any other form in which it made its appearance. But when it degenerated, as was too often the case, into typhus gravior vel mitior, then the consequences were justly to be dreaded, and were lamentably fatal. But the most frequent form which the disease assumed was of that continued type denominated by nosologists Synocha, the symptoms of which, at the commencement of the attack, have been already described.

The treatment of this form of the disease, which was by far the most frequent and the most alarming, was necessarily various, according to the strength of the patient, the violence of the attack, and the appearance of occasional symptoms. The most usual, and probably the most efficacious practice, was the following: after the crudities of the stomach had been ejected by means of an emetic, and the internal canal been completely emptied by purgatives in the manner already mentioned, the patient was allowed spoon diet only, and was kept quiet and cool, and free from all stimulus. Diaphoretics, consisting chiefly of pulvis antimonialis, were now had recourse to, especially in cases of great heat and dryness of skin. Cooling draughts, consisting of the *mistura salina*, nitre with barley-water, and such as these, were now employed, while the patient was allowed to drink freely of barley-water, which both relieved his thirst and excited diaphoresis. In cases of great determi-

nation of blood to the head, blisters were applied to the nape of the neck, or the cranium, and they seldom failed to give immediate relief, notwithstanding the unfavourable opinion entertained of them by Dr. Darwin and several other medical authorities. In this stage of the disease, the affusion of cold water, so much and so properly recommended by modern physicians, was employed with the happiest success. The patient never failed to be gratified as well as relieved by it, while the violence of the paroxysm was for a time considerably abated. A very useful substitute for this practice consisted in sprinkling the patient while in bed with vinegar and tepid water, afterwards carefully rubbing the body dry with a flannel or linen cloth.

This antiphlogistic treatment was persisted in till the violence of the fever abated. As soon as this happy event took place, small doses of the pulvis ipecacuanhae compositus, of from ten to fifteen grains each, were exhibited at bed-time. This seldom failed to procure a gentle sweat and refreshing sleep during the night, and the patient consequently felt his pain relieved, and his appetite in some degree returning next morning. He was now allowed the use of wine and porter in proportion to his debility, beginning at first with small quantities, which were gradually increased. He was also allowed the gradual use of soup and animal food; while bark was unceasingly administered to all convaleseents, in every stage of their recovery, in as great quantities as their stomachs could bear.

This treatment, with little variation, which necessarily arose from occasional symptoms, was the usual course followed by the army medical officers in Walcheren, whose zeal and exertions in the service of their country, in the performance of their duty, and in the cause of humanity, cannot be sufficiently praised or satisfactorily rewarded. What situation can be more dangerous, or what conduct more laudable, than that of those who spent the greatest part of their time in scenes of the

most deplorable distress, in visiting the sick and the dying, in administering to them remedies, in dispensing to them comforts, in relieving their wants, in alleviating their pains; and in soothing their sorrows!

Having thus, as I proposed, described concisely the causes, symptoms, and treatment of the fever, I shall conclude with making a few observations, which could not with propriety have been before introduced.

Venesection was in no stage of the disease advisable, and, as far as my experience, or accurate information extends, was never employed. The fever, even when of a continued form, rarely displayed any of those decidedly inflammatory appearances which indicate a high phlogistic diathesis, and which consequently render general bleeding requisite. Indeed, in every case, more or less, the tendency of the fluids to run to a state of putrefaction, partly, if not chiefly, the consequence, in my humble opinion, of the salt meat and hard biscuit issued to the troops, was very observable, which was of itself sufficient evidence that bleeding, instead of being indicated, would have been highly detrimental.

Patients were frequently put under a course of mercury, by means of small doses of calomel administered at short intervals. But this practice, though often useful in cases of visceral obstructions, especially those of the liver and spleen, which very frequently occurred, was necessarily employed with a cautious discrimination, as it was apt either to induce or to aggravate ascites or anasarca, very usual terminations of the fever.

It is a fact deserving of mention, that no patients, even though discharged as convalescent from the hospital, ever recovered, while in that country, their former health and strength. The majority of them relapsed, and were again received into hospital, while those who were able to perform their duties remained extremely pale, comparatively weak, had little appetite, and were apt to fall sick on the smallest exertion. This remarkable fact was no doubt in part owing to the

nature of the climate, and the shortness of the time during which we possessed those islands. But the chiefly operating cause I firmly believe to have been the nature of the food issued to the troops, (which I had the honour of mentioning at the time to General Brown, in the course of conversation on this subject) consisting of salt junk and hard biscuit, not to add the other causes, unripe fruit, spirituous liquors, tank-water, and damp lodging.

The employment of medical officers, in administering to the sick, was so constant and unremitting, that little or no time could be procured for minutely detailed reports of particular cases, or for dissections of the dead, to discover the morbid appearances. But it may in general be remarked that indurations and enlargements of the liver and spleen were often observed on dissection. I myself weighed a spleen about ten days ago at Hilsea Barracks, of a very unusual size and extreme induration, which weighed no less than three pounds and five ounces. But, as I have already far exceeded the bounds allotted to a concise view of the disease, I shall not at present enter on this part of the subject.

I shall therefore conclude with observing, that the islands of Walcheren and Beeveland are undoubtedly unhealthful, both on account of the soil, the climate, and the water; yet, if fresh meat and fresh bread were regularly issued to the troops; if fresh vegetables and good water were carefully provided for them; if they were anxiously restricted from the use of unripe fruit, as well as undiluted spirituous liquors; if flannel jackets and trousers, and dry, well ventilated apartments were allotted to them, very little sickness and mortality, indeed, would ever appear. In truth, I have no hesitation in saying that, if these precautions were attended to, the island of Walcheren might be kept with as little annual loss of men as either Jamaica, Martinique, or Guadaloupe.

RO. RENNY, Assistant-Surgeon to the Forces.

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*General Vyse to General Brownrigg.*

Beverley, March 7, 1810.

Dear Sir—As I am certain your kindness will give me credit for the satisfaction which I shall experience on every occasion in complying with your wishes, I feel equally happy to communicate, on the present, such information as my memory can enable me to impart, on the subject of your letter; and if any appearance of delay has attended my doing so, I request you to attribute it to my desire of rendering that information authentic, and my reluctance to depend solely upon that memory, now unexpectedly called upon, after a lapse of sixteen years, to enter into a detail of circumstances, the impression of which, though not totally effaced, must naturally be lessened by such a length of time.

I committed to writing many observations, while at Antwerp, on the works of that place, and of my passage to it up the Scheldt from Flushing, and was in hopes that I should have found the journal in which I had inserted them among my papers at this place; but I have lost much time in fruitless and ineffectual search; and, that I may lose no more, I now take up my pen, to answer the several questions which you have stated in your letter, with as much accuracy and precision as I am able, and to the utmost extent of my recollection, and the best of my judgment.

*Question.* Were not the works, in 1794, in a neglected, and in many parts in a state of decay?

*Answer.* They appeared to me to have been so long and so totally neglected, and in many parts so much decayed, as would have required considerable time to put them into any tolerable state of defence.

*Q.* Was there, or not, water in the ditches?

*A.* The season was very dry, but there was water in the ditches of the citadel. The other ditches of the place were dry, except in a few partial spots, where there might be a

little water, the consequence of land-springs, or some other local or partial cause.

*Q.* Were the entrances into the town over permanent stone or brick bridges?

*A.* Yes, but of different construction and strength.

*Q.* Were there guns mounted on the ramparts?

*A.* I think, a few, and that I observed some dismounted guns, and likewise some broken carriages.

*Q.* State of the citadel?

*A.* In general, in a state of sufficient repair, with some guns mounted. It was used as a magazine for forage, which was set fire to on the 22nd of July, 1794, when the place was evacuated by the English forces.

*Q.* In what state were the works at the Tête de Flandre?

*A.* In a very respectable state, and considerably improved by a strong working party, which I sent there by order of his Royal Highness the Duke of York.

*Q.* Did not the suburbs approach close to the gates; and were there not houses and gardens close to the edge of the glacis?

*A.* Yes, in many parts so much so, and so near, that, to have put the place into a proper state of defence, many houses and gardens must have been destroyed.

I have now, my dear sir, answered, to the best of my recollection and ability, all the questions contained in your letter; not, I trust, with any presumptuous confidence in either my own memory or my own judgment, but with the sincere desire of avoiding, upon a subject which has been productive of such contrariety of opinion, every appearance of partiality, or suspicion of influence in favour of the sentiments or opinions of others.

However, as what I have stated is collected from memory only, and as memory is always fallible, I cannot but wish you would be so good as to consider this communication as merely confidential; and though you, I am afraid, will derive from it

very little information, that consideration, how much soever it may lessen, cannot entirely deprive me of the pleasure which I experience in executing your commands, and of embracing this opportunity of assuring you of the sincere respect and regard of your, &c.,

J. V. VYSE.

## OPERATIONS IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.

1807—9.

Extreme was the mortification of Napoleon when he found himself anticipated, through the decision and promptness of the British cabinet, in his design of securing the co-operation of the Danish fleet in his grand scheme of collecting all the navies of Europe for the invasion of Britain. He was, therefore, the more solicitous that the naval force of Portugal, another of the powers against which the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit were directed, should not elude his grasp.

Between its ancient political alliance with England and its family alliance with Spain, the house of Braganza had a difficult game to play. The Prince of Brazil, invested with the Regency, on account of the mental incapacity of the queen, his mother, was united to a daughter of the Spanish monarch's. Charles IV., a prince weak to imbecility, and wholly unfit for a throne, in the critical circumstances in which Spain was placed, had, under the guidance of Godoy, the unworthy minion of his wife, afterwards Prince of the Peace, thrown himself into the arms of

France, and concluded, in 1796, an alliance offensive and defensive with the Republic.

When Napoleon had consolidated his power as First Consul, Spain, in spite of her family connexion, was compelled to join in hostilities against Portugal. These terminated, in 1801, in the peace of Badajoz, by which the Prince Regent ceded Olivenza and the surrounding district to Spain, and engaged to exclude the English from his ports. A further cession to France of part of Guiana was required.

Amidst incessant insults and humiliations, Portugal dragged on for some years a degraded existence, held in complete vassalage by France, through her tools, the Prince of the Peace and the Spanish cabinet. The Prince Regent, sensible of the advantages derived by Portugal from her old alliance with England, would fain have adhered stedfastly to that system: but the Imperial conferences at Tilsit had decided his fate, in case of refusal to obey all the mandates of the French Autocrat; who insisted that the ports of his kingdom should be closed against our commerce; that all British subjects in the country should be seized, and all British property confiscated; and that the naval force of Portugal should be placed at his disposal. Compliance with these demands would have been equivalent to a declaration of war against Great Britain. Most reluctant to break with his ally, the Prince Regent entered into negociation with France, in order to gain time; and, in October, 1807, concluded a treaty with the British Government, by which the latter engaged,

✓201

in the worst event, to assist him to emigrate to Brazil.

Meanwhile, an army under Junot had crossed the Bidassoa, and a negociation was commenced between France and Spain for deciding the fate of Portugal. The result was a partition treaty, which has always appeared to me to have been, on the part of Napoleon, a mere blind to conceal from the Spanish cabinet his designs against itself.

It stipulated that the northern province of Portugal, Entre Minho e Duero, should be given in exchange for Tuscany to the young Prince of Parma, son-in-law of Charles IV., who had been for a short time amused with the title of King of Etruria; that, in the south, Algarve and Alentejo should be assigned in full sovereignty to the Prince of the Peace; and that the central provinces, Estremadura, Beira, and Traz-oz-Montes, should be reserved by the French emperor to be disposed of at a general peace. Twenty-eight thousand French were to march through Spain; 40,000 were to be assembled as an army of reserve at Bayonne; and 27,000 Spaniards were to co-operate in the occupation of Portugal.

The *Moniteur*, the official paper of the French Government, now proclaimed the dethronement of the house of Braganza. This public intimation served to fix the wavering resolution of the Prince Regent, and preparations were immediately made for the departure of the royal family, the court, and a great proportion of the persons of rank and distinction, with their treasures and most valuable effects.

Junot, meanwhile, received the most peremptory orders to hasten, by forced marches, with his army of raw conscripts, to Lisbon, to secure the Portuguese squadron. He came too late. An English naval force had appeared off the mouth of the Tagus, and no time was lost in shipping valuable property of all sorts on board the Portuguese squadron, consisting of 8 sail of the line, 3 frigates, 3 brigs, and a number of merchantmen.

The court embarked on the 27th of November, accompanied by about 15,000 persons, who carried with them half the circulating medium of the country; leaving in the port of Lisbon a Russian squadron of nine sail of the line and two frigates, which had sought refuge there from the English cruisers, and had made no opposition to the departure of the Portuguese. This squadron was afterwards surrendered to Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, but restored to Russia on the conclusion of peace with that power.

The fleet of Portugal was speeding towards its destination when Junot, with the first small division of his famished, emaciated, ragged troops, arrived, on the 30th of November, at Lisbon, and occupied the capital without opposition.

Previously to the departure of the Prince Regent, an expedition under General Beresford and Sir Samuel Hood had, with his assent, sailed from England to secure Madeira. This mission it fulfilled without resistance, on the understanding that the island should be restored to the Portuguese authorities as soon as

the mother-country should be completely emancipated from French control.

If I were not thoroughly persuaded that there is scarcely one reader of this work who is not so intimately acquainted with the causes and consequences of the extraordinary events which occurred in Spain in 1808, as to need no preliminary summary to refresh his memory, I should still feel myself dispensed from entering upon that task, having already devoted a distinct publication to the subject.<sup>1</sup> It is to be observed also that the scope of this work does not admit of that general and complete view of Spanish affairs, which could alone be useful to any, if any there be, who are ignorant of the course and results of that glorious struggle, which contributed, perhaps in a greater degree than any other cause, to break that iron despotism by which Europe had been too long enthralled.

In fact, the Correspondence in this Section breaks off quite abruptly in September, 1809, when Lord Castlereagh suddenly resigned his office of Minister of War, previously to the duel with Mr. Canning, which removed his antagonist also from the cabinet.

Suffice it, therefore, in this place to remind the reader, that to Lord Castlereagh is mainly to be ascribed the prompt and efficient aid of every kind afforded to Spain, towards accomplishing the great work of her liberation; that to his influence, even con-

<sup>1</sup> Story of the Peninsular War, new edition, with considerable additions, 1848.

trary to the convictions of the King, was owing the selection of "so young a Lieutenant-General" to conduct the Military operations in the Peninsula, as that GREAT CAPTAIN, whose abilities soon proved the justice of the preference, and whose indomitable perseverance, amidst glorious triumphs and not a few discouragements, finally swept the length and breadth of the entire Peninsula clear from the baffled hosts of the ambitious usurper, and carried invasion into the heart of France itself.

The copious Correspondence of Sir Arthur Wellesley and Lord Castlereagh will, no doubt, be considered as stamping an extraordinary value upon this portion of the collection; and, though a few of the Duke of Wellington's letters are comprehended in the collection of his Despatches edited by Colonel Gurwood, I have not hesitated to introduce them here, copied from autographs addressed to my brother, and now in my possession.

The anxious solicitude of Lord Castlereagh to obtain the most complete and authentic information respecting the state of Spain and the Spanish people, on the outbreak of their insurrection, brought together a mass of Reports from official agents, mostly military, in various parts of the Peninsula, which throw much light on the spirit then prevailing there, and furnish interesting details relative to circumstances and events at the time of their occurrence. I therefore insert as many of them as have fallen into my hands, by way of Supplement to this Section.

*The Hon. Charles Stuart<sup>1</sup> to M. de Pinto.*

Lisbon, August 1, 1797.

As your Excellency has done me the honour to remark the regulations I have established, in order to prepare the army under my command for an active campaign, I have no scruple in calling your attention to one or two points which may materially facilitate this service.

Your Excellency must have observed that the park of artillery does not form a part of my order of battle, from which you may be led to conclude that the same number of horses or mules which I at first demanded from the Portuguese Government are no longer necessary for the ordnance; but this is not the case; for, though I am confident the transport of heavy artillery would effect the destruction of an army attempting to advance or retire into Portugal, yet field regimental guns may prove of the utmost utility; and, as it is my intention not only to concentrate, but at the same time to add to my force, by appropriating long 6-pounders, upon the construction of the English flying artillery, to each battalion, there cannot be any great diminution in the number of beasts required.

Another object of no less importance is the establishing guides. In a former memorial, I had the honour to submit to your Excellency the propriety of attaching a company of guides, composed of intelligent peasants, to the auxiliary army. Experience has since taught me that people of this description are only equal to guide in the narrow circle of their particular villages, and are utterly incapable of conducting an army twenty miles in any direction. To remove this difficulty, permit me to propose that a certain number of people in every town and village throughout the kingdom, should be appropriated to this particular service, receiving no pay when employed, and being excluded from serving in the militia ordonnances, and other levies.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CH. STUART.

<sup>1</sup> Envoy and Minister at Lisbon.

*On the Transfer of the Portuguese Government to the Brazils.*

If the Portuguese Government could be made sensible of the degradation, and probably the destruction which awaits them, or, if a sufficient degree of energy could be roused among them, there would still be time enough to snatch them from the destiny that is hanging over them, and to lay the foundation of a mighty and magnificent empire, which would speedily compensate the loss of Portugal, and preserve (if it be considered worth preserving) the Portuguese name.

This might be effected by transporting the Court and all its effects, (as was once intended to be done) and a selection of the best troops, with all their ships of war, to the Brazils. With the assistance of Great Britain, every preparation for such a step could be completed in a few days; their ships in a sufficient state of forwardness to carry off whatever was intended to be removed to the island of Madeira, which is but three days' sail from Lisbon, where, with two or three sail of English line-of-battle ships to protect them, they might remain as securely as in a British port from any attack of the enemy, until fully equipped for their ulterior destination.

The Portuguese being firmly attached to their name, and to the family on the throne, there is little doubt that numbers would be disposed to take advantage of leaving the country for another, where nothing is wanting but an adequate population, to supply every kind of produce for commerce and consumption.

Although the Spaniard of Europe affects to despise the Portuguese, it is not improbable that the heterogeneous classes of which the population of South America is composed might gradually be brought under one government, and the more readily, as there is some similarity in their language, and their religion is the same. The demand of this great empire for the manufactures of Europe, and the valuable produce it would have to offer in return, especially of naval stores, is a consideration of no small moment to Great Britain.

In fact, the occupation of the Brazils by Great Britain, or her ally, under the present circumstances of the Continent of Europe, seems to be indispensably necessary for our salvation. It would perhaps be more advisable that the Portuguese should hold the country than the British, as the latter, in this case, would be at liberty to turn their arms to the reduction of the Spanish part of South America, and particularly to the Caraccas, of which the French have long coveted the possession, and which there now seems to be little doubt has been ceded to them by Spain.

Might not the offer of assistance for enabling the Portuguese to carry such a measure as is here proposed into effect furnish a sufficient pretext for sending into the Tagus a squadron of six sail of the line, to prevent, at all events, the Portuguese fleet from falling into the hands of the French, or being employed in the invasion of this country, or some of its colonies ?

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*Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Cooke.*

Brighton, November 11, 1807.

Dear Cooke—I should think the Madeira service would be as soon performed by embarking three regiments from Portsmouth, in coppered transports there, as by again detaining and diverting the two regiments embarked at Cork. These two regiments I should think not sufficient in themselves, without the 63rd. The tonnage, as I apprehend from your statement, must still go from Portsmouth to receive them, having been detained by the state of the winds. If so, it seems a shorter operation to send the whole force at once from Portsmouth, than to send transports round by Cork, to take on board troops there, and to proceed from thence.

I don't quite understand the expression in your letter, "Nothing settled as to giving up their fleet." Our relations with the Court of Portugal are become so critical, and the ultimate determination of that Government, whether to throw

themselves with their fleet into our hands or those of France, may so much depend upon a momentary impulse, and the possibility of giving an instant support to a party in their councils, that I cannot but seriously lament that any minor considerations of convenience should be suffered to stand in the way of our having a powerful squadron off the Tagus, with such a proportion of land forces on board as might enable us, at any moment, to enter that river, and perhaps decide the question in our own favour. We can never hope to accomplish this by corps acting from a distance.

I should think Beresford a very good person to go to Madeira, with the three regiments from Portsmouth, having fully considered the subject.

I shall write to-morrow on de Puisaye's business.

CASTLEREAGH.

In recurring to the importance of a naval force, with land forces on board, to be *immediately* stationed off the Tagus, I should still be disposed to look to Moore's force, and the reinforcement to be sent from home to the Mediterranean, as corps eventually to support, if necessary. But I would not rely upon them for our first interposition. I cannot conceive that out of the 20 sail of the line now returned from the Baltic, 10 sail of the line might not be selected for a six weeks' cruise off the Tagus. If to these were joined the Leyden and the Inflexible, they would easily carry 4,000 troops, and, on their arrival on the station, placing themselves under Sir S. Smith's command, the ships now under his orders would be liberated for any other service.

As circumstances now stand, I quite agree with Lord Hawkesbury, that the Madeira operation ought to be performed by a separate force; and I own I cannot help feeling anxious on this subject, as I think we shall have a bad case if Portugal slips through our fingers, if our friends in the cabinet of Portugal can justify their submission to France by any colour of pre-

tence to a want of timely support from us. This charge might have been inconvenient when all our means were employed in the Baltic : but when they are now altogether disposable, I do not see that any satisfactory answer could be made to it ; nor do I conceive that we could contend that six sail of the line off the Tagus, without troops, could afford us any chance of being effectually useful in supporting the British party in the Portuguese councils ; or that the arrangement we had made for securing a co-operation with our land forces in aid of our squadron afforded any reasonable hope of their assistance being procured at the moment it might be required.

The arrangement which appears to be decided on may satisfy the terms of the secret treaty ; but I do not think it will in any degree satisfy either the spirit of our relations with that State, or our own separate views and interest, which appear to me to require that Sir Sidney Smith should be in such a state of naval and military equipment, as to be enabled to apprise Lord Strangford that he was prepared to enter the Tagus the first moment his lordship could reconcile the Portuguese Government to his doing so, with adequate means both to keep down popular commotion, to assist in completing the equipment of their fleet, and to put the Government in that state of independence which might best enable them, if France did not acquiesce in their views of compromise, to retire in safety to the Brazils.

Upon the supposition of the three regiments going to Madeira, and the 4,000 men embarking in the Tagus squadron, it might perhaps be sufficient, in the first instance, to detach to the Mediterranean only the four Hanoverian battalions and recruits, reserving for consideration whether any additional British force should be sent there, till it is clearly ascertained whether Moore's force returns to England or not. The whole of this arrangement in regard to Portugal may now, perhaps, come too late in point of time. France may have prevailed. Still, I think it would be a satisfaction to our own feelings, and

essential to our public justification, to have made, as early as the return of our forces from the Baltic would permit, arrangements which, in their nature, we could contend to be adequate and applicable to the case on which we had to act.

I do not write to Lord Hawkesbury on the subject, because I do not wish to embarrass his decision, when the materials for forming a correct judgment are perhaps not completely before me. But, of course, you will show this letter to him, as suggestions for his consideration.

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*Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Castlereagh.*

Foreign Office, December 28, 1807.

Dear Castlereagh—You will see, in Sir Hew Dalrymple's letters, that he expresses similar doubts to those which I stated at the last Cabinet, with respect to the expediency of leaving foreign regiments in garrison at Gibraltar. It would be yet time to desire General Spencer to exchange one of the British regiments which he carries with him, for that of Watteville, which General Moore has left at Gibraltar; and, merely after reading Sir H. Dalrymple's letter, it appears prudent to do so.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Sir A. Paget, which puts the value of Ceuta much higher than I had apprehended it to be. Pray return me this letter, with your opinion whether any thing can be done upon it. You see Paget is decidedly of opinion that the preparations should not be made at Gibraltar. I am afraid it is hardly to be hoped that Moore could be yet caught at Gibraltar. Yet his last letter is but eighteen days old.

Yours, very sincerely,

GEO. CANNING.

[Enclosure.]

*Sir Arthur Paget to the Right Hon. George Canning.*

December 27, 1807.

My dear Canning—It did not, I believe, occur to me to mention to you the very great importance of Ceuta. Rely on it that, if we are not, the French will very shortly be in pos-

session of it; and, if so, "the entrance into the Mediterranean will be difficult beyond all calculation, and to get out of it will be nearly impracticable, except with *strong* leading winds. On both shores of the Straits there is an eddy current, which, for the most part, sets to the westward, on which account it is, in light winds, usual to keep the Barbary coast on board; because, by reason of the batteries, you cannot navigate the Spanish side. Now, if Ceuta falls into the hands of the French, not only will the whole coast down to Tangier swarm with gun-boats, but, in time, such batteries will be erected as will effectually prevent the navigation of it. Add to this, the occupation both of Tetuan and Tangier will immediately follow, and, if so, the supplies with which our Cadiz fleet are now furnished will be cut off; nay, more, the ships may eventually be obliged to return, *to water* in England. Excuse this hint, &c.,

ARTHUR PAGET.

Bear in mind that the expedition of Ceuta should *not* be sent from Gibraltar, because any such preparations made there would be known, and create suspicion of the destination. It should be a *coup de main*, performed by troops coming down or going into the Mediterranean.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Beresford.*

Copy.

Downing Street, March 26, 1808.

Dear Sir—The events that have taken place at Lisbon subsequent to your leaving England have so entirely altered our connexion with that court, that we have deemed it expedient to modify the arrangement with respect to Madeira, assimilating it as much as possible to the description of occupation which prevailed in the last war on our part, in this particular island, and has long prevailed in respect to the Portuguese settlement of Goa, in the East Indies.

As the duties connected with your situation, under the new arrangement, are not likely to be of a description which I should deem of sufficient importance to justify me in with-

drawing you from the more active prosecution of your professional views, and as the change which it has been found necessary to make in the Government must naturally render your continuance there less satisfactory to your feelings than it might otherwise have been, I shall take an early opportunity of concerting with the Commander-in-Chief, that you should be relieved in the military command of the island, with the view of calling for your services in some other quarter, where I think they may be employed with more credit to yourself, and more advantage to his Majesty's interests.

I am, &c.,  
CASTLEREAGH.

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*Declaration of the Junta of the Asturias.*

Translation.

FULL POWERS.

The General Junta of the principality of Asturias, composed of the representatives of all its districts, in consequence of anarchical circumstances in which the whole kingdom is placed, since their King, under oppression and force, has ceded his rights to the crown of Spain and of the Indies to Napoleon Buonaparte, with unlimited power to dispose of it in favour of whomsoever he may think fit; and not deeming it proper that this cession, so unlawful on every account, should be acceded to, have reassumed the sovereignty in themselves, and have established themselves independent of the actual government, as soon as it was known that the latter was exercising its functions in the name of Napoleon, declaring that the supreme power resides in the Junta until the dynasty of the Bourbons, to which they have renewed, and do renew, the oath of fidelity, be restored.

The Junta has, in consequence, resolved to oppose with arms, and has solemnly declared war against, the French: the Junta is certain that the other provinces of the kingdom, where the greatest discontent and the most lively agitation of mind prevail, will unite themselves to them, the will having been already manifested to oppose the slavery to which France wishes to

reduce the kingdom, placing in it a sovereign of Buonaparte's family, in order to carry forward his unlimited views of ambition and of universal domination. Therefore, the Junta, relying very strongly upon the great succours which they hope to receive from the very powerful King of Great Britain, in defence of so good and just a cause, for the purpose of presenting themselves to his Majesty, laying before him all the events, and agreeing upon all that may be conducive to the proposed object, confer their full and ample powers, without limitation, to conclude whatever treaties may be necessary, which the Junta will hold for valid, as if they were made with them, to Don Joseph Queypo de Llave, Viscount of Materosa, and Don Andrew Angel de la Vega, whom they authorize as such Plenipotentiaries, without any restrictions in their powers.

Oviedo, the 25th of May, 1808.

(Signed) THE MARQUESS SANTA CRUZ MARZENADO.

THE COUNT OF MARZEL, of Peñalba.

DON ALVARO FLOREZ ESTRADA, Procurator-General.

By order of the General Junta of the Principality of Asturias,

DON JUAN ARGUELLES JOSAL,

Representative and Secretary.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Manchester.*

Draft.

Downing Street, June 4, 1808.

My Lord—I have the honour of enclosing to your Grace extracts of despatches received from Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple at Gibraltar, respecting the recent revolution in Spain; also extracts from the foreign papers, stating the proceedings of Buonaparte at Bayonne, and the forced abdication of the King of Spain and the Prince of Asturias, for themselves and their whole family.

The sensation of abhorrence which has been created throughout Spain by this complication of treacherous atrocity has been universal; and the people have, in several parts, risen into open

resistance and insurrection. But the number of the forces which the French found the means to introduce have been able in most parts to put down the efforts of the people, and the system of terror which they are establishing may possibly crush their independence.

Under these circumstances, it becomes the duty of his Majesty's Ministers to make every exertion for preventing the American provinces of Spain from falling into the hands of France by the same treachery which is subjugating Spain itself. Among these provinces, one of the most important, from its productions, its situations, harbour, and fortresses, is the island of Cuba, the possession of which, by a power so formidable, active, and hostile, as France, might be not only destructive to the trade, but even dangerous to the connexion of Jamaica with Great Britain.

It is represented here, and especially by letters received from Jamaica, that the people of Cuba are aware the French have formed designs against their island, and that they have manifested not only the strongest aversion to such a design, but a determination to resist it; and it is believed that the Spanish Governor is a man actuated by the most honourable and loyal principles. It is, therefore, conceived by his Majesty's Ministers that your Grace will not find it a matter of difficulty to open a confidential and secret communication with him, relative to the conduct he may be disposed or induced to hold.

The papers I enclose, which your Grace can easily have translated into Spanish, if necessary, will apprise the Spanish Governor of the deliberate and unparalleled system of violence and perfidy, by which Buonaparte has contrived to get within his grasp the royal family of Spain, to extort from them a renunciation of their royal rights and titles, to extinguish their dynasty, and to substitute his own family on their degradation and exclusion. If the Spanish Governor and the people of Cuba were before animated against the supposed designs of France, what must be their feelings and dispositions when

roused by the exposure of such complicated atrocities! It cannot be supposed that any Spaniard out of the immediate power of France will not be disposed to exercise the resentment which he must feel, and be determined to disappoint and defeat, as far as is in his power, the views of such criminal usurpation. As your Grace's communications must awaken these dispositions, your business will be to take the most immediate advantage of them, and to draw the Spanish Governor into some immediate act of resentment and hostility to France.

The 1st principle to inculcate is, that Great Britain is the only power that can either be instrumental in restoring the independence of Spain, and the rights of the royal family, or of preserving the Spanish provinces from becoming the plunder of the French armies.

2nd. That Great Britain has hitherto, in any attempt made upon the Spanish provinces, abstained from exciting them to separate from the mother country, in the hope that they might be the means of re-establishing the power of Spain, and enabling her to act with an upright policy, independent of France.

Should this object, by the late annexation of Spain to the usurper's dominions, and the imprisonment of the royal family in France, become hopeless, there are then only two lines of conduct which present themselves. One, that the Spanish provinces should declare themselves independent, and place themselves under the dominion of some Prince of the Royal Family not in the power of Buonaparte—this independence to be guaranteed by Great Britain. The other, that the Spanish provinces should declare themselves independent, and erect Governments according to their own free choice—the independence of such Governments to be guaranteed by Great Britain. Either of these systems might be managed for the interests of the Spanish provinces, either with a view of renouncing for ever all subordination to Spain, or of returning to that subordination whenever the Spanish monarchy shall be re-established under the line of its lawful sovereigns.

The ultimate arrangement of either system may require some time to settle ; but the primary step which is to lead to it is easy, and ought to be immediately adopted by the Spanish Colonial Governments—that is, a declaration of hostility against France, a determination to resist her, and a cordial co-operation and union with Great Britain in the means of resisting her.

If, therefore, the Spanish Governor shall be disposed to enter into a negociation with your Grace for preserving Cuba and the Spanish provinces from the domination of Buonaparte, your Grace is authorized to state, in his Majesty's name, that his Majesty, in all measures which he may take for the preserving the Spanish provinces either to a Prince of Spain, or for establishing them as independent Governments, does formally disclaim and renounce every intention and design of conquering any of those Provinces, or of subjecting them to the Crown of Great Britain ; and that his Majesty's views will be confined to defeating the objects of Buonaparte, and to protecting the Spanish provinces from his attacks, and guaranteeing them that independence of France, which is necessary equally to their own honour, freedom, and happiness, and to the security of the British Empire.

If the Spanish Governor shall accede to these views, thus opened by your Grace, you will immediately endeavour to concert measures for preventing the introduction of any French force or French officers into Cuba. And your Grace is hereby authorized to send a detachment to Cuba, from Jamaica, of 1,000 men, if the Governor will receive them ; and the deficiency made by this draft from the garrison of Jamaica will be supplied from the Leeward Islands ; as the Commander of the Forces on that station has received orders to send to Jamaica 1,000 men, upon a requisition from your Grace.

To enable your Grace to carry these instructions into execution, I am to desire you will lose no time in making the fullest communication to Vice-Admiral Rowley and Lieutenant-General Villettes ; and I trust you will be enabled to fix upon

such an officer for managing this important negociation, as, by his experience and ability, will facilitate its success.

Your Grace will take care that no means shall be left untried for awakening a proper spirit in the Spaniards of Cuba; and you will be enabled to assure those characters who shall boldly and decidedly come forward in favour of the cause of the general independence of the world, which is now threatened, that they may depend upon the favour and protection of Great Britain.

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Manchester.*

Draft.

Downing Street, June 4, 1808.

My Lord—Your Grace may possibly find yourself obliged to expend sums for secret service, in consequence of the instructions which I have transmitted to your Grace. Of those sums you will keep a separate account; as it will be necessary for you, upon your return to England, to take an oath before the Barons of Exchequer, that you have expended for Foreign Secret Service the sums you have drawn for, with my approbation, on that account: and, whenever you draw a bill for Secret Service, your Grace will be pleased to give notice by a private letter to me of the nature of the draft.

If the Governor of the Havannah or of the Floridas shall intimate a disposition to act in concert with your Grace, and to make any stipulation respecting the manner in which the troops may be employed, to preserve the Spanish provinces from the French, your Grace will feel yourself authorized to make advances to the respective Governors for the payment of their troops, till some arrangement can be formed.

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Manchester.*

Draft.

Downing Street, June 4, 1808.

My Lord—This letter will be delivered to your Grace by Mr. Pavier, who attends Mr. Williamson in his mission to America. He was born at Ceuta, and served long in the

Spanish service, and was an intendant of the marine of the Havannah. He has many connexions in Mexico, and may be extremely useful by his correspondence. He has been some years in this country, where he has been detained with a view of being employed in case circumstances shall render it necessary for placing the Spanish provinces in independence.

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Charles Williamson, Esq.*

Draft.

Downing Street, June 4, 1808.

Sir—His Majesty has commanded me to entrust you with confidential despatches for his Grace the Duke of Manchester, Governor of Jamaica, requiring his Grace to take immediate measures for opening a communication with Cuba, and for inducing the Spanish Governor to act in concert for preventing that island and the Spanish American provinces from falling into the power of Buonaparte. I have acquainted his Grace that you may be of the greatest use, in being confidentially employed by him for effecting those objects.

You will embark on board his Majesty's schooner, Flying Fish, which will proceed with you, in the first instance, off Cadiz, to Rear-Admiral Purvis, when you will open to him the objects of your mission, and obtain from him all such intelligence as he is in possession of, respecting the state of Spain, the sentiments of the Spanish nation, and the probable issue of affairs there. The Rear-Admiral has orders to communicate with you fully and confidentially.

You will be allowed for your expenses £800 a-year whilst employed, and will receive £500 in advance on your salary.

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands.*

Draft.

Downing Street, June 4, 1808.

Sir—The late unparalleled proceedings in Spain by Buonaparte, in forcing the whole Royal Family to abdicate and

renounce their right to the throne, and the measures he is taking to place that kingdom and the Spanish American provinces under his immediate power, call for every exertion of his Majesty's Government. If it may not be in their power to prevent the effects of his measures in Spain itself, it may be possible to counteract them in the Spanish American provinces. Measures are preparing for that purpose, which will shortly be communicated to you.

I have written fully upon this subject to the Duke of Manchester, his Majesty's Governor of Jamaica; and, if he shall apply to you for a reinforcement of one thousand men, I am to signify to you his Majesty's commands that you do concert measures with the naval Commander on the Leeward Island station, for having them forwarded to Jamaica.

I enclose to you a publication,<sup>1</sup> containing some accounts of what has passed in Spain; and I am to desire you will have the passages marked translated into Spanish, and a considerable number printed, and measures taken for circulating them through the Spanish provinces; which, it is conceived, may be easily effected from the free ports.

If any Spanish officers shall be sent to Barbadoes by Vice-Admiral Purvis, with a view to their being confidentially sent into the Spanish provinces, you will concert with the naval Commander on the station the best means of sending them to their destination, and establishing with them a confidential correspondence.

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Secretary Canning.*

Draft.

Downing Street, June 16, 1808.

Sir—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the [blank] instant, stating that it has been thought advisable, under the present circumstances in Spain, that the natives of the Asturias, now prisoners of war in this country, should be liberated and sent back to Spain; and I have to

<sup>1</sup> L'Ambigu, Nos. 182 to 185.

acquaint you that I have received his Majesty's commands to direct that measures may be taken for carrying the same into effect.

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Admiralty.*

Draft.

Downing Street, June 16, 1808.

My Lords—There being reason to believe that certain Spanish officers are about to embark on board American vessels from some of the ports of Holland, with views hostile to this country, I am to signify to your lordships his Majesty's pleasure that all American vessels coming from the ports of Holland should be strictly searched for Spanish officers; and that all Spanish officers, together with their papers, found on board any of the said American ships or vessels, should be detained, and forthwith sent into port for examination, until further orders; and your lordships will give the necessary orders accordingly to the officers commanding his Majesty's squadrons and vessels of war.

In the execution of this service, your lordships will instruct the commanders of the ships of war to be most particular in examining American vessels coming from the port of Amsterdam, information having been received that the Spanish officers in question propose to embark at that port.

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Colonel Sir Thomas Dyer, Major Roche, and Captain Patrick.*

Draft.

Downing Street, June 19, 1808.

Gentlemen—It being desirable that his Majesty's Government should obtain as precise information as possible of the state of affairs in the principality of Asturias, his Majesty has been pleased to direct that some officers of his army, acquainted with the Spanish language, should be sent to that principality, for the purpose of collecting and reporting such information; and, his Majesty having been pleased to make choice of you for

this service, you will immediately proceed to Plymouth, and there embark on board the [blank] prepared for your reception.

A Spanish gentleman, recently arrived from the Asturias, will accompany you to the port of Gijon, and will previously land, to prepare your reception at Oviedo; upon your arrival at which place, you will present to the General Assembly of the Province of Asturias the enclosed letter from the Deputies of that body, who are now in London.

The objects to which you are particularly to direct your attention are :

1. The safe disembarkation of the military stores, destined for the use of the Asturian levies, which stores will sail at the same time with you, and will be consigned to Sir Thomas Dyer. A specification of the nature and amount of these stores is herewith enclosed.

2. You are to obtain the most precise information of the number of troops, whether regular or irregular, actually in arms in the province of Asturias; of the extent of means possessed by that province for adding to those numbers, and of furnishing them with arms.

3. You will endeavour to ascertain the amount and distribution of the French armies in Spain, and particularly in the neighbourhood of the Asturias, and the nature of the difficulties or facilities attending the invasion of that province.

So soon as you shall have been received by the existing authorities of the country, you will obtain permission to direct your inquiries to those and such other points as are connected with the military situation and means of that province, and to penetrate, if it be practicable, into any adjacent province which shall have made common cause with the Asturias.

It may be expedient, for this purpose, that you should pursue separate lines of inquiry, as Sir Thomas Dyer may judge the most advisable, being careful only that one of your number should always be resident at the seat of the local Government. As soon as you shall have obtained any such particulars as he

may think material for the information of his Majesty's Government, Sir Thomas Dyer will return to England, in the vessel which will be directed to wait for him, leaving Major Roche and Captain Patrick to prosecute the objects of the mission.

It is hoped that you will find the spirit of the country unbroken, and its means of resistance to French power strengthened and improved. But, in the more unfortunate event of any signal disaster having taken place, or of the counsels of the local Government appearing to have undergone such a change, as that resistance should be no longer intended, it is left to Sir Thomas Dyer's discretion to decline disembarking the stores at the hazard of their falling into the hands of the enemy.

You will at all times express, in the strongest terms, his Majesty's earnest desire to contribute, by all means in his power, to the success of the noble struggle in which the Asturians are engaged; and Sir Thomas Dyer will receive any further propositions either from that or from any other province of Spain, and undertake to bring them home, to be laid before his Majesty's Government.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Lords of the Admiralty.*

Draft.

Downing Street, June 20, 1808.

My Lords—It being judged expedient to release some of the Spanish prisoners now at Plymouth, to the number of eight or ten, for the purpose of accompanying Sir Thomas Dyer to the coast of Spain, I have to signify to your lordships his Majesty's pleasure that you do issue the necessary orders to the Admiral at Plymouth, for carrying the same into effect, in such manner as Sir Thomas Dyer may point out.

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CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Commander of the Forces in the Leeward Islands.*

Draft.

Downing Street, June 20, 1808.

Sir—Upon the 4th inst., I wrote to you confidentially respecting the events which have taken place in Spain, and enclosed to you certain printed accounts, of the conduct of Buonaparte to that monarchy, which I desired you would have translated into Spanish, and have circulated in the Spanish provinces.

Since that letter was written, two Deputies of the States of the province of Asturias have arrived, in order to represent that this province had openly declared war against France, and had been joined by the province of Leon, and was in expectation of co-operation from Biscay and Gallicia; also that invitations had been sent to all the other provinces, to combine in a general confederacy in favour of the legitimate race of their monarchs, and for asserting their national independence.

They have also solicited the aid of his Majesty, in furtherance of their honourable exertions; and I now enclose copies of the communications which they have made, and of the answers which have been given by his Majesty's command. Subsequent advices to the 6th instant, from Coruña, confirm the truth of the representations made by the Deputies.

From the enclosed papers you will at once see that it is the great object of his Majesty to effect, if possible, the liberation of Spain from the tyranny of Buonaparte; and in any correspondence you may be enabled to open with any of the Spanish Governors, you will make them sensible of his Majesty's honourable purpose. His Majesty has no doubt that the Spanish provinces will feel an equal indignation with the inhabitants of the mother country, against the perfidy and tyranny of France; that they will use every means in their power to support the cause of the States of Asturias; and that they will co-operate with his Majesty in counteracting the

designs of the French, and in preventing them from extending their systematic system of perfidy and oppression to the American provinces.

If there should be any reason to dread any attack whatsoever upon any of the provinces of America by the French, his Majesty will be ready to support the efforts of the province in resisting the French by a sufficient force.

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Manchester.*

Draft.

Downing Street, June 20, 1808.

My Lord—The despatch I transmitted to your Grace by Mr. Williamson was accompanied with a paper intended for circulation among the Spanish provinces. It was written when the hopes of restoring that monarchy in Europe seemed to be at an end, and therefore presented a view of the conduct of Spain calculated to detach the provinces from the mother country.

As, by the insurrection in the Asturias, some probability of restoring the Spanish monarchy is revived, an object of the first importance in his Majesty's mind, it is wished to suspend any measure tending to divide and therefore to weaken that monarchy. I am, therefore, to instruct your Grace not to suffer the circulation of that paper under existing circumstances ; or to circulate only such parts as relate to the recent conduct of the French and do not reflect on the conduct of the Spanish Court.

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Manchester.*

Downing Street, June 22, 1808.

My Lord—I enclose to your Grace herewith a despatch which has been written by the Viscount de Materosa and Don André de la Vega, the Deputies from the Junta of the provinces of the Asturias, who have been accredited by them to the Court of London, upon the declaration of war by those provinces against France.

It is addressed to the Governor of Mexico ; and I am to

desire your Grace will forward the same, with a proper letter from yourself, to the Governor of the Havannah by a flag of truce; also that your Grace will take a copy of the said despatch, lest any accident should happen to the original, and to transmit the copy by a flag of truce to Vera Cruz, with a letter to the Governor, explaining the nature of this communication, and desiring him to forward the letters you enclose to him to the Governor of Mexico, and a copy of what has been sent to the Governor of the Havannah for him to forward.

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Translation of the Plan of Defensive Operations for the French Army in Portugal.*

Lisbon, June 28, 1808.

A powerful fleet of the enemy threatens the port and town of Lisbon. This fleet, strong, independent of its actual force, in the good understanding which it is sure to procure by the advantages of the moment, is enabled to act with the confidence necessarily inspired by the certainty of being powerfully seconded by the succours which cannot fail to flow from the ferment which men, elated and corrupted by the gold of the enemy, will take delight in spreading, for the purpose of exciting the people to all kinds of excess.

We may, therefore, assume that the town and the port of Lisbon may be attacked at the same moment by sea and by land: indeed, we may suppose that this moment is not very distant, if we may credit the different reports from the distant posts of the army, which, however, are seldom entitled to much confidence. In this state of affairs, it is important to consider which attacks are most to be apprehended, and by what means they are to be repelled.

We shall only consider those attacks which might be attempted by forcing the port, or such positions of the coast as are situated between Peniche and Setuval, as attacks by sea: every other attempt by debarkation will be considered in the

question of attacks by land, which we shall notice after having considered those by sea.

Let us then suppose the enemy, informed of the movements and progress of a land attack, proposes to make a diversion in favour of such attack, and avail himself of the advantage of the wind, probably north-east, to pass the narrow entrance and enter close to the Fort of St. Julien, in order to bear off for the port. In such case, the Fort of St. Julien can only hope to stop the fleet by firing point-blank. Those guns only which can be well supplied with red-hot balls should be pointed in this direction. The principal object of the others should be to destroy the rigging of the ships: the higher batteries of the Fort should endeavour to dismast and cripple the ships. The real advantage to be gained would be by checking the way of the ships, and probably forcing them out of their course; and as they must keep the wind as close as possible to enter, it is by no means improbable that some ship may be run aground on the northern point of the passage, which is the greatest advantage we can expect.

It is by no means probable that the assailants would anchor in the outer port to attempt a debarkation: if, however, they were to venture, the charge of the defence of the coast being confided to General Traval, he would soon procure assistance to repel the attempt, not very probable, when we consider the state of the armament on the right bank.

We may then suppose that the enemy would try to pass the defences of Belem and Torre Velha. These two points ought, therefore, to be reinforced as strongly as possible: it is doing without delay; and there is no doubt that, in the present state of things, the enemy will find difficulties, but it is principally from the Russian ships that he must experience a powerful resistance; the line of ships supported on the right by the battery of Belem, and on the left beyond the Naval Arsenal, by forming as close as possible to the right bank of the Tagus, will present the most formidable line of defence that can be proposed.

To support this line, mortar batteries should be established as quickly as possible in the Bastion of Alcantara, and in the Battery of St. Jean de Dieu. These two points are so disposed as to be capable of receiving guns which can be placed nowhere else so usefully. In supposing the enemy to have passed our defences, and to have succeeded in anchoring in the port, he could not maintain his position under the accumulated fires of the line-of-battle ships, and the mortar batteries of Alcantara, of Jean de Dieu, and of the Naval Arsenal. These mortar batteries must, therefore, be established without delay.

It is not thought necessary to detail here any of the movements or means of defence to be employed, in case of the enemy's debarking on either bank of the river between Setuval and Peniche : the defence of that part of the coast is entrusted to officers who are thoroughly acquainted with the theatre of the military operations which ought to take place, and the local advantages leave great probability of success.

After this view of the means of opposing an enemy who should attempt to force the port by his fleet, we will proceed to consider the attacks by land, which seem most to be apprehended for the port and town of Lisbon. Let us suppose (what is by no means likely) that clouds of insurgents, without control, without any able leader, without the means of subsistence, and very probably without unison, should venture to penetrate into Alentejo, and leave behind them such a place as Elvas, which ought never to have less than 3,000 men, with a view of taking the field in face of a corps which might be augmented to 6,000 men.

We need not hesitate to presume that we might advance beyond the Tagus, and take, for our first line of defence, the course of the Soro, beginning at Salvaterra, and ascending as far as Soverigna, from whence the line would bear upon the river; but, if the bridge across the Tagus cannot be constructed, and if the tranquillity of Lisbon does not admit of detaching from thence, we see a position much more concentrated and

much stronger on the right bank of the river. The centre would be at the confluence of the Zezene with the Tagus : it would extend by the right to Lisbon ; and, as it would seem impossible to force the right, the greatest strength of the army would be drawn towards Thomar, Ourem, and Leyria, where an intelligent officer would probably find excellent defensive positions in the nature of the country.

Admitting always that the left of his position might be forced, it would retire between Santarem and Peniche, where the ground being studied and reconnoitred beforehand, would probably afford powerful means of repelling an attack. Not far from thence would also be found the excellent position of Alenquer and Torres Vedras, the right of which would be extended to the Tagus, the left to the sea.

To come at last to that lamentable state of affairs, in which the army should be reduced to the necessity of retiring from the position of Alenquer and Torres Vedras, its retreat could only be made upon Lisbon. It would still have in front of the town a fine position, the right supported by the rivulet of Sacarem, the left by the heights of Bellas. This position being placed in a short time in a state of defence, and leaving to the enemy no resource to turn it, or for any diversion, would absolutely oblige him to carry it by main force ; an operation extremely delicate, and affording scarcely any probability of success to the troops, in all likelihood not much inured to war, who might risk the attempt.

The mode of defence which we have just considered leaving Alentejo at the disposal of the enemy, we must reasonably apprehend that he would direct his troops and artillery to the occupation of the heights of Almeida, from whence he could do infinite mischief to the town and to the ships : it is, therefore, indispensably necessary to provide against this danger by securing a good position to cover Almeida and to ensure its defence.

The first line herein mentioned, the right of which extends

from the mouth of the Zezene to Lisbon, being supposed to be well established, it is not probable that the enemy will be able to pass to the right bank of the river at this part of its course. He will perhaps attempt it above the mouth of the Zezene, but we should be informed of it, and, moving along the right bank of that river, we should dispute his passage ; at least, as far as Pedrogas, a considerable height, where it would become difficult to prevent his effecting a junction with the corps which would come from Upper Beira, and from Oporto and Coimbra.

But, supposing this junction effected, the defence would become precisely the same as that which we have before discussed ; and, without waiting for new combinations of defence, if we suppose 2 or 3,000 men between Leyria and Maffra, this force, which could easily concert its operations with the 6,000 men charged with the defence of the right bank of the Tagus, and of the line of Thomar and Leyria, would, in all probability, be sufficient to cover the approaches of the capital, while the troops left in the interior would be occupied in the important duty of preserving tranquillity.

In order, however, to comprehend all the combinations more or less probable, and even most fatal to the army—a duty which must be fulfilled, however painful to the imagination—let us suppose the army compelled to evacuate Lisbon. Traval's division will fall back upon Belem, preserving the heights of Memoria Necessidad, to assist in securing the tranquillity of the town. The army depôts of every description will be withdrawn to the right bank of the river, which it will not have been possible to attack. Sacarem will be the rallying point ; and the army, forced to a retreat, will commence it from this point, to retire by Santarem to Thomar ; from thence, passing the Zezene at Villa del Rey, it will re-ascend it at Belmonte Guarda and Almeida, by Cortesado, Montegardo, and Atalaya.

We are not aware of any obstacle likely to interrupt the

army in its retreat, which may be made *en masse*, as far as Thomar; but, when it arrives at this point, or even sooner, it may be divided into several columns, to reach its destination by the Upper Beira. On its reaching Almeida, the army will probably preserve sufficient force to traverse Spain, or, which is still more probable, to effect a junction with the nearest corps of troops.

We only suppose the retreat to be made upon the provinces of Beira and upon Almeida, the only possible retreat, if the river should fall into the power of the enemy; but it is much more likely that, in the contrary event, it would be ordered upon Elvas. The passage of the river, which would have been foreseen, would probably present no difficulty: a considerable number of small vessels would be collected in the river of Sacarem, and along the right bank occupied by the army; the troops entrenched at Almeida would fall back, to cover the debarkation on the left bank; and the army would retreat by the finest road in Portugal, which would afford every hope of its being effected in the best order—an advantage which we are entitled to hope will never be the object of our ambition.

VINCENT, Colonel of Engineers.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-Colonel Doyle.*

Draft.

Downing Street, July 2, 1808.

Sir—His Majesty having been pleased to direct that the Spanish prisoners of war in this country should be immediately sent back to Spain, and to such port as the Deputies from Spain may point out, it has been thought expedient that such soldiers and sailors as are fit for service should be selected from the remainder, and conveyed back, in the first instance, although the whole are ultimately to return to Spain.

With this view, and to facilitate the arrangement of this service, I have to acquaint you that you have been selected by his Majesty, as an officer well acquainted with the Spanish

language, to proceed, in the first instance, to Portsmouth, being furnished from hence with authority from the Deputies of the Provisional Government of Spain to explain to the Spanish prisoners the state of affairs in their country, and to rouse in them the inclination of aiding and taking an active part in the noble struggle in which they are engaged.

You will communicate with the Agent of Transports at Portsmouth, who will have the necessary orders relative to their embarkation ; and from Portsmouth you will proceed to Plymouth, and there act in a similar manner. The prisoners embarked at Portsmouth will touch at Plymouth ; and, as the Spanish Deputies are of opinion that your services will be useful in accompanying these men to Spain, you will proceed with them to the port they may be directed to, and, after delivering them up to such persons as the Deputies may point out, you will, after informing yourself of the state of affairs there, return to England for any further orders that may be given to you.

A supply of articles of clothing, &c., as enumerated in the margin, has been demanded by the Deputies, and will be sent in a transport, together with the prisoners, and consigned to your care. Two Spanish serjeants that have been sent for to Portsmouth will accompany you on this service ; and, as these have been seen and been instructed by the Deputies, it is hoped that you may derive assistance from them.

An advance of £200 will be made to you, in the first instance : you will communicate with me from Portsmouth or Plymouth, if you stand in need of a further supply ; and you will keep an account of your expenses for my information.

You will not fail to apply to me, on your arrival at Portsmouth or Plymouth, for any further instructions on any points that may arise, upon which you may require directions. You will be permitted to take Captain Kennedy, of the 96th Regiment, as an assistant to you upon this service. You will communicate, on your arrival at Portsmouth and Plymouth, with the admiral and officer in command of his Majesty's forces,

naval and military, at those stations, who will afford you any assistance that may be necessary in carrying the service into effect.

CASTLEREAGH.

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Cork, July 7, 1808.

My dear Lord—I arrived here last night, and I find that the 20th Dragoons and the 3,000 tons of shipping for the infantry have not yet arrived. The Irish Commissariat horses for the draught of the artillery are not yet all arrived, and will not be on board till Saturday. I propose to wait till that day for the Dragoons and the additional tonnage, and, if they should not then have arrived, I shall sail with what is ready, and let the rest follow.

By some accident, which, from not having seen the Agent of Transports, I cannot yet account for, we have four transports, as stated underneath, have not been returned to me in any statement from the Transport Board, or from your brother. These vessels have enabled General Floyd to embark the 95th, and make some provision for the embarkation of the 36th. But it appears to me that the whole are too much crowded; and, if the additional tonnage does not arrive to-morrow, I shall settle to leave behind the Veteran Battalion or the 36th, to follow with the additional tonnage and the 20th Dragoons, and give more space to all the troops in the transports. If the additional tonnage should arrive, and I should find that I do not want these four ships, I will leave them here.

Upon a review of your instructions and intentions, and a consideration of the state of affairs in Spain, according to the last accounts, I rather think that I shall, as soon as I have got everything away from Cork, best serve the cause by going myself to Corunna, and joining the fleet off Cape Finisterre or the Tagus. I propose, accordingly, to go on board one of the craft, and I expect to be at the rendezvous before the troops.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Ships not returned by the Transport Board.*

	Name.	Tonnage.	By what Regiment occupied.
No. 155	Dædalus	311	4th Veteran Battalion.
L H	George	366	4th Veteran Battalion.
G N	Liberty	219	45th Regiment.
M A	New Hope	178	36th Regiment, not yet embarked.

*Ships returned by the Transport Board on June 22, not yet arrived.*

	Tonnage.		
Darlington	—	Laden	with pikes.
Britannia	295	Entrenching tools ;	sailed June 20 from Plymouth.
Britannia	336	Laden	with arms.
Harford	312	do.	do.
Urania	327	do.	flour.
Linen Hall	153	do.	oats.
Friends	154	do.	do.
Iris	106	do.	do.

*Lord Castlereagh to Commodore Owen off Boulogne.*

Draft.

Stanmore Park, July 11, 1808.

Dear Sir—You will oblige me very much by sending me the best intelligence you can collect with respect to the enemy's movements and means of defence on the line between Boulogne and Antwerp, including Walcheren. I think the last Report stated the line-of-battle-ships to have been removed from Flushing to some position higher up the river, where they were equipping. It also spoke of a camp close to the position they occupied, but did not mention its strength.

How far would it be practicable for a naval force, supported by troops, to follow them up the Scheldt? Could our transports venture up the river, so as to make a *coup de main* on Antwerp feasible? And what force have you reason to suppose the enemy can assemble in that quarter? I should also

wish to know the enemy's force at Boulogne. Are their works on the western heights so far completed as to be closed? And how far would they require to be regularly approached? Can you attack and destroy the flotilla in the harbour and the river, having disembarked an army of superior force? Or, is it so far protected by the citadel to the eastward, and the new works to the westward, as to render the previous reduction of one or both necessary to the success of the enterprise?

Supposing an army landed to the westward, (at the distance, I think, of five or six miles, as has been recommended) where would you suppose they should re-embark? And does any position occur to you, where their re-embarkation could be so effectually covered by our ships as to afford them a prospect of retiring without material loss? I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.*

Draft.

Downing Street, July 15, 1808.

Dear Wellesley—Consistently with the employment of the necessary amount of force towards Spain and Portugal, before the enemy shall receive his expected reinforcements, I have made every effort to keep in your hands the greatest number of men, and for the longest time that circumstances would permit. I shall rejoice if it shall have fallen to your lot to place the Tagus in our hands: if not, I have no fear that you will find many opportunities of doing yourself honour and your country service.

Sir Hew Dalrymple will put you in possession of the steps I have deemed it my public duty to take, to secure to the service the most extensive and beneficial exercise of your exertions.

*Rt. Hon. G. Canning to Lord Castlereagh.*

Claremont, July 23, 1808.

Dear Castlereagh—The recovery of St. Andero confirms (as it appears to me) the expediency of our having something like

a force in that quarter. Five thousand men, or less, under any one of the officers whose names you showed me yesterday, might make an effectual and solid resistance against any further attempt of the French to push forward along that coast, and, with the addition of a few more small cruisers, would probably set free a much greater portion of the Spanish army for interior operations. Is not the suggestion of Colonel Wood, respecting Mr. Antonio, worth recurring to now? and is it not, at all events, desirable to send a great many more officers —if of artillery, so much the better.

Yours ever, G. C.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Crocodile, off Oporto, July 25, 1808.

My dear Lord—I avail myself of the opportunity of the return of the Peacock to England, to inform you that I sailed from Corunna, as I told you I should, in the night of the 21st, and joined the fleet next day, and arrived here yesterday in the Crocodile, and the fleet are now coming in.

All the provinces north of the Tagus, with the exception of the country immediately about Lisbon, are in a state of insurrection against the French, and the people are ready and desirous to take arms; but, unfortunately, there are none in the country; indeed, I may say, none to arm the troops which the Bishop of Oporto and the Junta of this place have assembled. They have at present a corps of about 5,000 men, regular troops and militia, including 300 cavalry, at Coimbra, armed with 1000 muskets got from the fleet, fowling-pieces, &c.; and 12,000 peasants, mostly unarmed, I believe. Their regular troops are composed of detachments of different corps, and cannot be deemed in any respect an efficient force. Besides these, there are 300 Spanish infantry, about 1,500 regular Portuguese infantry, and some militia volunteers and peasantry here. The Spanish infantry, which had commenced its march from Gallicia, as I informed you in my last letter, is not yet

arrived. It was stopped on the frontier, because there were no orders at Braganza to allow it to enter the country ; and, although the Bishop expects it, the Portuguese officers appear to think that the success of the French against the Spanish army, on the 14th, has diverted this corps from the service and this country. Under all these circumstances, I have determined to take forward the Portuguese corps now at Coimbra, and to collect every thing else upon this place.

The Bishop is much alarmed respecting the success of the French in the province of Valladolid, in Leon. It is reported here that there has been a second action ; and I saw a letter last night from the Bishop of St. Jago, stating that General Cuesta, the Castilian Commander-in-Chief, had informed him that he had gained a victory in this action, and had actually in his camp 1,500 horses taken from the French cavalry ; and it is at the same time reported that the French are actually in Benevente. It is impossible to learn the truth.

I have received a letter from Sir Charles Cotton, of the 9th instant, in which he advises me to leave the fleet to windward, and to go down to the Tagus to confer with him. He has occupied a post with 400 marines at Figuera, near Mondego, in front of Coimbra ; at which place, or at Peniche, he thinks it will be most advisable for me to land. I therefore propose to send the fleet to Mondego, to make all the arrangements for landing, to go down to communicate with the Admiral, and by the time I shall have returned all will be ready to go on shore either at Mondego or Peniche, or further to the southward, if the Admiral should think it desirable.

I have heard nothing positive of Spencer, excepting that he was with Sir Charles Cotton in the beginning of this month ; his corps having been landed, merely to preserve the health of the men, near Cape St. Mary's. I conclude, therefore, that I shall find him with the fleet off the Tagus.

The French corps is concentrated at and about Lisbon, and is said to consist of from 12 to 14,000 men. Sir Charles Cotton

says that they are adding to the fortifications of the town, of a citadel within the town, and of Fort St. Julian.

The measures to be adopted for this country are to supply it with arms and money. I saw a statement last night, from which it appears that they could get together 38,000 men with ease, if they had arms or money to pay them. If I should find the troops at Coimbra to be worth it, I propose to arm them.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

PS. The Spanish troops from Estremadura have entered the eastern frontier of Portugal, and have occupied all the posts on both sides of the Tagus, excepting Elvas and Almeida, still held by small detachments of the French.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird.*

Copy.

Downing Street, July 28, 1808.

Sir—I cannot suffer your sailing orders to go down, without sending you a few lines, although I have, in truth, little to say; as I think it of importance that you should lose no time in getting away with the gross of your armament. Should there be any delay in the arrival of any of the less important part of the equipment, as, for instance, the weak battalion of the 60th, which is ordered to join you from Plymouth, and which is going out upon the chance of being completed by Germans in Spain, you can leave them to follow by the next convoy.

Wishing you all success, I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

As we shall now have the means of embarking two regiments of cavalry at Portsmouth, I should be glad you would arrange proper cantonments for them on their arrival, in which the horses may be tolerably well off, while the army is assembling and preparing for service.

C.

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

On board the Donegal, August 1, 1808.

My dear Lord—I have nothing to add to my public letter of this date, excepting to tell you that I have every reason to believe General Spencer's account of the French force in Portugal is exaggerated. I intended to make the attack with my own corps, aided by the Portuguese, if it should have turned out that he could not join me, according to my orders of the 26th of July, till I received your letter of the 15th, in which you announced the reinforcement; and I shall now march on, of course, as soon as one of the corps will arrive.

Pole and Burghersh have apprized me of the arrangements for the future command of this army; and the former has informed me of your kindness towards me, of which I have experienced so many instances, that I can never doubt it in any case. All that I can say upon that subject is, that, whether I am to command the army or not, or am to quit it, I will do my best to ensure its success; and you may depend upon it, that I will not hurry the operations, or commence them one moment sooner than they ought to be commenced, in order that I may acquire the credit of the success. The Government will determine for me in what way they will employ me hereafter, whether here or elsewhere.

My opinion is, that Great Britain ought to raise, organize, and pay an army in Portugal, consisting of 30,000 Portuguese troops, which might be easily raised at an early period, and 20,000 British, including 4,000 or 5,000 cavalry. This army might operate on the frontiers of Portugal, in Spanish Estremadura, and it would serve as the link of communication between the kingdoms of Gallicia and Andalusia. It would give Great Britain the preponderance in the conduct of the war in the Peninsula; and, whatever might be the result of the Spanish exertions, Portugal would be saved from the French grasp. You know best whether you could bear the expense, or what part of it the Portuguese Government would

or could defray. But if you should adopt this plan, you must send every thing from England—arms, ammunition, clothing, accoutrements, ordnance, flour, oats, &c. These articles must find their way to the frontier, partly by the navigation of the Douro and Tagus, and partly by other means.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The ground I have for believing that Custanhos has beat Dupont is, that I have read a copy of his despatch to the Junta of Seville, published in the Coimbra Gazette. Its purport is nearly what I have stated in my despatch, excepting only that Dupont may have surrendered, with his army, and that the French force south of the Morena, not engaged in the action of the 20th, may have capitulated on condition of being sent to France by sea. I do not understand Portuguese well enough to say whether this is not the case, and somebody has taken away the Gazette.

You will observe that I have exceeded my authority in ordering Spence to draw for £100,000 upon England, and to advance that sum to the Junta of Seville; of which act I hope you will see the propriety, and that you will send me an approbation of it. I must mention, however, that since I did it, I have heard that Sir Hew Dalrymple had refused to advance them any money, although he had authority.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Brigadier-General Decken.*

Draft.

Downing Street, August 4, 1808.

Sir—His Majesty, having deemed it expedient that an officer of rank should be employed at the head-quarters of each of the armies assembled in the several provinces of Spain which are united in resisting French usurpation and invasion, has been graciously pleased to select you to be employed on this service. I am, therefore, to acquaint you that his Majesty has been pleased to appoint you a Brigadier-General upon the staff of the army serving under Lieut.-General Sir Hew Dal-

rymple, in Spain and Portugal, in which capacity you are to receive the pay and allowance of your rank.

You are forthwith to repair to Gijon, and report your arrival to the Junta of the province, and to the General commanding the army of the province. You will inform them that his Majesty has sent you, in order that you may give every possible assistance to the cause in which they are engaged :

1st. In giving advice and counsel when called upon.

2nd. In employing the officers who are under your superintendence in instructing new levies, wherin their experience may be thought useful.

3rd. In learning and representing the real wants of their forces ; and,

Lastly, In keeping up a communication with the Commanding Officer of his Majesty's forces in Spain and Portugal, so that he may be enabled to judge in respect to the points in which his Majesty's army can be best employed, so as to support and advance the common cause.

The nature of your destination will be opened to the Junta of the province of Asturias by Mr. Hunter, at Oviedo, who has received instructions to that purpose.<sup>1</sup>

I am particularly to desire that you will take frequent opportunities to be at head-quarters, and select such places of residence as will be most eligible for communication.

You will use every opportunity to correspond with the Commander of the forces in Spain, detailing to him all points of information which you may conceive it may be of use for him to be acquainted with. And you will make your communication hither to me, for the information of his Majesty and his Ministers, in the fullest and most confidential manner, and as frequently as may be in your power.

<sup>1</sup> A letter precisely similar, and accompanied by the same instructions, was addressed to Brigadier-General Sontag, who was ordered to proceed to Corunna, his mission being to Gallicia, to the Junta of which province its object was to be communicated by Mr. Stuart.

I need hardly point out to your experience the various heads upon which information will be desirable; but still I am anxious that you should be possessed of the leading points on which his Majesty's Ministers desire information. I annex to this despatch a memorandum for your observation and guidance. You will instruct the officers under your superintendence conformably to these instructions, who are hereby directed to report their proceedings to you, and to obey such orders as you may give them; and, as the earliest intelligence is of importance, you will, at the same time, direct them to correspond with me; and, where the service may require it, immediately with the Commander-in-Chief of the army, or any general officer commanding a corps of his Majesty's troops, to whom it may be desirable that the intelligence they may have to communicate should, without loss of time, be conveyed.

An advance of £500 will be made to you, for any immediate contingent expense, and you will be allowed to charge as contingent expenses such disbursements as a General Officer upon a detached service is allowed to charge in a contingent account.

CASTLEREAGH.

Enclosure.

*Memorandum of the direct Objects respecting which Information is required in regard to the Provinces of Asturias and Galicia.*

1st. The state of the existing military force in the province, detailing the nature of its organization.

2nd. The artillery, specifying its distinct species, whether in fortifications or for the field, and distinguishing the number of each calibre.

The quantity of ammunition in proportion to the artillery; the quantity of spare gun-carriages, and the materials and means of making and repairing them.

Whether pontoons are necessary in the province, and whether any in store?

What quantity of entrenching tools, and whether there are internal means, and to what extent, of procuring a supply?

What quantities of camp equipage and necessaries, and what internal means of procuring a supply ?

What quantity of artillery-horses, and mules? What internal means of procuring them, and what number wanting? Whether draught bullocks can be substituted, and to what number, and at what prices?

What the number of the Artillery corps and the Engineers How composed, what the nature of the officers, and in general the state of discipline and experience of the corps?

#### *Cavalry.*

What the number, composition, and state of the cavalry? The number of the regiments—whether light or heavy? Their establishment; the number and quality of the horses; the state of discipline; the means of recruiting and drilling the men, and of procuring horses for remount. What regiments old, what new; the state of their arms and equipments; and the internal means of increasing their quantity?

#### *Infantry.*

The number of regiments, and the number of men in each, distinguishing old battalions from new battalions; the number of levies assembled, but not regimented; the manner in which they are organized; their state of discipline; also the means of increasing their numbers.

The nature and state of their arms—the supply of muskets, ammunition, and the internal means of increasing the supply. Also the deficiency which must be provided elsewhere. Whether pikes are in use, and what supply wished for?

#### *Finance.*

The rate of pay of the different descriptions of service. The monthly expense of pay.

The mode of paying the army—whether in money or paper, and the nature of the rations and stoppages.

What are the means of the province for supporting the expenditure, and what assistance it can derive from other provinces ; what aid it may be necessary to give ?

*Provisions.*

What are the powers of the province for supporting its army ? — Whether any magazines have been formed, or can be formed, and to what extent ?

What is the nature of the forage, and quantity, and the facility of obtaining it ?

What the kind of provisions on which the soldiers live, and the nature of their rations, and the manner in which the Commissariat is managed ?

*Carriage and Draught Horses and Mules.*

What the nature and number of those in the province, distinguishing those already attached to the army from those which could be procured when wanted ?

A similar Report as to draught bullocks ; also with regard to the facility of procuring drivers.

*Political State.*

It is of great importance to receive information as to the true state of the public mind of the province.

How far the great proprietors and noblesse of the province are engaged in the popular cause ; how far the taxes are collected and applied ; how the rents of the proprietors, who are acting with the French, are disposed of.

In what manner the Junta of the province corresponds with the Juntas of other provinces ; and how far there is any centre of unity for the conduct of affairs.

To what degree the Commander-in-Chief of the army is dependent on the authority of the Junta.

*Description of the Country.*

Its general face and character in a military view ; the na-

ture, number, and direction of its roads, distinguishing those by which an army, with its artillery, can march, from those in which light corps without artillery can operate.

The positions which the country affords favourable to assembling troops, for making an attack upon the enemy.

The positions which it contains favourable to defensive operations.

The means it has of preserving its communications with the armies of other provinces, so as to form combined operations.

The general nature of the mountains, rivers, bridges, and passes, and of the kind of war for which the province is adapted.

The state of the cities, towns, and villages, not only with a view to those which are at all fortified, or might be fortified, but with respect to the number of troops they would hold in cantonments.

#### *Seasons.*

The general state of the weather in the different seasons of the year, and the healthy or unhealthy parts of the province ; as also the facilities of procuring fuel and water, and the nature of them.

Whether an army can operate during both the heats and the rains, or whether it must go into cantonments, and for how long, and at what periods ; also, what is the medical and hospital arrangement of the troops.

It is desired that such of these queries, upon which sufficient information has been already procured, may be immediately answered, and the rest after due investigation. Any material changes that may take place to be from time to time remarked.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The preceding orders and instructions, as far as they related to Brigadier-General Decken, were revoked a few days afterwards (August 10) by the transfer of the mission to the province of Asturias, with precisely the same instructions, to Major-General Leith.—ED.

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Camp at Lavos, August 8, 1808.

My dear Lord—My despatch contains the fullest information upon every subject, and I have nothing to add to it. I have had the greatest difficulty in organizing my Commissariat for the march, my Commissary-General being the worst of that description, and his department being very incomplete, notwithstanding the arrangements which I made with Huskisson upon this subject. The department deserves your serious attention. The existence of the army depends upon it, and yet the people who manage it are the most incapable of managing any thing out of a counting-house.

I shall be obliged to leave Spencer's guns behind, for want of the means of moving them, and I should have been obliged to leave my own, if it were not for the horses of the Irish Commissariat. Let nobody ever prevail upon you to send a corps to any part of Europe, at least, without horses to draw the guns. It is not true that horses lose their condition at sea.

I have just heard that Joseph Bonaparte left Madrid for France, accompanied by all the French, on the 29th of last month. I have received your private letter of the 21st of July, for which I am much obliged to you. I shall be the junior of the Lieutenant-Generals ; however, I am ready to serve the Government wherever and as they please.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*General Dumouriez to Lord Castlereagh.*

Broadstairs, Kent, Aoust 8, 1808.

My Lord—Les Patriotes éprouvent les disgraces que j'ai prévues et prédites, parceque ils font la guerre sans plan général et sans ensemble. Ils essuyeront encore des défaites considérables avant de se corriger. Mais tant que le Midy

restera libre, et que la communication sera conservée entre l'Andalousie et la Galice par le Portugal, la résidence du Roy Joseph à Madrid sera très précaire, et il luy restera plus de la moitié de l'Espagne à conquérir, ce qu'il ne peut pas faire en une seule campagne.

Le sort de l'Espagne, par consequent le notre, et celui de l'Europe, dépend donc de la conduite les Anglais en Portugal. C'est là qu'ils doivent se concentrer, se joindre aux Portugais, les organiser en corps d'armée, et en former une de 70 à 80,000 hommes. Non scullement le Portugal est imprenable avec une pareille force pour le défendre, mais il ne sera pas même attaqué. Cette armée peut porter la guerre offensive dans l'Estramadure et dans les Castilles en combinant ses mouvements par la droite avec ceux du Général Castaños et par la gauche avec ceux du Général Blake.

Les Arragonais, les Catalans, les Valenciens, seront vraisemblablement battus, mais s'ils sont obligé d'abandonner les plaines du beau royaume de Valence, ils ont une retraite assuré dans la chaine des montagnes des Alpuxarras, qui couvrent Murcie et Grenade, et qui se rejoignent à la Sierra Morena.

Cette position concentrée rejoindra leur gauche à la droite de l'armée d'Andalousie, qui elle-même sera appuyée par sa gauche par l'armée Anglo-Portugaise, et celle-cy par celle de Galice. Le Roy Joseph sera fort embarrassé dans cette position environnée. Les vivres lui manqueront, n'ayant pas la mer, et étant obligé de faire venir ses secours de tout espèce à dos de mulets par les Pyrénées, que l'hyver et les Miquelets lui fermeront à la fin d'Octobre, et alors plus son armée sera forte, plus il perdra de monde.

Mais pour que tout cela arrive, comme cela ne serait pas douteux, si on faisait la guerre sur un plan général bien entendu, il faudrait

1<sup>o</sup>. Que votre armée en Portugal soit entièrement arrivée et portée au nombre de 40,000 hommes, dont au moins un cinquième de cavalerie ;

2<sup>o</sup>. Qu'elle soit commandée par un général en chef quelconque, qui se soumette à cooperer d'après le plan général, et à n'y rien changer que dans les détails, quand les circonstances l'exigeront ;

3<sup>o</sup>. Que ce plan général soit adopté par la Junta générale, communiqué aux différentes Juntas des diverses Provinces, et suivi par les Commandants de leurs diverses armées ;

4<sup>o</sup>. Que le Ministère Anglais tienne auprès de la Junta générale à Seville un Général habile et d'un ordre supérieur, qui ait conçu ce plan, qui puisse en diriger toutes les parties et en changer les détails selon les circonstances—que ce Général soit agréable aux Espagnols, et, s'il est possible, choisi par eux, sur l'indication du Ministère Anglais. Il ne doit envoyer en son nom ni instructions ni ordres aux Généraux des différentes armées, pour éviter les jalouxies surtout du Général ou des Généraux Anglais. La Junta elle-même ne doit envoyer ni instructions ni ordres à l'armée Anglaise, mais seulement la communication du plan général et des changements que les circonstances obligent à y faire selon son plus ou moins de progrès, pour que l'armée Anglaise puisse arranger ses mouvements le plus régulièrement possible sur le plan général.

Voilà comme j'ay conçu la conduite de cette guerre, avant même qu'elle fut commencée. En conséquence, Mylord, je vous ai envoyé pour le Conseil, ainsi qu'à la Junta générale, un plan général. Mon expérience me fait croire qu'il est bon parceque il est calqué sur celui que j'ai conçu et exécuté en France en 1792. Il a au moins le mérite d'être le seul. On le suivra ou on ne le suivra pas ; mais j'ay la satisfaction d'avoir rempli mon devoir ; j'ay même été au-delà. Si le Conseil approuve ma conduite, ou mes idées, vous me le témoignerez en me répondant.

J'ay l'honneur d'être avec respect, &c.,

GENERAL DUMOURIEZ.

*Memorandum for consideration, on Measures projected in the present State of Affairs in Spain and Portugal.*

[BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.]

August 10, 1808.

The reduction of Dupont's army, the return to Madrid of the remains of Moncey's corps, and the retreat of Bessieres' from Leon and Benevente, indicate the intention of the enemy to be either to concentrate themselves on Madrid, or to fall back on Burgos. The Spanish forces in the southern provinces being thus liberated, and likely to move upon the capital, it is not probable (unless powerful reinforcements should arrive) that the enemy will venture to support Junot in Portugal.

Should Junot's retreat have been delayed till the arrival of the whole of the British force in Portugal, the fate of his army may be considered as decided; and the question for the Cabinet to determine will be what is next to be undertaken.

Should the French attempt to maintain themselves at Madrid, the mass of force which is likely to close in upon them from Andalusia, Murcia, Valencia, Estremadura, and Gallicia, it is hoped, will compel them, if not by force, at least by famine, to retire from that position.

To assist the efforts of the Spaniards, it may, however, be of the utmost consequence to send them from Portugal all the cavalry that can be spared, both British and Portuguese. If a light corps of 8 or 10,000 British infantry would give solidity to their efforts, and serve as a protection to our own cavalry, a corps of this amount might be speedily equipped and advanced, without materially interfering with other operations, perhaps of more importance than a forward movement with the entire of the British army on the side of Portugal, delayed, as it necessarily must be by equipments, and exposed to have the very object for which it is undertaken disappointed by the previous retreat of the enemy from Madrid.

Assuming the view above taken of the relative situation of

the contending armies to be tolerably correct, in order to embarrass the advance of reinforcements from France, and to accomplish, if possible, the ultimate surrender of the entire French army, it seems of the most pressing importance to give strength, by every means in our power, to the efforts of the northern provinces, *particularly to those of the Asturias and the provinces to the eastward*, whose being prevailed upon to take up arms in a great measure depends on the presence and protection of a British corps.

For this purpose it may be desirable to detach a considerable force from hence of both infantry and cavalry to act in connexion with the Spanish levies in that quarter, so as to menace at once the flank and rear of the enemy's line of operations. This corps may be made by troops from home sufficiently substantive to embarrass the French operations considerably, without prematurely weakening the army in Portugal ; but, should all chance of attack on that country disappear, and the force moving against Madrid compel the enemy to retire towards their own frontier, it might then be of moment to embark as large a proportion of the force in Portugal as could be spared from Lisbon without exposing the internal security of the country, and with it to join the British corps in the north of Spain. If, by such a movement, 30,000 British troops, supported by the Spanish armies of Asturias and Aragon, could be brought to act on the line of the enemy's communications, pressed, as they probably would be, in front by the forces which had driven them from Madrid, it is, perhaps, not too much to hope that such divisions of the enemy's army as should endeavour to retire by the Western Pyrenees, might either be compelled to surrender, or to seek a retreat across Spain, under circumstances of extreme danger and embarrassment.

Lord Castlereagh has deemed it his duty to bring these considerations under the view of his colleagues, in order that they may now determine on the principle on which the war in Spain and Portugal is hereafter to be conducted. The Cabinet will feel

that an early decision is the more pressing, as Sir Hew Dalrymple has no precise instructions beyond the occupation of Lisbon, the security of Cadiz, and the reduction of Dupont. It was considered that ulterior measures could not well be decided on till these objects, if not actually accomplished, were in train of being so. The intelligence of the last few days necessarily forces this important question upon the attention of Government.

Transports are now ready for embarking a corps of 10,000 men ; the proportion for the 5,000 men to embark at Cork has already sailed. The tonnage for the additional 5,000 men, being part of the 10,000 under orders in England, will be completed in about ten days.

Cavalry transports for 2,300 horses have been ordered back from Portugal, leaving provision for about 800 horses with the force there, for the purpose of moving the artillery horses of any corps it might be deemed expedient to detach from thence.

Exclusive of the above 2,300, there are now taken up at home transports for 534 horses, which supply is increasing daily, but by slow degrees.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Caldas, August 16, 1808.

My dear Lord—I have but little to add to my letters of this day. We are going on as well as possible—the army in high order and in great spirits. We make long marches, to which they are becoming accustomed ; and I make no doubt they will be equal to any thing, when we shall reach Lisbon. I have every hope of success.

The affair of the advanced posts of yesterday evening was unpleasant, because it was quite useless, and was occasioned contrary to orders, solely by the impatience of the officers, and the dash and eagerness of the men. They behaved remarkably well, and did some execution with their rifles.

I send you the history of our separation from the Portuguese army, that you may communicate upon it with De Souza. If you should determine to form a Portuguese army, you must, if possible, have nothing to do with General Bernardin Freire, or a General Fourgas, who is Chef de l'Etat Major, his adviser.

The fact is, they are afraid of the French; they are incapable of making any arrangement to feed their troops, and they are not a little afraid of them.

Our artillery horses are not what we ought to have; they have great merit in their way as cart-horses, dragoons, and Irish car-horses, bought for £12 each; but not fit for an army that, to be successful and carry things with a high hand, ought to be able to move.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Camp at Lourinha, August 18, 1808.

My dear Lord—My despatches of yesterday and this day will inform you of the state of our affairs here. I never saw such desperate fighting as in the attack of the pass by Lake, and in the three attacks made by the French on our troops in the mountains. These attacks were made in their best style, and our troops defended themselves capitally; and, if the difficulties of the ground had not prevented me from bringing up a sufficient number of troops and of cannon, we should have taken the whole army.

La Borde is desperately wounded, and another French General is killed. They say that the French lost 1,500 men, which is a large account; but I think they had more than 6,000 men in the action. As soon as Anstruther shall be landed, I hope that I shall give you a good account of the remainder of the French army; but I am afraid that I shall

not gain a complete victory, that is, I shall not entirely destroy them, for want of cavalry.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I enclose a letter for Mr. Borough about Lake's death, and one for Lord Longford, to tell him that his brother is quite well.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple.*

Draft.

Stanmore Park, August 20, 1808.

Sir—As the moment is not, I trust, remote when your force will be liberated for the objects to which it was, in the first instance, destined, I am anxious to be informed of your sentiments with respect to ulterior operations.

Portugal being recovered, our objects seem to be two: 1st, to aid the Spaniards in expelling the enemy; 2nd, in the mode of doing so, to aim, if possible, at the destruction or capture of the whole or a part of the French army.

The means we have to apply, (exclusive of 16,000 men in Sicily, 10,000 of which may be deemed disposable) are the 30,000 men assembled in Portugal, and 10,000 men now ready for embarkation here. I speak in this estimate of infantry. Our means of furnishing cavalry are limited principally by the power of transporting them.

When the horse transports ordered home arrive, together with those coming forward here, we shall be enabled to send four complete regiments from hence, exclusive of the artillery and staff horses attached to the 10,000 men now under orders, and further supplies of cavalry upon the second return of the same transports.

In directing your attention to the points which appear most deserving of investigation, I conceive we may dismiss, for the present, the whole line of coast from the Tagus to the French frontier of Roussillon. With the exception of Barcelona, the enemy appear to hold no position in the south of Spain; and,

although this place, and the approach from France, by the Eastern Pyrenees, may be considered to be of great military importance, yet it is comparatively of much less than the entrance by the Western Pyrenees, on which side the French army will certainly receive its principal reinforcements. It is, besides, a quarter inconveniently remote for a British force to act upon, removed from all its resources; and if our force, though large, will not bear to be dispersed on several objects, without losing much of its commanding effect, it is desirable, if a field for its application, of not less importance, opens itself nearer home, to prefer it, leaving the force from Sicily to act according to circumstances, to the annoyance of the enemy, either on the coast of Italy or Spain, within the Mediterranean.

If, then, our force is to be directed to operations on the side of Portugal, or in the north of Spain, are you disposed to recommend (regard being had to the *position, strength, and probable application* of the enemy's army) that *any and what part* of the force now under your orders should be equipped and advanced toward the frontier of Portugal, either with a view of being employed in the interior of Spain, in co-operation with the armies of Spain against the enemy in front, or of acting as a corps of observation, under the countenance of which the Portuguese army might be assembled and prepared for the defence of their country, in case the French should again penetrate to the frontier of Portugal?

Supposing the French army not advanced further than Segovia and Burgos, would not a movement from Lisbon, with a view to act offensively against them, be attended with much inconvenience, from the length of your line of communication, and the distance to which it would remove the army from its supplies, so far as they are to be drawn from home? Is the aid of a British force required to oppose the French army in front; and, if so, to what amount are you of opinion it ought to be carried, regard being had to the means of moving and

supplying it? or do you consider that the Spaniards are likely to have themselves the means and the disposition to employ them in concert, for opposing the enemy effectually in front?—in estimating which, you will naturally look to the armies of Valencia, Murcia, Andalusia, Estremadura, and Galicia. I do not include that of the Asturias, as it seems more naturally destined, when not employed defensively, in carrying their incursions to the eastward, for the annoyance of the enemy's flank and rear. We may hope for some aid from the Castilles and Leon, since the French have retired from their respective capitals.

If the native force of Spain can bear up against the enemy in front, might not a British force operate from the northern provinces with equal, if not more, effect, and more in communication with their fleet, than entering on the side of Portugal? If so, of what numbers would you compose the army so to be employed? and would you enter by Gijon or St. Andero, assuming that Corunna, although the best retreat, is too far retired to be a convenient point to move from?

Would a British corps of 20,000 men, with a proportion of cavalry, and supported by the Spanish levies, be too much exposed, in your judgment, in the Asturias, or in the principality of St. Andero, taking into consideration the defensible nature of the country? And if, from the enemy's army being occupied in front by the main army of Spain, collected from the provinces before referred to, it should be thought expedient that the British corps should act offensively, might not they advance either by the great road from Oviedo to Leon, or the road from St. Andero to Burgos?

Supposing the state of affairs in Portugal admitted of detaching 10,000 men, in addition to the 20,000 above supposed to be employed in the North, leaving Portugal, for the time, with only 10,000 men, are you of opinion that it would be prudent, with 30,000 British troops, to take a position at, or

to the eastward of, St. Andero, with a view of operating, in conjunction with the force of the country, against the French line of communication, and also against the flank and rear of their army, while pressed in front, as before supposed? Might not a force so considerable, brought to act in such a direction, render their further advance into Spain impracticable till it was first subdued? and are you induced to think that the French now have in Spain, or are likely soon to have, assembled in that quarter such an amount of force as would enable them to defend themselves against such an attack?

If they felt themselves compelled to retire into France, is it probable that they could save their whole army so pressed upon, the passes through the Pyrenees being in themselves difficult, the supplies scanty, and the mountains possibly occupied by armed peasantry?

Supposing the French should succeed in overcoming and disarming the Asturians, and thus entering Galicia before either could be supported by us, or the armies from the south of Spain come into operation, what effect would the rising military efforts of the northern provinces being thus crushed have upon the further operations of the enemy against Portugal and the rest of Spain? Would not the line of communication with France be then maintained with comparatively weak corps? And would not a much larger proportion of this force be disposable for prosecuting the subjugation of the remainder of the Peninsula? May it not, in the end, prove less hazardous to the British army, as well as more advantageous to the common cause, to join our efforts to those of Spain for the expulsion of the enemy, while the north of Spain is unsubdued, than to reserve our force for the defence of Portugal, and to have to contend for it when the resistance of Spain may be less general than it is at present?

I have said enough to suggest for your consideration the outline which I am desirous you should examine and fill up, as parts of the question depend on local information, particu-

larly what relates to the nature of the military defences of the Asturias and the principality of St. Andero, and to the country eastward even of the last place. It appears to me desirable that you should send, without loss of time, a confidential officer of experience, to enter by Gijon, to look at the whole of that line, to report to you upon it. If you have no pressing demand for his services in Portugal, which I should hope may be the case by the time this letter reaches you, I should be glad you would send Sir Arthur Wellesley on this service, with any scientific assistance you may deem requisite. He will find considerable progress made in collecting information by Major-General Leith, whom I have sent into that country, aided by Captains Lefevre and Birch, both good engineer officers.

I am sorry the state of our information does not enable us as yet to come to any decision as to the application of the force at home, or as to the ulterior use to be made of yours : the progress of events will, I trust, enable me to write to you, without much delay, more explicitly than it is now possible for me to do upon these points. In the mean time, and while the necessary measures are pursuing to collect information, I trust you will not hesitate to use the full discretion with which you have been invested, in such manner as your own excellent judgment may point out to you to be for the advantage of his Majesty's service, without deeming it necessary to wait for authority or instructions from home ; and I can safely assure you that you will find, not only in me but in my colleagues, the most sincere and cordial disposition to support you in the exercise of a responsibility, which, I am persuaded, you will not shrink from, in any instance, where the good of the service may be promoted by your acting without reference home.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH,

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Head-quarters at Vimero, August 20, 1808.

My dear Lord—Anstruther is on shore, and I expect him in camp every moment; and I shall be near Maffra to-morrow. The enemy have their advanced guard in front of Torres Vedras, and the main body of their army is collected in the rear of that town. I understand that they have got together every thing that Portugal can afford.

Colonel Brown, who has got charge of my letters to you, has not had an opportunity of going on board ship till this day. I intended to have sent them by my aide-de-camp, Captain Campbell, in order that he might receive the promotion usual on such occasions; but I hope that I shall have another and a better occasion to send him home; and, if I should not, I trust that he will not lose his promotion by my having omitted to send him on the present occasion.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Head-quarters at Vimero, August 21, 1808.

My dear Lord—Sir Harry Burrard will probably acquaint your lordship with the reasons which have induced him to call Sir John Moore's corps to the assistance of our army, which consists of nearly 26,000 men, including the Portuguese army, which was to join this morning, notwithstanding former determinations to the contrary, and is opposed by, I am convinced, not more than 12,000 or 14,000 Frenchmen, and to halt here till Sir John Moore's corps shall join. You will readily believe, however, that this determination is not in conformity with my opinion; and I only wish that Sir Harry had landed and seen things with his own eyes, before he had made it.

General Acland's brigade landed last night.

The French are in and about Torres Vedras. Junot's corps,

which arrived last, is the advanced guard ; and the others are in the rear, nearly on the ground to which La Borde retreated after the battle of the 17th.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Camp at Vimero, August 22, 1808.

My dear Lord—After I wrote to you yesterday morning, we were attacked by the whole French army, Sir Harry Burrard being still on board ship ; and I gained a complete victory. It was impossible for troops to behave better than ours did. We only wanted a few hundred more cavalry to annihilate the French army. I have sent my report upon this action to Sir Harry Burrard, who will send it home. You will see in it that I have mentioned Colonel Burne, of the 36th Regiment, in a very particular manner ; and I assure you that there is nothing that will give me so much satisfaction as to learn that something has been done for this old and meritorious soldier. The 36th Regiment are an example to this army.

Sir Harry did not land till late in the day, in the midst of the attack, and he desired me to continue my own operations ; and, as far as I am personally concerned in the action, I was amply rewarded for any disappointment I might have felt in not having had an opportunity of bringing the same to a close, by the satisfaction expressed by the army that this second and more important victory had been gained by their old General. I have also the pleasure to add, that it has had more effect than all the arguments I could use to induce the General to move on ; and I believe he will march to-morrow. Indeed, if he does not, we shall be poisoned here by the stench of the dead and wounded ; or we shall starve, every thing in the neighbourhood being already eat up.

From the number of dead Frenchmen about the ground,

and the number of prisoners and of wounded, I should think his loss could not be far short of 3,000 men. The force which attacked us was very respectable, and probably not short of 14,000 men, including 1,300 dragoons and artillery, and 300 *chasseurs à cheval*.

Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived last night, and will land this morning.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Camp at Ramalhal, August 23, 1808.

My dear Lord—You will have heard that one of the consequences of our victory of the 21st has been an agreement to suspend hostilities between the French and us, preparatory to the negociation of a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French. Although my name is affixed to this instrument, I beg that you will not believe that I negociated it, that I approve of it, or that I had any hand in wording it.

It was negociated by the General himself, in my presence and that of Sir Harry Burrard; and after it had been drawn out by General Kellermann, Sir Hew Dalrymple desired me to sign it. I object to its verbiage; I object to an indefinite suspension of hostilities; it ought to have been for forty-eight hours only. As it is now, the French will have forty-eight hours more to prepare for their defence, after Sir Hew will put an end to the suspension.

I approve of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal, particularly as it appears to be deemed impossible to move Sir John Moore's corps upon Santarem, so as to cut off the retreat of the French towards Elvas. They would establish themselves in Elvas, Fort de la Lippe, Almeida, and Peniche—places we should be obliged either to blockade or to attack regularly in the worst season of the year in Portugal, viz., the months of September and October, and the advance of the

army into Spain would be delayed till after that period. It is more for the advantage of the general cause to have 30,000 Englishmen in Spain, and 10,000 or 12,000 additional Frenchmen on the northern frontier of Spain, than to have the Frenchmen in Portugal, and the Englishmen employed in the blockade or siege of strong places. If they are to be allowed to evacuate, it must be with their property; but I should have wished to adopt some mode of making the French Generals disgorge the Church plate which they have stolen.

I see no objection to the substance of what is done respecting the Russians; indeed, if the Russians had persevered to the end of the contest in the neutrality which they have observed since its commencement, and the Portuguese officers had desired that their port should be respected, as that of a power in a state of neutrality between Russia and England, we might have laboured under some difficulties in the attack of the Russian fleet. But the French ought not to have been allowed to stipulate at all for the Russian fleet; and this is the great fault of the whole arrangement. However, bad as it is, it is fortunate it is not worse, and you will readily believe that I did every thing in my power to prevail upon the General to alter it, and to persist in his objections to it.

I will not conceal from you, however, my dear lord, that my situation in this army is a very delicate one. I never saw Sir Hew Dalrymple till yesterday; and it is not a very easy task to advise any man on the first day one meets with him. He must at least be prepared to receive advice. Then I have been successful with the army, and they don't appear to me to like to go to any body else for orders or instructions upon any subject. This is another awkward circumstance, which cannot end well; and, to tell you the truth, I should prefer to go home to staying here. However, if you wish me to stay, I will; and I only beg that you will not blame me, if things do not go on as you and my friends in London wish they should.

It appears that General Spencer and Sir Hew did not agree very well when they were at Gibraltar together; and poor Spencer is very low indeed. I wish that you could confer upon him some mark of the King's favour. There never was a braver officer, or one who deserves it better.

I enclose you a memorandum which I have sent to Sir Hew, respecting the Convention which he is to negociate in person with Junot. Kellermann objected to my going to the Admiral through the French posts, as he had found that I objected so strongly to the arrangement; and yet he was the person who first proposed to Sir Hew that I should sign the arrangement which he was going to sign himself.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

August 27th. Charles will have informed you of the state of things here since the date of this letter. The Admiral relieved us from the difficulty in which the 7th Article of the agreement respecting the Russians had involved us, by refusing to agree to it; and Murray was sent, the day before yesterday, to Lisbon, to apprise Junot of this refusal by the Admiral, and to negociate the Convention, if Junot should be inclined to negociate on the remaining part of the proposed basis, and, at all events, to bring the suspension of hostilities to a conclusion at 12 o'clock to-morrow. Junot has consented to negociate, and Murray is authorized to continue the suspension for twenty-four hours longer, if necessary, in order to complete the treaty. Mean time, I march to-morrow, if the Convention should not be concluded, or if the hostilities should not be farther suspended; and Sir John Moore, with a part of this corps, next day. Murray has been instructed to insist upon the points in the enclosed memorandum in the negociation of the Convention. Notwithstanding blunders, I think we shall yet bring our affairs in this country to a happy conclusion.

*Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Leith.*

Draft.

Downing Street, August 26, 1808.

Sir—This letter will be delivered to you by Captain Lefeuvre, whose talents as an engineer will be of much use in accelerating the survey of the military line of the Asturias and the principality of Santander. The examination of the country to the eastward of Santander is hardly of less pressing importance.

In addition to an examination of the principal roads by which the enemy may attempt to penetrate into either of these provinces, which, upon the map, appear to be limited to the road from Burgos by Reynosa to Santander, and that through Leon to Oviedo, it is desirable to ascertain what the facility is of lateral communication between these two lines of operation : that is, how far a corps in the Asturias can move to support one in the Montaña, and *vice versa* ; and, further, how far a corps, pressed in the Asturias by a superior force, can fall back on Ferrol.

The enclosed will point your attention to what immediately relates to the Asturias in a defensive sense. I should wish you, however, to extend your views to the practicability of offensive operations, and to state your opinion upon the comparative advantages of a forward movement upon either of the lines above referred to, or whether a line more to the eastward can be looked to. In considering this question, you may take it up on the two suppositions : 1st, of 20,000, and 2ndly, of 30,000 British troops being disposable for this operation. You will observe the defensive view of the subject is taken upon the supposition that only 10,000 men are at present applicable to service in the north of Spain, which must be considered as the limit, till our operations in Portugal are terminated.

You will feel the importance, as our army will have to depend altogether on the resources of the country in which they act for moving their supplies, of avoiding as far as possible an extended line of operations. I state the embarrassment to be

the *transport* of the provisions in the interior, as I can have no hesitation in undertaking to meet all the wants of the army whilst on the coast.

I should be glad to know what number of transports may be conveniently sheltered in the ports of Gijon and Santander, and whether cavalry can be disembarked at either place. You will also apprise me, without committing the Government, what is at present the position of the Junta of Asturias and Santander to receive the co-operation of a British corps, either for offensive or defensive purposes.

You will also inform me of the state of the climate which may be expected in the ensuing months—during what period the troops can continue to operate without unduly exposing their health, and what covering they may expect to find when they can no longer keep the field—what influence the climate is likely to have on the operations of the enemy—is it to be expected that they will be compelled to suspend operations during the winter; or is it more likely that they will continue, as has been their habit in other countries, without interruption in the field?

You will communicate, as early as possible, your sentiments on the points above stated, as well as any others which you may deem material, to Sir Hew Dalrymple, or the officer commanding in Portugal, as he will be instructed, under certain circumstances, to act without waiting for orders from home.

What measures would you recommend for encouraging Biscay and Navarre to rise?—If you see a prospect of a diversion so important being produced in the rear of the French armies, you will address yourself, on the subject of arms, to Sir Hew Dalrymple and the Juntas of Oviedo and Galicia—50,000 stand having been lately forwarded to the latter authorities, for the service of the northern departments of Spain—30,000 stand, together with 30,000 pikes, having been sent with Sir Arthur Wellesley to Portugal.

Can you contrive, by some confidential Spaniard, to open a communication with General Palafox in Arragon, for the purpose of ascertaining what his situation and means are, and how far he could co-operate in breaking in upon the French line of operations on that side, which seems to extend for not less than 260 miles, taking it from the frontier to Segovia? and, as they have to guard both the Vittoria and the Pampluna roads, a number of light corps of armed peasantry, I should apprehend, would either interrupt their convoys, or compel them to waste much of their force in escorts.

CASTLEREAGH.

*Queries.*

1. Whether, if the enemy have from 30,000 to 50,000 at Burgos and on that line, and before they are engaged by an army in their front, should attack the Asturias, are the Asturians capable of defending their province without assistance?
2. Whether 10,000 British, acting with the army of Asturias, and supported by the army of Gallicia on their flank, would enable them to resist such an attack?
3. Whether a British corps, if pressed, could fall back on Ferrol, if they had not time to re-embark at Gijon?
4. Whether, carrying their supplies, artillery, horses, and some cavalry for patrols, they could find the means of moving their provisions from the coast by carriages of the country, in the Asturias and Montaña?
5. What position should the British take up for the defence of Asturias—whether central, as Oviedo, ready to advance to the frontier, on the movement of the enemy being known, or a more advanced position, and what?
6. Is there more than one practicable road, by which the enemy can attempt to penetrate into the Asturias; and how many passes must be occupied, for securing the defences of that province?
7. The same query with respect to the Montaña.

*Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Leith.*

Draft.

London, August 27, 1808.

Sir—I enclose for your information a copy of a letter which I have written to Sir Hew Dalrymple, to the substance of which you will pay immediate attention. It is unnecessary for me to impress upon you the importance of using every possible effort to give effect to the insurrection in Biscay. I shall endeavour to forward without delay from hence a supply of pikes: arms and ammunition the Government of Gallicia and the Asturias must now have it in their power to furnish, from the very large provision sent within these few days from hence; and I trust they will see that in no quarter are they likely, at least in part, to be more usefully employed than in creating a force in the rear of the French armies.

CASTLEREAGH.

*Rt. Hon. G. Canning to Lord Castlereagh.*

Foreign Office, August 29, 1808.

My dear Castlereagh—Cooke has just showed me the despatches from Colonel Doyle, in which the landing of British troops, horse and foot, in the Northern Provinces, is described as so much taken for granted, that preparations are making for quartering them. I am all astonishment at this intelligence, and have given Stuart's despatches to Cooke to read, in order to show him how little foundation it is probable that he can have given for such an expedition. Unluckily, Stuart does not send me a copy of his letter to the Junta, to which Colonel Doyle appears to allude. But he distinctly says of it himself, "I particularly explained that the convoy with troops seen last week off Cape Ortegal would *not* disembark at this port;" and proceeds to remark how unreasonable General Blake is in "appearing still to expect a succour, which, in the short time since the Junta commanded a corps of British cavalry, could not reasonably be expected to arrive." He

goes on to say that he shall send a copy of General Blake's letter to Sir A. Wellesley, and adds, "If that officer or his Majesty's Government shall find the risk of disembarking a force at Santander *not too great* to be undertaken, I beg that *I may be enabled to transmit notice of their arrival* time enough for the General to take whatever measures may be necessary."

Now, all this does not look as if it were possible that Stuart could have given ground for the expectations upon which Colonel Doyle has acted.; and I have little doubt that the purport of his note to the Junta was merely to announce the passing of the convoy, in order that those expectations might *not* be imprudently raised.

He has never had one syllable of instructions from me that would justify his holding out any expectation of any military succour whatsoever, (nor ever trenched upon purely military subjects) and his own individual opinion has always gone to discourage the sending it.

Under these circumstances, nothing can be more unlucky than the orders which Colonel Doyle has given, and the wide-spreading correspondence which he has instituted throughout all Spain, as it appears to excite expectations which will be disappointed, and the disappointment of which may lead to disasters of great extent.

I cannot help fearing that this arises, in some measure, from all the different agents in Spain, military as well as civil, communicating with the Juntas, or different authorities, directly.

Surely an order ought to be given to the military officers in this, as in all other cases, to abstain from all such direct communication, and to receive their instructions as to all political matters from the civil agent. Already it is difficult enough to manage the Juntas; but, if they have an appeal from Stuart and Hunter to Doyle and Patrick, it will be quite impossible.

The Duc del Infantado has been at Blake's head-quarters. The Junta of Gallicia represented to Stuart their utter distrust of him, and entreated that he would not communicate with

him. Stuart very properly declined doing so. But Doyle, without consulting Stuart, has pronounced in the Duke's favour, and set off with him for Madrid. Surely that is acting upon too wide a discretion, and travelling a good deal out of any orders which Colonel Doyle can possibly have received.

I would send you Stuart's despatches, but that they must be kept, to go to the King.

Yours, very sincerely,

GEORGE CANNING.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Camp, North of Torres Vedras, August 30, 1808.

My dear Lord—A convention signed by General Kellermann and Colonel Murray, for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, was brought here yesterday morning, but was not ratified by the General, in consequence of his finding some fault with it. It was altered, but not as I thought it ought to have been, and was returned to Junot yesterday afternoon ; and, in the mean time, the army has halted in its position, with the only difference that we have a corps in Torres Vedras instead of three miles from that town. In short, in ten days after the action of the 21st, we are not further advanced, or, indeed, as I believe, so far advanced, as we should and ought to have been on the night of the 21st.

I assure you, my dear lord, matters are not prospering here, and I feel an earnest desire to quit the army. I have been too successful with this army ever to serve with it in a subordinate situation with satisfaction to the person who will command it, and, of course, not to myself. However, I will do whatever the Government desire.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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We are under orders to march in the morning, but I should not be surprised if we were to halt.

*Mr. Cooke to Lieut.-Colonel Doyle.*

Draft.

Downing Street, August 31, 1808.

Sir—Lord Castlereagh has received your letters to the 16th of [July or August]. By these it appears that, in consequence of a communication to you of a letter (written by Mr. Stuart to the Junta of the Galicias) by General Blake, you had taken such measures as were in your power to prepare the necessary provisions and accommodations for 16,000 British troops. How such a letter could have been written by Mr. Stuart, or such an interpretation be placed upon any letter he could have written, his Majesty's Ministers are at a loss to know; and Mr. Secretary Canning has written to Mr. Stuart upon the subject.

It next appears, from your letters, that, instead of endeavouring to ascertain the exact circumstances with regard to the said British corps, which was supposed to be nearly landing, having been seen off Cape Ortegal, you set off with the Duke of Infantado to Madrid, and that you had thought of taking measures for his being appointed Regent, and also to form a Council of Generals, for determining upon future operations. Upon these parts of your letters, I am to express Lord Castlereagh's disapproval, inasmuch as you appear to have exceeded the line of your Instructions, and to have entered into political relations and connexions without any authority, and by which his Majesty's Government may be possibly hereafter embarrassed.

Mr. Stuart, who has been accredited to the Junta of Corunna, is the only person in the Galicias through whom political measures are to be managed; and it must occur to you, if officers sent upon mere military commissions shall undertake to enter into political arrangements, without authority and without reference to his Majesty's Civil Residents, the utmost confusion may take place.

The fullest credit is given to your military activity and zeal;

and to that sphere it is wished you should confine yourself. I trust no real embarrassment will follow from the measure you have already taken ; and it is hoped that the caution these suggestions will inspire will induce you to conduct yourself in such a manner that no future apprehension or feeling of embarrassment may arise from your mission.

I take this opportunity of intimating to you that it may be advisable that your official letters should be confined to the relation of circumstances, the authenticity of which can be relied upon ; and that all looser accounts, and all your reasonings and conjectures, of themselves very desirable and valuable, should be stated in letters marked "*Private.*"

I am, &c.,

E. COOKE.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.*

Draft.

Downing Street, September 4, 1808.

My dear Wellesley—You will easily believe that few events in my life, indeed I may say none, have ever given me more gratification than the intelligence of your two splendid victories, to which I hardly know how to give the preference. That of the 21st was certainly the most important in all its results, and had certainly more the character of a great victory ; but there were features in the first which I need not particularize, which render it, as a military transaction, not less deserving of applause. There was something whimsically providential in the enemy forcing upon you, at the very moment when the command was passing, indeed had formally passed, into other hands, the glory of our achievement, which your personal moderation and sense of duty had induced you not to invite by any extraordinary acceleration of your operations.

You have received the reward of the principles which have governed your conduct, in an important accession of military reputation, and you have laid the foundation, I trust, of a succession of triumphs, as often as we can bring British troops on fair terms in contact with the enemy.

I have not seen the King since Captain Campbell arrived. His note to me marked the sense he entertains of your services ; and I understand that he listened to the details of your letters with as much interest and attention as to have got them nearly by heart.

I cannot suffer any other subject to mix itself with the undivided sentiments of gratitude and admiration with which I offer to you my thanks and congratulations on the services you have rendered to the army, to the great cause in which we are engaged against France, as well as to the immediate interests of your own country ; and I am persuaded that, in whatever station you may be placed in the army, your qualities as an officer will be displayed with equal zeal as while you were charged with the supreme command.

I shall reserve writing on other points till another occasion.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Brigadier-General Charles Stewart.*

Draft.

Downing Street, September 4, 1808.

My dearest Charles—The tumult of our joy on Wellesley's glorious conduct and successes has been cruelly disturbed by a communication from Souza of a supposed Convention, to which, in the copy, however, Wellesley's name appears affixed ; the operations of which instrument would, if carried into effect, secure to the French advantages beyond their reach under the most brilliant success, while their 10,000 men are now pressed upon by not less than 50,000 men, British and Portuguese.

In the 1st place, it is a recognition, on the face of the instrument, of Buonaparte as Emperor of the French.

2. It provides for the safe retreat of an enemy's corps destitute of all other means of escape.

3. It gives France the entire grace of saving for Russia her fleet, while, in truth, she had not a remnant of power left to protect it.

4. It makes a gratuitous sacrifice of the fleet of an enemy, and, in the manner of doing it, recognises rights of neutrality on the part of Portugal towards Russia, which, if they could have ever subsisted for a moment in a port occupied by a French army, were destroyed, even in pretence, by the formal appointment of Junot as Buonaparte's Lieutenant of Portugal ; and entails upon us all the encumbrance of watching with a fleet a port of our own, while we must give the enemy forty-eight hours start of us, lest we should catch him.

5. It gives France not only the immediate use of her army, which, without our active assistance, she could not have, but gives her also the plunder of Portugal, under the mask of private property.

6. It gives France all the grace of having protected those Portuguese who have betrayed their sovereign, while it entails upon us the disgrace of exposing our allies to be attacked hereafter by a fleet which France has had the authority and means to protect. Will Spain or Europe believe that this was preceded by triumphs on our part ? and will not France be convinced of the reverse ?

7. It lastly appears, in its general result, to be a happy contrivance, by which England shall have made a mighty effort for no other purpose than making a dependent State the protector of one of its enemies, while it becomes itself the instrument by which the other shall remove an army from a position in which *it is lost*, to one in which it may recommence its operations with advantage.

I should feel it an injustice by Wellesley, for which I could not forgive myself, to suppose that any power on earth could have induced him to be individually a party to such an arrangement ; as little can I suppose any British officer capable of it, much less those to whom we have confided the chief command of our army and navy. It is a Convention which no French officer, if put upon his honour, could in character propose as a rational arrangement between the parties, and which, as

an outline even, or first *projet*, would require all the impudence of that nation gravely to offer for consideration.

I can as little understand it as a suspension of arms; were it signed in that light, however unadvisable in policy, it would not be full of stipulations on the most important points to be treated of; in truth, leaving little beyond unimportant details to arrange. In short, it is a base forgery somewhere, and nothing can induce me to believe it genuine.

God bless you, dearest C.! In haste,

CASTLEREAGH.

I write to Dalrymple, enclosing Souza's Note, together with Canning's answer, in which the total disbelief of the fact is stated, and the indignation of this Government, at the attempt of a power which can only be brought into existence through our means, attempting to arrogate rights which she has not, for the purpose of turning them to the protection of an enemy which has been, in fact, hers, in assisting the French to maintain themselves in Lisbon, as much as ours.

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*The Duke of Portland to Lord Castlereagh.*

Bulstrode, Sunday, noon, September 4, 1808.

My dear Lord—I know not how to express my astonishment and perplexity at the contents of the Paper which purports to be the Convention made by Sir A. Wellesley and Kellermann. They may be the terms proposed by the latter; and yet the expectation that they could be entertained for a moment seems to be so preposterous, that I could scarcely have supposed that a Frenchman would have possessed sufficient assurance to have proposed them. But it is impossible that any English officer could have sanctioned them. To suppose Sir A. Wellesley capable of making such a sacrifice of the interest, honour, and good faith of his country and of his own good sense, would be an act of injustice that I should not forgive myself for being guilty of towards him. I am sure I need not desire you, my

dear Lord, to take the first moment you are able to relieve me from this cruel distress, and to solve this incomprehensible enigma.

Most truly yours ever,

PORLAND.

I shall be in town to-morrow evening, after dinner. I have asked Colonel Brown and Captain Campbell to dine with me on Tuesday; if you are unengaged, I should be very happy to have your company.

P.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Burghersh.*

[No date.]

My Lord—His Majesty having been graciously pleased to select your lordship to proceed from the head-quarters of the army, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Sir A. Wellesley, on a mission to collect information as to the internal military situation of Portugal and Spain at the present moment, I am to convey to you the King's pleasure that you do proceed forthwith to join that officer off the Tagus.

Your lordship will be regulated by the instructions which you may receive from the Lieutenant-General with respect to the quarter to which it is desirable your lordship's attention should, in the first instance, be directed, as well as the points on which detailed information is to be particularly obtained; and you will omit no occasion of reporting to me, as also to the Lieutenant-General, the result of your lordship's inquiries and observations.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Sir Hew Dalrymple.*

Draft.

1808.

Captain Lord Burghersh, who has been appointed to the staff of the army to serve in Portugal and Spain, has proceeded with despatches to Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, who has been desired, when his presence can be spared, to employ him in the interior of Spain. Permit me to recommend that, in joining the army and taking the command, you would continue him in the employment to which he has been destined,

if you shall find it compatible with the general service, and that you would favour him with your protection.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Sir Hew Dalrymple.*

Draft. Downing Street, September 4, 1808.

Sir—I cannot suffer my official letter of this date to go without troubling you with a few lines, to state confidentially and privately the undisguised state of the feelings of the Government upon M. de Souza's communication.

We really cannot bring ourselves to give any credence to the papers he has communicated; and yet we are unable to detect the misconception which has been imposed on him. The arrangement appears to us so much more advantageous than the French had any pretence for claiming, that, even on this ground, we are disposed to disbelieve it: but the terms, as they relate to Portugal, and the gratuitous sacrifice of the Russian fleet, not even to Russia, but to France—for France alone would profit by such a stipulation—do render it wholly unlikely, in our judgment, if proposed, to have been acceded to; and we can only bring ourselves to suppose that General Kellermann might have brought forward such a paper as a first project, and that, in that sense, it may have been certified by the signatures affixed to it. In short, in its present shape, it is difficult to reason upon it, and I trust we shall speedily be relieved from the task of endeavouring to solve this enigma, which the Portuguese Minister, with the assertion of most unjustifiable pretensions on the part of his court, has induced me to transmit to you, together with the answer which he has received from Mr. Canning.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Zambujar, September 5, 1808.

My dear Lord—You will receive from me, by this opportunity, a long letter upon our future operations: this relates

solely to my private views. It is quite impossible for me to continue any longer with this army, if Sir Hugh Dalrymple should remain at the head of it; and I wish, therefore, that you would allow me to return home, and resume the duties of my office, if I should still be in office, and it is convenient to the Government that I should retain it; or, if not, that I should remain upon the staff in England; or, if that should not be practicable, that I should remain without employment.

You will hear from others of the various causes which I must have for being dissatisfied, not only with the military and other public measures of the Commander-in-Chief, but with his treatment of myself. I am convinced it is better for him, for the army, and for me, that I should go away; and the sooner I go the better.

Since I wrote to you, on the 30th, the Convention has been returned, ratified by Junot, but materially altered. I understand we have not a sufficiency of the Tagus to give us a secure harbour; we have not got the navigation of the river; and, as we did not insist upon having Belem Castle, which was asked for by the alteration of the 29th, the transports cannot be watered without going into that part of the river occupied by the Russians and the French troops, to which, I understand, the Admiral will not consent. I have not seen the Convention, and don't know what it contains.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Zambujar, 12 miles north of Lisbon,  
September 5, 1808.

My dear Lord—Your brother Charles communicated to me your letter of the 20th August to Sir Hugh Dalrymple, of which Sir Hugh himself communicated to me different parts yesterday, and I proceed to give you my opinion on the points to which it relates. I must apprise you, however, that our

information here of the state of affairs in Spain is very defective; that we, or at least I, don't know what is the position, what are the numbers, what are the means, or what ought to be the objects of the French army in Spain; and I am equally ignorant of the state of the force of the Spaniards. I rather believe, however, that the French army in Spain now consists of about 40,000 men, of which number about 5,000 are cavalry, and that they are under the command of Marshal Bessières, and are stationed somewhere about La Vittoria, in Biscay. The probability that they will be reinforced must depend on the state of affairs in other parts of Europe, of which I have no knowledge whatever: but, if the attention of the French Government is not called to other quarters, we must expect that the French army in Spain will be increased at an early period to a very large amount. The amount of the force with which operations can be carried on in Spain is another and a very material consideration, which bears upon the whole question; and, from all that I have heard of the state of the resources in the country, I should doubt whether it will be practicable to carry on operations in Spain with a larger corps than 40,000 men. There may be other *corps de réserve*, and employed in operations on other lines, or on the same line, in the protection of convoys from France, &c.; but it is not probable that the corps in front will exceed 40,000 men. You must consider this, however, as a mere matter of opinion, founded upon general information of the state of the resources in Spain, in which I may be much mistaken.

The next point for consideration is the force of the Spaniards. I really know of nothing that they have in the shape of an army capable of meeting the French, excepting that under General Castanhos. General Cuesta has some cavalry in Castille; General Galluzzo some more in Estremadura; and Blake's army of Gallicia may in time become an efficient corps. But these armies of peasantry, which, in Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, have cut up French corps, must not be reckoned

upon, at least at present, as efficient armies to meet the French troops in the field. It is most probable that they will not, and indeed cannot, leave their provinces ; and, if they could, no officer could calculate a great operation upon such a body. I doubt not that, if an accurate report could be made upon their state, they want arms, ammunition, money, clothing, and military equipments of every description ; and, although such a body are very formidable and efficient in their own country, and probably equal to its defence, they must not be reckoned upon out of it ; and, in any case, it is impossible to estimate the effect of their efforts. In some cases, equal numbers will oppose with success the French troops ; in others, 1,000 Frenchmen, with cavalry and artillery, will disperse thousands of them ; and no reliance can be placed on them in their present state.

The result, then, of my information of the present state of the Spanish force to be opposed to the French is, that there are about 25,000 men, under Castanhos, now ready, and about the same number, under Blake, in Gallicia, upon whom you may *reckon* as efficient troops. All the rest may become so, and may be useful in different ways, even at present : but you must not found the arrangements for a great military operation on their utility or efficiency.

I understand that Government had promised 10,000 men to Castanhos ; and I have no doubt whatever that a corps well equipped, consisting of about 15,000 men, including a proportion of British cavalry and artillery, would be highly useful to him. This would make his army 40,000 men, of which the British corps would be the best troops that could be found anywhere ; and this army, aided by the insurrection from the other kingdoms of Spain, would be the operating army, against what I have supposed to be the French operating army. This British corps should advance from Portugal, to which kingdom it would be, in the mean time, a defence.

You should leave in Portugal a British corps of 5,000 men,

to be stationed at and in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, with probably a small garrison in Elvas. The object in stationing this corps in Portugal is to give strength to the Government which you will establish here, and to render it independent of the factions and intrigues by which it will be assailed on all sides.

You ought to send to Lisbon, in the quality of the King's Ambassador, a discreet person, who could superintend the management of the affairs of this country, particularly the expenditure of the money which you must supply for its wants, and its application to the purposes for which it will be given, viz., to provide a military defence.

The next consideration is the employment of the remainder of the army now in Portugal, amounting, by estimate, to about 10,000 men, with an additional corps of 10,000 men, assembled and ready in England, and some cavalry. I acknowledge that I don't think the affairs in Spain are in so prosperous a state as that you can trust in operations within that kingdom the whole disposable force which England possesses, without adopting measures of precaution which will render its retreat to the sea-coast nearly certain. Besides this, I will not conceal from you that our people are so new in the field, that I don't know of persons capable of supplying (or, if supplied, of distributing the supplies to) an army of 40,000 men (British troops) acting together in a body. Even if plenty could be supposed to exist, we should starve in the midst of it, for want of due arrangement. But the first objection is conclusive. We may depend upon it that, whenever we shall assemble an army, the French will consider its defeat and destruction their first object, particularly if Buonaparte should be at the head of the French troops himself; and if the scene of the operations of our army should be near the French frontier, he will have the means of multiplying, and will multiply, the numbers upon our army in such a degree as must get the better of them. For the British army, therefore, we must have a retreat open, and that retreat must be the sea.

An operation carried on from Portugal and the north of Spain would, as you truly observe, involve us in a line of operations much too long. The retreat would be difficult, if not impossible. This objection, you will say, would apply equally to the corps of 15,000 men proposed to be employed with Castanhos. First, I conceive that there is a great deal of difference between the risk of the loss of such a corps as this and that of the loss of the whole of the disposable force of Great Britain : Secondly, it does not follow that, because the whole British army could not make its retreat into Portugal, a corps of 15,000 men could not : Thirdly, it does not follow that this corps of 15,000 men would necessarily retreat upon Portugal. Being a part of Castanhos' army, it might retire with his troops upon Andalusia, leaving the frontiers of Portugal to be defended by Portuguese troops and the British corps of 5,000 men, till these or a part of them could again be brought round to the Tagus, or could enter Portugal by Algarve. I conclude, then, that, although this corps might be risked, and its retreat to the sea should be considered, in some degree, *en l'air*, that of the whole disposable force of Great Britain ought to be and must be secured.

The only efficient plan of operations in which the British troops can be employed, consistently with this view, is upon the flank and rear of the enemy's advance towards Madrid, by an issue from the Asturias. If it be true, as it is stated by the Asturian deputies in London, that their country is remarkably strong, and that it is secure from French invasion ; if it be true that the ports of St. Andero and Gijon, the former particularly, are secure harbours in the winter ; and if works can give to both or either the means of making an embarkation, even if the enemy should be able to break through the barrier afforded by the mountains, the Asturias is the country we should secure immediately, in which we should assemble our disposable force as soon as possible, and issue forth into the plains either by Leon or the pass of La Reynosa. The army

would then have a short, although probably a difficult communication with the sea, which must be carried on by mules, of which there are plenty in the country. It would co-operate with Blake's Galician army, and would press upon the enemy's right flank and rear, and turn his position upon the Ebro, which it is evident he intends to make his first line. To secure the Asturias as soon as possible, you may depend upon it, is your first object in Spain, and afterwards to assemble within that country your whole disposable force, after making the detachment to Castanhos.

There are some points of detail which must be attended to in these arrangements. The army now in this country might either be marched into Leon, or it might be embarked and transported to Gijon or St. Andero. The latter would be the quickest operation ; by the adoption of the former, its artillery, in its present form, might accompany it. But it must be recollect that, if the artillery should be kept in its present form, in case of retreat it must be left behind in the plains, as, I understand, *there is no carriage road* across the mountains of Asturias or La Montana. The troops, then, now in this country ought to be embarked on the Tagus, and sent to the Asturias, and ordnance carriages ought to be sent from England without loss of time, which can be taken to pieces and carried by hand, or, when put together, can be drawn by horses. The reports which will be made by the officers sent to those countries will state whether cavalry can pass through them : I should think they might, as I see that wherever a mule can go a horse can likewise. If so, the cavalry from England should likewise be landed in Asturias ; if not, the cavalry should be landed at Corunna or Ferrol, and join the army in the plains through the passes of Galicia, which, we know, are practicable for cavalry.

There remain now to be considered only the operations of the Sicilian corps, consisting of 10,000 men. In the present state of affairs, the Government will probably not deem it

expedient to remove this corps from the Mediterranean. If the Spaniards should be able to make any head against the French on the left of their line, in Catalonia and the Lower Ebro, this corps might reinforce that part of the Spanish insurrection, keeping its retreat always open to the sea. This, however, would be very difficult, the French being in possession of Barcelona; and probably the siege of that place, aided by the insurgents of Catalonia, would be the most this corps could perform; and, whether the operation should be successfully concluded, or the corps should be forced to re-embark, in consequence of the approach of a stronger French force, it would materially aid the operations of the troops in the centre of Spain.

The result of all these operations, which must, for the present, be distinct, would be to confine the French to their line of the Ebro for the present, and eventually to oblige them to retire upon their own frontier. Time would be gained for the farther organization of the Spanish Government and force, by the judicious and effectual employment of which, the British Government would be enabled to withdraw its troops from Spain, to employ them in other parts of Europe. As for preventing the retreat of the French from Spain, it is quite out of the question. They have possession of all the fortresses on this side of the Pyrenees, through which mountains there are not less than forty passes by which troops could march. Besides, if it were possible, under these circumstances, to place an army in their rear, with the object of cutting them off from France, you may depend upon it that all France would rise, as one man, for their relief, and the result would be the loss of the army which should be so employed.

In respect to your wish that I should go into the Asturias, to examine the country, and form a judgment of its strength, I have to mention to you that I am not a draughtsman, and but a bad hand at description. I should have no difficulty in forming an opinion, and a plan for the defence of that country,

provided I was certain that it would be executed; but it would be an idle waste of my time, and an imposition upon you, if I were to go into that country with the pretence of giving you, or any general officer you should employ there, an idea of the country; and it would be vain and fruitless to form a plan for the defence of the country, which would depend upon the execution of another. Indeed, this last would only bring disgrace upon me, and would disappoint you. Under these circumstances, I have told Sir Hugh Dalrymple that I was not able to perform the duty in which you had desired I should be employed; that I was not a topographical engineer, and could not pretend to describe in writing such a country as the Asturias; and he appeared to think that some of the gentlemen of the Quartermaster-General's department might be more usefully employed in this service.

I hope you will not believe that I feel any disinclination to performing any service on which you may think I can be of use to you, and that I have discouraged the idea of employing me on that proposed, solely from my incapacity of performing it as it ought to be performed, and from a certainty that you was not aware of the nature of the service which you required from me, when you wrote to Sir Hew Dalrymple.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Zambujar, 12 miles north of Lisbon, September 9, 1808.

My dear Lord—Your brother Charles is, I imagine, at Lisbon, and will make you acquainted with the state of affairs there. I write to you only in reference to the recommendation I made to you some days ago, to appoint a proper person to be his Majesty's ambassador here. Since I wrote that letter, I have heard so much in favour of Lord Robert Fitzgerald from various quarters, that I cannot avoid to recommend to you to

turn your thoughts to him. I am but little acquainted with him myself, but I hear an excellent character of him.

I fear that Sir Hugh will make a mistake respecting the appointment of the Regency at Lisbon. My intention was to have issued a Proclamation, and to have called the Regency appointed by the Prince to reassume their functions, with the exception of those members (by name) who had been confidentially employed by the French; and, in the same Proclamation, I should have desired the remaining *true* members of the Regency to fill the vacancies by election, according to the powers given to them of electing successors to vacancies by the very act which appoints them. I should then have exerted the influence which I should undoubtedly at this moment have had over them, to induce them to elect the Bishop of Oporto, and others who it is important should belong to the Government; and thus the Government would have been legally constituted, without the unnecessary interference of a foreign power.

I have discussed the whole plan more than once with Sir Hugh; have pointed out the mode of execution, &c.; but, instead of adopting it, I now hear that he is going to appoint a Regency by his own authority; which measure will only add tenfold to the difficulties with which the new Government will have to contend at its outset. I write to your brother, however, upon the subject, to beg him to make one more effort to keep Sir Hugh right; and, if I can, I will see your brother to-morrow.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I send you two letters which I wrote to Sir Harry Burrard, besides the first which I sent you; which are important, to show you my view of the campaign in this country.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Leith.*

Draft.

Downing Street, September 14, 1808.

Sir—Intelligence having been received from Captain Carroll, of the 1st instant, stating that General Blake was proceeding

and actually on march, with the Gallician army, to occupy the position of Reynosa, and that he was anxious provisions should be sent to Santander, for the supply of his army, in case of necessity, I am to acquaint you that the four Victuallers mentioned in the margin<sup>1</sup> have been ordered to the port of Santander, and are consigned to M. Assiotti, Deputy Commissary-General, who is embarked with the provisions, and is to deliver them according to the orders he shall receive from you ; and, if he shall not be able to communicate with you, and shall receive a requisition from General Blake, or the Junta of Santander, he is to make a delivery of provisions, for the use of General Blake's army, without waiting for your orders.

M. Assiotti will report to you, and you will be good enough to have him furnished with whatever intelligence you are in possession of, respecting the power of the country for the march and support of a large army.

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. In case of operations with a considerable English force in the north of Spain, it will be necessary to secure a large number of horses and mules, or other draught cattle. If they cannot be procured with this view, Lieut.-Colonel Hamilton, of the Waggon Train, has received orders to proceed to Gijon or Santander, in order to superintend the purchase. M. Assiotti, the Deputy Commissary, is instructed to supply the funds for the purchase ; and, as it may be of consequence that no time should be lost, I am to desire you to take such preparatory measures for securing the supply of 1,000 head, as you may think most advisable ; and, before any mules fit for inspection can have assembled, Lieut.-Colonel Hamilton will probably arrive in Spain. The cattle wanted are for provisions and baggage, as the artillery will bring their own horses. It is wished that this service may be executed quietly, so as to avoid raising expectations, as far as possible.

<sup>1</sup> Peggy, 227 tons; Joseph and Mary, 195 tons; Anne, 200 tons; Hannah, 183 tons.

*Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Leith.*

Draft.

Downing Street, September 17, 1808.

Sir—Fourteen thousand pikes have been embarked, and consigned to you at Gijon. They are destined for the use of the peasantry in the province of Biscay, or elsewhere, as may be most advantageous. And I am to desire you will take such measures for the distribution of them, or for storing them, as, under existing circumstances, you shall consider most advantageous for the general service.

CASTLEREAGH.

Draft.

*Lord Castlereagh to Sir Hew Dalrymple.*

[September 17, 1808.]

Sir—Having fully conveyed to you the King's sentiments and commands upon the 5th Article of the Definitive Treaty, I should have had nothing further to add upon this, to his Majesty, most anxious subject, had not the copy of a letter from you to General Freire, dated from Cintra, the 5th inst., been this day communicated by the Chevalier de Souza to his Majesty's Government, in which you inform him “that the French General had given you *his word and honour* that no Portuguese property, public or private, should be taken away, and that nothing considered as such should be taken on board.”

However much his Majesty could have wished that an article of such importance had been so worded as to have precluded even a temporary misconception on the part of the Portuguese nation, and to be altogether independent for its construction of personal assurances—yet his Majesty cannot but derive the greatest consolation from this communication, as placing beyond all possible doubt the sense in which the Article is to be understood and acted upon.

The injunctions contained in my former despatch, that the utmost precautions should be adopted to guard against an evasion of what I had then every reason to hope was the true intent and meaning of this Article, will, I have no doubt,

have determined you, if not previously done, to exert your utmost vigilance on this subject. The Prince Regent and his subjects are entitled to expect a better security for their protection against such an abuse, than either the honour or assurance of a French officer; and, as your right is indisputable, consistently with the most scrupulous good faith, rigidly to enforce the surrender and restitution of all Portuguese property, both public and private, I am to reiterate to you his Majesty's express commands, that no consideration of delicacy or forbearance towards the enemy do prevent you from performing, in the most effectual manner, this act of indispensable duty towards an ally, to whose protection the King considers himself as pledged by the strongest ties.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple.*

Copy.

Downing Street, September 17, 1808.

Sir—In addition to what is stated in my despatch to you of this date, I am to acquaint you that his Majesty's Government, notwithstanding that hostages have been exchanged for the exact fulfilment of the Convention concluded, cannot but entertain the most serious alarm that the French Government, with their accustomed disregard to treaties, and in conformity to their practice on more than one occasion of nearly a similar nature, may think fit to detain the British transports proceeding to the ports of France, in pursuance of the stipulations agreed on.

In the apprehension of so serious an injury to his Majesty's service as the detention in question would amount to, I am to convey to you his Majesty's pleasure that you do not suffer the third division to proceed from the Tagus till it is ascertained that the transports carrying the two first divisions have been permitted to sail from the French ports, where they may have disembarked the French troops. This direction is given in contemplation of there being no limitation in point of time

assigned in the Convention, except for the departure of the first division of the French army.

The Admiralty has given instructions to Sir Charles Cotton, that they shall, if possible, be landed in Quiberon Bay, or some open anchorage, where the transports may be less exposed to danger than if they actually entered a French port; and it may be highly material that, even after the second division shall have arrived off the French coast, the fact of the transports which proceeded with the first division being allowed to depart shall, if possible, be verified, before the second division shall be allowed actually to enter.

It is material that the French should be landed as far from the Spanish frontier as the stipulations of the Convention will permit.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Castlereagh.*

Hinckley, September 17, 1808, 6 P.M.

Dear Castlereagh—I am much obliged to you for the communication of the despatches from Sir H. Dalrymple, and of the accompanying letters and drafts.

I confess I think your first draft to Sir Hew Dalrymple, though not amounting to an approbation, is something too much like it. I think we cannot be too cautious not to say a word which can be construed even into acquiescence or conditional approbation.

The military parts of the Convention *may* be accounted for—that is possible. But I can conceive *no* possible case in which the latter part of the 5th Article, and the stipulations of the 16th, 17th, and 18th Articles, *can* be sanctioned by the Government of this country, or can be talked of or written about, in the name of the Government, otherwise than with the most decided and unqualified reprobation. So thinking, I cannot but be of opinion that no despatch ought to go to Sir Hew

Dalrymple without a full expression of the feelings of Government upon these points.

If the latter part of the 5th Article is supposed to admit of the construction which is hinted at in Perceval's note of yesterday, "that plunder, identified to be such, is *not* to be taken away," surely it is necessary for our honour that we should call upon Sir H. Dalrymple to explain whether such is the construction intended to be put upon it; for I have no hesitation in saying that I would rather break the whole Convention than consent to the execution of it, in the sense in which I understand it, and which alone (as it appears to me) the words will bear.

With respect to the 16th, 17th, and 18th Articles, my first complaint is that they are wholly out of the province of the Commander of an army. What business had he to stipulate impunity for civil traitors, and on security for domiciliated enemies, and the giving up of civil persons not within his control?

I am sure we all know and feel that we cannot, ought not, and will not, enforce one of these stipulations; that the Prince Regent will be a driveller (as he may be), if he does not deal with the persons who are the subjects of the two first of these Articles, whenever he regains his dominions, just as if no such Articles had ever been agreed to; and, as to the civil persons detained in Spain, we had neither the right nor the means to stipulate one word about them, good or bad. The Spaniards will do what they will with them. And, feeling this, we ought, I think, fairly to say that those Articles are entirely disapproved.

It really is not indifferent to leave it unexplained whether we do or do not approve. For this Convention will stand through the whole of this new and dreadful war, which is but just beginning in Europe, and by the result of which we or France must gain or lose our whole reputation—it will stand as a sort of landmark for the guidance of future Commanders, a terror to our allies, and an encouragement to our enemies:

and, though that cannot be altogether prevented, it is surely advisable to take as much from that terror and from that encouragement as possible, and not to let future Commanders have to plead the impunity and the approbation of the framers of this Convention in their own favour.

Such are the opinions which I feel more and more strongly, the more I consider the Convention in all its details. Its general effect, which cannot be altogether cured, (God knows!) is heart-breaking. But there are some little needless, useless disgraces belonging to it, that may be alleviated, if they cannot be entirely wiped away by the expression of our strong disapproval; and I should be grieved that Sir H. Dalrymple should have a first despatch to show, in which that disapproval was not marked strongly. It will come with a comparatively ill grace, when it comes extorted from us by the remonstrances of Spain and Portugal.

In your second draft, I have taken the liberty of altering a word, or, rather, I should think, of correcting a mistake; for I see nothing in the Convention which stipulates the time of the *second* sending of French troops; and yet your draft is worded as if it were only that of the *third* sending that was unsettled. We cannot surely give ourselves a latitude which we deny to the Spaniards in the execution of their Convention with respect to Dupont. We forbid them to send a *second* convoy, till the transports which carried the first are known to have come away.

I would have come up instantly, had there been a hint in Perceval's note to that effect. It would now be to no purpose to come up to-morrow, Sunday; but I will be in town time enough to attend a Cabinet in the evening of Monday; and I cannot help anxiously wishing that no despatches, *without a strong intimation of disapprobation*, should go till after a full deliberation.

I am, dear Castlereagh, yours very sincerely,

GEORGE CANNING.

*The Right Hon. G. Canning to Lord Castlereagh.*

Hinckley, September 17, 1808.

Dear Castlereagh—Since I sent back your messenger, I have put together a few of my thoughts on this most calamitous transaction, and have shaped them (for clearness' sake) in a draft for Sir H. Dalrymple. I do not mean to propose this draft for your adoption. It is much too diffuse; besides that, I should not think of making such a suggestion to you: but the substance is what, in my opinion, it becomes us to say and do, if we regard our own character.

I cannot think that Sir H. Dalrymple can be beneficially continued in the command. I regret it, because I think him, in many respects, eminently qualified for the *civil* part of the command in Portugal.

Yours sincerely,

G. C.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Lumian, near Lisbon, September 18, 1808.

My dear Lord—As the second division of the French troops are embarked, and are to sail in a day or two, and the third are embarking, and our troops are in possession of Lisbon, I conceive that the operations in this country are brought to a conclusion, and I have asked for and obtained leave to go to England; and I propose to go by the first favourable opportunity that will offer.

I enclose copies of the letters which passed between Sir Hugh Dalrymple and me upon this subject; as, in his, he advert's to another subject, respecting which his other letters home have been transmitted to you.

In a few days, the equinoctial rains will fall in Portugal, and it will then be quite impossible to move the troops, excepting by sea. Indeed, the march to those parts of Spain in which they could be actively employed against the enemy would, at this season of the year, be absolutely impossible; and if you

should wish me to return to the army, I can be with it in the Asturias, as soon as it can be in a state of preparation to act. In the mean time, Mr. Trail being dead, it is desirable that I should be in England, to deliver over my office to my successor, if I should no longer hold it, or to the person who will be appointed to fill his situation, if I should.

I am further induced to go home, not only by the advice of my friends here, who don't think I have been well treated by the Commander-in-Chief, but by that of your brother, who is of opinion that I might be of some use to you in England, and I propose to go by the first ship that will sail, which will probably be the Plover.

As I shall see you soon after you will receive this letter, I shall not enter upon public matters: indeed, I know nothing of them, excepting what I hear from public reports, and these are not favourable. The Spanish officers from the army of Estramadura are outrageous about something that has passed, and complain loudly in all parts of Lisbon.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Sir Hew Dalrymple to Lord Castlereagh.*

Head-quarters, Prayas, near Lisbon,  
September 19, 1808.

My Lord—I have the honour to transmit to your lordship very interesting despatches which I last night received from Major Cox.

Leaving the merits of this question without any comment, I take the liberty to suggest to your lordship, as a most desirable arrangement for the future, that the supply of the Spanish armies with money to pursue offensive operations against the French should be entrusted to some individual of consequence, fully in the confidence of his Majesty's Government, who might take care that all pecuniary aids should

be applied to the right purpose, and not expended in the manner in which, I fear, much of that sent to Seville will be bestowed.

I have lately found that considerable connexion subsists between the Junta of Seville and that of Spanish Estramadura at Badajoz ; and the army of the latter still surrounds Elvas, notwithstanding the Convention, and the end that is put thereby to hostilities in Portugal. The Spaniards were actually bombarding the French garrison in Fort La Lippe, when the British detachment arrived to take possession of the place. I have expostulated with the General commanding at Badajoz on this subject, and have no doubt of bringing him to reason on that point. It will be more difficult, I fear, to persuade him to march upon Madrid.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. DALRYMPLE.

*Brigadier-General Doyle to Major Cox.*

Madrid, September 1, 1808.

Sir—At the momentous crisis in which I write, the French, with their *united force* pouring down upon Zaragoza, and our army of Andalusia unable to move to its assistance, for want of money, I feel it highly necessary to request that you do immediately, in the name of the British Government, call upon the Junta of Seville to send forward to this capital, without a moment's delay, the money brought out by Mr. Duff *for the use of the army of the nation of Spain*, that may still remain in their hands.

I do not mean to enter into any discussion as to the intention of his Majesty's Government *quoad* the distribution of this money at the moment it was sent from England ; but I am confident it was intended to be employed according to *existing circumstances*, and for the benefit of *the cause of Spain*, and not for the use of *any individual Junta*. I do, therefore, thus solemnly protest, in the name of the Government by which

I am employed, against the appropriation of this money to any object unconnected with the actual benefit of the army now in this neighbourhood, and in presence of the enemy.

I have no doubt of your seeing the bearings of this question in the same light with me, and I have the fullest reliance upon your assistance to forward the money. I build upon your decision and consequent prompt measures. Thus the object, which is at once so desirable and so imperiously necessary, will be produced, and towards the completion of which grand object all supplies, all troops, all moneys, have been sent into this country, namely, the expulsion of the French.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

C. W. DOYLE.

*Quartermaster-General Whittingham to Major Cox.*

Madrid, September 5, 1808.

My dear Major—I have delayed writing from day to day, from the want of sufficiently interesting matter to occupy your attention.

A meeting of Generals took place yesterday at the Duke of Infantado's—present, General Cuesta, General Llamas, a Colonel of Artillery, with powers from Palafox, the Duke of Infantado, with powers from Blake, and General Castaños. The absolute, imperious necessity that the Andalusian army should advance immediately as far as Soria was felt by every one present, for the French have driven the Spaniards from Tudela, and are again within seven leagues of Zaragoza! It is totally impossible for General Castaños to move without money. The Junta of Seville have given their positive orders not to advance beyond Madrid, and will certainly not supply him with the means of disobeying their orders.

Brigadier-General Doyle has this day negotiated bills upon Mr. Duff for 50,000 dollars, and upon the Treasury for 150,000 dollars. This will enable General Castaños to send forward immediately two divisions to Soria, and to bring up his third

division to Madrid. General Blake is in full march to join the army in the neighbourhood of Soria. General Llamas, with the Valencian army, will occupy Taragona, or some position near to that place. Cuesta will take post at El Royo or Vimiesa.

Now, it appears to me, that the two millions of dollars sent by our Government to the Junta of Seville never could be intended for local or provincial purposes, but for the general benefit of Spain, and most particularly of the armies in the field; and certainly, if you will allow me to give an opinion upon the subject, you are fully authorized to protest, in the name of the British Government, against the conduct of the Junta of Seville, should they refuse to send forward to Madrid a very considerable proportion of the money they have received.

These are no times for compliments. The French, with 22,000 men, are again on the point of attacking Zaragoza; the people are greatly dispirited, as appears from a despatch of Palafax, which I have just read. It is to be hoped that our movements (of which they will receive an account to-morrow) will reanimate their drooping spirits; but the sum of 200,000 dollars will be quickly expended in the maintenance of an army, whose number will exceed 60,000 men; and we have absolutely no hope of being able to pay and feed them, without assistance from Seville, whose Junta has been so peculiarly assisted by the British Government.

You will excuse, my dear Major, the warmth with which I press this business upon your attention; but the moment is awfully important; and the loss of Zaragoza would be an evil of such magnitude that I shudder to think of the consequences that might ensue. I have to hope you will be able to arrange everything amicably with the Junta of Seville, and I shall expect your answer with the greatest anxiety. Doyle writes to you to-day upon the same subject. I cannot help flattering myself we shall soon have a second edition of the affair of

Baylen. God knows how much we all desire to pay our friends, the conquerors of Europe, another visit.

Yours ever,

S. WHITTINGHAM,

En Casa del Cap<sup>a</sup>. General Castaños, Quartel General.

*Major Cox to the Supreme Junta of Seville.*

Copy.

Madrid, September 9, 1808.

Most excellent Sirs—By a letter which I have received from Brigadier-General Doyle, who is charged with a particular commission from the British Government to this country, and at present residing at Madrid, from whence he writes, “I am informed that the French, with their *united force*, are pouring down upon Zaragoza, that they have retaken the town of Tudela, and threaten an immediate attack upon the capital of Aragon.”

Under these alarming circumstances, a meeting of the Generals commanding the principal armies of Spain was held at Madrid on the 4th instant, and the result of their conference was a unanimous opinion that it was absolutely necessary for the troops under the command of General Castaños to move forward immediately to Soria. It was, however, found that, notwithstanding the liberal supplies which Great Britain has so generously given for the service of this country, the Spanish army was literally unable to move for want of money! and that the Supreme Junta of Seville had refused General Castaños the means of paying his troops, if he should presume to march beyond Madrid, which was contrary to their orders.

I could scarcely have thought it possible that the Supreme Junta of Seville, who have hitherto manifested so much zeal for the general cause of their country, and have done so much towards the attainment of the great object which the nation holds in view, could have been capable of those ideas of partial interest which are so clearly demonstrated in the orders to which I allude, or of withholding those means which the British

Government, with such entire confidence, has entrusted to their care, for the general benefit of the Spanish nation.

In the pressing exigency of the case, General Doyle was induced, upon his own responsibility, to negociate bills on England and upon Mr. Duff to the amount of 200,000 dollars, with which he has paid the army which takes its name from the province, whose Government has received a million and a half from Great Britain expressly for its support. This has enabled General Castaños to put his army in movement; but it cannot last long in the payment of so large a body of troops, and the vast expenses attending their taking the field.

I therefore feel it my duty, both in conformity with the desire of General Doyle, the opinion of Mr. Duff, whom I have consulted, and my own view of the subject, to call peremptorily upon the Junta to send forward to Madrid, without the least delay, a considerable portion of the money which is lately come out from England, for the use of the army and the general service of the country; and at the same time to protest, as I do solemnly, in the name of the British Government, against the appropriation of this money, or any part of it, to purposes unconnected with those objects.

WILLIAM COX, Major, H.B.M.S.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Sir Hew Dalrymple.*

St. James's Square, September 21, 1808.

Sir—You will do me the justice to believe that it is not without great personal pain that I have been charged by his Majesty to convey to you any commands which can be unpleasant to your feelings. It was very strongly the wish of his Majesty's Government, upon a subject of so much delicacy, to have delayed taking any measure till they were in possession of more ample information; but, upon the most mature reflection, as they cannot flatter themselves that any possible explanation could reconcile them to some points in the arrangement, and as the detailed reasons upon which the military policy of

the Convention is to be explained can only be satisfactorily obtained by a personal interview, they have very reluctantly felt themselves obliged to desire your return to England.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Brodrick.*

Draft.

Downing Street, September 25, 1808.

Sir—I enclose, for your information, Extract of an Instruction which has been sent, by his Majesty's command, to Major-General Leith, from which you will observe that it is proposed without delay to assemble a large corps of his Majesty's troops in the neighbourhood of Coruña, there to be equipped for service.

As it is material that the troops, upon their arrival at Coruña, should be disembarked, and placed in convenient and comfortable cantonments, whilst the necessary equipments are collecting, I am to convey to you the King's commands that you do repair in person to that neighbourhood, and, in concert with his Majesty's civil servants, arrange with the persons in authority in Gallicia measures for their reception and accommodation. The strength of the corps may be estimated at 30,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, and they will carry a large supply of provisions with them in Victuallers, but will, of course, require to be supplied with cattle on their arrival.

Sir John Moore will be directed to send a Commissary from Portugal to superintend arrangements: till his arrival, the Commissary attached to the troops under Sir David Baird's orders, proceeding from hence, will act. In the mean time, you will proceed to make arrangements for the reception of the troops from hence, which may be expected to sail in the course of a few days from Falmouth.

I send you a memorandum, received from the Marquess of Romana, with respect to the cantonments in Gallicia. But you will observe that a much more extensive arrangement will

be necessary upon the arrival of the troops from Portugal, which Sir John Moore is directed to move either in transports, or by marching them through the interior, as may seem to him most convenient.

I have prevailed upon the Marquess of Romana to order his corps, without being disembarked, to proceed from Coruña to Santander, there to be incorporated, and to act with the armies of the Asturias and the Montaña. By this arrangement, the resources of Gallicia will be more applicable to the accommodation and equipment of the British army.

If, in addition to the purchases which the Deputy Commissary, M. Assiotti, is directed to make in the Asturias for the use of the British army, you could procure a supply of horses and mules in the Galicias, or in the north of Portugal, it would much assist Sir John Moore in his arrangements. The Commissary attached to Sir David Baird's corps will furnish the means of payment.

The enclosed letter from the Marquess de Romana you will be so good as to deliver to the officer in command of the Spanish troops which have proceeded to Coruña; and you will, in concert with the British naval officer at Coruña, arrange to have them despatched to Santander, without delay, ordering the transports to return to Coruña as soon as the troops are disembarked, in case they should be wanted to bring the British troops from Portugal.

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Leith.*

Draft.

Downing Street, September 25, 1808.

Sir—I have to acquaint you that his Majesty has determined forthwith to assemble a large force in the North of Spain, under the orders of Lieut.-General Sir John Moore. As it is not deemed advisable that any part of this corps should be committed in operations till the whole can be assembled and equipped for service, it has been determined to send the force

now assembling at Falmouth, under Sir David Baird, to Coruña, there to meet the force which is ordered to proceed from Portugal, to compose a part of Sir John Moore's army.

The Deputy Commissary, M. Assiotti, assisted by the corps of drivers, has been sent into the Asturias and the principality of Santander, to purchase horses and mules for the British army; in the prosecution of which important service you will render them every aid in your power. The horses and mules can be forwarded in such divisions from thence as may be most convenient to the cantonments of the British army.

Feeling all the importance of your suggestion with respect to strengthening the force which now covers the Montaña, I am happy to acquaint you that the Marquess of Romana has consented to order his army from Coruña, consisting of nearly 10,000 men, to be disembarked at Santander. As this corps is entirely composed of veteran and highly-disciplined soldiers, I trust its utility will not be confined to its own exertions; but that, by an incorporation of the trained peasantry in the northern provinces, it may give immediate solidity to an army of much larger amount.

The Marquess proposes immediately to triple his infantry by forming a regiment of three battalions upon each battalion of his present force; and I have assured him that he will receive from you every aid in doing so. The total want of regular force, both in the Asturias and the Montaña, to form even the basis of an army, will, I have no doubt, render the arrival of this valuable corps a matter of the utmost satisfaction to those entrusted with the chief authority in those provinces. They will feel, that in no way can their present force be so usefully employed as by being consolidated with so large a body of regular Spanish troops; and I should hope that, from the distinguished name and character of the Marquess of Romana, who has recently given so important and interesting a pledge to Spain and to the world of his devotion to the cause of his

country and of his sovereign, those provinces will be anxious to place so experienced an officer in the chief command of their armies.

I have given the Marquess de Romana assurances that you will concert measures with the Bishop of St. Ander for the reception and accommodation of his troops upon their arrival. They proceeded down Channel yesterday, with a fair wind, for Coruña, to which place orders will this night be sent for their repairing, without loss of time, to Santander. You will feel the importance of laying the ground without delay for inducing the Government of the Asturias and that of the Montaña to unite their armies with that of the Marquess of Romana. I enclose a letter on this subject from the Vicomte de Materosa to his Government, which you will deliver.

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. The 14,000 pikes, for the embarkation of which directions have been given, will be sent, in the course of a few days, to Santander. They will be placed at your disposal, and I should hope that some opening will present itself before long for turning them to account.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Leith.*

Draft.

Downing Street, September 26, 1808.

Sir—I am to acquaint you, in addition to my letter of the 25th instant, that the corps under the command of the Marquess de Romana is not of a provincial nature, nor raised by any particular province. It is not intended to demand from the province in which it may operate its pay and supplies; and his Majesty has graciously consented that it shall be subsisted from the resources of Great Britain, till an arrangement can be made with the General Government which may be established in Spain. I am, therefore, to desire that you will take measures with his Majesty's Deputy Commissary for having the corps supplied by British resources till the arrival of the Mar-

quess de Romana, by whom more detailed Instructions will be sent to you upon this head.

Three hundred horses will be wanted for the artillery of the Marquess de Romana's corps, and I am to desire you will authorize the Deputy Commissary to transfer for that service 300 of the number which may be purchased for his Majesty's service. The Deputy Commissary will be able to assist the officers under your command in drawing upon England for their pay and allowances.

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. As the above arrangement might be productive of great embarrassment, if drawn into precedent, you will take care that it be understood as exclusively applicable, for the reasons above specified, to the corps in question ; that it is not to continue above two months from the period of its arrival, which will afford full time for its being included in the general system of Spain ; and that the corps so to be provided shall not exceed 20,000 men at the utmost. The supplies must be paid for by bills on the Treasury, it being impossible to find a sufficiency of silver to meet the many demands made at this moment upon our resources.

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Sir Harry Burrard, Bart.*

Draft.

St. James's Square, September 26, 1808.

Sir—I cannot suffer the official notification of his Majesty's commands, with respect to the ulterior disposition of the greater proportion of the force now serving in Portugal, to proceed from hence, without expressing the satisfaction with which I have learned from your friends at the Horse Guards that the arrangement which has been deemed most advantageous for his Majesty's service is not likely to prove unacceptable to your feelings.

With respect to the nature and the extent of the command in Portugal, having no information subsequent to the 4th of

September, and that only communicating in very general terms the Convention lately entered into, his Majesty's Ministers have not felt themselves enabled to form any judgment, or to determine on any arrangement arising out of our present relations with that country. I have, therefore, only to hope that, upon Sir Hew Dalrymple's return to England, you will use your best endeavours to carry on the public service in the manner which you may deem most for the advantage of his Majesty's interests, and which may best conciliate the feelings of the Portuguese nation.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

*Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.*

Draft.

September 26, 1808.

My dear Wellesley—I am sure that you will do me the justice to believe that my silence on late events has arisen from any feeling but indifference. The truth is, I have been unwilling to write to you on so painful a subject, while I was unable to form a correct estimate either of feelings or opinions in any quarter. Charles<sup>1</sup> will probably have told you how strongly I myself felt upon the nature of the arrangements made with the enemy, when it first reached us, and was disbelieved. Since the definitive arrangement was received officially, we have tried to reconcile ourselves to it in some degree, but without effect.

You will learn from others the deep impression it has produced on the public mind, much beyond any former occurrence, at least in my recollection. The feeling of Government is, that the person at the head of the army can alone be considered as responsible for any Convention. Upon this principle, Sir H. Dalrymple has been recalled; what his line will be, remains to be seen. Should an inquiry ultimately be determined upon, I think it can hardly take place, if it hinges upon the state of

<sup>1</sup> The present Marquess of Londonderry.

the operations as constituting the expediency of the Convention, till the close of the campaign.

If Sir H. Dalrymple brings charges against you, the only mode in which it appears to me possible is upon the supposition of his charging you with bringing the army into such a situation as left him no option but to make a convention of concession to the enemy. With respect to your having advised any part of the measure, this may certainly make part of his justification, but it cannot transfer his responsibility in strictness to you.

But, my dear Wellesley, consult your own judgment, rather than what I have written with considerable haste. My first object is your réputation; my second is, that the country should not be deprived of your services at the present critical conjuncture. I should wish to see you placed in a much more responsible situation; but your reputation can never be lowered by whatever station the course of service assigns to you: and I have always thought that it was not the least proud part of your reputation as a soldier, that, after commanding armies and obtaining victories, you preferred your brigade to military inactivity. I am convinced that this is the true principle of a soldier, and is that which will elevate the individual in the long run. In the present instance, I suppose you will feel no reluctance to act with Moore: in intention, he has done justice to your military reputation in all his reports, and behaved to you like a gentleman on his arrival in Portugal.

I need not say how much my public and private feelings have suffered on the subject of the Convention. I hope the anxious solicitude which I feel for your fame and interest is not incompatible with what in justice I owe others. Dalrymple's misfortune I cannot but feel, as having been the person to bring him from a situation in which he was respected and happy, to plunge him in his present embarrassment. But it is in vain to dwell longer on this distressing subject.

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I am, &c.,

C.

*The Right Hon. G. Canning to Lord Castlereagh.*

Claremont, September 26, 1808.

Dear Castlereagh—I send you the draft of a letter to the King, which is, perhaps, under all the circumstances of the question, as it now stands, the best mode that I can adopt of obtaining the only object which I have in view—that of recording my opinion upon this most perplexing and painful subject. I wish, when you have read it, that you would take the trouble to forward it to the Duke of Portland, to whom (nor to any other member of the Cabinet) I have said nothing upon the subject, thinking it right first to communicate with you upon a matter arising out of your department.

I am the more anxious to record this opinion, as I foresee plainly the question of compensation to the Portuguese is likely soon to come upon us, if the obvious construction of the 5th Article is the true one.

I am ever, my dear Castlereagh, very sincerely yours,  
GEO. CANNING.

*The Right Hon. G. Canning to the King.*

Foreign Office, September 28, 1808.

The majority of your Majesty's confidential servants having humbly submitted to your Majesty, through Lord Castlereagh, their opinion that, under all the circumstances attending the Convention concluded with the French army in Portugal, there appeared no ground for interposing, on your Majesty's part, any obstacle to the execution of that Convention: Mr. Canning, (who was not present at that meeting of your Majesty's confidential servants at which this decision was taken) having conceived an opinion differing in some essential points from that which has been submitted to your Majesty, and continuing, after the most painful and anxious deliberation, still to retain that opinion, feels it his duty humbly to lay before your Majesty an exposition of the principles on which it is founded.

He most humbly assures your Majesty that he has no other motive or object in this statement, than a conscientious discharge of his duty to your Majesty; and that he has presumed to trouble your Majesty in writing, principally that he may be enabled to communicate to his colleagues the statement which he makes to your Majesty on a subject on which he has the misfortune to differ from so many of them in opinion.

Mr. Canning fully admits that all engagements taken, on the behalf of your Majesty, by persons competently authorized to enter into such engagements, ought to be fulfilled, (so far as it is in your Majesty's power rightfully to fulfil them) however repugnant to your Majesty's feelings, or however inconvenient to your Majesty's interests. But Mr. Canning cannot persuade himself that the competency of a Commander-in-Chief of your Majesty's armies to enter into stipulations in your Majesty's name is altogether unlimited, or that it extends to political as well as military objects. Mr. Canning humbly conceives that the competency of a Commander-in-Chief of your Majesty's armies is limited, by the very nature of his trust and office, and that it is further limited (like all legitimate power) by the rules of justice.

Consistently with these principles, Mr. Canning abstains from raising any question upon those articles of the Convention which affect, however prejudicially, the interests and honour of Great Britain alone. Even for those stipulations which affect the interests of other powers, remotely or incidentally, and through acts which your Majesty has the undoubted right and power to do—such as the conveyance of the French troops to France, and of the Russian sailors to Russia—Mr. Canning professes to see no remedy. But, where stipulations are contracted, the execution of which can only be obtained by your Majesty through a coercive control to be exercised over other independent powers, or where the thing stipulated is flagrantly unjust, Mr. Canning does presume most humbly to conceive

that such stipulation must be held to have been contracted without your Majesty's authority.

The 18th Article of the Convention engages for the restoration by the Spaniards, in return for the Spanish troops in the Tagus, of all French subjects, civil as well as military, not taken in arms, but now detained in Spain. If the execution of this Article is understood to be binding upon your Majesty, perhaps a question could hardly have been devised more likely to produce disagreement between your Majesty and Spain, or one in which your Majesty would probably be more unwilling to interfere, considering that your Majesty has, from the beginning of the present war, uniformly resisted a principle of exchange, by which France has attempted to confound civil with military captivity. But if (as may be contended) the engagement is merely personal to Sir Hew Dalrymple, and he alone is answerable for carrying it into effect, such an engagement appears to Mr. Canning to be absolutely null. And, if such were the construction adopted by your Majesty, it appears to Mr. Canning that such construction ought to have been unequivocally declared.

The 1st of the additional Articles contained nearly the same stipulation for the release by the Portuguese of all civil prisoners belonging to France, with the additional aggravation that such release is to be without exchange, although the French have Portuguese in their possession, both civil and military, to a great amount; and that the Portuguese authorities were not consulted upon the subject. Is your Majesty to enforce the execution of these stipulations?

The stipulation in Articles 16 and 17, for "a year's" security to the property, and for perpetual impunity to the persons of the adherents of France in Portugal, appears liable to no less objection. That security and impunity might justly be promised, so long as the British army must of necessity remain in military possession of Portugal. But, to extend them to a period within which the Portuguese Government must, in all

probability, have been established, is to place your Majesty in the situation of dictating, as a conqueror, to your Majesty's ally the terms on which alone he is to be permitted to recover his dominions. It is to make your Majesty the instrument of protecting and maintaining a French party in Portugal, in defiance of the lawful Government of that country.

But far more injurious to your Majesty's honour, and too likely in its execution to prove in the highest degree distressing to your Majesty's feelings, is the stipulation in the 5th Article for securing what is denominated the property of the French army.

There are two constructions given to this Article: the one, that it does not include unlawful plunder—the other, that it admits of no discrimination. The former construction rests principally on the word of honour of the French General; the latter is unfortunately countenanced by those words of the Article itself, which stipulate full security to the purchasers of what the French may sell; for, where was the necessity of security to the purchaser, unless the right of the seller to his property were acknowledged to be equivocal? If the latter construction be merely possible, it does appear to Mr. Canning that too early or too distinct an explanation could not have been given of your Majesty's sentiments upon it. That the Portuguese will patiently endure the embarkation of all the fruits of French violence, rapine, and sacrilege, is hardly credible; and if your Majesty is indeed bound to sanction the enforcing the execution of this stipulation in that sense, it may probably be to be enforced by means which cannot be thought of without horror.

It was, and still continues to be, the humble opinion of Mr. Canning, that your Majesty is *not* so bound. He humbly conceives that your Majesty could have no imaginable right to the plunder of Portugal, unless your Majesty had been resolved to conquer Portugal for yourself, instead of recovering it for your Majesty's ally. He thinks that your Majesty, possessing no such right, no military commander of your Majesty could

pledge your Majesty to the assumption and exercise of a power essentially unjust; and that, when an engagement taken in your Majesty's name has stipulated that, for your Majesty, of which your Majesty cannot sanction the execution, without doing violence and wrong, your Majesty might, without scruple or hesitation, declare such stipulation to be void.

Mr. Canning will not add to the length of this paper further than to entreat most humbly your Majesty's most gracious indulgence and forgiveness for the trouble which he has thus presumed to give your Majesty, and for the imperfect manner in which he has endeavoured to convey to your Majesty opinions which he feels too strongly, to think himself justified in withholding them from your Majesty on a subject of so much importance.

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*Major-General Beresford to Mr. Cooke.*

Lisbon, September 30, 1808.

My dear Cooke—I will not enter into the politics of this place: you have on those subjects a better correspondent than I am; and, in truth, I have not much time to write long letters to my friends.

We yesterday learnt the recall of our Commander; it could not be unexpected, and therefore, except among the Spaniards and Portuguese, has occasioned but little sensation. Who is finally to have the command of this army is what we are all anxious to know, and we trust a speedy decision, as we do not understand rotting here, doing nothing, while our friends, the Spaniards, are, with such earnestness, demanding our assistance, and particularly in Catalonia; a deputy from which province we have now here, who is one of the deputies of that province to the Central Junta, and who has brought from there, as well as from Madrid, the strongest solicitations and the most earnest requests for troops, arms, and ammunition. Half this demand of arms has been finally granted, but the remainder of this application is unattended to.

Believe me, &c., W. C. BERESFORD.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.*

St. James's Square, September 30, 1808.

My dear Lord—The Duke of Portland has been so obliging as to communicate to me confidentially the circumstances connected with your selection for the mission to Madrid. They are additional proofs of the forbearance you always have shown on personal claims; and I beg you will be assured that I am entirely satisfied with the selection which has been made. You will find, from what we hear, much contest at Madrid, in the midst of the dangers which surround them, for pre-eminence, both personal and local. What it may be wise for us to wish, it is difficult at this distance even to guess. Our principle has hitherto been to give them all the military support in our power, and to leave them to manage their own internal affairs. Mr. Frere leaves town on Sunday, to proceed to the seat of Government; and it is much wished by Mr. Canning that, till his arrival, no partiality should be marked by those acting for Great Britain to either party. I am happy to observe the Duke is well.

I am, &amp;c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Lord Castlereagh to the Marquess de la Romana.*

Lord Castlereagh having been informed by Mr. Canning that to-morrow is fixed for the Marquess de la Romana's departure, cannot avoid expressing his personal solicitude (as he may be deprived of the pleasure of receiving the Marquess de la Romana's commands in person) that every thing has been arranged by Mr. Cooke to his satisfaction, for the supply of his troops. The Marquess may be assured that every expedition shall be used in forwarding the various equipments to St. Andero.

In addition to his official letter, Lord Castlereagh takes the liberty of enclosing a private letter to General Leith, desiring him to render himself useful in every possible manner to the

Marquess ; and Lord C. ventures to assure him that he will find General Leith entirely deserving of his confidence.

Lord Castlereagh cannot take leave of the Marquess de la Romana, without expressing to him those sentiments of personal attachment and respect, with which his conduct and character have inspired him. In addition to the zeal and devotion with which it is his pride, as well as his public duty, to contribute to the great cause in which the two nations are embarked, Lord Castlereagh will always be disposed to follow with an especial interest the brilliant career which he trusts the Marquess de la Romana is destined to run in this mighty struggle for the liberties of Europe. He presumes to solicit that the Marquess will continue to honour him with his confidence and correspondence ; and, if he might indulge a wish with respect to future operations, it should be that, when the army of Great Britain shall have the honour of taking the field in the cause of Spain, it may find itself in immediate co-operation with the brave troops under the Marquess's orders.

Stanmore Park, October 1, 1808.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Lord Castlereagh.*

Mr. Canning, in forwarding Lord Castlereagh's paper in circulation, thinks it right to join with it the copy of the letter written by Mr. Canning to the King, on the subject of the Convention, to which Lord Castlereagh's reasonings appear to refer.

The question which is at issue having been already *practically* decided by the Cabinet, before Mr. Canning had an opportunity of giving his opinion, he thought it due to himself, and he felt it to be his duty to the King, to record his opinion in the only way that was open to him. And, having done so in explanation of his own personal conduct, he was not desirous of giving the Cabinet any further trouble on a subject on which it appears to him to be now too late to do much good. He

thinks it right only to add that Lord Castlereagh's paper does not shake his opinion, but furnishes (to his mind) some new ground for lamenting the decision which has been taken.

Foreign Office, October 4, 1808.

*Observations on the Convention of Cintra.*

BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.

In forming a judgment of what our duties are under the Convention lately concluded, it is necessary to consider what our situation was in Portugal at the period it was concluded, what we are competent to do, what we did, and what remains to be done by us, as resulting from the act of our own officers.

I consider his Majesty to have sent his army into Portugal as the ally of the Prince Regent, avowedly to reduce or expel the enemy from thence, and to restore the country to its lawful sovereign.

In entering upon this service, the loyal inhabitants of Portugal were invited, by the proclamation of the British commanders, to unite their exertions to ours in this common cause.

The British Commanders were, by their instructions, as well as by the very nature of the service on which they were employed, bound to conduct their operations *bond fide* to the declared purpose of their entering Portugal. They were bound, by their own proclamations, to co-operate cordially to this end with the Portuguese people; but I do not conceive they were either called upon or authorized to admit any Portuguese authority, then in existence, to control their operations, to the extent of becoming contracting parties to their engagements, and for this obvious reason, that none existed which could in any formal sense either answer for or bind the Prince, or, in his absence, those acting in his name.

It was clear there was no central Government at the moment governing Portugal generally; there was even no local Government acting on behalf of the Prince Regent in the part of the country where operations were carrying on. It is impossible to admit the claim, that the British General, in presence

of the enemy, could make no stipulation affecting Portugal without the previous consent of the local and provisional Governments of Oporto and Algarve; or that General Freire, who was either self-appointed, or, at most, recognised by the Government of Oporto only as commander of a limited force, and who withdrew his army, without any satisfactory explanation, at a moment the most critical to the safety of ours, should be entitled to be admitted as a contracting party, or that we were bound to follow up our operations against the enemy till such consent could be obtained. The case in Egypt was very different ; there was there an officer in command, regularly appointed by and representing the Turkish Government, and competent to bind his State ; but, in the present instance, there was nothing to prevent any Government that might rise up in Portugal, either *local* or *general*, from disavowing any consent General Freire might give ; and we could not plead it as of any substantial authority against such a disavowal.

In the absence, then, of all authority capable of binding either the sovereign or the Provisional Government, the duty of the British General appears to have been to take upon himself to act, to the best of his judgment, for and on behalf of the Prince Regent and his subjects ; that, under an adequate necessity, we considered him competent to do so, can hardly be doubted, after having authorized him, without waiting for any previous consent whatever from any authority within Portugal, upon the explanation of the enemy, to take the civil Government of the country into his own hands, *if he deemed it necessary*.

The recovery of Portugal with the least practicable sacrifice of its permanent or immediate interests being the only legitimate standard by which the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief ought to have been guided, as a matter of discretion, but not of right, on their part to be consulted, it did most certainly become him to inform himself of the feelings and claims of the country, from the leading persons exercising authority, civil or military, at the time, and to provide for them as far as

circumstances would permit. But I see no ground on which he would have been justified in admitting any persons then acting in either a military or civil capacity in Portugal to an actual participation of his authority, or to a control over it.

If the British army were justified in entering Portugal, to destroy, reduce, or expel the enemy, then in military possession, by conquest or fraud of the country, they were fully entitled to prosecute their operations to this end; notwithstanding, in their progress, the entire country might be desolated, the town of Lisbon bombarded and destroyed, and thousands of its loyal inhabitants made the inevitable sacrifice. If such was the extreme right of a British army, can it be doubted, as a mere question of competence, that, if a British General foresaw, or thought he foresaw, that such evils were likely to ensue to any considerable extent, and if he conscientiously believed that permitting the enemy to carry off even the entire plunder they had amassed, the protecting for a year those who had adhered to the enemy, and the delivering up of all French subjects detained in Portugal for civil offences without exchange, was the only or even the best means of doing so; that he was not competent to protect the country against what in his judgment was the greater evil, by stipulating for the lesser—if such was his competency, it remains to be considered, without justifying the particular exercise of the power, what our obligations now are with respect to the execution of the agreement thus entered into. I think it is quite clear that, if no case of incompetency can be made out, the right to break the treaty on our part cannot grow out of the mere improvidence of the act done, considered on grounds of policy; it can only be argued to arise out of the nature of some of the stipulations made, as unusual between contending armies, and beyond the powers of a military officer to stipulate. Taking them in their most objectionable shape, they relate exclusively to the obtaining protection for the persons or property of the French or their partisans either in Portugal or in Spain, in exchange

for advantages which the French assumed they had the means of denying, if the terms were refused ; advantages which the British General—wisely or unwisely, is not the question—may have deemed it essential to the interests of Portugal, should be purchased at the required price. It might be a very bad bargain, and apparently was so ; but there appears nothing in the nature of the terms which rendered them obviously absurd, if the party contracting had the power of carrying them into effect.

If there was no competent authority then present to consent, and bind either Spain or Portugal, and if the enemy, knowing that the British General could only stipulate in trust for those powers, consented to accept such security as a power so contracting could justifiably afford ; in offering that security to the French army, I think we clearly stand precluded from using any direct power we possess to obstruct the execution of the Treaty so agreed to. How far we are justified in using our direct power to enforce it, is a very distinct question. In the first place, it must have been perfectly obvious and notorious to the French General that the British General never meant to pledge, nor did or could pledge, his King to go to war with Spain, if Spain refused to liberate the imprisoned French, any more than Dupont supposed Spain would declare war against us, if we exercised our undoubted right of capturing his army on its return to France by sea ; notwithstanding Castaños took upon himself to covenant for allowing them to pass unmolested. As little could he suppose, that by the Convention his Majesty was to be precluded from restoring the Prince Regent's Government till all the stipulations were fulfilled, or, when restored, that Great Britain would go to war with Portugal if any infraction of the Treaty was committed. It appears to me, that the offer on our part must have been understood to mean no more than that every fair endeavour to give effect to those engagements should be made ; that is, such *bond fide* exertions as we should employ in pro-

secution of an interest of our own, not in its nature mortifying or requiring an appeal to arms ; that more could not be in the contemplation of the party with whom we treated ; and that the stipulation in this sense was accepted by the enemy for what it was worth.

Had the civil Government of Portugal been assumed, for other reasons, by the British General, so long as we administered it, I think we were clearly bound to employ its powers, supported by our military force, in execution of the Convention. But we are neither called upon nor justified in retaining the Government for the single purpose of keeping the fulfilment of the Treaty in our own hands. If the Government be restored, from that moment the British army becomes an auxiliary force. Whilst it remains within the country, it can, upon no principle of justice, be turned against the State, for the protection of which it is received into the country ; and I apprehend that, if we could in any case be called upon to make an infraction of the Treaty cause of war between us and Portugal, which I do not consider, for the reasons before stated, to be possible, war could not justifiably be commenced by us till our army had been previously withdrawn from Portugal.

The question then is, what are our duties, and what are those of Spain and Portugal ? Whether the latter powers could have procured whatever advantages are obtained for them by the Treaty, by their own means, may admit of a question. If they take the benefit of them, notwithstanding other parts of the arrangement may operate to their disadvantage, I think they take them with a moral obligation, our faith being pledged on their behalf, to fulfil the conditions on which they were obtained. This, however, is not the only obligation which attaches upon them to lend themselves to the fulfilment of them. Their ally, Great Britain, is making great efforts for their preservation. The power of pledging the faith of his Government is incident to a Commander-in-Chief. A British General makes an improvident arrangement, in which the

sacrifices are not exclusively confined to the interests of our allies; he commits the faith of his Government to the performance of it; we recall the General, and disapprove his conduct; but, the act being irrevocable, as we never can replace the enemy in the situation in which he stood before the agreement was made, have we no claims to expect from those allies that they will lend themselves to uphold our character for good faith, even at the expense of some sacrifice of their own separate interests? Have we not a claim that they should do by us what we did by Spain, in the case of Dupont—viz., concede our right under such regulations as were deemed necessary to prevent the concession from being turned to other purposes than the mere restoration of the French army?

If they refuse, have we a right to go to war with them? I think, clearly not, inasmuch as they never directly authorized us to act for them, and perhaps had not it in their power to divest themselves of the accruing benefits of the Convention rather than take it with its encumbrances. But I think we are fully entitled to claim their accession to it, as the just and necessary consequence of the support we are affording them; and that we are entitled, in vindication of our own character for good faith, to press for that consent by all those means of influence which our connexion and situation enable us to employ.

That Spain or Portugal would either refuse, or very much complain, when they find that the officer who made the Treaty is disavowed and dismissed, I do not believe; that we should stand justified to the world if we pushed the object in this sense, I cannot doubt; but if we should take upon ourselves to assume the right of ordering an admitted stipulation of the Treaty to be broken, and upon grounds of reasoning concerning the justice of which we cannot flatter ourselves the world will be unanimous, we take upon ourselves a responsibility of the most serious nature, on principles with respect to which the public opinion may be either against us or divided; and expose ourselves to have a system of retaliation taken up

by the enemy, under the most plausible of all pretexts, the calamities of which, to those subjects of his Majesty who are at this moment within the power of the enemy, we could neither repel nor endure. At present, a British General is charged with having done an improper act; the Government punishes him for having done so; they submit reluctantly to the evil, from no assignable bad motive, but for the purpose of preserving public faith, as far as depends on them, inviolable; they now stand altogether unmixed in the transaction—they have had no other share in it but to condemn it. If, however, they take upon themselves to apply a remedy, they make themselves answerable for all the consequences of that remedy; and I own that, in point of calamity to the nation and to the cause in which we are contending, the remedy proposed appears to me far to outweigh, in point of public mischief and public character, any that I can apprehend will arise from giving effect to the Treaty.

Having stated my own sentiments on this most delicate and important question, I feel it due to those who have viewed it in a different light to observe that it never has been proposed by them to break what they could consider as a Treaty concluded by an officer with powers competent to bind the public faith. What I have understood them to propose, is to reject and annul those stipulations alone in the Convention which they conceived no military commander had any power to insert, executing with fidelity the remainder of the Treaty. Whilst I admit, without hesitation, that a variety of instances may be conceived in which such a power of disavowal might and must be exercised upon the clearest principles of justice, my conviction, nevertheless, remains unshaken, that, in the present case, considering the nature of the stipulations as before described, and taking them in their most objectionable sense, they cannot be properly so dealt with, and I certainly could not reconcile it to my sense of duty humbly to advise his Majesty to expose the honour of his Crown to be called into

doubt on grounds which appear to me open to question. I must, on the contrary, be of opinion that his Majesty's permanent interests, whatever difficulties may attend the Convention in its execution, and whatever may be its demerits, will be best consulted by a faithful endeavour to give it effect; adopting, however, such measures towards those who are responsible for having concluded it as his Majesty in his wisdom may deem proper.

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*Note accompanying Lord Castlereagh's Observations on the Convention of Cintra.*

Before the subject of the late Convention is again brought under the consideration of the Cabinet, Lord Castlereagh is desirous of submitting to his colleagues the view of that question under which the advice he has already offered to his Majesty has been tendered, and according to which (subject to further discussion) it must continue to be governed, on any further point that may arise for decision, connected with that transaction.

Stanmore Park, October 2.

Lord C. has extracted from the Convention of Cairo the Articles which resemble, in a great degree, those which are to be found in the Convention of Lisbon.

*Extracts of a Convention for the Evacuation of Cairo, between General Belliard and Lord Hutchinson.*

June 27, 1801.

Art. 2. The French and auxiliary troops shall retire by land to Rosetta, proceeding by the left bank of the Nile, with their arms, baggage, field artillery, and ammunition, to be there embarked and conveyed to the French ports of the Mediterranean, with their arms, artillery, baggage, and effects, at the expense of the Allied Powers. The embarkation of the said French and auxiliary troops shall take place as soon as possible; but, at the latest, within fifteen days from the date of the ratifica-

tion of the present Convention. It is also agreed that the said troops shall be conveyed to the ports above mentioned by the ~~most~~ direct and expeditious route.

Art. 4. Twelve days after the ratification of the present Convention, the city of Cairo, the citadel, the ports, and the town of Boulac, shall be evacuated by the French and auxiliary troops, who will retire to Ibrahim Bey, the Isle of Rhoda, and its dependencies, the fort of Fourcroy, and Gizeh, from whence they shall depart as soon as possible, at the latest in five days, to proceed to the points of embarkation. The Generals commanding the British and Ottoman armies consequently engage that means shall be furnished at their charge for conveying the French and auxiliary troops as soon as possible from Gizeh.

Art. 7. The French and auxiliary troops shall be subsisted, from the period of their departure from Gizeh to the time of their embarkation, conformably to the regulations of the French army, and from the day of their embarkation to that of their landing in France, agreeably to the naval regulations of England.

Art. 8. The military and naval commanders of the British and Turkish forces shall provide vessels for conveying to the French ports of the Mediterranean the French and auxiliary troops, as well as all French and other persons employed in the service of the army. Every thing relative to this point, as well as in regard to subsistence, shall be regulated by Commissaries named for this purpose by the General of Division, Belliard, and by the naval and military Commanders-in-Chief of the allied forces, as soon as the present Convention shall be ratified. These Commissaries shall proceed to Rosetta or to Aboukir, in order to make every necessary preparation for the embarkation.

Art. 9. The Allied Powers shall provide four vessels, (or more, if possible) fitted for the conveyance of horses, water-casks, and forage sufficient for the voyage.

Art. 11. All the Administrations, the members of the

Commission of Arts and Sciences, and, in short, every person attached to the French army, shall enjoy the same advantages as the military. All the members of the said Administration, and of the Commission of Arts and Sciences, shall also carry with them not only all the papers relative to their mission, but also their private papers, as well as all other articles which have reference thereto.

Art. 12. All inhabitants of Egypt, of whatever nation they may be, who wish to follow the French troops, shall be at liberty so to do; nor shall their families, after their departure, be molested, or their goods confiscated.

Art. 13. No inhabitant of Egypt, of whatever religion, who may not wish to follow the French troops, shall suffer, either in person or property, on account of the connexion he may have entered into with the French, during their continuance in Egypt, provided he conforms to the laws of the country.

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*Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore to Brigadier-General Charles Stewart.*

Quelus, October 8, 1808.

My dear General—I send you a letter, which came under cover to me, but which I did not receive until yesterday evening, when I was called to Lisbon by Sir Harry Burrard.

You will be informed that I am appointed to the chief command in Spain, with 20,000 men from this, 10,000 from England. I have, besides the official notification, a private letter from Lord Castlereagh, assuring me of his personal support, and desiring me to correspond with him privately, without reserve, on all points where his interference can contribute to promote the public service. This I shall certainly do, as cordially as ever. Lord Castlereagh shall never perceive any difference in me—it is much more agreeable to reflect on the kindness of former times, than upon that which appeared otherwise, on a late occasion.

I enclose also a letter for Captain Bevan, from his brother;

but I shall thank you not to give it to him till my appointment appears in public orders. This is a delicacy due to Sir Harry Burrard, that nothing should be known until he announces it; and he has behaved with so much liberality to me, that I am bound to do nothing that can hurt him.

I remain, very faithfully,

JOHN MOORE.

*Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh.*

Madrid, October 8, 1808.

My dear Lord—Although I have nothing new to communicate, yet, a safe opportunity offering for England, I cannot avoid troubling you with a few lines upon the seemingly critical state of affairs.

The last despatch from Mr. Stuart will have informed you of the intercepted letter to the French Commander-in-Chief, by which it appears that, within the next six weeks, reinforcements, to the amount of 70,000 men, are expected from France. You will have learned, also, from Mr. Stuart, the alarm which this intelligence has given to the Junta, as well as the extraordinary activity that has superseded a state of still more extraordinary supineness and indifference to the force and position of the French army. The neglect of the measures now taken was so apparent, that it has been observed by several Spaniards, if the news had not been true, it became necessary to invent it.

This intelligence may be true or false: but, being in possession of no positive information which contradicts it, and every degree of probability and reason seeming to support it, it seems necessary, and at any rate safe, to believe it, and to act upon that belief. I am afraid that the same probability and reason must forbid any sanguine expectation being formed that the Spanish army, in its present state, can successfully resist a united corps of 100,000 disciplined troops.

The best Spanish opinions I have heard upon the present prospect seem to go to this—that the French force now in

Spain will retreat, or, if not doing so voluntarily, will be driven out. They state the French force to be discouraged, and I believe it. With regard to the union of great reinforcements, forming a large army, they think that the Spaniards will probably be beaten, that they may even lose the capital; but they all reckon upon the enthusiasm and perseverance of the Spanish character. They say that France can never keep Spain; and I cannot but agree in this opinion. The people have done all. Those past events have disappointed all calculation. No officer believed in the defeat of Dupont, or in the event of the siege of Saragossa. Colonel Lopez, who commanded the artillery at the latter place, said that he had occasion to converse with his men frequently during the siege upon the possibility of their not being able to defend themselves. Their answer always was, "We must then die."

This is the sentiment that pervades the whole nation—man, woman, and child. There is a security arising from this self-agency of the people, that may easily be conceived. No officer, no part of the Government, dare be faithless to their trust. Their immediate death and destruction would be the consequence. It is extraordinary, also, the great degree of order that accompanies this enthusiasm. In the army, the utmost subordination prevails. I never saw in my life more appearance of respect. In this capital, in which there has been literally no government for many weeks, not the least irregularity or excess has been committed. These effects happily arise out of the national character.

But if Bonaparte should furiously attempt the conquest of this country, or if the intelligence before adverted to should be correct, it will be obvious how important and essential our assistance may become. It is with this opinion that I have endeavoured to impress the advantage of calculating upon the possibility of misfortune. In my correspondence with Sir H. Dalrymple, I also have ventured to state how essential to the salvation of the country would be the union and concentra-

tion of our force, and how little comparatively useful, and possibly dangerous, might be the division of it.

The right light to consider our force in is as a first army of reserve. It is the more necessary to keep it entire, and not to hazard its existence or efficiency by a plan of detachment, when it is recollect that, of the whole combined force, it is the only part that is really disciplined, and, upon military principle alone, superior to the French army. It certainly would be much to be wished that it could be increased to such a force as to be sufficient of itself to cope with the enemy. The position of Valladolid, or any other keeping the communication with Portugal, Corunna, and Galicia, open, puts the army in complete safety, makes the union of all reinforcements easy, and is equally advantageous for the defence of Spain.

I have pressed the advance of the army in Portugal as much as possible. There will be no difficulty in moving the army on, at this season, by small detachments in succession. There will be no more want of accommodation or of subsistence.

Colonel Lopez will leave this for the English head-quarters the day after to-morrow. He has the requisite authority to make every arrangement, and he takes with him officers and commissaries, who will be stationed on both the routes of Almeida and Badajoz, in readiness to make every preparation, as soon as a decision shall have been made. All the military opinions here are in favour of the Almeida route for the whole. Such is the state of the cross-roads and the direction of the mountains, that the corps going by Madrid could not join the Almeida corps at any point nearer than Valladolid. In the event of misfortune, there would be great risk that the junction would not be made at all.

The gain of 6 or 8000 British in the Spanish army would be trifling, while its loss to the British army would in a material degree affect the consequence and power of it as a solely British army. I trust that the same sentiments will have been entertained by you. I am perhaps more convinced of their truth

by being on the spot, and I only lament that this concentration has not taken place. The reinforcements which cause so much alarm would not be of the same consequence.

I remain, &c.,

W. BENTINCK.

*Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir John Stuart.*

Draft.

St. James's Square, October 13, 1808.

My dear Sir—I cannot suffer my official letter of this date to proceed without a private letter, sending you the outline of what we are about.

Portugal being secured, though not altogether in the manner which our hopes led us to expect, we are looking to Spain as the great feature of the war. A case may exist in Italy, which may render the employment of your disposable force there an object of equal policy and perhaps superior duty; but it must be one of a very special nature to supersede the advantage of throwing every effort at this moment into the scale of Spain.

It is impossible to say what a British corps of 8,000 men might not do in the theatre of my Lord Peterborough's wars, where, with a force not superior, he might have probably decided the fate of the Spanish monarchy, had not the evil genius of the Government at home superseded him in the command.

It is my earnest wish, therefore, that you may be enabled to show yourself in that quarter. Spencer's corps did much, by its being moveable along the coast, early in the Spanish struggle, without ever committing itself. Yours might follow the progress of the enemy along that coast, if he should make that one line of his operations; and you could throw your weight upon any point in which the scales might be balanced.

It might also be of the utmost importance, in case of disaster, to have a corps applicable to the security of Cadiz, the great point, from which the best hopes and interests of the Spanish monarchy must look to retire to South America. It is desirable that a separate provision should exist for this object,

independent of what may be applicable to the defence of Portugal, on which country our army operating in the north of Spain will probably fall back. In the case supposed ever unfortunately arising, should you feel yourself enabled to direct your efforts to Spain, we shall then have a British force of nearly 60,000 men, operating to this one great object—that is, Sir John Moore will have in the North above 40,000, rank and file; we shall have 8,000 in Portugal; and your corps in the South: this ought to do much.

I shall not fail to fulfil your wishes, with respect to the recompence which you propose for your friend, whose claims to the Maida medal were disappointed by the letter of the Regulation, and not by any inferiority of merit on his part. I hope my brother conducts himself to your satisfaction.

I am, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

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*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.*

Holyhead, October 19, 1808.

My dear Lord—Although recent events may not encourage you to pay much attention to my military opinions, I will not omit to communicate to you the result of a good deal of reflection on the present situation of the Spaniards.

It appears to me that Bonaparté is about to adopt the means most likely to ensure success in his military operations, and I fear that the Spaniards are not aware of the extent of their danger. We must expect that, towards the close of this month, the French will have an army of 100,000 men assembled at Toulouse; besides those already in Spain, which may be reckoned at 40,000 or 50,000 more.

The attention of the Spaniards appears at present to be directed to drive the latter from their position in Spain before the former can come to their assistance; but the operations to be carried into execution for this purpose must not be of the

same desultory nature with those which they have adopted hitherto. Either the Spaniards must succeed in dislodging the French armies already in Spain, before the end of this month, when Bonaparte's reinforcements will be at Toulouse, or they will be exposed to be attacked by the reinforcements while engaged in the operations against the original army. If the Spaniards cannot accelerate these operations, they should forthwith relinquish them, and should take up a new defensive position, in which they may be able to maintain themselves for some time longer. I believe that the Ebro affords no military position, and that, to stop the progress of the enemy to the southward, they must look to positions in his front, on the mountains of Castille, and on his flank in Biscay, the Montana, and the Asturias.

It is scarcely necessary that I should illustrate what I have above pointed out, as the probable fate of the Spanish armies, if they are not able to accelerate and bring to a conclusion at an early period the operations in which they are now engaged ; as it must be obvious to every body, that an army employed in an operation against any particular corps cannot be in the best situation to resist the attack of another corps, of twice the strength of the first, which may be brought against it ; but, if any illustration were wanting, I could quote the case of the Austrian army, whose defeat at Marengo was occasioned and aggravated by the situation in which it was placed by the operations in which it had been engaged with Massena at Genoa. If it could have brought those operations to a conclusion at an earlier period, or if it had discontinued those operations, and had been placed in a situation in which it would not have been obliged to fight in order to regain its communication with Germany, its defeat at Marengo, if it had occurred, would not have been followed by the loss of all Italy.

So much for the Spaniards, and now for the operations of the British army in Spain. I don't agree with the Marquess de Romagna, that our army ought to begin its operations

from Corunna. The distance from Corunna to the nearest point of the Ebro is above 300 miles ; and the British troops will not reach that point till the end of December. It may be true that the Asturias and La Montana are not capable of equipping and supplying an army of the strength of that which will be employed in Spain ; but it does not follow, of course, that its equipments and supplies should be drawn only from the country in which it should be stationed ; or that, if it had been landed in Asturias, La Montana, or Biscay, Gallicia should not have contributed to the means of its equipment and support. In whatever country it may be landed, commissaries must be employed in those provinces which surround that country, to purchase or hire the means of equipment and movement, and of subsistence ; and the choice of the landing-place must depend on other considerations.

In my opinion, a great and leading object of the operations of the French army must be to obtain possession of Biscay, La Montana, Asturias, and Gallicia, and I believe that there is no natural obstacle to their march, and no defensive position from St. Sebastians and Bilbao to St. Andero and Gijon, excepting what the general nature of the country will afford. I mean that there is no chain of mountains, as there is between Asturias and La Montana and Leon, between Castille and Aragon. I am convinced that, as long as those countries can be held, the French can make no progress to the southward, and they would probably be stopped in the mountains of Castille. If these provinces are lost, it is probable that even the positions in the Sierra Morena will not stop them.

If all this be true, it is surely most important to throw the best troops into these important provinces, and that at an early period. If the British infantry should be landed at St. Andero, they are at their station ; they could be immediately brought into action ; they could be supported from this country ; and, if acting in co-operation with the armies of Blake and

Romagna, 80,000 Frenchmen could not drive them out of those countries.

But I object to the landing at Corunna on other grounds, referable to the probable plan of operations in Spain. It is obvious that these must be defensive on our side; and the position to be taken will be either with the whole force in the enemy's front, giving up the northern provinces, or with a part of the force in his front in the mountains of Castille, and a part on his flank in Biscay, Asturias, &c. In the first case, our troops must take their chance with the others, and take their leave of the Bay of Biscay; but still they would be nearer their point by making their landing at St. Andero. In the second case, ought the British troops to be in the heart of Spain, in the enemy's front, or on the coast, on his flank? I believe nobody will hesitate in the decision upon this point: they ought certainly to be in communication with the coast: and, however this point may be decided, it would be most convenient to land them at St. Andero.

In whatever part of the north of Spain they may be landed, however, and whatever may be the nature of the operations in which they may be employed, and whatever the seat of those operations, it is necessary to look a little to their future subsistence, and to the supply of ammunition and military stores which they will require. This can be effected only by the establishment of sufficient magazines. As long as the operations of the British army are confined to the coast, the mode of supply is not a matter of much difficulty. The difficulty will occur, if it should form a part of that army which I have supposed is to oppose the enemy in front.

The stores and provisions which are to form this magazine must be carried from Corunna to the rear of the army supposed to be stationed in the mountains of Castille. Will this be practicable, even if the Spaniards should be able, by their exertions, to retain the northern provinces, viewing the difficulties of the road, and the probable position of the enemy?

It will certainly be quite practicable if the Spaniards should lose the northern provinces. Considering, then, the possibility that the British army may lose its communication with Corunna in the one case, and the certainty that it will lose it in the other ; and that it must lose it if the Spaniards should be obliged to withdraw entirely from the North of Spain, and to look to the defence of the southern provinces, I advise you to consider of the means of supplying magazines, to be formed in the rear of the army either by Valencia and Madrid, or by the Tagus as high as Abrantes, and thence by Toledo. I should prefer the latter route. The water carriage is certain as far as Abrantes, and from thence the land carriage to Toledo is not more than 300 miles.

You might give the General, in the first instance, the means of forming his magazines by a communication with Corunna ; but it will be necessary that you should take care to have the means of supplying him by his rear, if he should require it.

All these difficulties of communication and supply of magazines, to which, as I told you in a former, scarcely one of us has turned his mind, render it most desirable that our army should be employed on the enemy's flank and on the coast ; and, as I have above pointed out, there are other military reasons in favour of this plan of operations.

I forgot to recommend to you, when I was in London, to have some shoes sent out for the soldiers, and some worsted socks and flannel waistcoats. There had been a great consumption of the former in Portugal, and I am convinced that Spain will not be able to supply the deficiency, as, probably, any of the latter articles. The soldiers will, of course, pay for them in the usual manner.

If this letter should tire you, you owe it to a N.W. wind, which is not very pleasant to me.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Since I have written this letter, I have seen the account in

the "Courier" of Monday that the French had withdrawn from the Ebro, and thrown themselves upon Bilboa, of which they have obtained possession. Depend upon it that their efforts will be directed, in the first instance, to obtain possession of the northern provinces, and I much fear that we shall not be in time to prevent them if we should land at Corunna.

I recommend to you to make all your arrangements for forming a magazine in the heart of Spain, whether the General will call for it or not. After what has passed lately, the general officers will be disinclined to take upon themselves anything excepting the performance of their military duty under their instructions, and Sir John Moore will be unwilling to throw himself into the heart of Spain unless he is ordered to do so, or to make arrangements preparatory to that operation till it will be ordered by Government, when such arrangements will be too late. If the British army should not, after all, adopt that line of operation, the provisions and stores collected will answer for the Spaniards.

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*Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Sir Harry Burrard, Bart.*

Downing Street, October 29, 1808.

Sir—That you may be enabled to judge of the nature and extent of the inquiry which his Majesty has directed to be made into the late Convention, I think it right to send you confidentially a copy of the warrant which has been prepared for assembling the Court. I lament the necessity of such a proceeding; but the impression which prevails upon the termination of the campaign in Portugal has rendered it indispensable that the judgment on the question should be made by a tribunal less open to imputation and suspicion in these times than the King's Ministers; and, I am sure, it must be the wish of all concerned that the subject should be fully explained and understood by the public.

I feel much obliged by your very liberal and kind feelings to Sir John Moore, and for the cordial manner in which you have

always lent yourself to the public service. I trust that you will feel the desiring your immediate return is preferable to exposing the Court, on its meeting, to have its proceedings delayed. The same course will be taken with such other officers as we may deem the most likely to be called for by the Court of Inquiry.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

END OF VOL VI.





